

## IN THE INTEREST OF ITS PEOPLE: PAKISTAN'S NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICO-STRATEGIC REORIENTATION - OBSERVATIONS FROM AN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

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### Abstract

*Pakistan is once more at a crossroads. It faces a set of interlocked problems, an unprecedented existential challenge related to comprehensive security (politico-social, military and economic dimensions; and not only to its physical security). The reasons for this grim state of national affairs are diverse, but cumulating and interlinked, for which partially Pakistan itself but also external actors are responsible. In order to tackle the problems Pakistan will need a new thinking and approach – primarily helping itself. This concretely means: changing the society through mobilisation of the human and resource-oriented potentials existing in the country (source of inspiration through “asabiyya”), supporting the youth and training “ideal leaders”, working for a “just power Nation”, and forming a national consensus for the implementation of a comprehensive set of reforms which has to provide stability and peace. Critical factors to be taken into account for this will be the perceptions and interests of the people, a shift from the national-military to the human dimension of security, and, above all, the respect of the will of Pakistan’s people for self-determination and sovereignty by external actors as well as honest and reliable relations conducted by them.*

**Key Words:** Pakistan, Politics, Problems, Reorientation.

### Introduction: Different Views, Questions and Method of Analysis

**T**he Pakistani public is replete with information and competent analyses regarding the country’s manifold and multifaceted security problems and challenges.<sup>1</sup> Only recently, three opinions that were

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<sup>1</sup> For a few, convincing subject-specific examples see Ehsan Mehmood Khan, “Internal Security Strategy for Pakistan,” *San Analysis/Pak Institute for Peace Studies* (January 2011); Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*

voiced from different angles but with convincing reasoning are worthwhile mentioning here. They showcase not only the incubus of issues but also the challenge-oriented awareness existing in the country:-

- *First*, under the question “Who will save Pakistan?”<sup>2</sup> Najam Sethi commented on the “state of nation” and concluded: “Therefore, we must try and fix the system incrementally, without derailing it.” Two core institutions would need to reform themselves if Pakistan were to get going. “The army must revamp its national-security doctrine and stop insisting on commandeering the realms of economy and society in an age of internal scarcity and regional distrust. And the media must act with greater responsibility to encourage a progressive, moderate and international outlook on the mindset of the nation. No modern democracy or economy can work in the stifling environment of religious orthodoxy, international isolation or military supremacy.”
- *Second*, in the aftermath of Salman Taseer’s tragic assassination on 4 January 2011 Moeed Yusuf under the title “The future trend”<sup>3</sup> commented that this barbarian act and its reasons “remind us of the level of degeneration to which Pakistani society has sunk”. He argued that “eliminating intolerance demands eradicating the militant industry in all its aspects, not just tackling certain groups”;
- *Third*, in his analysis of the role and purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, Pervez Hoodhboy asks: “Even if our nuclear weapons are safe, can they really guarantee Pakistan’s safety?”<sup>4</sup> He comes to the firm conclusion: “No”. His argumentation is worth quoting in full as it exemplifies both the awareness of the scope of the problems Pakistan faces as well as the magnitude of solutions needed: “An

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(London/New York: 2008); Ilhan Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947 – 2008* (Oxford/New York: 2010); or Malecha Lodhi’s ed., *Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’* (Karachi: 2011) in which competent authors reflect in a differentiating manner about Pakistan’s policy weaknesses and corrective needs.

<sup>2</sup> Najam Sethi, “Who Will Save Pakistan,” *News*, January 30, 2011; “The Pakistan Ultimatum,” *News*, April 12, 2011. He argues for a correction of “the duality or contradiction in the military’s private and public position vis à vis its relationship with civilians in Pakistan and its relationship with America...”

<sup>3</sup> *Dawn*, January 10, 2011, Yusuf’s plea finds its proof in the recent, likewise tragic assassination of the Christian Federal Minister for Minorities, Shabaz Bhatti, on March 2, 2011. Both murders are, among else, bloody illustrations for conflicting perceptions of the traditional, extremist religious forces and secular moderate circles, and the erosion and confusion of Pakistan’s national identity. For this challenge, see: <http://www.facebook.com/pages/SouthAsiaNet/163961143642039>. For a relevant answer, see: *PIPS-RMW FM Radio*, “Deradicalization Campaign in Pakistan in National and Regional Languages,” see *PIPS*, *ibid*.

<sup>4</sup> *Herald*, February 2011, 30 – 33. The quotation is on 33.

extremist takeover of Pakistan is probably no further than 5 to 10 years away. Even today, some radical Islamists are advocating war against America. But such a war would end Pakistan as a nation state even if no nukes are ever used. Saving Pakistan from religious extremism will require the army, which alone has power over critical decisions, to stop using its old bag of tricks. It must stop pretending that the threat lies across our borders when in fact the threat lies within. Napoleon's bayonet ultimately could not save him, and Pakistan's nuclear bayonet has also had its day. It cannot protect the country. Instead, Pakistan needs peace, economic justice, rule of law, tax reform, a social contract, education and a new federation agreement."

These three voices clearly highlight that in recent years Pakistan has suffered from systemic weaknesses of its polity and an infection of violent disorder, extremism and militancy. The former is mainly a consequence of the national security doctrine anchored in the threat perception from India and in the fear that Pakistan would lose control over India-centred national security policy to the civilians. The latter is mainly pursued in the name of a politicised brand of religion which many Muslims, including the great majority of Pakistanis, do not recognise as their own. However, I do not think that Pakistan is a fully lost cause, still or again close "to the brink",<sup>5</sup> or "literally standing on a precipice",<sup>6</sup> ungovernable, a failed state,<sup>7</sup> or a "decaying nation"<sup>8</sup>. Fortunately, the situation with regards to militancy has improved, but

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<sup>5</sup> See the "Pakistan on the Brink: Threefold Crisis Rocks Country's Foundations," Strategic Comment, *International Institute of Strategic Studies* (IISS) vol. 14, issue 9 (November 2008). This account was written after the massive, worldwide shocking suicide bomb that destroyed the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on September 20, 2008. The situation regarding terrorists' caused violence has improved, though not uniformly in the country. See "Pakistan Security Report 2010," ed. by *Pak Institute for Peace Studies* (PIPS), Islamabad (January 2011). Hamid Mir: "Pakistan is no more a most dangerous place in the world because terrorist incidents and suicide attacks are on the decrease, but on the other side corruption and bad governance are becoming a more serious problem than terrorism," *News*, February 26, 2011.

<sup>6</sup> Talat Masood, "Strategic Reorientation," *News*, July 13, 2009; see also <http://www.paktalibanisation.com/?p=850>.

<sup>7</sup> Though one has to state that Pakistan disposes of some elements of a failing state: assassinations, partially dysfunctional democracy, internal violent strife, economic meltdown, secessionist movements, and wide corruption. "Revolution or Anarchy?," *Friday Times*, March 4, 2011. For reliable indicators of a "Failing State" and, in contrast, "Good Governance," see Sam Wilkin, "Can Bad Governance be Good for Development?," *Survival* vol. 53, no. 1 (February-March 2011): 61-75, here 73.

<sup>8</sup> I agree with Maleeha Lodhi that "Pakistan is a living not a decaying nation." She voiced this during her book launch ceremony in London on May 6, 2011 in London. See *News*, May 7, 2011.

the conclusion voiced for “strategic reorientation” is to date relevant.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, in accordance with Farrukh Saleem, I think that Pakistan has to help itself. “We must cure our own cancer. We must reform, and he who reforms, God assists.”<sup>10</sup> It is about time, particularly in the aftermath of the Osama bin Laden killing, that “Pakistanis own up to the fact that our own house is not exactly in order. The principal failure is internal, and so is the fix”.<sup>11</sup> And, also in order “to transcend its institutional scaffold” Pakistan needs to “discuss democracy more forcefully”,<sup>12</sup> including the questioning of “the basic premise on which the military builds its image as the custodian of its security – the perceived threat from India.”<sup>13</sup>

Nonetheless, Pakistan’s challenges run deep. What, amid all the uncertainty, many difficulties, unresolved contradictions and obfuscations, has really been happening in Pakistan over the last couple of years? What are the factors and reasons that Pakistan has come to this? What is the way out, what needs to be done?

Trying to answer these and other questions has a motivating force, namely to provide some insight and draw a few lessons, as Sher Ali Pataudi reflected<sup>14</sup> – with the hope that these might be of helpful guidance for the reader. The author’s endeavour is to provide some material and reflections on nation and state-related aspects and policies from a distinct European perspective, though as objectively as possible. He approaches the matter from a security perspective which owes its origin to the “Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)”, which is the comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security concept with its military, economic and human dimensions.<sup>15</sup> This seems to him, in perspective of the domestic

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<sup>9</sup> Regarding the improved situation see “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” *PIPS*, 3, 5-6; regarding the need for strategic redirection see Talat Masood, “Strategic Reorientation.”

<sup>10</sup> Farrukh Saleem, “Capital Suggestion: Stability, Please,” *News*, October 3, 2010, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=7995&Cat=9>.

<sup>11</sup> Moeed Yusuf, “Time for Introspection,” *Dawn*, May 16, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Ishtiaq Ahmed, “Military and Power?,” editorial, *newstoday*, February 10, 2008, <http://www.bdnewsarchive.com/news/odetails.php?id=412145>.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> In his timeless legacy, *The story: Soldiering and politics in India and Pakistan* (Lahore 1983/3<sup>rd</sup> edition), Sher Ali Pataudi on March 14, 1977 grumbled (triggered by the agitation by the Nine parties): “What will happen now, God alone knows. The country seems to be in an endless state of crisis from the day of its birth – 14<sup>th</sup> August ’47. Thirty years is a long time in which to learn. But we do not seem to have learnt much.” 411. The book is a treasure trove of wise insights for lessons learnt in the field of politics, not only for Pakistanis, but also for foreigners willing to properly understand this country and undertake trustful relations with it.

<sup>15</sup> For the OSCE, its guiding security principles and pertinent documents having enshrined those, <http://www.osce.org/library/66185>. Of constituting and strategic importance: “The Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between

phenomena and in a world of globalized intellectual and cultural exchanges, economical, environmental and demographical developments, a more suitable and logical instrument for the issues to be analysed. But, it does not militate against the facts and principles of political realism and international relations as Hans Morgenthau in his classic "Politics among Nations" has devised it.<sup>16</sup> Though, the State is still one of the main security policy actors, it is not the only one (any longer).

### Accurate Accounting of Pakistan – See Its People

Indeed, a central focus of this analysis lies on the facts and problems of Pakistan having some of its root causes in a rather loose nation and weak state.<sup>17</sup> But, many Pakistani books published and views voiced represent just 5 per cent of its population – a group of people living in towns or temporarily abroad, representing and claiming an urbanized, feudal-kinship like and industrial-elitist perspective and rhetoric. It is this minority with which the West sides – with a minority that is not at all unselfish and community-oriented, but with vested self-interests and often paid, thereby becoming dependent and addicted. A journey to, listening to the opinions of the other 95 per cent, the "common man in the street and in rural areas" (living in the slums, on the land, in the mountains), the vast majority of Pakistanis, convey a different, more authentic perception and stance. They seldom appear in the Parliament, in the intellectual society, but probably more often in the Pakistani

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Participating States," *Helsinki*, August 1, 1975, <http://www.osce.org/mc/39501>; "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security," *Budapest*, December 3, 1994, <http://www.osce.org/fsc/41355>. This author is hardly being able to contribute with more conclusive reflections; it holds true for instance with regard to reinforcing the thinking and acting for joint regional efforts à la OSCE as there is already in place SAARC. Bhutanese Prime Minister Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley on March 20, 2011 called for "more concerted and collective efforts by member states of the South Asian region to boost regional trade, tourism, protect environment and eradicate the menace of terrorism," *News*, March 21, 2011. He said that Bhutan had firm belief in the collective future of South Asian countries which shared a common heritage. "He underlined the need for adopting a more regional approach by the members of SAARC on all the issues..." Among else he mentioned to enhancing co-operation related to the threat of terrorism and climate change and urged Pakistan and India to resolve the outstanding issues including Kashmir and to adopt more precautionary and security measures for nuclear reactors. Ibid. Or, regarding confidence-building see Moonis Ahmar, "Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia," *PSIS Occasional Papers* no. 3 (1991).

<sup>16</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: 2006). Morgenthau's timeless deliberations are relevant to our time and context. Issues such as the purpose of the state, power and interests and the common good, the relations between the various nations, law and government, ethics and politics – all those subjects are of a perennial nature.

<sup>17</sup> On this see Anatol Lieven's, *Pakistan. A Hard Country* (London: 2011), 12-16.

Army. They are part of the very existence, culture and life of this country, shaping and determining its future. They have a soul, dignity and honour. It is this dichotomy which is a fact, a characteristic of the situation in Pakistan, but which neither the ruling elites nor most of the scholars are addressing properly.<sup>18</sup> And, for unfamiliar outsiders it is difficult to distinguish between the mainstream arguments and the marginal, having a much bigger, enduring impact on political patterns and positions.

Therefore, a separate chapter with core issues as the ordinary man and woman see them must be added. As we have noticed and experienced it during our many journeys through Pakistan: He is interested in a united, strong Pakistan (not a fragmented and weak one), he is interested in a peaceful Pakistan (not one which spreads war and hate and fear), he is interested in a progressive and prosperous Pakistan (not an extremist and backward one), and he is interested in a version of Islam which fosters love, understanding and solidarity. Understanding Pakistan properly means to be aware also of this “unspoken and hidden majority.” It is important to underline this because it conveys another, inconspicuous but nevertheless brighter picture of the realities as conveyed through media and official statements. One of the real causes of the Pakistani problem is the distortion of the realities (through politics and media) and the disregard of the interests of the majority of the Pakistani people.

The common wisdom is that the politicians, but also foreign actors must listen to the Pakistani citizen, to its people because, as we have seen, its voices shape political consciousness in its societies. The fact is that in the highly stratified Pakistani and Islamic nation, the street and countryside count almost for nothing which is the main reason why people often rally, yelling hateful slogans and voicing their protest violently. The time has come to look beyond the traditional parties and politics to new fora and pluralistic, independent ways of politics.

### **Framework of Analysis: Some Fundamentals – Geography, History, Internal Difficulties and External Dynamics**

Why is Pakistan what it is today? What is relevant for every state, is also valid for Pakistan. In order to understand its present and to discern solutions for its problems, one has to start from its geography and history - constituent factors

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<sup>18</sup> One might, as a contrasting view, recall here General Kayani’s speech during the 2<sup>nd</sup> ceremony “Youm-e-Shuhada” in Rawalpindi on April 30, 2011. Certainly as an experienced leader, and knowing the mechanisms and principles for successful leadership, Kayani built a bridge between the masses and the armed forces, thereby reinforcing the army’s stance. Thus he said: “The people of Pakistan were destined to move towards prosperity, but the country’s dignity and honour would not be compromised to achieve this objective,” *News*, May 1, 2011.

of its nationhood - as well as state-building, of its policy and strategy. A short reminder will elucidate this:

### *Geography*

Pakistan is located at the geo-strategic junction of South, Central and West Asia. It borders on Afghanistan (2,430 km), China (523 km), India (2,912 km), Iran (909 km) and on the Arabian Sea (coastline with 1,046 km). It covers an area of 796,095 square kilometres of which only about 30 per cent are cultivable along a few large rivers.<sup>19</sup> From this results:-

- a blend of varying, challenging landscapes and geological features. Its borders have often been disputed, crossed, and parts of its territory sometimes occupied. Any cross-border interest and/or vibration from its neighbours are strongly felt within the borders of this country. Aspirations crossing the frontiers and/or trying to influence it have brought about suspicion and mistrust. The country was and is periodically hit by earthquakes, resulting in numerous human fatalities and severe setbacks in human resources and development;
- climatic variations (triggering droughts and terrible floods) and a topography which brought/brings about enormous difficulties for its cultivation, development and economic exchange;
- the country and its large population (between 170 and 180 million people) are extremely dependant on continuous supply of natural resources/products, on reliable vital infrastructures, open borders for trade and improvement of its degraded environment (paying already a heavy health and economic price for it).<sup>20</sup> Considering this alone could imply that Pakistan's interest would opt more prudently for a co-operative approach with her neighbours. However, this is not the case.

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<sup>19</sup> See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan>.

<sup>20</sup> Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world and fourth in Asia. The Washington-based *Pew Research Centre* has concluded that by 2030 Pakistan's population is expected to grow to 256 million, making it the most populous Muslim nation. Pakistan's population has increased 5, 6 times during the past 63 years, implying an average annual rate of growth of 2.77 per cent, one of the highest in the world. This burgeoning population has major implications for availability and sustainability of resources, infrastructures and services needed for Pakistani people to survive. Hashim Abro, "Overpopulation Burdens Economy and Environment," *News*, March 21, 2011. M. Sharif, "Food Security in Peril"; and, on Pakistan's Resource Constraint and Development-dependending State of Affairs: M. Osman Ghani, "Cuts in Development Programmes Certain to Aggravate Poverty," *News*, March 21, 2011.

### *History*

The difficulties of its nation- and state-building cannot be brought to mind enough.<sup>21</sup> Pakistan was created in 1947 out of the provinces of British India with a Muslim majority when British colonial rule over India ended. Created in the name of a religious identity, Pakistan has inherited a diverse ethnic composition and unfinished territorial business such as Kashmir and the Durand Line, until today enduring conflictive problems with India and Afghanistan. Over more than 60 years since its independence Pakistan has had three full-scale wars and a limited one with India [but none whatsoever with Afghanistan]. Pakistan's first direct national elections took place more than 20 years after its independence, in 1970, and resulted in the secession in 1971 of one of its territories, East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. From the outset, the Pakistani people have had difficulties subsuming their particular ethnic identities, dialects and customs into a single national narrative and forming country-wide solidarity. Islam, the stated basis for Pakistan's separation from India was and still is, in its national interest, but which is not enough to create a solid, durable national identity. While Pakistan is the only country to have been created on the basis of a common Muslim identity, Pakistani Muslims have been and are in practice deeply divided about the nature and role of their religion in state politics. Unable to furnish a basis for a common national identity, religion proved insufficient and even detrimental (in its violent sectarian mutation) to hold the state together in its original form – despite the efforts of the governing elites including the Military using Islam as a rallying nationalistic force to help cope with diverse and rebellious ethno-linguistic groups and with a hostile neighbourhood (India, Afghanistan) since the inception of the state.

### *Internal Difficulties*

Pakistan also suffers from the ignominy of being a quagmire of internal problems that either are self-generated or self-created challenges due to non-resolution of these issues in the past, or that are a fall-out from the effects of the external threats or dynamics. Namely:-

- *Weak National Integration:* The differences between the four provinces and semi-autonomous regions (FATA, Azad Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan) that make up most of Pakistan go beyond language and ethnicity, important though these are. These root in the great contrasts of traditions, of social order and system, in differences

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<sup>21</sup> Sher Ali Pataudi, *The Story. Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan*, Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: 2009); Khaled Ahmed, *Sectarian War. Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East* (New York: Oxford, 2011); Ilhan Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan*.

between rich and poor, and tensions between them because of influence over natural resources and in federal institutions.

- Pakistan is facing the negative ramifications of various actions taken or ignored by successive governments to achieve national integration especially. The hard stand taken by the former Musharraf government on the Kalabagh Dam issue pitched Punjab against the three smaller provinces. The Akbar Bugti episode alienated a significant percentage of Balochis resulting in the influence of the Balochistan Liberation Army which itself became fodder for Indian and other countries' influence and manipulations. The renaming of the NWFP as KPK brought Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns at loggerheads and the issue continues to create heartburn. The recent exercise to amend the "Law of Blasphemy" has further vitiated the already traumatized nation. Punjab's former Governor Salman Taseer became a fatal victim due to his vociferous views on this law (assassinated on 4 January 2011). The tendency of various political parties to use the parochial and populist cards, surrendering to the Islamists on the issue of "Blasphemy Law", the weak political landscape mars prospects of national cohesion. While PML-N uses the Punjab, the PPP depends on the Sindh to achieve their respective objectives. The Raymond Davis affair (never declared to be outside criminal jurisdiction, his release on 16 March through payment of blood money/Shariah law and as a result of a behind the scene deal between Pakistani and American security establishment) reveals a deep gap between democratic forces and powers of the security establishment in their interplay to exploit or contain anti-Americanism – all influencing again negatively on democracy and the national cohesion.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> See the short analysis by Ghazi Salhuddin, "Dancing with Democracy," *News*, March 20, 2011: "Obviously the veto power that the military establishment has retained in the exercise of our national security and foreign policies is a valid point of reference in any discussion on the state of democracy in Pakistan." Babar Sattar's shrewd remarks under the title, "Our Ranting and Raving," *News*, March 19, 2011: "Our faceless khakis were running the show all along. ...the biggest winners in this haggles have been the army and the ISI, and the democratic process, civilian control of the military and a rational tolerant society the sorest losers. ...the Raymond Davis episode transpired because our security apparatus is not accountable to the people of Pakistan and the national security policy is not subject to public scrutiny. ...this will remind the US and other foreign actors of the necessity of building direct ties with the army, further perpetuate the civil-military imbalance in Pakistan and weaken the democratic process. Meanwhile the nation addicted to hollow notions of pride will continue to confuse jingoism with national interest and growing anti-Americanism will keep religious parties, bigotry and intolerance alive and well in Pakistan." For a correct assessment of the negative impacts of drone attacks and the

- *Economic and Social Fragility*: Pakistan has witnessed a severe economic and social downturn over the past couple of years.<sup>23</sup> The nation has seen inflation inching towards 20 per cent or even more while the State Bank is religiously increasing the discount rate in every Monetary Policy announcement. The unemployment lines are lengthening daily while industrial investment has stagnated. Non-performing bank loans have breached the PKR 500 Billion threshold, while the Government keeps obtaining loans from commercial banks and the State Bank of Pakistan. The foreign exchange reserves are positive and at an all time high, but at the same time, the external debt is over US \$ 57 billion and growing. IMF has blocked the release of the next tranche citing the inability of the government to undertake taxation reforms, in particular the Reformed General Sales Tax (RGST).<sup>24</sup> All this is compounded by an average annual population growth of almost 3 per cent which is unlikely to change in the near future because of strong socio-cultural factors, lack of education (especially among females) and relatively low investment in health and family planning.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the nature (institutional corruption) and level of corruption in Pakistan are high which constrains foreign investment, impedes the reliability of law enforcement including the effectiveness of the Police.<sup>26</sup> The prevalent poverty and the poor

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one executed on 16 May in North Waziristan (just 2 days after the Parliament had agreed on the “Resolution on unilateral US Forces Action in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011” on the thinking and credibility of Pakistanis and their Parliamentarians, see Brian Cloughley, “Destroying Pakistan’s Democracy,” *News*, May 18, 2011. The US behavior is violent interference into domestic affairs and disregard of agreements as well as the dignity of a country. It will add to other long-term, disastrous effects if not changed.

<sup>23</sup> For this see also the chapter “Non-traditional Security Treats,” *Pakistan Security Report 2010* (PIPS), 42-45.

<sup>24</sup> How important and justified a taxation reform is, results from the following. On March 19, 2011 Federal Board of Revenue Chairman, Salman Siddique, said that “some 2,3 million people from the privileged class do not pay taxes and to bring them in tax net, notices would be issued to them under section 123 of taxation laws,” *News*, March 20, 2011. He also said that bringing agriculture sector into tax net was of importance too.

<sup>25</sup> Example: Pakistan still ranks 8th globally among the 22 high burden countries affected by Tuberculosis (TB). It poses a serious and ever-increasing problem in Pakistan: over 1.6 million suffer from TB, 373 cases per 100’000 population. The number is increasing due to lack of adequate precautionary measures, poverty, poor/malnourished, living in overcrowded houses/infrastructures, etc. For this see “World Tuberculosis Day 2011: Pakistan 8<sup>th</sup> High-Burden State,” *News*, March 24, 2011.

<sup>26</sup> See “The Transparency International Pakistan Report 2009/10,”

education sector are the major factors for economic stagnation and political exploitation as well as social turmoil.<sup>27</sup> And, the whole economy is heavily burdened by defence expenditure; around 16 per cent of its total expenditure is spent on defence whereas for education only around 12 per cent of the defence expenditure is invested.<sup>28</sup> The low living standard is further compounded by the

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<http://www.transparency.org.pk/news/newsdetail.php?nid=521>. Two major findings are: First, the level of corruption in Pakistan has gone up from Rs. 195 billion, in 2009, to Rs. 223 billion in 2010, representing a disquieting jump of Rs. 28 billion in just one year, or over two billion rupees per month. Second: FBR, Customs and Taxation have been ranked the least corrupt departments. In terms of bribery per act of corruption, land administration has been rated as the most corrupt department. A major cause of corruption and waste of public money is the non-implementation of Public Procurement Rules (PPR). The main violators of the PPR Rules include Wapda, CDA, NHA, SECP, SBP, Customs, FIA, NLC, PID, Privatization Commission and Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan. Further causes of corruption are the lack of accountability, lack of merit and low salaries. See also "Corruption breeding Terrorism, Violence: Senator," *Dawn*, February 28, 2011.

<sup>27</sup> For the poverty see, "6 – 7 m People Joining the Pool of Poor Each Year: Report," *Dawn*, March 21, 2011. Quantitatively Pakistan's poverty is around 60 million, contributing to politico-social instability all over the country, particularly in urban areas. *Ibid.* For a concrete analysis of the facts of the "Education Emergency in Pakistan," *News*, March 20, 2011, with its special report on "Agenda Education," 32-33: "Despite two decades of efforts to put children in schools, over 10 million of primary school going age children are out of school and about one-third of those who enroll dropout before completing the primary cycle. Many of those who do manage to complete the primary cycle will be found lacking in literacy and numeracy, civic education and other basic competencies. This learning deficit continues into the secondary cycle. Across the spectrum, reform has almost exclusively been concerned with access." Quoted from Abbas Rashid, "As Things Stand," *ibid.*, 32. Interview with Dr. Faisal Bari, "Access and Quality Issues are Intertwined," *ibid.*, 33: "Education for the masses has not been a priority of the state. The elites have always used the excuse of lack of funds to not provide good education for the masses. They have been able to create niches for themselves ...and allow middle class and above to step out of the public sector system." Michael Barber, "How to Get there from Here: Lessons in Education Reform from around the World," *Pakistan Education*, March 2011, <http://pakistaneducationtaskforce.com/>.

<sup>28</sup> For the fiscal year 2010-11, the Government allocated Rs. 442,173 billion for defence affairs and services. The allocation for defence is 14.5 per cent higher as compared to the Rs 378.135 billion revised defence budget for the outgoing fiscal year. As inflation stands at 11.5 per cent, the defence budget is almost three percent higher than the inflation rate. In the outgoing fiscal, the government originally allocated Rs 342.913 billion. The amount was, however, revised to Rs 378.135 billion. For education affairs services Rs. 34, 5 billion were allotted. The Federal Minister for Finance announced the national budget for the fiscal year 2010-11 in the National Assembly on June 5, 2010. See *News*, June 6, 2010.

- serious power crisis and poor water quantity and quality.<sup>29</sup>
- *Religious activism/sectarianism, radicalism and terrorism*: 97 per cent of Pakistan's population is Muslim, but it is not a monolithic whole. The two major sects of Islam in Pakistan are Sunni and Shia. Their divide remains the most profound and the consequent political developments most disturbing one.<sup>30</sup> Not only have certain groups in the various sub-divisions of Islam become more intolerant and radical in this regard, but many of them have also developed militant groups of their own, largely as a result of events since 1979. The Deobandi Sunnis – joined by Ahl-e-Hadith and Jamaat Islami – were the biggest beneficiaries of the Afghan jihad. Their madrassas received large amounts of funds during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and are in the forefront of jihadi activism and terrorism in Pakistan still today. Some militant groups are involved in sectarian terrorism against Shiites, others are targeting non-Muslims, the state and its security forces, while others were and are used by the state to promote its strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir (some of whom have now turned against the government and become involved in terrorist activities inside the country). Not all the militant religious groups in Pakistan are involved in terrorism as such, but they are part and parcel of the militant Islamic framework that has and feeds and links up with terrorism.
  - The character of militant violence underwent a significant change around the years 2005-06 – a little over four years after the start of the US-led Coalition's operations in Afghanistan – when the frequency of suicide bombings began to increase.<sup>31</sup> After 2006 suicide bombings multiplied dramatically, and terrorists became

<sup>29</sup> "Acute water shortage hits Rawalpindi," *News*, May 11, 2011. According to this report, most schools are without drinking water facilities. "A survey conducted by 'The News' reveals that more than 80 % of government and 60 % private educational institutions have no proper arrangements for drinking water. Most schools neither have water tanks nor any other arrangement for drinking water. Children bring water bottles from their homes, which are not enough for the whole day. Many children do not go to school toilets due to absence of water. Male students manage in emergency situation but female students face problems in this regard." Ibid. See also "President Convenes Meeting as Power Crisis Surges," *News*, April 25, 2011; or, "Most Pakistanis Drink Alarming Unsafe Water," *News*, April 25, 2011.

<sup>30</sup> Khaled Ahmed, *Sectarian War. Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East* (New York: Oxford, 2011).

<sup>31</sup> For this see the illuminating and authoritative studies by Amir Mir, "Talibanisation of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11; with a foreword by Khaled Ahmed," New Dehli, 2009, and "The Fluttering Flag of Jihad; with a foreword by Khaled Ahmed," Lahore, 2008; see furthermore Imtiaz Gul, "The al Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas," New Dehli, 2009.

demonstrably able to operate throughout the country, including Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Lahore (Marriott, Red Mosque, HQs, ISI building). A broad “neo-Taliban” movement had emerged – distinct from the Afghan Taliban and from mainstream Pakistani religious parties such as the MMA, although this clerical alliance played an important role in the consolidation of al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas.<sup>32</sup> The groups concerned tended and tend to reject the legitimacy of the Pakistan state and are prepared to wage jihad on other Muslims who do not share their ideology on the Sharia. What makes the matter more difficult is the fact that today Taliban elements have amalgamated with criminal and smuggling networks in the transport and service sectors.

- Until today, religious extremism and terrorism have been of the greatest concern in Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> “It is the home grown terrorist outfits supported by al Qaeda, or the “enemy nearby” in Zawahiri’s words, that pose the gravest threat to Pakistan.”<sup>34</sup> Religious orthodoxy, terrorism and insurgency remain challenges as long as their root causes are not removed and political as well as socio-economic solutions are producing sustainable results.<sup>35</sup> These problems however, did not begin on 9/11 or with the invasion of Afghanistan by the US; they began much earlier with the efforts of a religiously driven lobby to undo the original secular concept of Pakistan which has been under attack since independence in 1947.

<sup>32</sup> Khaled Ahmed, *Sectarian War*, 320-338, “(Conclusion: Tribal Areas and Sectarian Terror in Pakistan).” Terrorism in the tribal areas of Pakistan is a result of state policy. The territory was used in the covert wars against the Soviet Union and India. It was for too long kept administratively separated from the rest of Pakistan. The region’s economy gradually delinked itself from the national economy and development. These and other factors facilitated the transformation of the FATA as a stronghold of al Qaeda, its foreign legions and helped to breed the Taliban ascendancy (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan).

<sup>33</sup> Foremost, one has to take note of the human disaster terrorism and sectarianism have caused. “If casualties in terrorist attacks, operations by the security forces and their clashes with the militants, inter-tribal clashes and cross-border attacks (including drone strikes and incursions by NATO/ISAF forces in FATA) in Pakistan are counted, the overall figures in 2010 amount to 10'003 people dead and 10'283 injured.” “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” 5. Over the period from 2003 until 2010, the total Pakistani fatalities in terrorist violence stand at more than 30'000 (with over 2'500 bomb blasts). Farrukh Saleem, “Stability, Please,” 6.

<sup>34</sup> Iftikhar Murshed, “Wolf at the Doorstep,” *News*, April 25, 2011.

<sup>35</sup> Confirming this, Iftikhar Murshed’s conclusion: “Yet a counterterrorism strategy has not even been thought through by the country’s inept leadership,” *News*, April 25, 2011. For this, in particular from a politico-military perspective, Shuja Nawaz, “Learning by Doing: The Pakistan’s Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency,” *Atlantic Council* (February 2011).

The seeds were sown along the history of Pakistan, when an Islamic orthodox state and jihadism were fostered and instrumentalized against India. However, it is possible to say without oversimplification that, when the Taliban and al Qaeda crumbled in Afghanistan, members of the two groups escaped to Pakistan.<sup>36</sup> General Musharraf thought it fit to categorise militants into good and bad ones. The good ones were given refuge in Waziristan and in other agencies. The result: “These guests” are now destroying and killing the country’s own population. Factors such as the controversial US drone strikes and Pakistan government’s ambiguous stance on it and the military’s as well as the ISI’s alleged longstanding relationship with groups like the Haqqani network, have unsettled the bilateral trust and relations between Pakistan and the US.<sup>37</sup> By permitting the creation of militias based on religion the Pakistani establishment has made it difficult for itself to implement the writ of the state. As a result the Pakistani state has become dysfunctional with regard to its role as security provider.<sup>38</sup>

### *External Dynamics*

All Pakistan’s neighbours – India, Afghanistan, Iran, China, and, across the Arabian Sea, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, but also other key actors such as the US – have substantial interests in Pakistan. Some of these interests, such as the sectarian preoccupations of Saudi Arabia and Iran, or the strategic interests of India, China and the US, may be mutually conflicting, and their pursuit may have destabilising effects on Pakistan. But these countries also share a fundamental interest in the maintenance of Pakistan as a stable and secure state. The following selected issues from an external angle shall be

<sup>36</sup> Against the background of ISAF’s efforts to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan this is even today the case. “ISAF Claims Successes in Afghanistan: Generals Say Taliban Leaders Hiding in Pakistan,” *News*, April 23, 2011.

<sup>37</sup> “Mullen Admits Lack of Trust in Pak-US Ties,” *News*, April 21, 2011; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Getting Serious about Drones,” *News*, April 27, 2011; “US Ties with Pakistan Falter over Drone Strikes: NYT,” *News*, April 19, 2011; “NATO Route to be Blocked if Drone Hits Continue: Imran,” *News*, April 25, 2011; and Brian Cloughley, “Destroying Pakistan’s Democracy.”

<sup>38</sup> The dysfunctional and contra-productive effects of terrorism are visible in all spheres of life, but in particular in the domain of education. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minister for Schools and Literacy, Sardar Huassain Babak, on March 18, 2011 in explanations to APP stated: “A total of 1’698 schools were partially or fully destroyed in militancy and flood related incidents in the province. Over 721’392 students were affected in the six districts of the province KPK out of which the ratio of female is 371’604. The insurgents mostly targeted girls’ schools and ordered both teachers and students to stay inside their homes according to their version of Islamic teachings, or face dire consequences,” *News*, March 19, 2011.

highlighted. As with so many other aspects of Pakistani existence, it is instructive to take again into account the historical dimension in the context of foreign policy dynamics and problems.<sup>39</sup>

- *India*: Since independence, India has been and is both Pakistan's arch rival, and the "other" against which the country defines itself. Pakistan owes much of its identity to its distinctness from India. It has engaged in three sizeable wars with India, plus several major border clashes and skirmishes, and there have been numerous periods of high tension. Kashmir is the major issue which has added to these conflicts. Pakistan has been accused of sponsoring proxy paramilitary operations undertaken in the name of "freedom fighting".<sup>40</sup> It has developed and deployed nuclear weapons whose sole strategic purpose relates to India. And, it has used its relations with other countries, particularly Afghanistan and China, to promote its anti-India interests.
- For the sake of objectivity India, for its part, has been far from passive. India's agencies too have engaged in violent covert operations. It was India that conducted the first nuclear test in 1974, which spurred Pakistan along a similar path. It first declared a nuclear-weapons capability after further tests in 1998, which Pakistan immediately replicated. India's methods for dealing with insurgencies in Kashmir have often been brutal, inhumane and inconsistent with its claims to democracy.
- Much has already been written from many perspectives on the differences between India and Pakistan, be it on the issue of overwhelming importance, Kashmir - the oldest dispute still before the United Nations - or be it on Pakistan's defence strategy and the nuclear option/programmes. Pakistan and India have been embroiled in a never-ending militaristic, diplomatic and media hyped propagandist contest from over Kashmir to defence doctrines, to interference by proxies/terrorists, to charges India was instigating Kabul against Pakistan. All this has had and having a heavy toll on human lives and resources of Pakistan as well as

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<sup>39</sup> This chapter heavily relies on Hilary Synnott's study, *Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of Instability* (New York: Abingdon, 2008), 129-157.

<sup>40</sup> In an interview for "Der Spiegel" ex-President Musharraf admitted that Pakistan had formed underground militant groups to fight in Kashmir. Asked why did Pakistan train militant underground groups to fight India in Kashmir, the former President said Nawaz Sharif's apathy of the Kashmir issue was one of the reasons, so was the fact that the world had turned a blind eye to the dispute. "Yes, it is the right of any country to promote its own interests...when India is not prepared to discuss Kashmir at the United Nations and is not prepared to resolve the dispute in a peaceful manner," Musharraf said. For this see *News*, October 6, 2010.

the mindset of the Pakistani military.<sup>41</sup> The resolution of the Kashmir dispute is the Achilles' heel of peace and security in this region.<sup>42</sup>

- *Afghanistan*: Pakistan has mostly viewed Afghanistan through the prism of its antagonistic relationship with India; and, it still does.<sup>43</sup> The motivation here is said to be Afghanistan's possible use as Pakistan's "defence in depth", or to cultivating its mujahadeen militias as paramilitary reservists against possible Indian threats. Whatever, Pakistan's concern has been to secure its western flank to be able to concentrate on its eastern border. But, Pakistan's concerns about Afghanistan in relation to India took on a new dimension when ex President Musharraf decided to join the US-led Coalition against terrorism. Musharraf and the elite were deeply apprehensive about the US policy of using the Northern Alliance to spearhead military operations in Afghanistan as that involved an unholy mix of anti-Pakistan elements since the Alliance enjoyed Indian patronage and had ethnic tussle with the Pashtuns on whom Pakistan relied due to traditional and blood ties. Pakistan opposes the domination of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan as the Pashtuns constitute the majority chunk (over 40 per cent) of the Afghan ethnic diversity and are the majority population of Pakistan's province of KPK across the border.
- While both Pakistan and India have legitimate interests to protect in Afghanistan, the historic tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan are in themselves a matter of deep concern.<sup>44</sup> Pakistan's Afghan policy was initially framed in response to the irredentist

<sup>41</sup> Najam Sethi's, "The Pakistani Ultimatum," *News*, April 12, 2011: "The military's scheme of things requires a permanent state of relative hostility towards, and distrust of, India. That is why its national security doctrine is fashioned on the premise that it is India's military capacity to harm Pakistan rather than its intentions to build a permanent peace that matter."

<sup>42</sup> Alastair Lamb, *A Disputed Legacy 1846 – 1990* (Karachi: 2006); Ghulam Nabi Fai, "Kashmir Issue: Its Impact on Regional & International Peace & Security" (unpublished presentation during the 14<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, Switzerland, June 3, 2010).

<sup>43</sup> Khalid Aziz, "Aligning Regional Security Policies," *News*, August 25, 2008: "As long as Pakistan continues to fear an Indian encirclement through Afghanistan, it will continue to maintain some form of links to the Taliban. In a manner, Pakistan is buying insurance. Thus, it will not be possible to achieve peace and stabilization in Afghanistan unless the Pakistan-India dispute on Kashmir is out of the way. Furthermore, the growing friendship between the US and India creates further suspicion against the real US design in Pakistan." Ibid. Furthermore, by the same author, "US, FATA and Afghanistan," *News*, November 11, 2008.

<sup>44</sup> Azmat Hayat Khan, *The Durand Line – Its Geo-Strategic Importance* ed. by M. Y Effendi (Peshawar/Islamabad: 2005).

threat posed by Afghanistan, which in 1947 had questioned Pakistan's right to legitimate statehood on the grounds that its western borders were drawn on territory seized from Afghanistan by British colonial forces without the consent of the local Pashtun population. The claim has always been vigorously contested by Pakistan, which has refused to countenance any suggestion of the "illegality" of the Pakistani state or the proposals to review its border with Afghanistan – the Durand Line. This resistance on the part of Pakistan was and is deeply grounded in its awareness that its claim to represent a coherent national identity capable of matching India's could not be sustained without a territorially secure state. This paradigm is heightened by Pakistan's emergence in 1947 as a truncated state which has had to face secession and separatist threats. Pakistan is therefore determined not to allow an assault on the legality of its Western borders or its right to speak on behalf of all those within these borders. Pakistan has also to be watchful of Pashtun nationalism though the bogey of Pakhtunistan raised by pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul has not been heard of for a long time now.

- Events since 9/11 have forced Pakistan (publicly at least) to withdraw its support for the Taliban and avoid the kind of close involvement in Afghan affairs to which it had grown accustomed since the early 1980s.<sup>45</sup> Today there seems to be an agreement on an Afghan policy which is interested in a status-quo regarding the Durand Line as an international frontier and seeks stability and internal harmony in Afghanistan. Pakistan needs a friendly Afghanistan no matter who rules it. It also contributes to the consolidation of its fragile national identity and to the easing of relations with India. The dynamics and outcome of the "Core Group" having been agreed to by Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US "for promoting and facilitating efforts for reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan" remain open.<sup>46</sup>
- *China*: The bilateral relationship remains valuable to both sides. Historically China moved closer to Pakistan as its relations with India deteriorated, with war breaking out between China and India in 1962. By the end of 1963, when Pakistan ceded territory around Aksai Chin to China, Pakistan and China had settled their

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<sup>45</sup> For a coherent analysis of the effects of 9/11 on Pakistan's affairs of the state and its social fabric see Talat Masood's, "The Aftermath of 9/11," *News*, September 14, 2009.

<sup>46</sup> Speech by the Prime Minister Gilani on May 9, 2011 in the National Assembly on the Abbottabad Incident, 14 (unpublished).

border disputes, and China was soon to prove to be a reliable source of diplomatic, economic and military support. The relationship blossomed for all to see with the completion in 1978 of the strategically important Karakoram Highway, a feat of engineering that Musharraf has called, rightly, the “Eighth Wonder of the World”. For China, its relationship with Pakistan has served as a hedge against India, in particular given the fact that China and India have their own disputes over hundreds of kilometres of border and other regional issues. Pakistan also provides China with a bridge to the Muslim world, a conduit into South Asia strategic space and maritime access to the Gulf through the port of Gwadar. The most politically significant aspects of China’s co-operation with Pakistan have been and are in the military and nuclear fields (supply of arms, support for production/repair facilities at Taxila and Kamra, joint development of JF-17 Thunder aircraft, training of nuclear scientists, help in operation of uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta and weapon-delivery systems, etc). Trade between the two countries has increased. The bilateral co-operation though is not without limits; China is of the opinion that the “Line of Control” should be respected, a position that is largely influenced by the awareness of the dangers of a confrontation between the two South-Asian nuclear powers. China is also concerned about the spread of Islamist militancy in and around Pakistan, and the risk that China could become infected by it (Muslim Uighur separatism in Xinjiang province). However, the bilateral relationship remains strategically valuable to both sides.<sup>47</sup>

- US: The more than 60-years’ history of relations between the United States and Pakistan has been marked by periods of courtship and interludes of distrust and sulking.<sup>48</sup> Since 9/11, these relations have again entered an era of closer ties with shared

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<sup>47</sup> This also emerges from the most recent visit to China and bilateral meeting between Pakistan’s Prime Minister Gilani and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on May 18, 2011. It was concluded that China and Pakistan would remain forever good neighbours and good partners. But, more important is the support which Pakistan could reassure from China in the context of the violation of the sovereignty in the context of the “war on terror.” “China has asked the United States to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty, understand its problems, address its concerns and acknowledge the sacrifices rendered by it in the war against terror.” See *Dawn*, May 19, 2011.

<sup>48</sup> For this see the former US Ambassador Anne W. Patterson’s “Remarks on the Pakistan-US relationship” to participants in the National Defense Course, National Defense University Islamabad, Pakistan, February 13, 2010 (unpublished). See also Bruce Riedel’s, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global Jihad* (Washington D.C: 2011).

interests. But, at least until 2009, when Obama announced his new combined strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US' approach towards Pakistan appeared to be focused mainly on containment, dealing with specific threats and challenges as they arose or as opportunities to tackle them presented themselves. The main instruments were military (training, equipment, selective use of force by drones, unilateral actions such as the raid against the al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011 in Abbottabad). These methods, including the "to do"-more harangue, not only clearly failed to achieve the US objectives but contributed to dangerous reactionary movements in Pakistan together with generating a simmering anti-Americanism.<sup>49</sup>

- President Obama seems to be genuinely interested in Pakistan and its welfare. The President believes the US did not do enough in recent years to help Pakistan fight extremism and terrorism, build its economy and develop a democratic society. The actions he has taken during his Presidency reflect his belief that the United States should support Pakistan in all of these areas. In his December 1, 2009 policy speech on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama said: "In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust... [T]he Pakistani people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed."<sup>50</sup> However, there remains a perception that the renewed friendship is being driven solely by America's need for Pakistani co-operation in the "War on Terrorism" and that the US could leave again after the business in Afghanistan is done. However, the elements of the "comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan" launched by him relating to Pakistan represent an advance on the practice of the Bush administration. There is more aid to Pakistan's civil sectors and also more political support through

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<sup>49</sup> See "Kayani Rejects US Notion of 'not' Doing Enough," *News*, April 22, 2011. His comments followed remarks by Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, accusing ISI of having ties with Afghan Taliban in tribal belt. He referred to the ongoing Pakistani operations as "a testimony of our national resolve to defeat terrorism" and admitted that a "trust deficit between the institutions as well as people" existed between the US and Pakistan. Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> President Barack Obama quoted in "Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review," *The White House*, Office of the Press Secretary, December 16, 2010.

the Friends of Democratic Pakistan group and economic assistance. But, a truly reliable combined approach to the problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan has still its fundamental weakness as it does not adequately differentiate between the different threats and challenges existing in both countries with different nature and degree.<sup>51</sup> As mentioned above, the drone strikes further complicate the relationship. Moreover, Pakistan's request to provide the list of all CIA operatives inside Pakistan and limiting its activities and strong exception taken to the unilateral operation of 2 May 2011 confirm the lack of transparency and openness between the two nations.<sup>52</sup> However, the US is likely to remain the most powerful, although not the only, external source of influence and material assistance.

- *A change in geostrategic approach:* History confirms that the US neo-conservatives used three countries in order to control and influence the developments in the Near/Middle East and South-Asian Sub-continent. Pakistan also figured in this plan. It was first Iran in the 1950-70s, Saudi-Arabia in the 1980s until the early 21<sup>st</sup> century and since a few years now, it is India. However, facts show that as long as Pakistan is disregarded or circumvented, that long will mistrust and conflicts prolong in the region. The correct approach would be of sovereign equality and non-intervention in Pakistan's internal affairs. Pakistan's concerns with regard to Afghanistan (fair share in power for the Pashtuns) and India (Kashmir) will have to be addressed in this approach.
- There is another conclusion to be drawn from this country-related analysis: The West and the US in particular need to be aware of China and its scheme for the region and Pakistan in particular. Gwadar and Balochistan (40 per cent of the Pakistani landscape) will be important for China, whereas the policy and strategy of the West tend to bifurcate and balkanize Balochistan.
- *Terrorism:* The main reason why the author addresses the issue of terrorism under "external dynamics" has its logic in the fact that the fight against it was once and is still America's war, but for several years now it has been waged on Pakistani soil – at the cost of huge number of Pakistani lives. Pakistan, its neighbours, the

<sup>51</sup> Lt Gen (Retd.) Talat Masood, "Beyond the Clinton Visit," *News*, November 12, 2008: "Hopefully, the micro-management phase of Pakistan by the US will soon be over. Close cooperation combined with discrete advice and even pressure at times for common good can be justified. But a client-master relationship is no more tenable in a transformed Pakistan." Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> "The Four Points ISI Chief raised with CIA: An Account of the Critical Washington Talks," *News*, April 27, 2011.

US and the whole world have a common enemy. Pakistan has, over the past few years, become the flashpoint as well as the most important country regarding counterterrorism.<sup>53</sup> The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and some other militant groups say they attack the Pakistani state – and kill civilians in the process – because it co-operates with America. It was this very ideology that Osama Bin Laden promoted, seeking retaliation for American interference in the Muslim world through attacks against the US and the Muslim governments who work with it. In other words, the al Qaeda obsession, the fear of Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets falling into the hands of militants and extremists, the Western penchant for containing Islamism, the increasing thirst for Middle Eastern oil and mineral resources in Afghanistan, the influencing China factor – all have resulted in an increased interest in Pakistan. It has become, directly or through outside influence, one of those Muslim countries that is now a platform where military and armed forces of various countries have joined as a coalition to achieve the American objective “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future”. The American mantra “Do More” in the “Global War on Terror” and the enduring lack of trust have created a deep chasm between Washington's flawed Afghanistan-Pakistan policy and the sub-regional pragmatism of Pakistan's High Command.

However, the killing of Osama Bin Laden, America's prime enemy, in the night of 2 May 2011 in Abbottabad, on Pakistani soil, through a unilateral ground and air operation, is just exposing facts and more questions regarding Pakistan's role and its institutions in the war on terror.<sup>54</sup> It will have yet unknown implications on policy and positions. And, at stake are, among else, governance (Who leads the country, and in what manner? Will there be a new era for civilian accountability by implementing its duty of oversight?), national security (Was it incompetence or complicity of the security instruments, what is the future strategy?) and the future of Pakistani and American co-operation on counter-terrorism (Will America conduct more unilateral strikes in Pakistan

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<sup>53</sup> Maleeha Lodhi ed., *Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State'* and “Does a Phrase Matter?” *News*, March 15, 2011. A lot has been said and written on this. Furthermore to remember here are the annual PIPS reports, Babar Sattar's, “A welcome Resolution,” *News*, October 25, 2008: (dealing with the “Consensus Parliamentary Resolution of October 22, 2008” having been an embryo of an anti-terrorism strategy but which remained to a large extent dead letter), Mushahid Hussain's, “Where's the Counter-Terror Strategy?,” *News*, November 24, 2009.

<sup>54</sup> On this see the many reports which appeared in the daily media i.e. in *Friday Times*, May 6-12, 2011; *News*, May 8, 2011.

if it has information about high-value targets, thereby infringe its sovereignty and further fostering anti-Americanism?).

That Pakistan's Parliament is able to take wide ranging decisions from the unanimously agreed "Resolution on Unilateral US Forces Action in Abbottabad on 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2011" on 14 May based on and facilitated by briefings given during an 11 hours' long in-camera joint session of Parliament by Director General ISI Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Deputy Chief of Air Staff Asim Suleman (Operations) and Director General Military Operations Major General Ashfaq Nadeem Ahmed.<sup>55</sup> Key elements of this resolution are the condemnation of the unilateral US raid in Abbottabad, the call for the NATO supply route through Pakistan to troops in Kabul to be stopped if the US continues unilateral action within the country including drone attacks, calling for an independent commission to be set up to ascertain responsibility for this raid (the composition of this body is to be decided through consultations between the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition), and the re-examination of the nature of Pakistan's relations with the US.

The basis is now laid for a thorough, nonpartisan, institutionally independent inquiry to know why the world's most wanted terrorist entered Pakistan and lived undetected in the heart of a garrison city for so long, and how the US special forces could enter Pakistan undetected and complete the action unhindered. This will help to avoid hypocrisy and facelift, particularly in view of the fact that until before the resolution ordered the investigation, all commissions were internal: the one tasked by the Chief of Army looking into the possible negligence or mistakes in the Osama Bin Laden incident;<sup>56</sup> the one tasked by the Chief of Air Staff, and the one by the Prime Minister.<sup>57</sup>

That this session was dramatic and unique in the parliamentary history of Pakistan results also from the fact that this marks only the third time in the country's history that top military and intelligence leaders have briefed parliamentarians. And, the DG ISI even offered to resign – though he stressed

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<sup>55</sup> "DG ISI Admits Failure: Offers to Resign," *News*, 14 May 2011. Of course, another key-factor for this resolution was the pressure put up by Nawaz Sharif's PML-N who sought the constitution of a high profile judicial commission to inquire into events surrounding the Osama Bin Laden fiasco. "Nawaz for Independent Body to Probe May 2 Incident," *News*, May 11, 2011; and "Demand for Judicial Inquiry to Fix Responsibility, Terms of Reference Suggested, Nawaz Rejects US Probe by Military," *Dawn*, May 12, 2011.

<sup>56</sup> "Kayani Orders Probe into Intelligence Failure, Seeks Cut in US Personnel," *Dawn*, May 6, 2011. It is a military inquiry analyzing the "circumstances that led into this situation." If this report and what of it will be published remains open.

<sup>57</sup> Speech of the Prime Minister in the National Assembly on the Abbottabad Incident on May 9, 2011 (unpublished): point 9 (p. 16) "an investigation in the matter has been ordered which shall be conducted by Adjutant General of the Pakistan Army Lt. Gen. Javed Iqbal."

that the blame for the intelligence failure at Abbottabad needed to be shared.<sup>58</sup> No one in Parliament though suggested that Pasha should step down – but his offer to do so must be welcomed in a country where there is no tradition of quitting top posts in the event of failure.

The tone that echoed in Parliament reflected the thinking of the people across the country; it is quite evident that most citizens believe Islamabad must not ignore what has happened and must take action to reassert Pakistan's sovereignty and dignity.<sup>59</sup> The setting up of a commission to examine the sequence of events in Abbottabad and its recommendations can play a key role in establishing the tradition of going after the truth in the country.<sup>60</sup>

However, it is important that this incident does not deflect the two countries from their shared goal: to secure the nations from the common threat of terrorism. The post-Osama world requires a new chapter in counter-terrorism co-operation between Pakistan and the US as the second-in-command of al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, and other senior members of the group remain at large. Fortunately, there is plenty of precedent to build on; on several occasions they have shared intelligence or conducted joint operations that have resulted in the arrests of high-profile terrorists in Pakistan. Co-operation is the only successful way the two countries will be able to fight the terrorist threat, for the sake primarily for Pakistan's stability and national security.

But, the future of its relationship with the US remains open due to the fact the resolution passed on 14 May 2011 called upon the government to revisit and review its terms of engagement with the US, with a view to ensuring that Pakistan's national interests are fully respected and accommodated in pursuit of policies for countering terrorism and achieving reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan. This means – also in view of Nawaz Sharif's demands voiced on 14 May 2011 during a press conference<sup>61</sup> - that Pakistan is likely to reassert its own position with Washington, and abandon a relationship that is based largely on obeying US orders.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> The first such briefing came in 1988 as the Afghan war ended, the second on October 22, 2008 ahead of action against the Taliban in the former NWFP.

<sup>59</sup> Babar Sattar, "Facelift or Overhaul?" *News*, May 14, 2011. And, the oped, "Daring Decisions," *News*, May 15, 2011.

<sup>60</sup> That is why foreign actors should be mindful and respectful of what the Parliamentarians have decided. Brian Cloughley, "Destroying Pakistan's Democracy," 7.

<sup>61</sup> "Nawaz for presenting army, agencies' budgets in Parliament; says govt. must stop obeying dictates of agencies, US; warns army, agencies against running parallel govts.," *News*, May 15, 2011.

<sup>62</sup> The PML-N leader also pointed out that foreign policy needed to be determined by elected representatives and not agencies. And, he also demanded that the budget of the army and the intelligence agencies be put before Parliament.

## Framework of Analysis Based on Structural Notions

### *Ideas and Values*

Pakistan is a special case among national states. It was created in the name of religion. It created a territorial construct with two wings having been 1500 kilometres apart and which, after a bloody civil war, separated (1971). With the secession and foundation of Bangladesh, it became obvious that religion as guarantor of national unity was not enough. Generations of leaders and elites have tried to use Islamic ideology to fabricate national unity among a diverse people and to counter external threats. In the process a largely uneducated Muslim population has not only persistently been duped and robbed of its rights in the name of a religious utopia but this exploitation of peoples religious sentiment by Pakistan's political and military leaders through schemes like General Zia's Islamization programme has eventually resulted in radicalising the conservative sections of society which is one of the main causes of terrorist violence in the country and which, in various ways, threatens its existence.<sup>63</sup>

Although the role of religion in politics has always been disputed, since the country's formation, and many leaders, including the founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah, as well as the majority of the general public have disapproved theocracy, still religious militancy and the terrorism associated with it have not only destabilized Pakistan internally, but also placed it in an adverse position at the regional and international level. The process of Islamization has made no progress beyond the level of the central government while there have been attempts to base laws on secular principles. But since so far these attempts have been mostly unsuccessful because of lack of courage and vision in the leadership that could not face up to the challenge of the extremist forces and pursue the change with conviction, it has only helped in strengthening the extremists who now feel free to promote their agendas. The change would have required the abjuration of a policy that mixed religion with regional interest and security in favour of inculcation of a modern outlook in its people.<sup>64</sup>

In sum: One of the major sources of the uncertainty of Pakistan's national identity and its political stance lies in an unclear answer to the question whether Pakistan is a "Muslim homeland" or a "Guarantor of Islam". Probably it should be neither. Not because functioning as a secular democracy could be interpreted as going against the Islamic precepts, or being an ideological state would have gone against modernity and liberalism. For as

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<sup>63</sup> Khaled Ahmed, *Sectarian War*. Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan*.

<sup>64</sup> The murders of Salman Taseer (January 4, 2011) and Shabaz Bhatti (March 2, 2011) are the most recent examples of this state.

long as progress and religion are not reconciled politically, Pakistan will remain in trouble with regard to its ideas and values.<sup>65</sup>

#### *Polity and Civil-military Relations*

Understanding Pakistan requires not only an analysis of the ideological and religious orientation of the country but also a look at its political-institutional history and development. This political-level, state-focused approach is needed because it will elucidate the difficulties, failures and weaknesses of state- and institution-building.<sup>66</sup>

The existential challenges Pakistan faces today are also reflected in the weaknesses of its politics and institutions. Almost every decade since Pakistan's inception has seen a replacement of civilian by military rule. The first military coup, led by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan in 1958, resulted in 11 years with Ayub at the helm, which ended when Yahya Khan, another general, took over in 1969. Yahya Kahn led Pakistan for two years, until the disastrous war in 1971. The next military takeover came in 1977, when General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq deposed and subsequently executed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1979). Military rule then lasted until Zia's death in mysterious circumstances in 1988. In 1999, Pervez Musharraf deposed Nawaz

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<sup>65</sup> The few scholars quoted here confirm Farzana Shaikh's conclusion (in her book *Making Sense of Pakistan*) of an uncertain identity because of the non-consensual answer on the role of Islam in the country and its society. First, enlightening in this regard Saqlain Imam, "A fallacious Binary," *News*, October 3, 2010 (Dialogue): "Now the choice for the Pakistani state and diaspora is not whether Islam is our identity or *raison d'être*. It's a decision about whether Pakistan needs to progress or not. The choice is between facing the world or a dead-end. One can keep Muslim identity while choosing a secular system of governance, because this would ensure the society to open ways of reasoning and progress in all fields including sciences, technology, politics, economics and the modern day challenges of futuristic technology." Ibid. Second, see also Khaled Ahmed "Why Do we Hate Secularism?," *News*, November 21, 2010 (Dialogue): He is convincing too with regard to reasoning for internal pluralism instead of sectarian divide, for integration instead of either/or, the reconciliation of worldly concerns *with faith* instead of a wrong ideal and hypocrisy. "And the Muslims are not yet ready to give the real secularism a chance." Ibid. Third, interesting also Ejaz Haider, "Reconciling the Binaries," (Dialogue): "Man needs both the spiritual and the mundane. The secular, the day-to-day, crucial for non-discriminatory collective existence, has to understand the vital need for the final rite de passage. Existence requires creating the whole; it requires synthesis; the binaries must be reconciled." Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> For the aspect of the decline in the ability of the Pakistani state to govern effectively see Ilhan Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008*. For the role of the military as a parallel state and given the extent of its influence as the ultimate dominator of politics see Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State* (London/New York: 2008), as well as Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc. Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (Oxford, 2007).

Sharif in a third coup, standing down in 2008. In all, Pakistan has been run by generals for more than half of its lifetime.

On taking over, each of the four generals pledged to swiftly restore democracy, while lamenting that the civilian leaders lacked the qualities that would enable them to bring about good governance and democracy themselves. In reality, none of the generals left office voluntarily. Even Musharraf had to resign in November 2007 to avoid impeachment.

Adding to this state of permanent imbalance between civil-military relations and of breakdown of democratic developments is the fact that even when not directly in charge, the army has been politically active behind the scenes. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his daughter Benazir each came to office after normal elections following periods of military rule. But, Bhutto was deposed by General Zia, and the two terms of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were brought to premature ends. At least three of Pakistan's prime ministers – Mohammad Khan Junejo in Zia's time, and Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali and Shaukat Aziz in Musharraf's – were products of elections in which the army had intervened.

Interaction between the civilian politicians and the military, therefore, has been, and remains, both active and complex. It merits examination:<sup>67</sup>

- *First*, in their struggle to exercise, maintain and enhance their power and interests, secular politicians and military leaders alike have made use of the power and influence of religion and in particular of the US for their own purposes. One important manifestation of this has been the creation, cooption or support of militant religious groups and their use as proxy or supplementary fighters against real or supposed external threats. In some instances the government has acted overtly, as during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In others, support for militant groups has been covert and denied officially, as in the case of the assisted infiltration of "freedom fighters" into Indian-administered Kashmir.
- *Second*, in electoral politics, religious parties or movements have frequently been wooed in order to secure their support in

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<sup>67</sup> Address by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on April 16, 2011 to visiting officers of the Command and Staff College, Quetta, at the Supreme Court building in Islamabad ("Armed Forces Must Act Within Jurisdiction: CJ," *News*, April 17, 2011). He said that "the history of Pakistan reflects a recurring conflict between the underdeveloped political system and the well organized army, and whenever there are political crises, we have witnessed military intervention followed by prolonged military rule." He also said that it was the duty of democratically elected governments to ensure that civil powers were superior to the Armed Forces. Ibid. Aqil Shah, "Making Sense of Pakistan's Civilian-Military Matrix," *Express Tribune*, April 22, 2011.

parliament or to induce them not to oppose some course of action. The plans by Nawaz Sharif, a protégé of General Zia, to introduce Sharia law throughout the country in 1999, were an example of this kind of courting. Or, on certain occasions, political processes have been manipulated to the advantage of religious parties in order to reduce the influence of one or more of the main traditional political parties. This phenomenon was particularly evident during the 2002 general election, when it seemed that the mainstream political parties might defeat PML-Q that had been created to support Musharraf. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) responded by helping an alliance of religious parties (MMA) to achieve dominance in NWFP, thereby reducing the overall vote for mainstream parties.

This expedient approach to religion in politics helps to explain the failure of successive governments in bringing about modernisation, moderation and democracy and to undo regressive legislation like the “Hudood Ordinance” and the “Blasphemy Law”. All such methods have been employed to use religion for politics in recent years, and some continue to date under the government elected in February 2008.

However, another significant product of this pragmatic though nationally harmful intermix of politics, military and religion manifested in Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan when General Zia with Western governments and Saudi Arabian support launched the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which included the conversion of religiously motivated groups and their followers into a militant force of “freedom fighters” which was provided with funds, guns and training and infused with the spirit of Jihad. The damage caused by this alliance cannot be overestimated. It explains the nature and extent of militant violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan up to this day. It attracted and encouraged men from several different countries to join the jihad, supplemented by young Pakistani men who had been trained and motivated in the proliferating madrassas. The installation of the Taliban regime in Kabul with its strong ties with al Qaeda was its ultimate outcome.

From the start of US operations in Afghanistan in October 2001 until 2003, the country felt threatened on two fronts simultaneously: from al Qaeda and Pakistan's former allies the Taliban in the west, and from the Indian Army in the east. As already mentioned, Pakistan's army and its intelligence services were closely involved in the events described above. However, the role played by these institutions has been a product of the strategic judgements of the army itself. It was not a disinterested assessment of the broader national interest in any case.

A perennial priority for the military in its analyses of the strategic situation has been the safeguard of its own interests. Strong from the outset, strengthened by extensive external support and having been assigned the highest position in territorial security, the Pakistan Army has become the most powerful and effective as well as efficient institution of the country.<sup>68</sup> Other states have displayed little understanding of Pakistan's complexities in this and other matters, and have made serious mistakes in their relationship with the country as a result. They have either been too easily frustrated and demonstrated their exasperation or have even withdrawn their support. As a result the army concluded that it would set its own moral and strategic compass for cooperation, largely independently of the political and strategic concerns of the country's civilian politicians.

The reason why Pakistan is an extraordinarily difficult country to govern lies mainly in the army's role in politics till this day. Of course, other factors such as the relatively little practical experience of politicians, self-interests of the country's elite and their fierce rivalries have prevented the civilians from taking a joint stance towards the army have also played a part. On matters of national security, including nuclear weapons, and on key foreign-policy issues such as Kashmir, India and Afghanistan, the army to date has never ceded control of policy and operations to civilian authorities, with the role of government departments such as the foreign ministry in these fields having remained largely confined to taking instructions and gathering material for arguments to make in defence of army-directed policies. Always alert to possible damage to their own institutional interests, the army has frequently manipulated the political process.<sup>69</sup> This is not to disregard the cohesive and towering factor the Pakistani Army constitutes with regard to a functioning state and a clearly steered nation. However, the point is that the people, its elected politicians and the three state powers must become the arbiters of Pakistan's destiny. A step-by-step change in the Army's role as "guardian" to a democratically controlled "servant" is necessary too.

In addition to this, one has to underline that the Pakistani state and institutional apparatus have over the years also deteriorated because the servants of the state have become personal servants of the powerful members of the executive.<sup>70</sup> "Pakistan's governance and culture of power closely correspond to the highly arbitrary, proprietorial and ideocratic pattern of

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<sup>68</sup> A pertinent and constructive solution-producing analysis regarding the reformulation of "Pakistan's global profile from a paranoid security state to a normal state living in peace with itself and its neighbours" is Hasan Askhari Rizvi's, "A New Agenda for Pakistan – Redefining State and Security," *Friday Times*, October 8-14, 2010.

<sup>69</sup> "Long Hot Summer," Editorial, *Friday Times*, April 15-1, which makes the point that the "ISI is trying to cobble an electoral alliance of MQM, APM, TI, JI and JUI to field against the PMLN and PPP in time to come."

<sup>70</sup> Ilhan Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947 – 2008*.

continental bureaucratic empires in the subcontinent's history. Over a period of sixty years, the Anglo-Muslim elite that governed Pakistan has failed to build upon the positive aspects of the British imperial nomocracy. It has actually done worse through the subversion and destruction, both conscious and unintentional, of the structure, ethos, and discipline of the state apparatus."<sup>71</sup>

### *Society*

As we have seen, Pakistan finds itself facing multiple challenges today on account of geography, history, politics, religious extremism and terrorism. Adding to this at the societal level is the relatively low standard of life, linked to its corruption, and poor education. Fifty-four per cent of the Pakistani population is deprived of the basic necessities of life such as education, health and standard of living in accordance with the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), while about one-tenth of them are direct victim of corruption.<sup>72</sup> More specifically 51.2 per cent are deprived of education, 29.2 per cent of health and 42.9 per cent of basic living; 11.8 per cent are at risk of multidimensional poverty; 4 per cent of the population live on degraded land, 10 per cent have no access to water and 55 per cent are living without sanitation. There are 896 deaths per one million due to indoor and outdoor air and water pollution. And, there are 8953 per one million people on average who have been affected by natural disasters in Pakistan.

Education in general, primary education in particular, needs a special reference here in perspective of a comparison to Pakistan's defence budget. For the 2011-12 financial year (starting July) it is set to rise by 18 per cent to 5.6 billion US Dollars. Defence spending will account for 3.4 per cent of the GDP, although this is probably an underestimate. This increase follows a 17 per cent rise in defence spending last year and has been justified by the military by citing the cost of counterinsurgency operations.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 255. The author concludes that "the salvation of a state to be successful must be grounded in a rational diagnosis of the central element of the crisis that afflicts it. ...In principle, therefore, the rulers and the servants of the state need to realize that as an administrative state Pakistan must ensure that the best and the brightest are inducted into the officer corps of the state apparatus and that the viability of the state depends on this being done. The recruitment, discipline and transfers of the servants of the state must be entrusted to autonomous bodies constituted by acts of parliament effectively reducing the role of the rulers to the making of policies and overseeing their implementation." Ibid., 289.

<sup>72</sup> This reveals the "Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme, February 22, 2011," *News*, February 24, 2011.

<sup>73</sup> According to the IMF, defence spending accounts for approximately 16 per cent of total government spending while health and education total less than 3 per cent. By one account, total spending on health and education over the past three decades was less than half of last year's defence budget. Indeed, the 17 per cent increase in 2010-

Various non-governmental organisations and foundations, led by the executive director of the Pakistan Institute of Labour and Research (PILER), Karamat Ali, demanded that the government take urgent measures for the enrolment of every child of school-going age in school during the current academic year.<sup>74</sup> He said that as envisaged in the national education policy 2010, the government was required to allocate 7 per cent of its GDP by 2015 for the education sector, while it was supposed to allocate 3.19 per cent for the current financial year. “However, according to the latest data from the National Commission for Human Development, the government has been able to allocate 1.9 per cent of its GDP for 2010-11, the lowest spending on education by the country compared to other countries in the region.”<sup>75</sup> He also mentioned that Pakistan had 70 million children in the age group of 5 and 19 years, out of which only 27.9 million were enrolled in schools. Also in this regard one has to state that the government has badly failed to implement the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan on education.<sup>76</sup> A. Aziz Kabani from the Sindh Education Foundation said that Pakistan needs to work for an improved primary education system. But, “the enrolment at primary schools could not be increased for various reasons, including the non-availability of public schools, inadequate infrastructure, shortage of teachers and a lack in teaching standards, social and economic inequality, lack of interest of parents and the community’s failure to monitor the public sector schools.”<sup>77</sup>

As long as the government will sideline effective reforms in the financing and structure of education, the country’s development and growth will continue to suffer. The diversion of resources to social spending is critical because Pakistan ranks 125<sup>th</sup> out of 169 countries on the UN Human Development Index where around 40 per cent live below the poverty line.<sup>78</sup>

Over the last couple of years Pakistan has certainly experienced an overall multiple decline making it even more difficult to sustain its 170-180

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11 was accompanied by a 27 per cent cut in the health budget. See [http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en\\_GB/features/caii/features/pakistan/2010/06/01/feature-01](http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/pakistan/2010/06/01/feature-01). See also Shuja Nawaz’s analysis, “Army and Politics” in Maleeha Lodhi, *Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’*, 79-94, in particular 86.

<sup>74</sup> See “Govt. Move over Universal Primary Education Sought,” *Dawn*, May 5, 2011.

<sup>75</sup> “Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme,” the same report in *Dawn*, May 5, 2011 shows a revealing chart “Public Sector Spending on Education (as % GDP).” According to this Vietnam spends 5.3 per cent, Iran 5.2 per cent, India 3.3 per cent and Pakistan only 2.1 per cent, being the country with the deepest percentage compared with 8 other countries.

<sup>76</sup> See *the Constitution, Article 25A: Right to education*, “The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law.”

<sup>77</sup> “Govt. Move over Universal Primary Education Sought.”

<sup>78</sup> “Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme.”

million people. Since 2007 Pakistan faces a continuous “close-to-the-brink” and collapsible situation. The reasons are manifold: lack of decisive, sustainable will and bad management by various governments, failure to strengthen the institutions of the state, the high growth rate of both the country's general population (circa 3 per cent a year) and of its working-age population (circa 3 per cent), the emergence of a national security crisis from 2006/7 onwards due to terrorism and to natural disasters (2005 and 2010) disrupting the social bonds; corruption which is endemic in Pakistani society and politics, and feudalism which ensures to the big landowners the political and economic control over the population mass and which is the fertile soil for violence primarily against women, children and the poor.

Moreover the women's potential is being wasted and they are routinely subjected to discrimination and violence. A brief report on the annual statistics of such incidents shows that over 8000 women became victims in the year 2010.<sup>79</sup> According to the report it is becoming more and more difficult for organizations working on women issues to continue advocacy and awareness activities in certain conflict-ridden areas.

Two aspects linked to the Pakistani society need to be highlighted:-

- *First*, in a society like Pakistan, where religiosity is largely innate and critical thinking is generally not put to use, ideological initiations and radicalization play a critical role in influencing public opinion. A recent study on radicalisation by the Islamabad-based think tank “The Pak Institute for Peace Studies” concludes that the phenomenon occurs on three levels:<sup>80</sup> it finds and confirms the above that poverty, inequality and economic deprivations contribute to radicalisation in some areas but are not the drivers of the phenomenon. There is also increasing religiosity in society, and though the think tank does not find a direct link with violent radicalisation, it identifies religious extremism as the common factor in all the visible trends of radicalisation in Pakistan. It occurs in the lower, middle and upper-middle class income groups, though with varying factors.
- *Second*, the fact is that intolerance and an overall ambivalence towards the use of violence pervades in much of the Pakistani society – elite and non-elite, rich and poor. This is not the place to dwell on the question why a traditionally relatively moderate Pakistani society has arrived at this disturbing state. But, Pakistan

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<sup>79</sup> “Aurat Foundation and Violence against Women Watch Group,” *News*, February 25, 2011.

<sup>80</sup> Muhammad Azam, “Radicalization in Pakistan: Sociocultural Realities,” *PIPS Research Journal* vol. 2, no. 1 (Jan-Mar 2009): 43-66. For the deradicalization plan of PIPS see: <http://www.san-pips.com/modules/main/pages/chart1.php>

has become a polarised society. The liberals and/or the “silent majority” are on the retreat. The assassination of Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer on 4 January 2011, proves this. The space for rational discourse has become smaller. This is a societal challenge par excellence because it fosters fanaticism and intolerance.

*Critical Factors: Perceptions of the People, the Kashmir Issue and Positive Developments as Seen by the Author*

As it has been highlighted in the title and introduction: It is essential for any solid, legitimate future policy of Pakistan, but also for a helpful approach of the external actors, to take into account the *perceptions and realities of people's majority* - composed of the following facts, viewpoints and attitudes:

- *First:* Out of around 40 million Pashtuns living worldwide, the majority of this ethnic group lives in Pakistan (27 million; 12 million in Afghanistan). The Pashtuns are an important ethnic group. If not the glue, they are the binding force and cohesive ethnic factor for Pakistan (though less than the Punjabis with around 40 per cent of the population, or the Sindhis with around 14 per cent). They, the Pashtuns (around 15 per cent of the whole population) are living all over Pakistan, namely in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, in the FATA, but also in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, in particular in Karachi. Since for many centuries, the current Pakistani-Afghan border and Pashtun region has been the corridor of movements and exchanges, any policy and strategy dealing with Pakistan, Afghanistan and India needs to take into account the Pashtuns and their interests! Alienating them, would result in its failure. Certainly, the neglect of FATA, the key area of the Pashtuns, and the ravages there caused by the “war on terror” have all contributed to a policy of disaster. And, if India wants to live in peace, wants to have an undisturbed Western Frontier, there is but one conclusion: a policy of acquiescence, respect and honest friendship with the Pashtuns.
- *Second:* The real strength of Pakistan as a nation lies in the resilience of its people, their ingenuity and their generosity even in difficult times such as natural calamities. The Pakistani people are patriotic and proud, have faith in Pakistan and, despite all problems, vouch for Pakistan as a nation. The pride is reflected in the fact that the majority of the people do not want the government and the media to portray them as poor and backward. A great potential lies in the young and dynamic youth,

well educated in different disciplines; the future belongs to this youth which is coming up with a different mindset if appropriately educated and trained! Pakistan has the strong support of its highly motivated expatriate community.

- *Third:* Pakistan's agricultural and mineral potential has not been exploited and used by a sound, goal-oriented policy of its leadership. This and the energy shortages as well as numerous examples of mismanagement are creating major crisis/hardship for the people. The well laid out irrigation system to support the agricultural sector is not fully effective.
- *Fourth:* The stability and prosperity of the country are to a large extent ensured by the institution of the Armed Forces. They are strong, disciplined and loyal to Pakistan's security. The integrity of the country is being safeguarded by the security institutions (including intelligence institutions).
- *Fifth:* Good governance and a trustworthy, patriotic leadership are the major concern of the people. Short-term political maneuvering is destroying the trust in the democratic institutions.
- *Sixth:* The Taliban problem seems to suit all the major players as they can continue to prolong their occupation. Likewise, the Afghanistan problem seems to be an international strategic maneuver to influence the Middle East (Iran), Central Asia, South Asia and China. It could take decades before foreigners quit the area.
- *Seventh:* The Pakistani people realize that they are caught in the power struggle of major powers of the region on the one hand and extra-regional powers on the other. The majority of the people perceive that external forces have united to breakup Pakistan. People also feel that their problems originate from the country going nuclear. This, to a certain extent, contradicts the fact that Pakistan's security is reinforced by a safe nuclear force with a well-developed missile system.
- *Eight:* Despite all the US Aid and support a deep trust deficit exists between the people of Pakistan and the West, especially the US.

Whatever happens – these perceptions will not fade away overnight and have to be taken into account into any policy. To help make it a force for good rather than a risk and impediment, external actors, in particular the West, need to develop a much deeper knowledge of Pakistan and build a relationship of honesty and trust in implementing the purposes and principles of the “Charter of the United Nations” or the “Declaration on

Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States of the C/OSCE".<sup>81</sup>

- *Kashmir*: The Kashmir dispute has dominated Pakistan-India relations ever since the Transfer of Power in 1947.<sup>82</sup> Resolving this contested inheritance on a durable basis would dramatically improve the relations between these two countries, their people and, beyond this, ensure the stability of the region.<sup>83</sup> If neither the US nor India are willing and able to enter into a peace process to address Pakistan's concerns regarding Kashmir, there will be no improvement in the region. There is no military solution of the problem. Solving the Kashmir dispute is the most effective way for fundamentally changing the behavior of the Pakistani security establishment which has been draining the resources of the country. The larger issue facing Pakistan is not only its weak state, but an inadequate policy by the US and other influential actors in quickening the peace process between Pakistan and India with a Kashmir solution.
- *Positive Developments*: Before concluding with some proposals, the author would like to underline once more that not everything is bleak in Pakistan's polity and society. The two positive developments during his tenure in Pakistan were the judiciary movement and the parliamentary elections in February 2008. On one side, the judiciary movement has shown that the civil society can trigger changes. On the other side, it clearly proved the wish of the people for the rule of law and justice. The elections showed that Pakistan and its people are not adverse to democracy and a democratic set-up. The elections gave a clear message to the victorious parties: do away with military rule and religious parties, live up to the separation of the three state powers and reinforcement of democratic institutions.

But, neither the judicial movement nor the elections brought about sustainable political changes. The newly elected *classe politique* did not implement the *vox populi*. Today, the political parties are back in the conditions they were in the 90s.

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<sup>81</sup> see [http://pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id/dir\\_dok/un\\_charter.pdf](http://pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id/dir_dok/un_charter.pdf); and: <http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html>

<sup>82</sup> Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir. A Disputed Legacy 1846 – 1990* (Karachi: 2006).

<sup>83</sup> Ghulam Nabi Fai, "Kashmir Issue: Its impact on Regional & International Peace & Security."

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## Conclusions with Proposals for a Vision and Future Agenda for Pakistan

As we have seen, the problems of Pakistan and the challenges it faces are chronic, many of them dating back to its earliest years:

- The reality of Pakistan is starkly different from the vision of the “Founding Fathers of Pakistan” who envisaged a Muslim state run according to Islamic principles of equality, tolerance, social justice and solidarity, a democratic state following norms of international relationship. The identity of Pakistan as a nation is gravely disrupted.
- Pakistan has had to evolve as a distinct security state assigning the highest priority to territorial and military security.<sup>84</sup> None of the security issues with its immediate neighbours have been solved, thereby cementing the paradigm of a security state.
- Throughout its history Pakistan has struggled to function as a democratic state but has failed owing to failure of the politicians or the intervention of the armed forces.
- Pakistan has a federal form of government but the federating units have been struggling against a strong centre and for increased powers and autonomy. Demands for provincial rights have led to a raging insurgency in Balochistan while militancy in FATA is attributed among other reasons to socio-economic neglect of the area and denial of constitutional rights to the people.
- But, Pakistan has also paid a heavy price for other countries' behaviour towards it, notably its long relationship with the US whose accommodation of the country's military rulers has impeded democratic development. The US-intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 has fostered and nurtured the present day religious extremism and terrorism putting the country's security in jeopardy.

The question arises what can be done in order to solve these problems and to reverse some misconstructions which have taken hold over the years. The following concepts and ideas, derived from the analysis above, are suggested, being well aware that implementing those will need generational time, a lot of dialogue, courage and human resources as well as a stable strategic environment in order to give them a chance to mature. I am suggesting the following broad approaches as an alternative to the visible, current prevailing aimlessness:-

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<sup>84</sup> This is not to disregard the progress Pakistan has made if compared with the situation from which Pakistan had to start as a new state in the late 1940s or early 1950s; literacy, infrastructures, etc, certainly have improved since then.

- 1.) *Vision*: The core issue is that Pakistan's society needs a fundamental change in order to give it another face. Change to be brought about in this regard could come through the vision of "a just power nation"<sup>85</sup>, "asabiyya"<sup>86</sup> and "ideal leadership"<sup>87</sup>. Power relations are at the basis of all social interaction, political thinking and economic activity; thus, if Pakistan can use the power of values and ideas, of leadership and authority, of politics and arms, of money and ownership, and of voice in controlled and legitimised form, then it can set free new potentials and resources, and generate respect and new avenues. Pakistan has also to cure the breakdown of social cohesion. Changing its society for the better means to implement "asabiyya" - justice (adl), compassion and balance (ihsan), and knowledge (ilm). More importantly: the failure of (Muslim) leadership must be corrected through "ideal leaders" who are moral and professional personalities and by implementing "asabiyya", as the core feature of society.
- 2.) *Consensus on religion's role in state and society*: As a task also derived from point 1 mentioned above, Pakistan and its people through a *volonté générale* or a national act of solidarity need to find a path to a joint understanding, a new consensus on its identity, that is a new contract on the role of Islam in the state and society (shared values and beliefs; to renounce the tactics of political indoctrination in the spirit of jihad).<sup>88</sup> The Constitution is the basis; an inclusive approach of dialogue which underlines a morality that emphasises justice and compassion for all, including non-Muslims, will deradicalize, foster an identity of peace, liberty and personal safety. This creative politico-ethic discourse must lead to a recultivation of a tolerant, modern

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<sup>85</sup> For the sake of intellectual integrity the author must draw the reader's attention to the "Just Power" Symposium which has taken place from 12 – 13 May 2011 at the University of St. Gallen Switzerland. Its concept and deliberations are valuable guidance for this point.

See <http://www.stgallen-symposium.org/en/Symposium/Topic.aspx>

<sup>86</sup> Enlightening and guiding for this Akbar S. Ahmed, *Islam under Siege: Living Dangerously in a Post-Honor World* (Lahore: 2003), 74-104.

<sup>87</sup> Relevant for this Akbar Ahmed's elaborations on leadership, "The Failure of Muslim Leadership," 105-122, of his book *Islam under Siege*, see "fn. 86."

<sup>88</sup> This means honesty and the admission to leave religious feelings aside on the political board in Pakistan. Religion remains in Pakistan one of the most forceful operatives to fuse the socially, regionally and linguistically heterogeneous elements together.

Muslim mind,<sup>89</sup> an internal balance between the traditions, principles and needs of the state, and the religious belief of the people.<sup>90</sup>

- 3.) *Inclusive elaboration of a national security strategy and of a national implementing body:* Based on an agreed formula of vision and identity, a committee of wise Pakistani men under the lead of the Prime Minister has to formulate a new national security strategy (aims, ways and means) which is based on a comprehensive, co-operative and integral security concept. Its purpose should be to depart from a paranoid military-oriented and-dominated security state to a citizen-oriented *res publica*.<sup>91</sup> The Army must commit itself to civilian rule, provided they are willing and able to carry their political responsibility.<sup>92</sup> This

<sup>89</sup> In an exclusive interview with Aamir Riaz in *News*, May 1, 2011, part Political Economy/IV People, the British historian and Islam scholar Francis Christopher Rowland Robinson, under the title "Rational Islam," concluded that: "In Pakistan, the situation is not ripe for rational Islamic traditions because of multiple reasons." As a major reason he mentioned the lack of people "who believe in rational traditions of Islamic learning based on Sufism. In situations where you have sectarian militant wings in all school of Muslim thought it is very difficult to bridge the gap. You have to translate Mahalis' theological thoughts into modern language." Ibid. Why this came about? "One striking development in that era in South Asia had been the rejection of Perso-Islamic tradition. That rejection ultimately helped the destruction of rational Islamic science and embracing the Arabic and the Western way." Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Also regarding this the author is obliged to Akbar Ahmed's, *Islam under siege*, "fn. 86;" see in particular his chapter, "Toward a Global Paradigm," 151-172. Moeed Yusuf, "The Future Trend," *Dawn*, January 10, 2011: "In the worst case, fanaticism, the extreme level of intolerance, will force non-violent moderates to conform or exit. This, and not a violent Taliban takeover, is Pakistan's real threat." Ibid. Muhammad Amir Rana, "Folds of Radicalization," *Dawn*, July 19, 2010.

<sup>91</sup> According to Muhammad Azam Khan such a new policy has to start from acknowledging the fact that "huge standing armies and nuclear weapons will mean little if the population is hungry, sick, jobless or are killed by the oppressive systems, practices and corrupt state institutions," *Dawn*, January 10, 2011: "Deterrence and security". And: "No amount of nuclear deterrence will rescue a nation if it is imploding from within. A complete rethink on national security including foreign policy, economy and institution building along with 'credible deterrence' against extremism is the need of the times." Ibid. Similar with regard to the main challenges/threat from within: Pervez Hoodbhoy in his analysis "Pakistan's Nuclear Bayonet," *Herald*, February 2011, 30-33.

<sup>92</sup> Unfortunately, in this regard there is much to be done. Releasing its pertinent report "Performance of the Parliamentary Committees of Defence and National Security during the first 3 years of the 13<sup>th</sup> National Assembly of Pakistan (March 15, 2008 – March 15, 2011)" (Islamabad May 2011), the *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency* (PILDAT) comes to the conclusion that the elected Government and Parliament continue to abdicate responsibility to define and oversee comprehensive national security strategy. "One is hard pressed to find any

strategy must objectively assess Pakistanis' national, economical, societal and environmental needs and put them into coherent policy concepts. The essentials of a counter terrorism strategy with its comprehensive, and not only military needs, would have to be part of it.<sup>93</sup> Their implementation must be put under the responsibility of a new institutional set-up (a new strategic formulation-/decision-making body) lead by the Prime Minister being fully accountable to the Parliament.<sup>94</sup>

- 4.) *Domestic Operational Policies Based on the Policy Concepts*, i.e. putting its own house in order with new operational policies in the fields of education, provincial relations and resources Pakistan needs to re-establish an attractive, future-oriented public education and health care system which makes use of the rich potential of its youth and offers poor families with their children an alternative to madrassas! Women must be empowered. The relations between the centre and the provinces must be reformed, giving the provinces not only real autonomy and problem-solving power, but also creating a new province with the FATA.<sup>95</sup> A new policy tackling resources' scarcity, energy shortages, middle class and job creation must be formulated.<sup>96</sup>

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contribution or any role played by Parliamentary committees in any major security decision taken by the country. Both Parliament and the Government do not seem prepared to be in the forefront of defining what constitutes a national security strategy of Pakistan in dealing with this war that has no end in sight," internet release of Pildat of May 10, 2011.

<sup>93</sup> Talat Masood, "Confronting the Challenge," *News*, November 5, 2009; Rafia Zakaria, "Drones and Aid," *Dawn*, January 12, 2011; Maleeha Lodhi, "Does a Phrase Matter?."

<sup>94</sup> See Lt Gen (Retd) Talat Masood "Lessons to Learn from Kargil," *Dawn*, July 7, 1999.

<sup>95</sup> Ayaz Wazir in his analysis, "Tribesmen Alone," *News*, February 23, 2011: "The people of FATA are tired. ...They want peace. ...They want to have a separate province where they can look after themselves like their brothers in other provinces of the country." Ejaz Haider, "A New Agenda for Pakistan – A Case for More Provinces," *Friday Times*, October 8-14, 2010: "Without decentralization the federation cannot function any more – at least not without use of force. Smaller provincial units and viable local governments are the answer to nation's problems even as they challenge the turf of central and centralized bureaucracies." Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> How pressing and relevant this conclusion is, results from the fact that people from all walks of life (transporters, traders, lawyers, teachers and other members of society) in a meeting held on 2 May 2011 decided to launch a "movement against the government for what they termed its wrong policies which are resulting in price hike and other crises affecting the common man," *News*, May 3, 2011: "Movement to oust government in the offing". And these people are by far not the only ones

- 5.) *External operational policies based on the policy concept*, i. e. creating a balanced, constructive foreign policy concept which fosters peace, independence and co-operation with the neighbours and other actors. First, the relations with India and Afghanistan [There were three major wars with India, but relations with Afghanistan always remained peaceful.] need to be re-addressed, be it bilaterally or multilaterally in the form of a sub-regional, OSCE-like forum of co-operation. Confidence- and Security Building must be reinvigorated via the development of multifaceted economic and human interaction with these countries. The US must be won over for such a regional alignment.<sup>97</sup> Trust and firm proof of this approach should lead to peace agreements on contentious issues such as Kashmir and the Durand Line.<sup>98</sup> This step-by-step approach for peace and stability will help to shift the “security state perspective to societal welfare”,<sup>99</sup> to unburden the state,<sup>100</sup> to set free domestic and neighbourly resources and energies, to attract foreign investments, to reduce the disproportionately high investments on defence and to reduce the dependence on foreign assistance. For this political vision and leadership paired with sustainable support by the civil societies on all sides will be needed.<sup>101</sup>

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who are ready to go on roads and start a “freedom movement against the government”.

<sup>97</sup> See Khalid Aziz, “Aligning Regional Security Policies:” “Three recommendations arise out of this discussion. Firstly, the US must adopt a counter-insurgency approach based on winning the friendship of the Pashtuns. Secondly, it must assist in the solution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, and, thirdly, it should help resolving the Durand Line dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

<sup>98</sup> See Ishtiaq Ahmed, “Military and power?,” quoted in fn. 12 above, here with a similar conclusion: “The basic premise on which the military builds its image as the custodian of its security – the perceived threat from India – needs to be questioned. With both India and Pakistan now nuclear powers they cannot attack each other with impunity. So, may be it is time to become partners in a peace deal instead.”

<sup>99</sup> See Hasan Askhari Rizvi, “A New Agenda for Pakistan – Redefining State and Security,” *Friday Times*, October 8-14, 2010.

<sup>100</sup> Khaled Ahmed, in an answer to the question “Is there a way to get rid of terrorist attacks in the short and long term?,” *News*, July 11, 2010 (“Terror will go on in a gradual process”): “The state is too weak for solutions. Its process of crumbling is evident in increased ungovernability, inability of the border customs to control the illegal influx of goods, and the tendency of the judges to favour such phenomena as the Lal Masjid in Islamabad. One big step, to change the state that eats its own children back to normal is to normalize relations with India by putting Kashmir on the backburner.”

<sup>101</sup> The civil societies of India and Pakistan are there. See the initiatives taken by *Times of India Group* and Pakistan's *Jang Group*, “Aman ki Asha;” or, the panel discussions and gatherings by the Pune chapter of Young Indians (a wing of the Confederation

- 6.) *Transforming the body politic and civil society:* Conceptualising and implementing all this needs the inclusion of the best thinkers and actors – newly created through the Pakistani youth from all over the country! This needs a departure from politicised appointments, patronage, political symbolism and a recalibration of the role and tasks of the military and intelligence services.<sup>102</sup> There must be a change of party politics.<sup>103</sup> There must be created a new system of attracting the young and the best of the society for politics (including founding a new party) and an independent, accountable administration/state apparatus based on constitutional responsibilities and principles. The prestige of the state through its quality, political neutrality and accountability must be improved. Only this will help to correct the non-military, nation- and state-building role of the Army in the field of policy-making and administration, delegitimizing their rationale for contributing and engaging in the civilian sector and politics.
- 7.) *Thorough implementation and compliance:* Most Pakistanis adhere to the undiminished validity of the Constitution with its guiding principles and common values, having embodied the responsibilities of the State and its representatives towards their people.<sup>104</sup> And, likewise most Pakistanis do recognize the importance and significance of the substance enshrined in

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of Indian Industry). For this see *News*, March 24, 2011. There is both great youth energy and insight to shed the stereotypical thinking and prejudices.

<sup>102</sup> The issue of transforming Pakistan's Army with regard to its self-understanding, politico-social-economic role, missions for national security, etc, would deserve a separate study. It would certainly have to deal with topics such as its fundamental and primary reform towards its self-conception and democratic control. For this see: "Of Sacred Cows and other Conspiracy Theories," *Friday Times*, March 18-24, 2011. Comprehensively on this issue already the studies of Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc. Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, and Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*." Ayesha Siddiqa, "A Regime-less Change," *Dawn*, November 21, 2008.

<sup>103</sup> See the pertinent analysis of Babar Sattar, "Our Sickly Democracy," *News*, April 30, 2011. He concludes: "But neither is it (Pakistan) willing to put up indefinitely with autocratic civilian regimes engaged in transactional relationship with ordinary people, reducing them to petty clients. Business, as usual, is no longer sustainable. Political parties can either become vehicles for change or get wiped away as agents of the status quo." Ibid. Before Sattar was criticizing the "undemocratic party structures, feudal-tribal culture, and politics of patronage as opposed to policy."

<sup>104</sup> See for instance President Asif Ali Zardari himself in his fourth speech delivered in the joint sitting of both houses of Parliament on March 22, 2011: "We believe that all state organs should work within their parameters as laid down in the constitution. The restoration of the constitution shows that if we rise above politicking, we can deliver," *News*, March 23, 2011.

documents such as the “Consensus Resolution on the fight against extremism, militancy and terrorism in all its forms,” “The Charter of Democracy” or the recent “Resolution” agreed by the Parliament on 14 May 2011.<sup>105</sup> But, against the background of these fundamental and pivotal documents and the above-mentioned facts and developments one has also to conclude that Pakistan and its elite lack the respect and will for the implementation in good faith of all commitments undertaken therein.<sup>106</sup> And, crucial decisions are not carried

<sup>105</sup> Consensus Resolution passed at in-camera Joint Sitting of Parliament on October 22, 2008, published by *Associated Press of Pakistan*, October 23, 2008; Text of the Charter of Democracy, signed by the late former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 15, 2006 (London); Resolution of 14<sup>th</sup> May 2011 on unilateral US Forces Action in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011.

<sup>106</sup> Just a few examples highlighted here will suffice: a.) Constitution: Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law, etc (Art. 4), Chapter – 1: Fundamental rights, e.g.: Security of persons (Art. 9), Equality of citizens (Art. 25), Right to education (Art. 25. A); Chapter – 2: Principles of policy, e.g.: Full participation of women in national life (Art. 34), Protection of minorities (Art. 36), Promotion of social justice and eradication of social evils (Art. 37); b.) Consensus Resolution: “Urgent review of our national security strategy” (Art. 1), “Condemning all forms and manifestations of terrorism, including the spread of sectarian hatred and violence, with a firm resolve to combat it and to address its root causes” (Art. 3), “The nation stands united against any incursions and invasions of the homeland, and calls upon the government to deal with it effectively” (Art. 4), “State shall maintain the rule of law” (Art. 9), “Military will be replaced as early as possible by civilian law enforcement agencies” (Art. 11), “Pakistan’s strategic interests be protected by developing stakes in regional peace and trade, both on the western and eastern borders” (Art. 12), “Special Committee of Parliament be constituted to periodically review...” (Art. 14); c.) Charter of Democracy: “FATA shall be included in the NWFP province in consultation with them” (Art. 8), “The efficacy of the higher defence and security structure ... will be reviewed” (Art.11), “All military and judicial officers will be required to file annual assets and income declarations like Parliamentarians to make them accountable to the public” (Art. 24), “Civil-military relations” (D.): “accountability, debate, approval by Parliament”. E.g. “the practice of defining national security, ordering and determining the budget are in the hands of the Pakistan army.” For the reluctance, lack of will or interest for the implementation of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment see Khaled Ahmed, “Seeing off HEC,” *Friday Times*, April 15-21; and Fouzia Saeed “Taking the Lead,” in: *ibid.*, 4: “But the process of implementation of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, especially the devolution of the major portfolios to the provinces, has not seen the same kind of support from the major political parties. It is as if the ball has been thrown into the bureaucratic arena and the political leadership has gone on vacation. A pattern we have seen so often.” *Ibid.* On May 5, 2011 a consortium named Balochistan Citizen Committee for Provincial Autonomy published its passed resolution requesting the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment as per Terms of Reference of the implementation commission. See *Dawn*, May 5, 2011: “Call for implementation of 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment,” 17. It stated, among else: “If it is not fully

through.<sup>107</sup> Consequently the non-implementation and non-compliance of those commitments constitute a matter of direct and serious concern for the existence and future of Pakistan.<sup>108</sup> As long as the responsibility for implementation is not better sensed, for that long any response and approach for any future arrangements improving the situation will be futile.

- 8.) *Results:* Pakistan's salvation of the many problems lies in implementing the legally binding Constitution and fundamental political documents/decisions in letter and spirit, in opting for a new paradigm composed of religious and ethnic tolerance and harmony, of a new social contract for the welfare of the common people (rescuing the population from progressive impoverishment and humiliation), of a co-operative and forces-synergising security regime with its neighbours (integrating the three dimensions of security – military, human, economic), of a fully democratic system oriented towards its citizens including the army and security services reliably accountable to the Parliament, and, last but not least of an inclusive, coherent approach using the potential of its human and natural resources.

One thing is clear: The solution to the problems lies primarily within Pakistan.<sup>109</sup> It needs foremost the realization that human society develops with the evolution of an integral and inter-active structure of values, institutions and laws which civilise human nature. Fundamentalism seeks to reverse this direction of change and feeds society on fascist ideals of power, war and

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implemented in its true spirit, it will be negation of the real federation and will increase tensions and widen the gap between the Centre and the provinces, especially Balochistan" (ibid.).

<sup>107</sup> Most recent examples: the withdrawn "Reformed General Sales Tax (RGST) Bill 2010," the "back and forth" regarding the "Blasphemy Law."

<sup>108</sup> Other examples might be quoted to underline the validity of this point of conclusion. The wrestling of terrorism has serious flaws, since long. "Better coordination among intelligence agencies, the capacity-building of law-enforcement agencies, curbs on terrorism financing and adequate measures to prevent banned militant organizations from operating across the country are lacking." See for this Muhammad Amir Rana, "Terrorism: Judicial Flaws," *Dawn*, April 18, 2011. Or Mudassir Raja, "The Reason Terrorism Suspects Go Free," *Dawn*, April 19, 2011: "Mostly, the prosecution's case collapsed because the trial judge found the witnesses and confessional statements unreliable."

<sup>109</sup> This author fully concurs with Talat Masood's succinct analysis and conclusions, "The aftermath of 9/11:" "The above facts notwithstanding, Pakistan cannot absolve itself of its responsibility for where it stands today." This in particular against the background of the fact that "wheeling and dealing by external players protect their interests under the cover of seeking a smooth transition from military to civilian rule did create several distortions in our political system." Ibid.

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conquest and ultimately towards a return to the basic human instincts. But, in order to achieve this Pakistan urgently needs a mobilization of the youth with its tremendous potential, therefore an educational reform and with it a political awakening among its citizens for fundamental changes, which honest and selfless leaders must conceptualize and implement. There are Heads of the State and Government - those not living up to their constitutional tasks must be changed -, responsible to the Parliament and an independent judiciary. They must be made to ensure freedom, justice and peace (obligation to the *res publica* of Pakistan), a new political movement as alternative to fundamentalism - reversing the movement to capture power and acquire control over national resources in the name only and/or primarily of religion, with the apparent aim to establish a theocracy based on a literal interpretation of religious laws.

Once again: Pakistan has one of the largest percentages of youth in the world. Sixty per cent of the population is under 25 years of age. Their passion, energy and intellectual potential must be harnessed through a new vision ("Leitbild"), through the conviction that Islam is a source of inspiration and strength, and not an impediment. The leaders, policymakers, institutions, business community and educationists must lead them - for peace, security, dignity and welfare of the Pakistani citizens, Nation and State. ■