Potential and Prospects of Pakistani Diaspora

Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)

Potential and Prospects of Pakistani Diaspora

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ACRONYMS

ACFROC	All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
ANP	Awami National Party
APPNA	Association of Physicians of Pakistani Descent of North America
BBC Urdu	British Broadcasting Corporation Urdu
BEOE	Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment
BIOE	Bureau of Immigration and Overseas Employment
CAK	Culture Area Karakorum
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CGE	Computable General Equilibrium
CP	Colombo Process
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CWAs	Community Welfare Attaches
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
DfG	Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FERC	Foreign Exchange Remittance Card
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HEC	Higher Education Commission
ICU	Intensive Care Unit
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization of Migration
IT	Information Technology
KHW	Karakorum High Way
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LMU	Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
ME	Middle East

MOIF	Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
MQM	Mohajir Quami Movement
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
NGOs	Non-governmental Organization
NICOP	National Identity Cards for Overseas Pakistanis
NIPS	National Institute of Pakistan Studies
NPC	National People's Congress
NRI	Non Resident Indians
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OCAC	Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee
OCIs	Overseas Citizens of India
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEPs	Overseas Employment Promoters
ONS	Office of the National Statistics
OPF	Overseas Pakistanis Foundation
PBD	Pravasi Bharatiya Divas
PDC	Pakistan Diaspora Commission
PIDE	Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
PIOs	Persons of Indian Origin
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League (N)
POC	Pakistan Origin Cards
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSLM	Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement Survey
SADC	South Asian Diaspora Convention
SAI	South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University
SCCCI	Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry
SEZs	Special Economic Zones
SLS	Semant Lok Sangthan
STEM	Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
TCF	The Citizens Foundation
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WCEC	World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention
WTO	World Trade Organization

Contents

Introduction

**Dr. Noor ul Haq, Air Cdre Khalid Iqbal (R)
and Muhammad Nawaz Khan**

This volume presents the proceedings of a two-day international conference on "Potential and Prospects of Pakistani Diaspora" jointly organised by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), Germany on November 14-15 , 2012. Prominent scholars, academicians and policy-makers from Pakistan, United Kingdom (UK), India and Singapore participated in the Conference. Various contemporary models were discussed and strategies were proposed to optimise Pakistani diaspora's role in enhancing social and economic status of the country.

The objective of the Conference was to have an in-depth study of various aspects of Pakistani diaspora to evolve a vision for optimally managing it and realizing its potential. In order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the diaspora's impact on the social, political and economic life in Pakistan, a cross-sectional study was undertaken alongside a comparative evaluation as to how other countries with other sizable diasporas have managed and utilized them for respective national development.

Pakistan has a huge and diverse diaspora numbering around seven million, scattered all over the world. They are either Pakistani citizens or are of Pakistani origin. Some have moved to the UK, where they already live as second or third generation, while some have moved to the United States (US) and Canada to start a new life. Others have taken up temporary work in the Middle East (ME)/Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to improve their livelihood. Besides, Pakistani students are living and studying at various universities, mostly in the western countries; some of them return to their homeland to make use of their acquired knowledge and expertise; a large number chooses to adopt their host country as a place of permanent residence. A large number of them also hold dual citizenship. Cumulatively, overseas Pakistanis contribute around five per cent of Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) through remittances i.e., around US$ 13 billion per annum.

Over the decades, the mobility of the Pakistani emigrants has been global and has had a considerable impact on the society of host countries as well as developments in Pakistan. In view of the potential and importance

of its diaspora, the government of Pakistan has instituted the Ministry for Overseas Pakistanis. The ministry's task is to formulate policies to facilitate working conditions of Pakistanis abroad and assist their re-integration when they finally return home.

The impulse for migration, social conditions prior to migration, experiences in the new country of residence, social and familial connections to Pakistan and the dilemma whether to return or not — are some of the variables influencing the non-resident Pakistanis' patterns of engagement back home. How do members of the diaspora returning home affect the intellectual and social life of the local communities? How can students coming back from abroad improve conditions in Pakistan? Are there ways and means to better coordinate and manage a large number of overseas Pakistanis with diverse educational and social backgrounds? In which ways, can engagement with the Pakistani diaspora open up avenues for national development?

The Pakistani emigrants comprise mostly of working class people who leave their homeland in search of livelihood, though the number of members from higher socio-economic strata, professionals and businessmen has been growing over the decades. The motive for migration is primarily economic; to secure not only basic livelihood but a better life for themselves and dependants back home. The choice to return is governed by factors like comparative opportunities in the host country and homeland, willingness of the host countries to retain them, and family compulsions in Pakistan.

The Pakistani diaspora makes tangible as well as intangible contributions to their country of origin as well as to their country of residence. Studies have explored the changing dynamics of migration, issues of citizenship, religion, opportunities and challenges Pakistani migrants are facing in their countries of residence. A field much less explored is the influence overseas Pakistanis have exercised on their country of origin in terms of remittances, philanthropic donations, support for political parties, transfer of knowledge and development of human capital etc.

In their country of residence, they have become part of its economic life by filling the human resource gap, making up for labour and professional shortages and augmenting the services sector as guest workers. Their contribution in terms of ethnic and cultural diversity is another aspect of their presence. At the political level, the Pakistani emigrants make a two-way contribution: they affiliate with and donate monetarily to the political parties of choice at home; in the adopted countries they try to participate in political lobbying, join interest groups and take part in various forms of

political activity. In this regard, a number of Pakistanis have attained prominent positions in the political systems of their adopted countries.

Relocation has its psychological, familial, cultural, religious and political effects on the life of migrants. In the post 9/11 setting, the relationship to their host countries has become complex and, often, problematic. Undue prejudices, stereotyping and linking the Pakistanis to activities of extremists have depressed their morale. Nevertheless, the Pakistani emigrants have, by and large, stayed constructively engaged and have struggled to live up to the expectations of their hosts. The incipient slow down in the European economies and of North America are likely to make life harder for them with consequent reduction in remittances.

This volume contains 13 papers/transcripts, contributed by scholars from Pakistan, UK, India and Singapore. The papers describe the experiences of these countries through case studies. They touch upon various aspects of handling of their respective diasporas and suggest ways to further enhance their capacity building. The papers/transcripts on Pakistan discuss the role and contribution of Pakistani diaspora in socio-economic uplift of the country. The book is organised into two parts. The first part includes the Inaugural Address by the Chief Guest, Dr. Kamal Monnoo, Member Board of Governors, IPRI and the concluding speech in the final session by Dr. Farooq Sattar, Minister for Overseas Pakistanis. The second part comprises papers/presentations and transcripts read at the conference.

The paper by Dr. Marta Bolognani on **"Changing Perceptions about Home: The Life of Second and Third Generation"** highlights that second and third generation Pakistanis in Britain still maintain very close relationships with Pakistan. One-third Pakistanis in Britain visit Pakistan each year. Despite the intensity of transnational relationships (such as holiday visits, intercontinental marriages and remittances), the political and ideological affiliation to Pakistan is tantamount to no more than 'banal nationalism' expressed in a limited number of ways.

In her paper **"Changing Patterns of Migration: Brain Drain/Human Capital Migration,"** Ms. Nadia Sajjad, describes various internal and external patterns of migration in and from Pakistan. The analysis of the findings draws the conclusion that economic and job provision is a major pull factor in skilled migration. Ms. Sajjad also lists the following reasons of brain drain: Poor economic conditions at home, non-availability of opportunities for youth in the existing social set-up, availability of resources in foreign countries to conduct research, higher salaries in recipient countries, and better living facilities for their families.

Ms. Saira Rehman's paper on **"Migration and Family Structures: Case Study of Mirpur,"** defines migration as physical transition of an

individual or a group from one society to another. She lists the following as the main causes of migration: inequality of income distribution, poverty in the home country, and social, political and environmental reasons. The joint family system is being overtaken by nuclear family norm. Migrant families left behind have risen socially with remittances. Children have better brought up and cultural and intergenerational gap has widened. Family bonding in terms of marriage is loosening its grip since third generation Mirpuris are least interested in bringing spouses from Mirpur.

Dr. Azam Chaudhry's paper on **"Experiences of a Pakistani Student in Germany,"** explains that there are 499 German-Pakistani academic exchanges today which were only 53 in the year 2000. In the year 2011, 243 Pakistani students went to Germany. In total, there are 1844 Pakistani students at German Universities at present. Since, the year 2004, the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan has funded 400 Pakistani students for education in Germany, 200 of whom have completed degrees and returned to Pakistan. Dr. Chaudhry highlights that foreign PhDs alone would not produce the desired results unless Pakistan transformed the general academic atmosphere in its universities.

Professor Dr. Moonis Ahmar's paper on **"Conflict Conflagration and Conflict Mitigation in the Context of Pakistani Diaspora: Permanent, Circular Migration & Political Refuge,"** analyses four major areas where one can see a direct and indirect involvement of Pakistani diaspora making its impact on conflict formation, transformation and mitigation. These are: political divide and schism, ethnic/nationalist movements, class and economic stratification, and radicalisation and militancy. Dr. Ahmar points out that diaspora can be engaged in positive conflict transformation. Pakistani diaspora can play a pivotal role in conflict mitigation and resolution by training the youth. They can also act as a pressure group to restrain political parties from augmenting the level of polarization and schism in the country.

Professor Dr. G. M. Arif's paper on **"International Migrations and Middle Class Nexus in Pakistan: A Preliminary Investigation,"** highlights the importance of the middle class as a means of mitigating inequalities in a society and as a source of growth and development. The middle class is the backbone of both the market economy and democracy in the era of globalisation. He points out that there are links between the emergence of the middle class and increase in emigration, as well as migrants and expansion of middle class. Diasporas are potentially powerful agents of development and change at home. Dr. Arif concludes that to maximize benefits, internal and external migration should be made part of development strategy.

Dr. Sabiha H. Syed in her paper on **"Migrants' Rights and Pakistani Diaspora Communities,"** says that the diaspora belonging to Pakistan was well established even before the creation of the country. The migration phenomenon was related to colonial occupation of lands. Pakistani diaspora is much larger than the official figure of seven million. Most migrants of Pakistani origin are involved in 3-D jobs: "dirty, dangerous and degrading". Now there are conventions and resolutions passed by the United Nations (UN) to secure migrants' rights. Unfortunately, Pakistan has not signed these conventions or resolutions yet. There is a lack of legal framework and channels for safeguarding migrants' rights.

In their paper, **"Diaspora and Economy: Effects of the Global Economic Slowdown on Remittances,"** Dr. Vaqar Ahmed and Muhammed Sohaib identify Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman as the top three destinations of Pakistani workers. He says that the global financial crisis which affected economies and remittances worldwide had little impact on Pakistan's remittances because the Middle East (with the exception of UAE) remained insulated from the financial crisis. He suggests that due to these unfavourable developments, a 'Look East' strategy may be a good alternative for Pakistani workers. Pakistanis have not been able to tap the potential opportunities that Chinese proximity offers. Dr. Ahmed recommends that Pakistan should align its migration policy with its national development policy.

In his presentation **"Influence of Remittances on Disaster Management,"** Dr. Abid Qayum Suleri elaborates that the data to assess the role of remittances and disaster response relates mainly to post earthquake and floods periods and includes both outside and domestic remittances. He said that what was important during disasters was how the flow of remittances was kept intact. He stressed that government needed establish mobile banking in disaster-hit areas and see how informal channels could be regularized and institutionalized with certain rules.

In his presentation, **"Diaspora Philanthropy"** Mr. Zubair K. Bhatti discussed philanthropic utilization of remittances which was large and was growing. He categorised remittances in three groups: those sent to family; for investment and for charity. Remittances for charity purposes though smaller were important particularly in situations of natural disasters. He estimated that 94 per cent of that dole went to individuals. Zakat was a major part of philanthropy but here, too, the share of individuals was larger than of institutions. Of the organisations, most money went to faith-based organisations; 94 per cent of all money given to organisations had faith driven inclinations.

Professor Dr. Mohammed A. Kalam's paper on **"Indian Model of Managing Diaspora (Non Resident Indians),"** dwelled on the term Diaspora's coming into usage in recent times and held it unsuitable for scientific usage as it pertained to forcible Jewish exodus from their homeland. Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), and Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs) are the other two categories. There were 22 million (21,909,875) Indians living and working abroad in 180 countries in 2012 comprising 10,037,761 NRIs and 11,872,114 PIOs. He believes that migration is not a random activity and involves a high degree of networking based on family, kinship, village, region, language, caste and ethnic ties or a combination of some of these.

In their paper, **"The Chinese Model of Diaspora Management,"** Professor Dr. Hong Liu and Dr. Els van Dongen discuss the formation of Chinese diaspora. The paper points out that the new migrants are the focus of Chinese policies. There is engagement with diaspora on two fronts: 1) diaspora to nation state — attracting Chinese talent abroad by offering one to five year visas, research sponsorships, and schemes such as 2004 Green Card programme, 2006 programme, 2008 '1000 Talents Scheme', and Industrial parks for returnees; and 2) bringing nation state to the diaspora — delegation exchanges, cultural promotions, and political motivations. There are five interrelated institutions to engage with Chinese diaspora.

Dr. Muhammad Hafeez's paper on **"Vision for Overseas Pakistanis 2050: Imperatives and Challenges,"** explains that the effect of anything depends upon how we use it. Do we expect only money and economic contribution from the Pakistani diaspora? He stresses that we need to focus on social and political aspect, too. In fact, the word diaspora brings a feeling of entity and collectivity. Dr. Hafeez suggests a 'Pakistan diaspora commission' which should be independent and have members from the diaspora as well. This commission can contribute in social, political and economic fields. He said Pakistanis working abroad have a passion to serve Pakistan. He cited the World Bank's Water Projects Bond for Pakistan in September 2012.

In the light of the views expressed by conference participants, Mr. Usman Ghani, Assistant Research Officer, presented the following key recommendations:

- The multiple transnational connections between British Pakistanis and Pakistan should be geared to the country's advantage as it happened during the Kashmir earthquake when overseas Pakistanis contributed generously to help the victims.

- Government should devise policies and programmes to encourage overseas skilled workers to increase their remittances.
- Diaspora networks should also be used to serve as an effective tool through which expertise and skills could be transferred to Pakistan in the form of technology transfer.
- Since Muslim identity in Pakistani diaspora of second and third generation is getting less pronounced, language and emotional attachment for what they refer to as 'back home' should be consolidated so that diaspora remains attached to Pakistan and continues to contribute to its economic development.
- The current contribution of foreign remittances to GDP is more than four per cent and in some years have even become the major part of foreign exchange reserves. To encourage this trend, the banking system in the country should be geared to facilitate speedy and hassle-free transfers by expanding banking network and setting up branches in the host countries. This would discourage informal transfers like *hundi* business and ensure transfers through normal channels.
- Provision of tax relief incentives linked to remittances' bench marks could motivate the migrants to send more money. This may require amendments in the current Income Tax Ordinance.
- For optimum benefits, the following may be considered:-
    - The migrants should be imparted a basic understanding of the language, culture, legal, social and political set up of destination countries.
    - Global market analysis and training of potential workers in skills in rising demand.
    - Publicity/marketing efforts in foreign countries to ensure a stable market for Pakistani manpower.
    - Highlight investment venues for returning migrants and those wishing to do joint ventures.
- To enhance the number of emigrants, the government's immigration policy should also be revised while focusing on two broad objectives: lowering migration costs by reducing recruiting, and settling-down costs and enhancing migration benefits by enforcing minimum standards, social security coverage, protection of migrants, introducing welfare measures for them, and making use of returning migrants' expertise.

- A contribution to welfare fund from all registered migrants can provide insurance cover for all overseas Pakistanis in case of accidents etc.
- Community Welfare Attaches' in the Embassies of Pakistan should help in protecting migrants' rights and dispute settlement with their employers. This is important especially for less educated migrants who are not aware of their legal rights. In this regard, diaspora engagement at both ends i.e. country of residence and country of origin is necessary. Also the governments of sender and receiver countries should cooperate in protecting diaspora laws and rights through formal agreements.
- A 'Centre for Pakistani diaspora Studies' should be established for policy analysis.
- Pakistani diaspora should be motivated for investing in the education and developmental projects as well. In this regard, Pakistani government should facilitate investment procedures and create avenues for secure and profitable investments by diaspora.
- Fiscal incentives should be provided to the returning migrants who wish to set up small and/or medium scale business. These may take the form of tax breaks or other related initial concessions.
- The Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF) should further expand its functions and provide services such as investment advice to the returning workers, helping potential investors, providing loans to the dependents of deceased workers and developing housing facilities for migrants.
- China has used its diaspora effectively by integrating it economically, culturally and to a lesser extent politically into the state's nation-building project, with a focus on modernization. For example, during the reform era, 1979 to 1997, more than two-thirds of all foreign capital flowing into China came from ethnic Chinese. The majority of investments, both in terms of capital and number of enterprises founded, between 1978 and 1994 also came from ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia in particular. Ministry for Overseas Pakistanis may emulate Chinese model of diaspora management which has following characteristics:

- Cultivating diasporal financial and knowledge capital as a national policy.
- There is a sophisticated set of institutional mechanisms from the central to the local levels, and they have been intimately embedded in China's bureaucratic and political structures as well as culture.
- Institutional structures have been supported and facilitated by other mechanisms, such as consular departments in overseas embassies, and a variety of research institutions/universities providing policy consultations and training of officials pertaining to overseas Chinese policy. For example, there are two universities, Jinan University in Guangzhou and Huaqiao University in Fujian, which help formulate and disseminate a series of discourses pertaining to the important roles of Chinese diaspora.
- The state policy toward diaspora has been pragmatic and flexible in its focus, in tandem with China's changing priorities in national development. While "attracting trade and luring capital" constituted the focus of overseas Chinese policy in the first two decades, after the reform attracting talent and luring knowledge became the catchword for the new policy formulation which focuses on recruiting global talents of Chinese ethnicity. This strategy is in line with China's new policy in moving away from a low-end production workshop of the world to an innovative country which would produce high value-added products.

- Beyond the remittances, Pakistan should also benefit from its growing diaspora like China and India have done from theirs, in the domains of: business, economic, social, political, educational and technological development. The realisation of such great potential would only be possible if Pakistani government's public policy, public-private partnerships and state-to-state relations with the West create necessary enabling conditions. In this regard the existing organisations of Pakistanis, such as OPEN Silicon Valley, Association of Physicians of Pakistani Descent of North America (APPNA), and PakAlumni Worldwide, can be helpful. To succeed in this endeavour, following measures would be helpful:

  - Creatively use diaspora for development of Pakistan in line with indigenous environment.
  - Pakistan Diaspora Commission (PDC) may be established to induce, optimise and integrate the positive effects.
  - PDC could use Chinese and Indian models for guidance.
  - Pakistan should focus on social, economic, and political dimensions of our diaspora.
  - Pakistani diaspora should become an active part of planning and development in Pakistan.
  - Systematic Human Resource Development programme should be implemented to implement a shift in diaspora constitution from low-end work force to value added executive and professional categories — say over next 30 years.

- Pakistan embassies should encourage mutual interaction among diaspora by organising national days/events and facilitate them in organising themselves in some kind of social and welfare organisations abroad. By having better mutual interaction and relations, they would be able to use their influence in the host countries to enhance Pakistan's soft image abroad and lobby for Pakistan to reinforce its diplomacy to advance its foreign policy objectives.■

Welcome Address

Dr. Noor ul Haq

Honourble Dr. Kamal Monnoo,
Respected audience,
Ladies and Gentlemen!
Assalam-u-Alaikum and Good Morning!

It is my privilege this morning to welcome our chief guest, Dr. Kamal Monnoo, Member, Board of Governors, IPRI, who in spite of his several commitments agreed to come to Islamabad to preside over the inaugural session of the international conference on "Potential and Prospects of Pakistani Diaspora".

The Pakistani diaspora runs into millions of people. They are either of Pakistani origin or still citizens of Pakistan. They are found all over the world in all continents. They live and work in other countries for earning better wages, better education and quality of life. They are mostly residing in the US, UK, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. They comprise doctors, engineers, professors, businessmen, workers and labourers. They serve as ambassadors of Pakistan at no cost to the home country. Their remittances are a great source to improve the country's balance of payment.

Ladies and Gentlemen! I welcome all our guests, some of whom have come from far off places, to attend the conference. The conference is being organised with the cooperation of our partner Hanns Seidal Foundation of Germany. It is a two-day conference spread over four working sessions, besides the inaugural and concluding sessions. The discussion would broadly feature

- The Changing Perception, Pattern and Potential of Migration,
- Effects of Migration,
- Contribution by Pakistani diaspora, and
- Pakistan's Sharing of Best Practices followed by other countries.

I hope the conference would be productive and fruitful for all of us. Thank you.

Opening Remarks

Andreas Duerr

In his welcome remarks, Mr. Andreas Duerr, programme coordinator at the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad, dwelt briefly on how Pakistan could utilize the vast economic, professional and cultural resources of its diaspora. He thanked the speakers for putting forward useful suggestions and discussing the role of the diaspora in the country's progress.

He said the scholarly focus for long had been on the relationship between diasporic groups and their host societies. He cited James Clifford, one of the leading lights on the theories concerning the concept of diaspora, who held that societies could not be studied without taking into account the role of the migrants in establishing links with the external world. Applied to Pakistan with its vast diaspora worldwide, one could ask the crucial question, how the country could utilize and manage these economic and cultural resources in a beneficial way.

Mr. Duerr described the current conference as a first step towards that endeavour in which the Hanns Seidel Foundation was collaborating as part of its mission in Pakistan. Being a German political foundation, the HSF had deep interest in supporting federalism and civic responsibilities in Pakistan that would contribute to the country's stability and development. He said that the foundations of sustainable solutions and policies could be laid by providing capacity building measures in the academic sector.

Mr. Duerr praised the IPRI staff for their hard work in organising the conference and wished the participants a pleasant stay in Islamabad and fruitful deliberations.■

Inaugural Address

Dr. Kamal Monnoo

Dr. Kamal Monnoo, Member Board of Governors, IPRI, in his inaugural Address said that the issue concerning Pakistani diaspora was important as it concerned millions of overseas nationals who were a living linkage between their country of origin and the outside world. The economic productivity of the Pakistani diaspora, not only in the shape of remittances but as an overall modernizing influence also was a significant factor. There was an incubator-effect associated with the diaspora; its contribution in their home country's progress and development through investment in the form of remittances, skills and knowledge is of great importance. They were also important in foreign opinion making as well as in social relationships with foreign communities.

On the prospects of the Pakistani diaspora, Dr. Monnoo said that that depended upon how we utilized its potential. He regretted that the country's policies had not been well informed through the years in which lack of coordination was apparent. He acknowledged that in supporting the country's balance of payments, remittances were a big help. He expected that remittances from overseas Pakistanis could become the highest contributor in balancing our accounts by 2014. He noted that the remittances of Bangladesh and Indian expatriates were falling compared to the rising trend shown in case of Pakistanis.

Dr. Monnoo emphasized that the full potential of the diaspora could be utilized only if things at home got better and we were able to put our house in order.■

Concluding Remarks

Dr. Muhammad Farooq Sattar

Dr. Farooq Sattar, the then Minister for Overseas Pakistanis, in his concluding remarks said that he was happy to participate in the two-day deliberations on the issue of finding how best our community of Overseas Pakistanis can contribute to the progress of the country.

He suggested that to achieve that objective it was essential to involve the diaspora and give it a more active role in the country's politics, economy and social life. He said that in that respect the example of China was before us which carved an important role for its nationals living abroad in the country's economy. Among other examples were that of non-resident Indians, Mexicans, Filipinos, Thais, Malaysians, South Koreans and Bangladeshis. He said that what modern China was today was on account of the overseas Chinese. He emphasized that in the modern world economy dictated politics, and not the other way round. It meant a larger role for the diaspora in proportion to its great potential. He said that Pakistan was facing increased challenges that were existential and needed all hands on deck.

Dr. Sattar said that a country's diaspora was inspired by the vision of its leaders. Overseas Pakistanis needed empowerment to have a say in the country's affairs. They needed to look up to their country. For that to happen Pakistan would need to reclaim its respectable place in the world.

It was time, the minister said, that Pakistan had an Overseas Pakistanis policy. The government needed to demonstrate its ownership of that policy as has been done by governments of countries with large diasporas. He said that owning our diaspora would mean we ensure a place of respect for them and equal rights in the country where they are living and working. Their empowerment would translate into reality when we include them in building national consensus and engage them in a democratic way in national affairs.

Commenting on the situation at home he said that it was a redefining moment for Pakistan; time to reincarnate the Pakistan of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah who wanted Pakistan to be a civilized, secular, progressive and a liberal welfare democratic state.

Dr. Sattar declared that he was planning to announce the first ever diaspora policy at an international conference where overseas Pakistanis from all over the world were going to be invited. He regretted that under the existing system the powers of his ministry had been greatly curtailed. All he

could do was to bring home bodies of deceased Pakistanis. Over the living expatriates he had little concern. He said the new policy would be effective only if it was endorsed and owned by the other ministries of the government.

The minister said it was time we decided to do something, to light a candle, instead of cursing the darkness and gloom. This was the way forward which could unite the people of Pakistan, to organise them and mobilize their energy and their potential. The diaspora was an important part of our national effort, he said. They needed a national vision from their country of origin which had to decide at this juncture if it was to be the Quaid's Pakistan or the Pakistan of the Taliban. There was no third option. Referring to the attack on a school girl Malala, he said it was a wakeup call and we could not wait for more such tragedies to jolt us into action. Dr. Sattar pointed out three areas on which the national policy had to be proactive; these were 'extremism', 'economic deterioration' and 'power shortage'.

He said that Overseas Pakistanis had a role in good governance and democratization which they could play if they were involved in the overall process of development and growth. In fact there was no way to leave them out if progress of the country was the aim. What was needed was a long term policy on manpower development and invest [s] in this fastest growing asset in terms of our population. He also pointed to the need for a socio-economic framework to adjust returning Pakistanis. He identified mining, housing, micro finance and small and medium sized enterprises on which earnings of non-resident Pakistanis could be invested.

He was confident that if the potential of the Pakistani diaspora was properly tapped it could free the country from dependence on foreign aid and make the economy self reliant. He said that overseas Pakistanis were our roaming ambassadors and present the real image of Pakistan. The majority of people of Pakistan were very moderate, civilized and believed in the principle of 'live and let live'. They believed in unity in diversity. They wanted to use their pluralism for re-enforcing their natural growth and integration, national construction and development but there were no policies to project that reality. If overseas Pakistanis were used for presenting a positive and soft image of Pakistan, then there would be no need to employ Mark Siegel to lobby for Pakistan.

He stated he had sent a proposal, to make amendments in the law to enable overseas Pakistanis to contest in the elections. That would give them their right place in the nation.

Finally, discussing features of his new policy he said there would be private-public sector ventures where overseas Pakistanis would be invited

to invest and develop quality education centres, technical and vocational centres. The policy would look after the families of the overseas Pakistanis at home and ensure them equal rights in the host countries.■

CHAPTER 1

Changing Perceptions about Home: The Life of Second and Third Generation

Dr. Marta Bolognani

Introduction

Second and third generation Pakistanis in Britain undoubtedly maintain still very close relationships with Pakistan. British Pakistani transnationalism[1] is well-known inside and outside academia through its manifestations such as intercontinental marriages (Charseley 2007), visits to the country of origin (Bolognani 2012b), remittances (Mughal and Makhlouf 2011) and charity work (Rehman and Kalra 2006). Transnationalism, then, is not only a 'way of being'(Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001) related to the accidental migration and family history, but an established (albeit always changing) 'way of doing' (ibid.). This is a common topic discussed by British public opinion as, due to the social unrest young Pakistani males have been involved in over the last decade, it has been hypothesised that young Pakistanis are not 'loyal' to Britain (for a critique of this position see Werbner 2005). In addition, researchers have found that the idea of return to Pakistan has not been completely dismissed (see among others Ali and Holden 2006, Bolognani 2007).

The political, social and economic nature of transnational relationships is of contentious interest for both countries of settlement and countries of origins. Countries of settlement are primarily interested in how these practices affect the integration process (Bolognani forthcoming, O'Flaherty, Skrbis and Tranter 2007:825), while countries of origin are concerned about their economic impact (Ahlburg and Brown 1998:146,148, Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992:3). People's lives are thus inevitably entangled in multiple allegiances — and this demands transnationalism scholars to move beyond the analysis of the competition between nation states over transnational practices by exploring the personal

[1] Given the theoretical controversies about the phenomenon of transnationalism, it is imperative to set out at the beginning of this paper that here I will use Portes et al.'s definition as a condition of 'high intensity of exchanges, the new modes of transacting, and the multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis' (Portes, A., L. E. Guarnizo & P. Landolt (1999). The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22, 217-237.) 219.

(Louie 2001).When migration-related decisions are at stake, although states have a huge impact on the migrants' lives, familial-personal relations exercise a decisive role in computing social-patriotic commitment and economic factors (Gmelch 1980:141, King 2000:17, Stefansson 2006:123).

A focus on individual experience (internal and external, emotional and real) allows one to go beyond the countries of settlements and countries of origin's political and economic investment in transnational practices. This has the advantage of opening the possibility of a more nuanced understanding of the complex triangulation between sending states, receiving states and migrants themselves (Sinatti 2012). One way to do so is to take 'home' as the multidimensional concept *par excellence* accounting for individual and collective perceptions and see how collective migration, family history and individual experience construct belonging and how this impacts the above mentioned triangulation (see also de Souza 2005, Golob 2009).

This paper will explore British Pakistanis' second and third generation's emotionally-close but politically-loose tie with 'back home'. It will point to the likelihood that their decreasing patriotic feelings, in spite of their multiple bonds to Pakistan, may interfere with possible gains on the part of the Pakistani state. In order to do so I will start with an analysis of the multiple personal transnational relationships that shape the idea of home and belonging for second and third generation Pakistanis. Then I will explore how the twofold process that allows to cultivate a tie emotionally while dismissing other politically-relevant aspects, may interfere, in the Pakistani case, with the potential that transnational practices are generally supposed to hold for countries of origin. As an example of how the economic bond between Pakistan and British Pakistanis does not necessarily translate into political or ideological affiliation, I will review the change over time in the public face of Pakistani associations in Britain. The data provided in this paper is based on a number of fieldworks both in United Kingdom (UK) and Pakistan (Mirpur District) between 2008 and 2012[2].

Emotionally-strong and Politically-loose

The visit to their parents' country of origin occupies a unique place in the lives of British Pakistanis (Mason 2004) because of the size of the phenomenon, its frequency, its resilience among the second generation, and the economic commitment that it presupposes (Bolognani 2012b). Whether

[2] The data on which this paper relies is from PREMIG, a Norwegian Research Council funded project (2011-2013), an IPPR research conducted in 2008 and EurIslam, a framework 7 EU-funded project (2010-2011).

frequency of visits is necessarily evidence of a close bond, or that this type of connection results in clear economic benefits for Pakistan, however, it is still arguable (Brooks and Singh 1978, Bolognani 2007). What is Pakistan for the second and third generation of British Pakistanis, then? The majority of them tend to refer to Pakistan still as 'back home', a term that they have inherited from the way their parents refer to their country of origin. One has a feeling, however, that among second-generation migrants, often the term 'home' is used more as a symbolic rather than a physical place (see also Al-Ali 2002, Falicov 2005, Bolognani 2007). Even when British Pakistanis have a strong familiarity and long history of time spent in Pakistan, their bond with 'back home' is quite particular. Many of them are influenced in their perception by the fact that they are kind of 'tourists at home', a position which is a strange fusion of familiarity and strangeness.

Second and third generation British Pakistanis get to know 'home' through roots tourism, holidays, health visits, and family visits (Bolognani 2012b). Roots tourism is the process by which the older generation attempts to convey homeland attachment to the younger, or by which the younger generation tries to get to know its own roots:

> My parents want to show me my roots and I want to see my roots. (…) Britain is their country, not our country. This feeling is always at the back of our head and the tables can turn at any time. (…) It's like even though we have British passports and nationalities but still we are just Pakistanis [and hence can be kicked out any day. (Taufeeq, 25, self-employed, from Derby, quoted in Bolognani 2012b).

Holidays are now a popular definition of sojourns in Pakistan, challenging the primacy of purely family-focused visits (Bolognani 2012b). Holidays in Pakistan offer the opportunity to experience nature and entertainment at a fraction of the UK cost, and at the same time to be with family, as explained by the following vignettes:

> Inzamam is a 44-year old man, married with 6 children. His wife is from Pakistan and moved to UK when they got married. He was born in Pakistan and came over when he was 3 years old. He has since lived in Bradford. He works as a Quality Assurance Manager for a big retailer and has travelled extensively, especially to the Far East, for work. He feels he would only consider going to Pakistan for a holiday; he claims that having been born there gives him a natural "affinity with Pakistan" but he does not feel a "longing to belong" there (Focus group in November 2011).

> Omid is 50 years old. He was born in Pakistan and came over at the age of five. He is single with no children. He lives in Manchester and runs a mechanic's workshop. He believes that a lot of British Pakistanis get ideas about moving abroad for a holiday, but "when a person is in holiday-mode certain countries look attractive as people are free from all their worries. But to live there, a lot more needs to be taken into consideration such as day to day problems, education and healthcare". He went on to explain that when one is young they may think that they want to live in various countries but "when you take everything into consideration over the years then as a mature person you come to a more considered decision" (Focus group in November 2011).

Another popular way through which second and third generation British Pakistanis experience their ancestral land is by seeking an improvement in their physical or spiritual health: some travel there to detox, others to seek help by visiting pilgrimage sites (see Bolognani 2012b).

It can be argued, however, that the main reason for visiting is still family. The second and third generation accompany elders to visit the extended family, assess possibilities of marriage with local partners, attend funerals or help with bureaucratic or personal disputes, particularly land-related (Bolognani 2012b). As in other post-migration contexts, however, the way the country of origin is experienced during these short visits can be heavily skewed by the 'holiday feeling' that paints everything in a positive light (Laoire 2007:339), or creates a shock so big that may even inhibit return for the ones who had considered it (Al-Ali et al. 2001: 623, Muggeridge and Doná 2006:420):

> 'the young people there [in the UK], they don't wanna [want] relate to Pakistan anymore. They go to Dubai for holidays or come here (…). They come here for holidays only. They can't live here. (Saeed, early twenties, Birmingham, employed, visiting Mirpur in 2008)
>
> I want to keep coming back to visit after a period of every five years (…)[it is a] better climate to enjoy the place and get away from things (Abida, 34 years old, Preston, housewife, visiting Mirpur in 2008)

But also:

> A haaji shopkeeper still rips you off when he knows you're from England. So what's the point… (Imran, 34, British businessman currently resident in Dubai, visiting Mirpur in 2008).

> There is no law and order here… there is nothing wrong with Pakistan but it is the people that are the problem (Irfan, late twenties, self-employed, Bradford, visiting Mirpur in 2008).

In both cases of holiday bliss or culture shock, the relationship between British Pakistanis and Pakistan is not of a nature that is likely to improve things for Pakistan as 'country of origin', as I will argue later, as the relationship with 'back home' is often of an exploitative nature and the patriotic arguments are almost extinct. This does not mean that the myth of return has been extinguished though.

When researching second and third generation Pakistanis in Bradford in 2002-2003, many interviewees used the idea of return as a rhetorical argument to symbolically and politically negotiate their place in British society by mentioning the possibility of return to Pakistan. The underlying argument was that if Britain did not want them anymore after the Northern riots and 9/11, they would move to Pakistan (Bolognani 2007). In my PREMIG research in 2011-2012, nearly ten years later, however, the argument of going 'back home' has progressively disappeared. In the last decade, if the relations between Britain as a state and Pakistanis as an ethnic group have not improved on many counts (Thomas 2010), Pakistan itself has clearly become a much more difficult place to depict as an oasis. In spite of this, however, some interviewees were still thinking about returning, albeit not for political reasons, but, perhaps surprisingly, more for lifestyle ones (Bolognani 2012a). This can be considered a reflection of their new class status as Britons than a judgment on Pakistan or Britain. Over the last decade Pakistan has progressively acquired a burdensome set of connotations in the imagination of both British Pakistanis and Britons and the rhetorical negotiation of the political myth of return has lost currency. In a kind of typical postcolonial condition — where the colonised suffer from a sense of inferiority complex, most second and third generation interviewees I talked to between 2002 and 2012 seem to have constructed a sense of superiority and confidence precisely against the negative connotations they attach to Pakistan in general. As argued in many a seminal work on identity among second and third generation British Pakistanis (see for example Bolognani and Mellor 2012) , both the lack of attachment to their parents' heritage, and the antagonism against aspects of the host country's culture, often lead to the prioritisation of an alternative 'strong' and 'positive' identity: 'Islam'. Roots tourism is then being progressively abandoned and so is (mostly) the cultivation of their Kashmiri connections on political grounds. Connections with family and frequency of visits may be maintained, but they are often emotionally-led and of a compensatory nature. It can be said that an inferiority complex developed in

a postcolonial setting such as Britain is compensated against contact with the imagined source of such complex, and it is in this way that UK underdogs feel a high-powered social group, for example, while holidaying in Mirpur (Bolognani 2012b).

In the next section, I will explore how these identity processes in which the idea of home is both cultivated practically and dismissed ideologically interferes, in the Pakistani case, with the potential that transnational practices are generally supposed to hold for countries of origin.

The Potential Benefits of Transnationalism for the Country of Origin

Countries of origin often consider their émigrés as a great resource. They are first of all an economic resource, as they send remittances or plan to invest or even return (Schiller et al. 1992) ; they are also potential brokers for diplomatic relations (Finch 2009) and may carry with them seeds of social change (such as social remittances, see Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). An increasing number of countries aim at maintaining connections with the expatriates and even interfere in their processes of settlement abroad (see for example Prime Minister Erdogan's appeals to both the German state and Turks in Germani, Avci and Kirişci 2006). While the changes emigrants have gone through during their time abroad may be of use to the country of origin, often these are considered potentially undermining for the original bond with 'back home'. For example, the Moroccan state actively tries to counter Islamist propaganda absorbed by its migrants to Europe as this is deemed to be a threat to the Moroccan establishment (Kahmann and Dguidegue 2012). Many Governments affected by mass emigration are thus putting in place policies to maximize the potential of their transnational population and limit the perceived damage of exposure of their subjects and their subjects' offspring to rival ideas, ideologies and practices. In spite of the often unequal power relation between sending and receiving countries, it has been argued that Muslim countries of origin still exert a considerable influence on their émigrés in respect of Islam (Brand 2006:44).

In the case of Pakistan, the power exerted by the state on its émigrés and their offspring is not obviously related to its monopoly of Islam. In spite of its title, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan seems to have abided by the secular principles that guided its founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Ahmed 1997:174.175) as far as its diasporic communities are concerned. Pakistan in fact has no equivalent of institutions such as Diyanet, the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs. Diyanet abroad tends to establish

itself as the interlocutor for European states in their relations with the Turkish Muslim community and is used by the Turkish government as a foreign-policy instrument, promoting one brand of 'Turkish Islam' (Citak 2010). The largest contribution to the lives of the diaspora in Britain of Pakistani institutions, in fact, regards mainly ethnic or political entities such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Soekefeld and Bolognani 2011) or the Pakistan People's Party (Werbner 2002:100). It appears that the Pakistan High Commission is important for most British Pakistanis only at the level of consular services such as issuing of identity cards. Even in more general terms, there is less and less resonance of themes discussed in Pakistan among the diaspora, as the 'Enlightened Moderation' propaganda testifies: this allegedly Sufi-inspired religious attitude promoted by the Pakistani governments in one way or another, albeit inconsistently, has resonated more with the American public opinion than within the diaspora circles.

Pakistanis in Europe, thus, have kept a very strong emotional connection with Pakistan, but have overall abandoned political relations or hopes in favour of a more Muslim universal formula (see Ummah), as it will be explained below. Nevertheless, there are initiatives wanting to maximize the bond between Pakistan and British Pakistanis of any generation. The 2009 Pakistan Remittance Initiative, for instance, is said to have brought the total sum of remittances to US$ 10.9 billion, making Pakistan the fifth largest remittances receiver in the world (APP 2012). In these figures, Britain appears as the second highest destination country generating remittances (with a per annum growth of 32.2 following United Arab Emirates (UAE) at 32.2 per cent, ibid.). The economic bond between Pakistan and British Pakistanis seems to be thus still thriving and consistent (Mughal and Makhlouf 2011), while the political or ideological aspects of such an affiliation are not so. This is testified by a historical review of the associations of Pakistanis in Britain derived from a piece of research — project EurIslam — within the European Union (EU) framework.

The Change over Time of Pakistani Associations in Britain

Countries of settlement in Western Europe have had a tradition of looking more towards the perceived threat to the existing social fabric by immigrants than at their benefits. Issues of insularity and of maintenance of divisive customs are often mentioned in the public discourse, while the economic discussion of the benefits of the immigrant workforce is played down if not challenged. An underlying message in this discourse is the choice given to migrants: either fully integrate (whatever this means), or go back. To safeguard a broad spirit of liberalism, however, countries of

settlement feel obliged to recognise particularistic civil society phenomena, such as the formation of ethnic or religious associations.

Stuck in between, migrants both as individuals and as groups have to make choices through processes of personal and collective (political) negotiation. These choices respond to political and discursive opportunities and adversities (Snow and Benford 1988) in ways that are affected by religious belief, trajectories of self-realization, changes occurred during migration, demographic variables and ideology. This supports the thesis expressed in the introduction that Pakistanis in Europe have kept a very strong emotional connection with Pakistan but have overall abandoned political relations or hopes tied to the country of origin.

In order to illustrate this I will summarize the historical review of Pakistani and Muslim associations in Britain by EurIslam. In UK in the postwar period a number of migrant welfare organisations were called after Pakistan. The main scope of these associations was to facilitate the welfare of their adherents, and more broadly often to take up a cultural promotion of their heritage. Although this may be defined as ethnic withdrawal, in the sense that ethnic identification was necessary to be part of it, they must be considered as the natural progression of the settlement process of migrants who looked at each other for solidarity, comfort and practical help. During my research in 2010-2011, the panorama of Muslim associations surveyed, in spite of Pakistanis representing the majority of Muslims in Britain, showed that the label 'Pakistani' was disappearing. I only found a handful of organisations that used identities referring to their national 'homeland', which shows that the Muslim organisational field is much more oriented towards British society. Among the 41 associations contacted in England, Wales and Scotland, the only organisation using the label 'Pakistani' declared the plan to rename itself in order to be able to reach out to more recent migrant groups and obtain more funding (Bolognani and Statham forthcoming). The Muslim label has then become more popular than any homeland or ethnic one because of a number of reasons. The first one is that opening up to the possibility of an heterogenous membership base may prolong an organisation's life expectancy given the intense competition. The second is that in Britain certain groups that rely on public funding need to comply with minimum diversity standards. The third is that Muslim associations have now clearly 'sank roots' (Werbner 2005:745) in a multicultural society and therefore are not pursuing migrants' particularistic agendas but are part of mainstream political discourse. Overall, the attention and commitment to UK-wide issues was one of the most significant elements in the outlook of all the organisations interviewed. This also means that rather than focusing on religious opinions or practices of a universal value and that could be applicable to any Muslim in whichever

part of the Ummah, all organisations are very deeply influenced and engaged with the country of settlement and their immediate locality. Most associations said that they dealt with foreign policy issues more because they were asked to do so by the media, rather than because they thought it was among their priorities; they complained about being asked to comment on a variety of problems (from Hudood laws in Pakistan to anti-terror policy) in spite of their remit being, most of the time, local. For most of them this was an adversity rather than an opportunity structure against which they had to react. We could then say that the intensification of religious practices, trajectories of self-realisation influenced by a structural push towards activism, changes over time since migration, and demographic variables such as the generational one, all concur towards making the countries of origin's grip on British Pakistanis weaker. These associations have moved from first-generation migrants' leadership to one mainly occupied by British-born or at least British-educated men and women. In all interviews, the biographical component was offered to me as the main reason behind one's leadership: one's experience of growing up as a minortiy and as a Muslim in Britan was the strongest motivation towards activism. If biographical reasons (such as discovery of a political commitment through engagement in the locality, or the discovery of Islam) are so important in shaping their social action, what kind of role does 'home' as Pakistan have in the biography of second and third-generation Pakistanis?

The Waning of Patriotism in the Diaspora

In 2012, I have worked in close contact with Dr. Ceri Oeppen on the same project on possibilities and realities of return migration (PREMIG). Oeppen works on the Afghanistan part of the project, while I work on the Pakistan one. Oeppen is currently focusing on one particular strand that has emerged from her interviews: the view of return as 'doing something for your own country' (Oeppen 2012). Personal communication has highlighted how this strand seems to be completely absent from my interviews over the last decade with Pakistanis of any generation in Britain, while Afghanis in Britain seem to show signs of strong patriotism that have popular manifestations in pendants shaped as Afghanistan and scarves with their flag's colour. Any charitable or development concern expressed by my interviewees since 2002 is either articulated through a family or humanitarian frame, but there is no nationalistic frame. This may be related to the fact that most of my interviewees have been of Mirpuri origin.

Mirpur could be said to have an all-round peripheral connotation, although in the UK it has become the place that embodies the collective

imaginary of the Pakistani population. The town of Mirpur is located on a hill on the border between Azad Kashmir and the plains of Punjab (the Potohar Plateau). This town now has a new relatively orderly shopping centre surrounded by badly maintained roads, roundabouts sponsored by Bradford restaurants and buildings with columns covered by bougainvillea that have arisen thanks to the investments of migrants, but at the time of the Princely State of Kashmir it was an area of no relevance. The absence of what is recognised in the world as Kashmiri handicrafts (shawls, papier mâché, walnut wood work) demonstrates the peripheral location of Mirpur in the economy and in the history of Kashmir (see also: Kabir 2009). The language spoken in Mirpur (Pahari) is more similar to the Potohari dialect of Punjab than to Kashmiri. Ties with Pakistan are, if not antagonistic as in much of the rest of Kashmir, at least cold. The last 50 years have been characterized by a phenomenon of alienation towards the Pakistani state because of the exploitation of the energy produced by the Mangla dam (not rewarded with investments in local infrastructure), the denial of permission to have its own airport (in summer twenty-five flights a week to arrive in Islamabad from England and one can easily imagine that the vast majority of passengers go to Mirpur) and the disastrous reconstruction (or lack thereof) in the surrounding areas after the 2005 earthquake. On the other hand, I have mentioned elsewhere that Mirpuris do not particularly feel for the Kashmiri cause either (Bolognani 2012b). Furthermore, I have not registered any difference among non-Mirpuri interviewees, who still bring in family-networks-based arguments to articulate any development-oriented action.

Forms of 'banal nationalism' (Sokefeld 2006) such as the celebrations for the rarer and rarer Pakistani cricket victories or the exhibition of the Pakistani flag at melas in UK seem to erect a border with local minorities (i.e., British Indians), rather than being a continuation of the Subcontinent's political struggles. While during my first visit in Mirpur in 2003 I bought a 'Proud to be Pakistani' t-shirt, already in 2008 no such merchandise was available. Although the older generations migrated to the UK may still have some formal respect for their identity as Pakistanis, the younger generations, in spite of their cultivated familiarity with 'back home' overall dismiss political connections to Pakistan. This was exemplified by the anecdote retold me in 2005 by a husband and wife (respectively from Faisalabad and Mirpur, both in their fifties). Their now 20-year-old son had gone through a period of religious intensification in his teens, where he had started attending meetings of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). Although the Sufi milieu in which the parents had grown up did not make them sympathetic towards HT, they had allowed their son to attend the meetings thinking that they would keep him away from 'bad company'. When one day, however, he

came back home repeating what the HT organisers had said against Muhammad Ali Jinnah, they prohibited his attendance. Such zeal was exceptional for the attitudes towards Pakistan that I have registered in a decade of research. However, the different generational investment in the idea and history of Pakistan is very obvious in this anecdote. This is particularly surprising if we think of the intense nationalistic propaganda on which public discourse in Pakistan is based, especially as far as education is concerned (Saigol 2005). Why has this propaganda not been transmitted successfully down to generations in Britain? Second and third generation Pakistanis interviewed since 2002 have almost unanimously demanded to be labelled as Muslim before (if not at all) as Pakistanis or Kashmiris (Soekefeld and Bolognani 2011, Bolognani and Mellor 2012). This sort of 'faith intensification' over nationality/ethnicity/culture does not match the trends amongst Afghanis, but even among other Muslim populations of different heritages, or among other minorities such as African-Caribbeans, Chinese and Indians(Bolognani and Mellor 2012). This has also repercussions on public discourse, and thus commentators are more inclined to use religious categories and variables, rather than any other (ibid.).

The fact that public disocurse pushes British Pakistanis to idenitfy as British in a political claim of inclusion (Webster 2012) may also be a part of an identity discourse that shifts further away from Pakistan based on citizenship arguments. The dilution that may occur through the passing of generations may also be a component, although this may be in contradiction with the consistent rate of transnational practices that I have illustrated above. If these transnational practices, such as annual visiting, may not directly help the Pakistani government in either the political or economic sphere, however, I believe that in these 'emotionally-close' relationships there is a potential that can be fulfilled over time, as the two vignettes below illustrate:

> Zulfikar followed his sister to Britain as a child, as her sister was getting married to a man who had already migrated to Birmingham. He remembers 20 years ago, visiting relatives in Mirpur, he told them that his contact with Pakistan would come to an end when his parents died. He tells me this story while he is packing for his annual visit. He says that his relatives have reminded him of that statement ever since. He smiles telling me that recently he has gone through something he calls a 'rediscovery'. He has re-discovered some sort of connection with Pakistan, and even if he did not go back to his own village, he would still go back to Pakistan after his mum died, but as a professional, maybe by encouraging teachers in Britain to make links with there, to help with the

> infrastructure. He thinks that in the last few years reading the Urdu newspapers has been part of a personal evolution that has led him to care much more for the Pakistani community than in the past, both in UK and in Pakistan. Although he has worked as a professional among Pakistanis for many years, he feels that he is doing everything with a different spirit now. He feels he kind of left the Pakistan community in the 1970s (he married an English woman) and proved that he could live in another world, but now he can go back in their midst because he wants to. For example now, out of a personal and not professional interest, he is about to launch a project on Pakistani writers (interview recorded in UK in 2011).
>
> Sahar is in her mid-twenties, was born in the UK of Pakistani parents and moved back to Pakistan in her teenage years. She has now come back to the UK to gain a postgraduate qualification. I ask if anything could change her mind about going back to Pakistan. She first says no, then she thinks that she would like to give 'something back to Pakistan' although the brain-drain argument does not apply to her because she came from the UK, so in a way she abandoned the UK for a while, not Pakistan. Still, she thinks she owes something to that country and would like to do something at a charity level. I ask her why she feels she has a debt with the country and she mentions that she got a very good education in Pakistan. I remind her that her education was all private and that her family paid all of it. She then says that when you spend 12 years in a country you feel attached to it; now she speaks the language, she is ethnically Pakistani, and therefore she feels a natural tie (interview recorded in UK in 2011).

The two examples above show how younger British Pakistani generations do not actively pursue or explicitly recognise a national link to Pakistan, but during their intense transnational interactions, they end up nursing a tie that, especially in times of need, may have an important economic and political bearing. This tie, no matter how volatile, has already shown evidence of being of some consequence at times of crisis. By looking at the effect that the (mainly touristic) relation between the countries affected by the 2004 tsunami and the charity donors had and the lack of international donations for the 2010 floods in North Western Pakistan (Bolognani 2012b), it is easy to imagine what potential the transnational relationships reviewed above may carry. As Pakistan has currently next-to-nothing tourism, the appeal in time of crisis will mainly be directed to the émigrés and their children who 'naturally' (in Sahar's words) feel affinity and empathy.

Conclusion

Above I have argued that second and third generation Pakistanis in UK have kept a very strong emotional connection with Pakistan but have overall abandoned political relations or hopes. This contradicts expectations that Muslim States have a stronger grip on their emigrants because of religious/ideological implications. British Pakistanis, however, have moved towards a more universal formula of Muslim identity that often affords them the opportunity of becoming transnational in a way that resonates both with citizenship debates in the country of settlement and religious trends such as the revival of the Ummah discourse. The sentimental appeal of the motherland is waning with the generations, while new global movements offer stronger identity options and settlement societies' prizes in integration seem far more promising than the ones countries of origin can ever offer. In this way, we can see how transnationalism itself carries the potential, in the long term, to erode the more institutionalised relationships with the country of origin.

On the other hand, British Pakistanis of any generation are still emotionally very close to their country of origin. Often, as Nielsen and Riddle argue (2007:4), emotions become a variable in diaspora investments. However, such emotionally-based investments often benefit a small circle of people closer to the donor, turning areas of high emigration such as Mirpur into what Ballard once called 'capital-rich under-development' (Ballard 2003). Wherever a business investment goes beyond the family-wide benefit, it is likely that this is to the advantage of a UK-based business, and only incidentally to the locality (see Bolognani 2012b). Economic remittances in the form of emotionally-triggered donations may be considered a potlatch (Bolognani 2007:71). The potlatch is known through classic anthropological texts as the ceremonial custom traditionally performed in North America to re-distribute a community's wealth. In the case of Pakistan, it has been argued that similar customs of redistribution of gifts and viands contribute to the reaffirmation of one's status (Lyon 2004:146). In Mirpur, the aspects of wealth redistribution and status reaffirmation seem to detract from the potential of injecting into a wider segment of society, therefore producing the above mentioned 'capital-rich under-development'. Although the feeling of guilt for having migrated and left others behind, typical of migration contexts (Long 2004), seems to be progressively disappearing in favour of more ambivalent relationships that include streaks of exploitation (see Bolognani 2012b), I argue that , the perpetuation of the link between the UK and Mirpur may become significant in the future. The multiple transnational connections between British Pakistanis and Pakistan, be they leisure-based, family-based or

business-based, may become significant in times of need, as happened during the Kashmir earthquake (Rehman and Kalra 2006). The currently mostly empty formulation ‘back-home’, may be filled with meaning in particular circumstances. As long as the formulation ‘back home’ persists in the everyday language of British Pakistanis, then, I argue that there is a container ready to be filled with emotional meaning that may benefit Pakistan. In this way, although political and ideological ties are visibly waning, emotional ties can still be capitalised on by the state. The battle over transnational benefits, then, is likely to be lost unless Pakistan is able to capitalize on the different forms of transnationalism from below.■

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CHAPTER 2

Changing Patterns of Migration: Brain Drain/human Capital Migration

Nadia Sajjad

Introduction

"A simple way to take measure of a country is to look at how many want in and how many want out."

— Tony Blair

Migration in the age of globalisation is not just characterized as international flow of capital, commodities, goods, services and information but more importantly high skilled labour. The developed countries are absorbing various skilled workers and scientists in the form of scholarships and other incentives like the H1-B visa programme in the United States, Green Card scheme for Information Technology (IT) experts in Germany, and introduction of the highly skilled migrant programme in the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. Developing countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and China, are the major contributors of highly skilled migrant workers.[1] International migration has been the most observable and potent side of globalisation. International and domestic migration gains significant importance in the 21st century era. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its 2002 policy report defines highly skilled men and women with a broad range of educational and occupational backgrounds as university students, nurses, information technology specialists, researchers, business executives and managers, and intra-company transferees. Some of these highly skilled individuals migrate on a temporary basis, while others migrate with an intention to settle permanently in the host country. Most countries having economic wealth are the centre of attraction for skilled migrants. After World War II, the brain drain phenomenon has been associated with the United States (US), because it was an economically rich country. The

[1] G. T. K Naeem & Zainab Iftikhar. "Migration of Highly Skilled and its Impact on the Economic and Technological Development of Pakistan and Bangladesh," report no. 10-11, South Asia Network of Economic Research Institutes, 1.

OECD report relates the migration of skilled workers to globalisation that started after WWII, characterized by the return of extensive cross-national flows of capital, goods, raw materials, and information.[2] Many social scientists consider this phenomenon as a social issue in both receiving and sending countries. This is more or less visible as the dilemma for all countries.[3]

Statement of the Problem

Human resources are one of the most valuable assets of any country's economy which invests millions in the education and development of their work force to sustain and enhance its economic growth. With globalisation qualified workers and skilled work force of developing countries have been migrating abroad to enter in global competition for economic benefits they cannot get in their homeland. This paper addresses the problem from Pakistan's situation and tries to find how the brain drain can be converted into brain gain and suggests policy recommendations.

Pakistan and Migration

Migration, both internal and international, has been a constant in the history of Pakistan since inception after getting independence from British rule. Millions of people started moving from India to Pakistan for not just economic but largely social, political and religious reasons. Another wave of migration began in 1970 with the emergence of Bangladesh resulting in a significant number of people of West Pakistani origin returning home.

An in-depth analysis of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the rural and urban areas is necessary to understand the causes of rural-urban migration in Pakistan. But it has been observed that a joint household model of migration would be more appropriate than an individual level model of migration (Stark and Bloom 1985, Stark 1991). The towns around military cantonments between Lahore and Peshawar in the north-west were centres of urbanization. Lahore attracted rural immigrants from all around and Karachi as the capital of the country as well as of Sindh became a hub of rural-urban migration.[4]

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[2] "International Mobility of the Highly Skilled," policy brief, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July, 2002, 1.

[3] Sunita Dodani & Ronald E LaPorte, "Brain Drain from Developing Countries: How Can Brain Drain Be Converted into Wisdom Gain?" *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine,* vol. 98, no. 11 (November 2005): 487.

[4] Gazdar, Haris. "A Review of Migration Issues in Pakistan," Childtrafficking.com, June 22-23, 2003, 4.

International Migration

International migration is an inextricable part of economic globalisation and should be brought under broader multilateral agreements regulating trade and investment. International migration does not stem from a lack of market development, but from the development of markets themselves. Immigration policies to date have implicitly assumed that immigrants come to maximise earnings and policies have sought to influence conditions in labour markets.[5]

The first wave of international migration from Pakistan to Britain started in the 1950s.

The primary motive was socio-economic. The economic pull towards Britain was powerful as labour was over 30 times more paying than in Pakistan. The migrants belonged mostly to Mirpur district in Azad Kashmir, Campbellpur sub-district, Peshawar and villages in Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat and Lyallpur.[6]

Another wave of migration from urban centres in Pakistan to urban centres overseas specifically towards the Middle East (ME) started in 1970 when the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto encouraged both skilled and unskilled labour to work in the Persian Gulf countries under the aegis of the ministry of Labour. In the 1980s, there were an estimated two million Pakistanis working in the Gulf States but by 1990 when employment opportunities were decreasing there following the Gulf war many workers had to return to Pakistan.[7]

What may be described as the third wave of migration was towards Europe and America of young men establishing themselves and then calling their families and dependents. During the same period of the 1980s, there was a growing trend among well-off urban families to send their children to overseas for higher education. In the category of migrants comprised people escaping political oppression in Pakistan. Most emigrated to western Europe and North America. The migration of Pakistanis to settle in North America has been going on since 1965 when the US government lifted immigration restrictions and repealed quotas.

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[5] Douglas S. Massey, "Patterns and Processes of International Migration in the 21," Time.Dufe.Edu., 2003.

[6] Alison Shaw, *Kinship and Continuity: Pakistani families in Britain*, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 13-15.

[7] "Migration and Pakistan?" Yes Pakistan.com, June 18, 2012, http://www.yespakistan.com/people/migration_pak.asp (accessed September 2, 2012).

Pakistani migration to Japan started in the 1980s comprising mostly members of the 'mohajar' community. Japan was a good choice for single male migrants. The trend was believed to have begun in the late 1970s when one Pakistani working in Japan sent a car back to his homeland. The potential for doing business in used cars also attracted more Pakistanis to come to Japan in the 1990s. Another motive for migration to Japan was social freedom which was not possible in Pakistan or Muslim countries of the Gulf. Many Pakistanis entered Japan through illegal visas and got themselves regularized through marriage with Japanese women.[8]

Current Migration Pattern and Brain Drain Issue

The concept of globalisation is complex and controversial. David Held, a leading theorist of globalisation, has provided the following definition: 'Globalisation may be thought of as a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions — assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact — generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.' These processes have already resulted in an increase in the goods, ideas, information, and capital flowing across borders and many commentators argue that globalisation is also increasing the flow of people across borders, too. According to a migration and remittances factbook of 2011, the top five emigration countries of South Asia were India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Their destination is the high-income OECD countries (23.6 per cent), high-income non-OECD countries (34.2 per cent), intra-regional (28.2 per cent), other developing countries (9.4 per cent) and unidentified (4.6 per cent).

A growing proportion of people who move for largely economic reasons are now classified as highly skilled migrants. The migration of intellectual manpower from less developed countries to more developed countries is a global phenomenon. While the migration of intellect has its own merits and leads to better development of the world, it is also damaging for the countries which badly need their presence and their contributions. Brain drain can cripple the delivery of key services, especially in education or health care.[9] A brain drain or human capital flight is an emigration of trained and talented individuals to other nations or jurisdictions. Brain drain can occur either when individuals who study

[8] "Pakistanis in Japan," Wikipedia, October 24, 2012, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistanis_in_Japan (accessed September 24, 2012).

[9] Jeff Dayton-Johnson et al., "Migration and Employment," *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, 154.

abroad and complete their education do not return to their home country, or when individuals educated in their home country emigrate for higher wages or better opportunities.

Worldwide there is also a significant international movement of students too, and they often are also included in the category of highly skilled migrants. According to a study by Dodani and Laporte, it was found that Pakistan has been the recipient of several training programmes for the past three decades. Under the Ministry of Science and Technology from 1985 to 1993 candidates were funded for doctoral level training abroad and of these 116 acquired a doctor of philosophy (PhD) in health sciences. However, only ten per cent of these returned back causing a brain drain of 90 per cent.[10] Nadeem ul Haq in his research identified that human capital management policies based on skill incentives parity and with an eye to the level and quality of professional development is a better approach to dealing with human capital problems. Like the rich countries, the poor countries must also understand the advantages of drawing on the global talent market. More efforts might be needed to be placed on policies for crowding in human capital through targeting the development of domestic professions. In Pakistan, the migration rate of individuals with a tertiary education is more than seven per cent.

[10] Dodani Sunita, "Building research capacity in Pakistan: Effectiveness of an epidemiology training workshop taught by traditional classroom and video teleconferencing methods." (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 8.

List of Qualified Workers Migrated Overseas in January 2012-October 2012

Month	Doctor	Engineer	Teacher/ Lecturer	Manager	Accountant	Comp operater	Surveyor	Pharacist	Banker
January 2012	-	-	-	-		65	3	-	-
March 2012	5	25	3	8	1	5		5	-
April 2012	3	18	4	9	6	2	3	2	-
May 2012	4	13	2	5	5	-	-	-	-
June 2012	18	4	2	13	5	15	2	1	-
July 2012	3	17	4	5	4	-	2	-	-
August 2012	6	14	6	17	7	-	2	-	-
September 2012	3	18	7	2	7	-	-	-	-
October 2012	3	16	5	23	6	-	4	-	17

Source: Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment.

Causes of Brain Drain in Pakistan

The migration of the Pakistani professionals to foreign countries has increased visibly among young educated and skilled Pakistani such as doctors, IT experts, scientists and other qualified persons. The study conducted by Naveed Wahid Awan et al., on the impact of educational attainment on individual wages found a negative relationship between educational capital and economic growth in Pakistan. It was found that there is no significant causal relationship between economic growth and educational capital. As a capital good, education can be used to develop human resources necessary for economic and social development. The focus on education as a capital good relates to the concept of human capital, which emphasizes that the development of skills is equally an important factor in production as are finance, natural resources, and physical equipment. In this study, it was advocated to reform the system to upgrade and internalise the contributions of educational capital to economic growth.[11]

Economics reasons such as job satisfaction, academically progressive environment, better pay and service conditions as well as opportunities for acquiring higher education are some of the strong reasons behind the brain-drain from Pakistan. There is no doubt that more and better opportunities in the US and UK are the attractions for moving there but political instability at home also forces the people to leave the motherland. Another reason is lack of higher education centres, specifically in science and technology. Education gets a tiny portion of the national budget in which the share of higher education is just a negligible slice.[12]

When a Saudi delegation came to Lahore to hire Pakistani doctors, a senior surgeon said: "There is already a shortage of doctors in several departments, like Intensive-care units (ICUs), emergency wards and anesthesia. No matter how hard you work to build your hospitals, you cannot run them without good doctors. Instead of doing something to stop the brain drain, the government is facilitating other governments to hire its best doctors."[13]

Nasir Nadeem and Dr. Muhammad Ashfaq, found that brain drain occur due to the following reasons:

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[11] Naveed Wahid Awan et al., "A dynamic analysis of education and economic," *Gomal University Journal of Research* (2011): 32.

[12] Majid Tamoor, "Pakistan Brain Drain, *Saach TV*, August July 29, 2012, http://www.saach.tv/2012/08/29/brain-drain-in-pakistan/

[13] Ali Usman, "Brain drain: Saudi officials arrive to hire more Pakistan doctors," *Express Tribute*, April 24, 2012.

- Poor economic conditions.
- Non-availability of opportunities for youth in the existing social set-up.
- Availability of resources in foreign countries to conduct research.
- Higher salary levels for researchers in recipient countries.
- Better living facilities like housing etc., for the migrants' family.
- The differential in salaries and living conditions between the home and recipient countries.[14]

Strategies for Converting Brain Drain into Brain Gain

How can the negative impact of high quality manpower loss be compensated. The government spends billions on the education of experts, but these skills are utilized by foreign countries when the experts fail to return to their country. The question is how can the diasporas play their role in the country's development. The answer lies in migrants bringing technology, skills and new ideas back from abroad in addition to remittances, technology transfer and networking.

Method and Procedure of Study

This research was conducted to find out the reasons of skilled workers migrating abroad through two types of questionnaires to obtain the views of skilled emigrants. A total of 240 respondents from immigration consultancies were randomly selected to make up the sample. Selected participants answered a survey questionnaire. Data gathered from this research were then computed for interpretation. Along with primary data, selected secondary data was also collected to support the survey results.

Nature of Study

Main purpose of this study is to ascertain the causes of brain drain and how to offset its bad effects. The study is based on both secondary and primary data and information gathered through questionnaires and structured interviews. The population of this research can be defined as immigration consultancies and the sampling unit is the highly skilled emigrant.

[14] Nasir Nadeem & Dr Muhammad Ashfaq, "Brain drain: causes and implications," *Dawn*, October 18, 2004.

Sample Selection

The sample was selected by using a random formula for all the skilled Pakistanis settled abroad as well as those who opt for going abroad. But due to limitation of resources and time, it was decided to choose emigration consultancies in Pakistan to take as a sample. Again owing to my limitations as a female researcher, I had to confine myself to immigration consultancies in Peshawar area, as it is a survey research which includes questionnaire as well as interviews. Structured and unstructured interviews of those clients who do not respond to questionnaires were conducted.

From 15 immigration consultancies emigrants were selected as respondents; their ages are in the range of 25 to 40 and 100 return emigrants were interviewed for the study. The total target sample comprised of 100 people migrating abroad and 100 return migrants through random sampling.

The education level of the skilled emigrants was taken as a sample. They included doctors, engineers, businessmen, teachers/researchers, students, lawyers, IT specialists etc.

Research Instruments

Interviews: Interviews and informal discussions were held with target respondents to capture their perceptions, which helped the study to a great extent. Structured interviews were conducted with return migrants from UK, Australia, UK and Canada.

Limitations

The difficulty arose due to non-availability of data about highly qualified persons who were reluctant in sharing of data. To meet that constraints the data was delimited to the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) regional office, Peshawar.

Most of the difficulties cropped up in analyzing the emigrants' behaviour and their personnel views on the causes of brain drain in Pakistan and the reliability of that information.

Source of Data

The source of data would be both primary as well as secondary.

Organisation and Interpretation of Data:

The data collected through questionnaire/Library/Internet study was organised, tabulated and interpreted accordingly. For the interpretation of

each question percentages have been used wherever possible. The question getting qualitative or descriptive answers were organised and interpreted separately. The main findings have been drawn, conclusions arrived and recommendations made at the end.

Response from Pakistanis going to Migrate

Research Question 1: Reasons for Skilled Migration

	Question/Consultations Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Economic Factor	100	70%	30%
2	Security Factor/Political Factor	100	20%	80%
3	Family considerations	100	30%	70%
4	Academic/Research	100	50%	50%
5	Employment	100	59%	39%
6	Better standard of living	100	15%	85%

Research Question 2: Job Security now and on Return

S.No	Question/ Consultations Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views		
			Yes %	No%	Not sure %
1	Happy with the current job	100	35%	40%	25%
2	Confident to find job abroad	100	50%	20%	30%
3	Confident to find job after return	100	50%	20%	30%

Research Question 3: Emigrants Intentions about Returning and Utilizing Expertise in Pakistan

S. No	Question/ Consultations Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views		
			Yes %	No%	Not sure %
1	Do you have intentions to return	100%	35%	40%	25%
2	I will definitely return and have made plans to do so.	100%	30%	20%	50%

Research Question 4: Strategies that have to be Applied to Make Them Stay in Pakistan

S.No	Question/ Consultations Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Job availability	100	50%	50%
2	Provide research facilities	100	40%	60%
3	Preserve economic problems	100	55%	45%
4	Secure working environment	100	17%	83%
5	Provide quality Education	100	43%	57%
6	Merit system and talent encouragement	100	55%	45%

Research Question 5: Solutions to Stop Brain Drain

S.No	Question/ Consultation Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Provide employment suited to qualification	100	17%	83%
2	Basic facilities of life be provided	100	10%	90%
3	There is need for Educational Reforms	100	25%	75%
4	Good Governance	100	30%	70%
5	Research facilities	100	49%	51%
6	Provide good working environment	100	37%	63%
7	Fair recruitment and promotions	100	77%	23%
8	Economic problems need to be addressed	100	49%	51%
9	Encourage Intellectuals	100	40%	60%
10	Awareness campaign	100	28%	72%

Responses from Return Migrants

Research Question 6: Reasons for Brain Drain/Leaving Homeland

S.No	Question/Consultation Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Economic factor	100	59%	39%
2	General job dissatisfaction	100	51%	49%
3	Dissatisfied with political/social Conditions	100	14%	86%
5	Security problems	100	20%	80%
6	Family consideration	100	30%	70%
7	Lack of opportunities for development	100	34%	66%

Research Question7: What is Attractive for Emigrants in Foreign Countries?

S.No	Question/Consultation Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Higher wages &income	100	80%	20%
2	Greater job mobility	100	55%	45%
3	Professional career development	100	40%	60%
4	Better working conditions	100	25%	75%
5	Degree demand	100	64%	36%
6	Social security	100	28%	72%
7	Modern educational system	100	48%	52%
8	Prestige of foreign training	100	33%	67%

Research Question 8: Remittances could be a Substitute for Brain Drain

S.No	Question/Consultation Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views		
			Yes %	No%	May be %
1	Could remittances fill the gap of the skilled Intellectuals	100%	61%	24%	0%
2	Remittances are a substitute for Brain drain loss	100%	50%	40%	10%
3.	Remittances we received are from skilled workers	100%	30%	27%	43%

Research Question 9: Government Level Intervention Regarding Brain Drain

S.No	Question/Consultation Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Government should restrict the outflow of migration	100	61%	39%
2	Government should apply heavy taxes on the emigrants in sending country	100	45%	55%
3	Government should initiate attractive projects for overseas Pakistanis to bring them back	100	79%	21%

Research Question 10: Retention should be given to Students

S.No	Question/Consultation Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Retention through educational programmes	100	39%	41%
2	Retention through economic support programme	100	58%	42%
3	Retention through developmental programmes	100	51%	49%
4	Retention through career building programmes	100	57%	43%

Research Question 11: Measures that Need to be Taken to Attract Pakistanis from Abroad

S.No	Question/Consultation Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Provide working condition	100%	27%	73%
3	Provide jobs that meet their qualification and skills	100%	49%	51%
4	By economic support	100%	61%	39%
5	Business opportunities	100%	66%	34%
10	By offering attractive packages	100%	69%	31%

Research Question 12: Diaspora's Role in Brain Gain and Brain Circulation

S.No	Question/Consultation Points	Number of Respondents	Respondents Views	
			Yes %	No%
1	Remittances role is effective in compensating brain drain issue	100	34%	66%
2	Diasporas contribution in Pakistan development through remittances	100	56%	44%
3	Diasporas contribution in Pakistan development through brain circulation	100	62%	38%
4	Are you satisfied with government role in diaspora structures	100	34%	66%

Interpretation of the Data

Findings from Emigrants

According to emigrants data, the following findings are obtained.

Most of the emigrants are leaving Pakistan due to (70%) economic factor, (20%) of the migrants view the political situation of the country not stable enough for survival. Family consideration were viewed as a powerful cause for their emigration (30%), whereas the emigrants who consider to improve their academic qualification (50%). Job security and not satisfied with current job (59%) also was a factor to move to green pastures. As far as good living standards are considered (15%) are holding that reason to migrate. Thirty-five per cent of the migrants are quite confident that they will get the job after return and acquiring skills whereas disappointment regarding job provision was found among (50%) and (50%) claim that they are not sure and will not say anything.

Return migration plays an important role in lessening brain drain effect in various ways. As far as the emigrants are concerned, (35%) want to return and utilize their expertise in Pakistan against (30%) who do not want to come back and would remain overseas. To the question what are the measures that need to be taken to make them stay in Pakistan. (50%) of the emigrants consider availability of job is a measure which can stop their migration; (40%) of the emigrants propose better research facilities in Pakistan which would stop this outflow: (55%) suggest overcoming of economic problems as a solution for their stay in the homeland.

According to skilled workers (49 %) suggest employment suited to their qualification was the means for combating brain drain; (10%) recommend basic facilities (Health, Education, Security) in the country: (25%) advocate educational reforms; (30%) recommend secure working environment; (49%) suggest research facilities and good working environment; (77%) propose fair recruitment and promotion To encourage intellectuals while (49%) believe economic problems of most of the emigrants need to be addressed to stop human capital flight; (28%) put forward suggestions regarding awareness campaigns to stop brain drain.

Findings from Return Migrants

As far as their migration to overseas is concerned (59%) of the migrants view professional isolation as a major reason for outflow of intellectuals; (51%) consider general job dissatisfaction as a major reason for their migration to Australia; (14) of the migrants believe poor economic returns are a cause of their migration to overseas; (20%) think dissatisfaction with

social/political conditions is the most important ground of brain drain; (30%) feel security is the main reason for leaving country; (20%) cite family consideration; (30%) of the returnees believe lack of proper planning for manpower jobs was the main cause of migration among skilled persons; (34%) of the returnees think lack of opportunities for development is a reason for their leaving.

What is attractive for you in foreign countries which compel you to leave your family and friends?

Higher wages are attractive to (80%); (55%) thought greater job mobility was a factor to stay there; (40%) believe professional development as a magnet; (25%) consider better working conditions; (64%) thought a foreign degree and modern educational system were more in demand there; (33%) consider foreign training more advanced and better compared to country of origin.

In response to query about remittances (61%) said remittances could never substitute for brain drain; (50%) returnees thought remittances could be a substitute; (30%) thought remittances were received from skilled workers.

Regarding restriction on emigration of intellectuals, (61%) of the returnees recommend [s] restriction on outflow of skilled migrant; (45%) believe source countries should apply taxes on skilled workers; (79%) suggest attractive projects for skilled migrants.

About the efficacy of Educational/Economic Support/ Developmental/Recreational/Career Building programmes (39%) support such initiatives; (59%) believe this for skilled workers; (51%) suggest that for talented students; (57%) suggest career building programmes to be initiated and implemented in different fields.

How the Intelligentsia among the diasporas could be attracted from abroad? (27%) say by providing better working condition; (51%) think through brain circulation programmes funded by government in science technology sector; (61%) favour economic support; (66%) business opportunities; (69%) think attractive packages be offered to competent people.

In respect of Diasporas as a tool for brain gain or Brain circulation: (34%) consider proper flow of remittances as an effective tool in compensating brain drain issue while (56%) consider this role through remittances; (62%) believe diasporas' involvement in Pakistan's development is possible through brain circulation; (34%) show satisfaction with government role in diasporas' structures.

Conclusion

Analysis of the findings concludes that economic satisfaction and job provision are major pull factor in skilled migration. Many people are migrating to acquire higher skills and education that are in great demand in Pakistan. We present the picture of a scattered community due lack of proper manpower planning as per resources. As a developing country we are facing budget and funding constraints in social sectors of health and education. Most of the youth of the country are migrating for better jobs abroad while most of the skilled and intellectual class was compelled by economic reasons. Apart from that we are facing brain drain because our skilled workers need better working and research environment which is not available. It is evident that most of the youth of the country are not satisfied with social/political as well as educational environment. To conclude our findings show that talent is being frustrated by economic and family factors. The data identifies higher wages and job mobility and professional career development as pull factors to move. Social security is another big reason. Migrants consider remittances as a positive check on brain drain but strongly feel that remittances can never be a substitute for skilled migration outflow.

Recommendations

In the light of this study, the following recommendations are made. During interviews with the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas staff, Peshawar, it was found that the reasons for dissatisfaction in job related matters are also attached to education. We need to devise a curriculum and teaching strategies based on development of professional skills. The areas that need attention are:

- Quality education.
- Qualified teachers, adequate facilities, proper funding, comprehensive curriculums, affordable tuition fees and the availability of scholarships, research facilities and proper educational support. All of these factors are dependent to a certain degree on availability of funds. For access to quality education, serious financial commitment by the government is necessary.
- Scholarships/economic support programme should be initiated for the poor talented students.
- In the recruitment policy, scholarship, promotion, a standard should be set which should be applicable equally and uniformly to all level of people without discrimination and nepotism.

- Quality education should be provided along with research facilities to stop the outflow of skilled migrants for seeking quality education and research opportunities abroad. .
- Different Economic/Developmental, Recreational/Educational Programmes should be initiated to attract overseas skilled workers and also encourage our youth and skilled workers.
- Diasporas can contribute to the economic development of the country if government devised policies, programmes, researches to encourage overseas skilled workers. Diasporas' networks can serve as an effective tool through which expertise and skills can be transferred to Pakistan in the form of technology and skills transfer as Brain circulation.
- Policy level intervention is necessary for budget allocation for Education and developmental sector.
- Initiate programmes/projects for encouraging talented youth.
- Assist students to acquire self knowledge and awareness.■

CHAPTER 3

Migration and Family Structures: Case Study of Mirpur

Saira Rehman

Introduction

Migration is as old a phenomenon as human history. It affects human life both at the societal and individual levels in all aspects. It brings about change in the social environment of the migrant which amounts to total change. In the Indian subcontinent, mass migration has occurred from time to time from various regions, perhaps the biggest in familiar history was that occasioned by Partition in 1947 and which could be classed closest to what is implied by the term 'diaspora' since that migration was akin to the Jews' exodus in search of a new home. This present study, however, concerns migration of a different kind. People from Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir started migrating to the United Kingdom (UK) in the early decades of the twentieth century, a process that got accelerated in the post-World War era and continues to this day in the form of a chain phenomenon This paper focuses on the anthropological aspects of this migration and studies the societal changes that have come about over the decades in the life style, customs and traditions of the migrant families. What changes have occurred in the life of the migrants due to prolonged exposure to Western culture and those related to them living back home in the country of origin. Since marriage customs and traditions have a big share in the cultural life of the migrants, these would much mention in this study as also the anthropological factors behind the said change.

The present phase of migration of the people from Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) started in the 1950s and continued unabated through the 1960s motivated by economic reasons at home and post war construction and consequent labour shortage in Western Europe and UK. The Kashmiris thronged to Britain facilitated by their previously established networks existing since the days when they were hired by the British Merchant Navy in 1930s and 1940s. This migration accelerated due to the construction of the Mangla Dam in the late 1960s, which caused the displacement of over 100,000 people in and around Mirpur. People from other parts of the state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Gilgit Baltistan (federally controlled by

Pakistan) and Jammu and Kashmir (Indian administered part) migrated in large numbers to the Middle East (ME) in the 70s and 80s. A new wave of migration from Azad Kashmir to the UK started in the 1980s continuing into the 1990s through family reunions. Migration of skilled labour still continues in the 2000s in search of better employment and earning opportunities that are not available in Pakistan where industrial activity has been slack over the years.

Almost all researchers on South Asian communities in the UK recognise that "two-thirds of all the Pakistanis in the UK are actually from Mirpur and its surrounding areas in (Azad) Jammu and Kashmir" (Ballard 1990, 220) and, according to the Office of the National Statistics (ONS) the number of Pakistanis is up to 916,700. This means that the Kashmiri diaspora community from (Azad) Jammu and Kashmir is around 603,800. These numbers do not include the population in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. There is a growing presence of immigrants, migrant workers and refugees from the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and also from Gilgit and Baltistan in the UK. Arguably, there are around 800,000 people who have an ethnic origin and heritage in Jammu and Kashmir currently lawfully living in the UK, which makes them the second-largest total population of non-white minority groups in the UK.

Cultural Settings of Mirpur

Family structure and social organisation in Mirpur is patrilineal in nature. Strong biraderi system exists among Mirpuris. Jatts, Arain and Gujjars are the major ethnic groups in Mirpur. However, languages like Pahari, Potohari, Punjabi and Kashmiri dialects are widely spoken in Mirpur. Similarly, rich traditions and customs of all aspects of human life are practised and form the societal fabric. Rituals and traditions of rites of passage are religiously practised. Marriage is considered as an important aspect and event of life and celebrated in an elaborated way. Marriage patterns include caste-based endogamy, exchange marriages, marrying relatives and close kin settled in the UK. Through anthropological research, it is found that Mirpuris are greatly influenced by the British culture. The youth tries to look like Britishers, they try to behave and speak like them and even food choices shifting towards a more western diet. It is also surveyed that a vast number of young people want to migrate to the UK for a better future. Almost 3000 to 4000 people apply for British visa monthly. Moreover, marrying and accepting proposals from UK are also considered as a viable option to start a new life in UK.

Trends of Family Structures

With the passage of time, trends within the family structure have been changing. Earlier, joint family was the common feature of family structure but now due to socio-economic improvement, the nuclear family system is preferred. Though, the extended family is still visible and it seems to be fighting for survival. Data in the table below depicts the major changes in the family pattern.

Extended Family	Joint Family	**Nuclear Family**	Sample Size
7	4	**14**	25

Source: Anthropological Research

Historical Background of Migration in Mirpur

The majority of Pakistanis in England come from a small area in Pakistan called Mirpur — a district in Azad Kashmir. At least 75 per cent of Pakistani immigrants have come from Mirpur (Imran and Smith 1997). Ballard (2002a) writes: "No other district in Pakistan has seen a higher proportion of its population engage in transnational migration than Mirpur, and from nowhere else have a higher proportion of such migrants successfully established themselves in Britain."

Mirpuri is the second-most common mother-tongue in the UK (behind English, but ahead of Welsh and other immigrant languages). A current population estimate for Mirpuris in the UK is between 500,000 and 600,000. While some Mirpuris immigrated to England before the partition of the subcontinent, migration in droves of thousands began in the 1960s. There were forces from both within Pakistan and from England that encouraged this mass migration.

The force within Pakistan was the removal of thousands of people from their ancestral homeland. Pakistan built the Mangla Dam in the Mirpur district to help manage water resources and to generate hydroelectric power. While its completion in 1966 was a benefit to the country as a whole, it came with a price for the people in Mirpur. Building the dam flooded many villages and displaced over 100,000 people.

Meanwhile England was having an acute labour-shortage in her textile industry. England offered visas to those who would fill the factory positions. The displaced Mirpuris used their compensation money from

their lost lands to cover their travel expenses to England. They would, generally, commute back and forth to Pakistan every few years or so.

However, as a recession came in the 1970s, as well as more strict immigration laws, it became more difficult for them to leave the UK and expect to find work again on returning. As a result, by the end of the 1970s Mirpuris chose to settle in the UK — although the process of immigration could be protracted over several years. This was one factor causing the Mirpuri population in the UK to explode. New immigration to UK was restricted more to dependents of those who had already obtained entry or to those who married visa holders.

Mirpuris in Britain

Altogether, there are nearly a million people of Pakistani origin in Britain, and an estimated 70 per cent of these have links to Mirpur or the surrounding areas. Mirpur, located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is one of the country's least developed regions. However, most Mirpuris still maintain close links with their home villages and families, though the character of those links is slowly changing. Those links may include:

- Remittances
- Marriages and
- Investment in the development of Mirpur

Marriage Preferences among Mirpuris living in Britain

Hence, in Mirpur, ‘brothers and sisters now expect to be given right of first refusal in offers of marriage for each other’s children, so much so that the rejection causes great offence: it is often regarded as a repudiation of the obligations of sibling ship itself’ (Ballard, 1990: 231, italics in the original). While ‘this does not mean that Mirpuri marriages are always arranged between close kin’ (Ballard, 1990: 231; italics in the original). Well over half of all marriages in Mirpur appeared at the time to be contracted between first cousins.

Table 1, Kinship Relationship to Spouse

Relationship	No. of Marriages	%
First Cousin	41	59
Other Relative	12	17
Unrelated, Same Biradari	8	11
Unrelated, Different Biradari	6	9
Non-Pakistani	3	4
Total	**70**	**100**

- **Endogamy**
  There is a preference for endogamous marriages within Mirpuris. Endogamy generally refers to clan-oriented marriages which in local terminology are called *Bridari marriages or Zaat mein Shadi karna*. According to a survey, Mirpuris both in Pakistan and Britain, prefer to find spouses within their own caste and clan. Endogamy still is one of the major factors for the Mirpuris in UK to retain the bond of clan through marriages with cousins left back in Mirpur who belong to the same caste. They believe that traditions, customs and rituals are caste specific and should remain intact by tying the marital knot within the family.

- **Consanguineous Marriages**
  As a working definition, unions contracted between persons biologically related as second cousins ($F \geq 0.0156$) are categorized as consanguineous.[1] In Mirpur, consanguineous marriage is also commonly practiced. It has two aspects: one is religious and the other one is social. In interviews respondents argued that marriage within the family was also encouraged and preferred in Islam. Also, it was asserted that since Islam taught to help and support relatives in all forms, marriage also meant helping them by sharing the burden of many daughters by marrying them to their sons.[2] In Britain, parents inculcate in their children preference for consanguineous marriages by giving them the above mentioned

[1] A.H. Bittles, "A Background Summary of Consanguineous Marriage," *Consang.net*, 2001: 2., http://www.consang.net/images/d/dd/01AHBWeb3.pdf (accessed October 4, 2012).
[2] Ibid.

reasons to choose spouses from among relatives. However, a number of anthropological studies show that the trend of marrying back in Mirpur has been declining due to cultural differences between the generation brought up in UK and Mirpur.

- **First Cousin Marriage**
  Cousin marriages appear to have been a common feature of traditional societies. In pre-modern society, when most people lived in one local community, marriages often took place within a close family or tribal network. Marriages within the extended family were particularly favoured by agricultural and land-owning families, the aristocracy and royalty to keep family wealth within the family. It was feared that should an individual marry outside the family, after his or her death the estate would be divided among strangers, leading to fragmentation of the wealth of the tribe or extended family.[3]

Types of First Cousin Marriages of 41 UK-raised Spouses

20 women married to	
Father's sister's son	8
Father's Brother's son	5
Mother's Sister's Son	4
Mother's Brother's Son	3
21 men married to	
Father's Brother's daughter	6
Father's sister's daughter	7
Mother's Brother's daughter	4
Mother's Sister's daughter	2
Double First Cousin (FBD & MZD)	2

- **Exchange Marriage**
  A brother-sister exchange, in which a brother and sister marry in the same family, usually their cousins who are a sister and brother, is also a common practice. The main purpose is to strengthen ties between the two families and also to secure the future of daughters.

[3] Khola Hasan, "The Medical and Social Costs of Consanguineous Marriages among British Mirpuris," *South Asia Research*, vol. 29, issue 3, (2009): 277, http://sar.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/29/3/27 (accessed October 12, 2012).

In case, if a husband does not fulfil his duties towards his wife then his sister could be in trouble as well. Also, financial assets will remain within the two families. Anthropological research shows that this trend is also declining and children either in Mirpur or in the UK do not agree on exchange marriages. They consider it bargaining and against modern values and education.

Defiance Regarding Marriage Decision in UK-based Individuals

In recent years, it has been seen that unlike the past, children living in UK have no interest in choosing their spouses from Mirpur, neither girls nor boys. However, parents still want their children to marry back in Mirpur. But males children compared to female, both in UK and Mirpur resist such parental pressure. In fact cases are not few in which even girls settled in UK have refused to marry their Mirpur-settled cousins. Socially speaking, individualism imbibed from the western culture and exposure to new trends of the younger generation are major reasons behind the defiance against marrying back home.

Marriage Preference in Mirpur

Still, in Mirpur, like other Punjab areas, marriage patterns revolve around two concepts: Endogamy/Caste based and 'First Cousin Marriage'.

Reasons of Changes in the Preferences of British Mirpuris

Social anthropologists have come to a conclusion that trend within the younger generation of Mirpur living in the UK to marry with their cousins or relatives back in Mirpur has been declining. In interviews young people in Bradford, Birmingham and Yorkshire, girls and boys both have expressed their views that they did not prefer to bring their spouses from Mirpur because of difference in cultural grooming and background. The main reasons which were mentioned were as follow:

- Culture shock in terms of marrying back home
- Exposure to other cultures of Britain
- Language barriers
- Losing interest in cultural and religious values

Conclusion

Migration affects human cultures deeply. However, cultural patterns particularly marriage practices are deeply imbedded in the socio-cultural life of any community through history and force of tradition. But in case of trans-national marriages particularly among Mirpuris living in the UK for two generations has been to follow the trend set by their parents and forefathers but now the third generation migrants are not ready to toe the line of their parents and elders. In short, marriage patterns are changing and trans-national marriages are declining in case of UK-raised Mirpuris. The reasons could be summed up as follows:

- Cultural gap between the UK-raised new generation and the Mirpur-based generation.
- Language: a main barrier to make the marriages work.
- Family bonding as far as marriage is concerned is loosening its grip.
- Divorce rate is also getting higher in case of forced marriages.
- Third generation is least interested in Mirpur particularly in terms of marriage.■

CHAPTER 4

Experiences of a Pakistani Student in Germany

Dr M. Azam Chaudhry

Introduction

This paper was written for the conference: "Potential and Prospects of Pakistani Diaspora". The objectives of the conference included exploring "the influence overseas Pakistani have exercised on their country of origin in terms of political change through remittances, philanthropic donations, support for the political parties, transfer of knowledge and development of human capital etc." The conference addressed questions like: "How do members of the diaspora returning home, affect the intellectual and social life of the local communities? Are there ways and means to better coordinate and manage a large number of overseas Pakistanis with diverse educational and social backgrounds? In which ways can engagement with the Pakistani diaspora open up avenues for national development?" My contribution in this conference addressed mainly the first question. The theme of my presentation was: "Pakistani Scholars Overseas: A chance for the Domestic Educational System."

As is evident I have chosen one country (Germany) and one person (myself) to reflect upon the academic relations between Germany (the West) and Pakistan and its impact upon Pakistani educational system and chances for the future. It is not that I claim to be a representative of all Pakistanis in Germany. My experiences, I am sure, are unique in many ways. I share some elements of my cultural background with other Pakistanis but even in those cases my experiences were certainly unique. I have a total of 32 years of academic working links with Germans. Besides teaching, at least, at two German universities I have conducted two anthropological fieldworks in Germany and I have collaborated in about a dozen projects with several German universities and professors. The idea is to expose German educational and academic collaboration experiences in which I was personally involved and had in-depth knowledge of. It should by implication help us in assessing the nature and extent of the impact of German educational culture on Pakistan. It could also be useful for the future planning of our educational system. It should also be helpful to those who are interested to study and do research in Germany. Likewise I have focused on Germany alone in this essay not to conclude that all other

countries of the world where Pakistani scholars studied, did research, taught or are affiliated with, will be the same. I have preferred to focus on one country where I had firsthand knowledge and experience then saying something about every topic and every country only to cover greater range. May be other people can contribute other experiences.

Self-reflexive Account as Apt Illustration

Anthropology prefers focusing on micro level and doing participant observation, another name, for fieldwork, to collect data which frequently consists of case studies, life histories, autobiographies and more recently even self-reflexive accounts of the anthropologists themselves which generally refer to the same i.e. an in-depth description of an event or a person. All of them serve the same purpose, the so called, 'apt illustration'. In the words of Gluckman: "Clearly one good case can illuminate the working of a social system in a way that a series of morphological statements cannot achieve" (1969: 9). The self-reflexive account of the anthropologist or the position of researchers with reference to the research has been named differently such as 'reflexivity', 'positionality' and 'agency', some even refer to it as 'autobiography of the field' (Okely 1992: 3, Chaudhary 2008: 309) and others call it 'auto-anthropology" (Strathern 1987: 17). It is "the conscious use of the self as a resource for making sense of others" (Hervik (1994:92), Okely called it: "lived interactions, participatory experiences and embodied knowledge" (1992: 3) and in the words of Hastrup it was: "an awareness of self as both subject and object" (1995: 82).

The major criticism on the self-reflexive accounts is that they contain an element of fantasy and are ideal self-portrayals, some call it "mere navel gazing" (Okely 1992: 3). Salzman, for instance, notes: "researcher's reflexive account is deceptive and misleading, manipulative and dishonest. And it raises the question whether we can ever tell if a reflexive account is reliable…. Who knows what an ethnographer did, or did not do, in the deserts of Balochistan or the mountains of Sardinia?" (Salzman 2002: 810). The question from Salzman is: why only self-reflexive accounts should be deceptive, misleading, manipulative and dishonest and not the entire anthropological enterprise which is based on individual fieldwork? The fact is that this shift in the position of the anthropologist from "margins of ethnography, to be seen as constitutive and inescapable" (Clifford 1990: 14) is the result of conceptual moves in the discipline from the traditional positivist view of hard ethnographic data to the anthropology that considers ethnography a 'fiction' at best a 'true fiction' or else named 'partial truths' (Clifford 1990, Hastrup 1995: 47). Anthropology is not alone in this

conceptual journey. History which Levi-Strauss said was ethnography of the past (Levi-Strauss 1963) has been called 'his/story' (Soekefeld 1997) here like in ethnography the author has taken the driving seat.

The following two pages contain some 'hard facts' about the Pakistan German academic exchange provided by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD): office, Islamabad. These facts are first of all about DAAD-funded academic exchanges though they also mention some other data but not necessarily all. This statistics is provided to give an approximate idea of academic relations between Germany and Pakistan.

Some Facts about Pakistan German Exchange[1]

DAAD-funded German-Pak. academic exchange (including HEC scholarships).

Total of Pakistani Students at Universities in Germany



	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Pakistani	72	68	52	56	53	65	83	66	79	128	198	358	400	426	446	470
Germans	7	11	16	15	4	12	2	0	4	13	24	7	29	9	22	29
Total	79	79	68	71	57	77	85	66	83	141	222	365	429	435	468	499

[1] Thanks to DAAD office Islamabad for providing 'Facts on German Pakistan Academic Cooperation'. This was provided as a soft copy and I have incorporated them in this paper with little sentence changes.



DAAD Scholarships for Pakistani Students, Graduates and Academics

Funding Programme	**Total 2011**	**New 2012***
Research Grant (up to 6 month)	1	0
Research Grant (Sandwich-Programme)	5	0
Research Grant (one year or longer)	19	12
Re-invitation of former scholarship awardees	2	1
Research stay for senior faculty	1	1
Public Policy/Good Governance (Master)	4	2
Conflict Studies and Management	2	0
Postgraduate Courses for Professionals with	12	8
Students participating in study trip	15	0
Scientists participating in orientation trips	3	2
Total	**64**	**26**

*Not to be added to "Total 2011". "Total 2012" not yet published.

Pakistan German Academic Relations: A Short Personal Detour[2]

In May 1981, I had just finished my B.A. exams and was looking for a job. Peter Zingel, an economist from South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University (SAI hereafter) had come to Islamabad to initiate a sub-office of

[2] This section gives details of only those projects of which I was mostly directly part. For those who are interested in knowing about more German academics and German projects in Pakistan I have attached, as annex 1, a description of such projects by W.-Peter Zingel from his still unpublished lecture.

the SAI in Islamabad at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, located at Quaid-i-Azam University. This was actually the shifting of this sub-office from Kabul now under formal Soviet Union (SU) occupation to Islamabad. He needed a young lad, something similar to what we in Pakistan call "*chotta*" (lit. young lad: generally multifunctional waiter in simple local restaurants) and what in German they call "*madschen fuer alles*" (multifunctional young maid), in other words a person who should be able to do everything to help Zingel run the office smoothly. For instance I should know typing, should make and sew packets of books for sending to SAI library, should know to catalogue books for the small office library, check post office box, bring tea and help the German guests coming to Pakistan, etc.

Introduction to Pak-German Study Group: The same year I met some members of the Pak-German Study Group, a multi-disciplinary group consisting of mainly social scientists: anthropologists, linguists, geographers, etc., exploring Gilgit-Baltistan at that time known as Northern Areas of Pakistan. The next year the Group had bought a car at Karachi and they needed to fetch it to Islamabad by road. As a '*chotta* I accompanied the German driver. I did not know at that time that this Group was going to influence my life in such a long-lasting manner. Karl Jettmar, the leader of the Pak-German Study Group was part of the first German Hindukush expedition of 1955-56 visiting the Northern Areas of Pakistan.[3] This must have been a 'real' adventure traveling to these high mountain regions with, at best, only jeep tracks not to mention the metal roads. This expedition spent more than one and half year traveling on foot, donkey backs, horses and jeeps. They travelled to the most remote valleys and regions and discovered unique and till that time mostly unknown people and cultures. The head of the mission died and many other members suffered heavily in health. At least the three members of this expedition K. Jettmar, P. Snoy and G. Buddruss, were to continue their research in the area for many years to come and their students and collaborators continue to lead research projects in this area till to date.

Jettmar found the Pak.-German Study Group with a Pakistani counterpart Ahmad Hassan Dani, a professor at the Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, after the completion of the Karakorum High Way (KKH hereafter) in the year 1978 for systematic explorations of the Pakistani part of the Hindukush, Karakorum and Himalaya. This group later on focused on the documentation of the rock-carvings and inscriptions

[3] A lot has been written on this expedition and on its results, for instance, a full volume of Journal of Asian Civilizations "Masters of Understanding: German Scholars in the Hindu Kush and Karakorum, 1955-2005" vol. XXXI, no. 1-2, July and December, 2008, has been dedicated to this expedition and its later off shoots.

along the KKH. Jettmar himself developed a passion for this area after his first visit and continued to come to the area; 1955-56, 1964, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1978 and then every year till the mid nineties after which his health did not allow him to come. He continued to write about this area till almost his death in the year 2002. These rock-carvings and inscriptions were something very unique in the world in many ways especially in artistry, contents and the sheer numbers. Photographic exhibitions of these carvings were arranged not only in all major cities of Germany but in major capitals of the world by Jettmar and his team. The rock-carvings and inscriptions project was taken over by Harald Hauptmann in the year 1989. I worked with this project actively till 1996, the year I joined the Department of Anthropology at Quaid-i-Azam University. The project was officially closed this year i.e. 2012.

A student of Jettmar who participated in the 1981 expedition, Dr I. Stellrecht, by then the director of the Institute of Anthropology, University of Tuebingen, started the largest ever research project "Culture Area Karakorum" (CAK hereafter) 1989-1995. Stellrecht herself and Mathias Weniger, a geographer from university of Bonn, continued their research in Gilgit-Baltistan region till to date uninterrupted. M. Soekefeld, the director and professor of Institute of Anthropology at the University of Munich who was part of the CAK is now running several research projects in Gilgit-Baltistan in collaboration with the National Institute of Pakistan Studies (NIPS). I have been involved in academic collaboration with all of them. Another member of the CAK is Hermann Kreutzmann, director of Institute of Geography at the Free University of Berlin has also been doing research in this area all these years. Thanks to these German researchers that Gilgit-Baltistan is one of the best explored regions of Pakistan. All these research projects were carried out in collaboration with different major Pakistani universities like Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, University of the Punjab, Lahore, University of Peshawar, involving local scholars.

The Islamabad office of the SAI was closed in the year 1985 and I was lucky to be taken over by Jettmar's Pak.-German Study Group with which I had been partly affiliated in all these years. I got admission at the NIPS in a Master's programme in the year 1982 and Zingel and especially his successor, Bernt Glatzer, facilitated the continuation of my education along with the work for them. Fateh Muhammad Malik, the director of the NIPS, was selected for the Iqbal Chair at SAI Heidelberg and I could introduce Malik to Jettmar.

Iqbal Chair at SAI Heidelberg[4]

In the wake of the preparation of Allama Iqbal's centenary, Mr. Munir Ahmad, the Cultural Counsellor of the Pakistan Embassy in Bonn, suggested to establish a professorial fellowship, funded by the Government of Pakistan, in honour of Dr Muhamad Iqbal. The Allama had spent some months in Heidelberg in 1907 when he was waiting to defend his doctoral thesis on the Development of Metaphysics in Persia at Munich University. His letters are proof of his success in mastering the German language. Almost three quarters of a century later, Professor Mohammed Ajmal Makhdum became the first "Iqbal-Professor" at the South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University. He was followed by Professors Mohammad S. Khan Shibli, Fateh Mohammed Malik (two times), Hasan Aksari Rizvi, Pervez Iqbal Cheema and — presently — Syed Wiqar Ali Shah. The Iqbal Chair at Heidelberg is unfortunately the only institution where a Pakistani academic is sent to a German University for academic exchange. Until now even these Pakistani academicians worked and taught about Pakistan without ever doing any academic research on Germany.

Heidelberg for PhD

I had finished my M.A. in Pakistan studies in 1985 and later on in the 1988 I got a job at Islamabad Model College for Boys F-8/4. Jettmar, who was very appreciative of my work for the project and wanted to keep me for his project, helped me to get a sort of work assistantship at the Heidelberg Academy of Humanities and Sciences where I could work for some hours and also do my studies for PhD from the Heidelberg University. Here I would like to mention for the benefit of those interested to study and do research in Germany that in spite of the good starting conditions — I had already come to know several German academicians at Heidelberg University — there were a number of challenges involved in doing PhD from Germany. The biggest first challenge was learning the German language.

I had already done a short course at the National University of Modern Languages, at that time known as National Institute of Modern Languages, before proceeding to Germany. In Heidelberg, I got admission in a private language institute — Padactiv — for two months but I learned the language mainly by myself. I carried always a small pocket dictionary and whenever I saw a new word I tried to learn its meanings. Another strategy was to avoid making friends with Pakistanis in Germany. The biggest help in this regards came from my German friends who only spoke

[4] This portion I have taken from an unprinted lecture of W.-P. Zingel.

German and no English with me. And of course all these past years of work with Germans had also left some impact and in result I successfully secured admission at the University after two months. At that time German language proficiency was a precondition for admission in German universities.

Another big challenge at the university was what I call 'knowledge gap'. The educational and cultural background of my German class fellows was very different. It took me quite a while to understand the contents of the academic discourse even after I had acquired proficiency in the German language. Here again, I have to appreciate my German friends who had answered all my what, how and why questions with remarkable patience. As a Pakistani student, I was rather used to listening lectures and reproducing them in written annual exams. There were a very few, if at all, such memory testing written exams in Heidelberg but one has to do a lot of text readings, text discussions, take home written assignments and presentations. I had to learn how to properly read a text which in Germany students learned in their high schools. I completed my PhD in the year 1995 and the same year I married a German lady. Next year, I returned to Pakistan and was lucky to get a job at the Department of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad.

It would be unfair not to mention the many prospects and avenues German academic connection, particularly the knowledge of the German language, and its culture opened for me. The first most important in this regards was the invitation Stellrecht extended to me to attend the Colloquia of CAK scholars. This was a forum of the German social scientists working on Pakistan. My supervisor Jettmar and after his death George Pfeffer (Jettmar already during his life time handed me over to Pfeffer for future support and advice) have been very important source of guidance. These connections proved very useful in making many future research collaborations with German universities and social scientists. In the years 2002-2003 I went back to Germany to do one year fieldwork on the topic of Gemeinde Politics in Rhineland. Thanks to the lucrative job and generosity of my, at that time, German wife I could do this research without any external funding. This research was a breaking point in my academic life in many ways. I improved further my German language proficiency and first time came into contact with the 'real' Germans and their culture. I sum it up by saying that if German language opened a door to a new world, in PhD I learned to read and write, then this research first time taught me how to raise social science questions. For instance, I have been writing about my 'own' culture before but now new dimensions of understanding my own culture were opened. Pfeffer invited me to teach at the Institute of Ethnology Free University of Berlin. One year later I got the opportunity to

teach two semesters at the Institute of Ethnology, University of Tuebingen. At both the institutes we agreed to do joint research and teaching in the future. In the following pages I would like to give examples of some of these collaboration projects with German institutions and academics.

Institute of Ethnology, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich and the NIPS

Prof. M. Soekefeld, the director of Ethnology at Munich, has been a member of CAK and since my induction at Quaid-i-Azam University we have been collaborating in different research and teaching projects. The most recent one was "Reconstruction and Social Change after the Earthquake of October 2005". In this project which was funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DfG) (German Research Society), four MPhil students from Pakistan and two PhD students from Germany got generous funds to do joint research. These students were jointly supervised by me and Soekefeld. In 2012 a concluding international workshop was organised at NIPS with scientists mainly from Canada, UK, Germany and Pakistan. This offered a unique opportunity for the Pakistani students and colleagues to learn the state of the art developments on research and theories on disaster management. The same year we jointly launched a new project "Coping with Change in Gilgit-Baltistan" with an additional partner, the Karakorum International University, Gilgit. The first workshop of this project "Film-Workshop Visual Anthropology" in which students from NIPS and Anthropology department of Quaid-i-Azam university and students and faculty from Karakorum International University, Gilgit took part. Two professors of visual anthropology from Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) Munich conducted this workshop. All the expenditures of this were borne by DAAD.

Hanns-Seidel Foundation Islamabad and the NIPS

The Islamabad office of the Hanns-Seidel Foundation, Germany, signed a Project Agreement with the NIPS in the year 2012 for three years in which it agreed to provide funds for the following main items: One two-day workshop annually, five research projects annually, fortnightly lecture series at NIPS and funds for the publication of '*Scrutiny'* , the institute's journal. There are grants for air travel and lodging of two international and two national speakers plus food and entertainment for the participants of the workshop. The best five PhD and/or MPhil students of the NIPS were selected for this year and they are receiving assistantship for doing research and thesis writing and traveling to their fields. Similar Hanns-Seidel

provides funds for travel and lodging of the Pakistani scholars who are invited to deliver lectures in the Institute's fortnightly lecture series. There will be an additional honorarium for those visiting scholars who will supply a publishable written text of their lecture.

Duissburg/Essen and the NIPS

The title of the collaboration project is "Peaceful Change and Violent Conflicts: The Transformation of the Middle East and Western Muslim Relations. This involves mainly three countries — Pakistan, Germany and Morocco. The main component of the project is bringing together students and academics of these countries together to discuss what was going on in the Muslim countries, mainly of the Middle East (ME), since the so called 'Arab Spring' and how this is affecting the West-Muslim relations. Different activities were undertaken under this project. One was a summer school at Duissburg, Germany, involving students from all these three countries. At the NIPS we selected a group of eight students (mix of high performing and low income groups) and three faculty members. Texts were prepared, discussions on different topics relating to Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Pakistan were organised. Posters for presentations were also prepared. Poster presentations were a great experience for our Pakistani and Moroccan students who had never done this before. The next summer school is planned in Pakistan in 2013. Another activity is conducting and especially writing joint research papers which will be published at the end of the three years' period.

Conclusion: Assessing Impact

This article described my education in Germany and some of the research and teaching collaborations between the NIPS and the German universities/ academics funded by the German sources over the period of mainly last one to two years. There were other projects in this period and, especially, beyond this time frame which had to be left out for lack of time and space and even those projects that were focused here had been described only partially. What was expected to achieve was the assessment of the impact Pakistani scholars overseas have and could have on the indigenous educational system especially in the sense of how bright is the future of our education system. I have followed a micro level, qualitative, 'one corn for the whole stock' sort of approach. To put it more bluntly the idea was to give somewhat detailed report of my education and subsequent academic links with Germany to assess its possible impact on the education at NIPS

and this should enable the reader by implication to assess the impact of Pakistani scholars overseas on its educational system and its future.

The very idea is definitely full of flaws not only because the NIPS possibly has more than its share of the overseas (German) influence in the curricula activities compared to the other institutes and departments at the Quaid-i-Azam University let alone the entire educational system of Pakistan. The NIPS had even a German faculty member teaching courses here since the last more than three semesters. The NIPS could theoretically serve as an ideal model to assess what could be achieved. It would be unfair not to acknowledge the direct impact on those faculty members and students who were quite significant in numbers at the NIPS who were directly or indirectly exposed to those research collaborations and exchange programmes. There will certainly be some synergy impacts as well.

The impact of Pakistani academics overseas on the local educational system should not be over-emphasised. When we look at the academic exchanges and collaborations, generally, 'the West' writes about them, about us and about the rest of the world. The problem is not that the knowledge they produce about others is incomplete because "only the locals have and can understand … local knowledge", the problem is also that the knowledge they produce about themselves is also 'biased' and ethnocentric'. Everything goes for the interest and benefit of the Germans: only those projects and that type of knowledge which the Germans deem fit: Funds for those projects which are funded by the DAAD are given to the German partners, not the Pakistani partners. It is not that 'we can do it better' but the knowledge we will produce about ourselves and about them will be biased differently from their biased knowledge, simply because of our cultural baggage. We know that the knowledge that we produce is at best only partially true; it is "contested, committed…" therefore we have to collect a lot of partial truths to give space to 'plural voices'. This knowledge — Pakistanis', the non-Western knowledge about the West and about themselves — is not only important for the Pakistanis (non-western) but also for the West because this is a knowledge which is different from their knowledge.

There has been some change in this imbalance since Higher Education Commission's (HEC) several programmes, in spite of their very limited scope and success among others, are limited to educational institutional knowledge, not the knowledge about the Western society by Pakistanis. If we look at Pakistani scholars in Germany we find only one – Iqbal Chair — if we look at Germen scholars in Pakistan, the list is very long.■

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Annex 1

German Academics in Pakistan by W. Peter Zingel

Among the Germans, Professor Otto Schiller advised the Government of Pakistan's Agricultural Commission. When he became Head of the Institute of International Comparative Agricultural Policy and Rural Sociology of the newly established South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University, he guided a number of doctoral students from Pakistan and Germany working on the agricultural systems of Pakistan in cooperation with the Agricultural University in Lyallpur (now: Faisalabad). Under his successor Professor Winfried von Urff, we were a group of young economists studying Pakistan's development in cooperation again with the Agricultural University, with the Department of Economics of Quaid-i-Azam University, and with the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE). Professors Mahmood Khan, Dilawar Ali Khan (both from AU Lyallpur), Abdul Matin (Peshawar University), Hussein Mullick (QAU) and Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi (PIDE) were among those with whom contacts were closest. Professor Frithjof Kuhnen and Prof. Manig (both Göttingen University) guided a series of studies, mainly on the Peshawar Valley. In Political Science, Professor Karl E. Newman (Köln U) and Dr. Hans Frey (SAI, Heidelberg University) taught at Quaid-i-Azam University. Professor Karl-Heinz Pfeffer (Münster University) had been teaching at Punjab University and started its Social Science Research Centre; his son, Professor Georg Pfeffer (then: Freiburg University, later Heidelberg and Berlin), started Anthropology at Quaid-i-Azam; Dr. Naved-e-Rahat, Dr. Azam Chaudhary, both now at QAU, the late Dr. Adam Nayyar of Lok Virsa, Dr. Naghma Imdad, and Dr. Anis Dani were among his first students. Dr. Doris Buddenberg (SAI, Heidelberg University) also taught anthropology at QAU; Professor Jürgen Wasim Frembgen (Munich University) is a frequent visitor. Among the historians, Professor Gita Dharampal-Frick recently taught at Quaid-i-Azam University. Professor Jamal Malik (Erfurt University), a Pakistan national who grew up in Germany, now is our best expert on religion and society in Pakistan.

The German Democratic Republic, i.e. the erstwhile East German state, had a different approach to South Asian studies with emphasis on languages. Dr. Christina Österheld who now teaches Urdu at the SAI in Heidelberg, Dr. Bettina Robotka, now in Karachi, the political scientist Dr Dietrich Reetz and the Sindhi-specialist Dr. Michael Schied are three among those still active.

Professor Karl Jettmar, an Anthropologist (SAI, Heidelberg University) shared a fascination in the rock carvings in the Upper Indus with Professor Ahmad Hassan Dani (QAU). Every year he would come with a Pakistan-German expedition to study those manifestations of change and exchange of cultures in Northern Pakistan. His work was continued by a larger group of researchers of the Pak-German Karakoram Project, led by Professor Irmtraud Stellrecht (Tübingen University); the work on the rock inscriptions went on under Professor Harald Hauptmann (Heidelberg University, Academy of Science); Professor Hugh van Skyhawk (Mainz University) presently is teaching at the Quaid-i-Azam University. Among the geographers Prof. Fred Scholz (Berlin FU) stands out with his study of the tribes of Balochistan, Professor Hans-Georg Bohle (then Freiburg University) worked on people's coping with disasters; presently Professor Hermann Kreutzmann (Berlin University) comes with a group of students to Pakistan every year. Professor Matthias Wineger (Bonn University) and Professor Marcus Nüsser (SAI, Heidelberg University) have been studying glacial movements in the Karakorum and in the Western Himalayas — an important topic with relevance for social science in the times of climate change.

Professor Michael Jansen (RWTH Aachen) reconstructed the findings of the excavations in Moenjo Daro. As a man of architectural history he taught us what to make out of the archaeological findings. We still need to know more about the reasons of decline and erosion of such a great civilization. The puzzle obviously is more complex than commonly assumed. More insight is especially sought on the social organisation of the early societies of this country. Maybe we can draw lessons from Pakistan's past for how to react to catastrophes.

Not a social scientist in the strict sense, but a person with wide ranging knowledge and interests who became the personification of German scholarship in Pakistan, has been Professor Annemarie Schimmel (Harvard and Bonn).

The famous orientalist over decades came to Pakistan and taught and wrote about the country and its language, i.e. Urdu. Nobody in Germany could arouse so much interest in Pakistan, its culture and society as she did. The list is far from complete. Not all contacts led to lasting cooperation. Quaid-i-Azam University, Punjab University, Peshawar University and the Agricultural University in Faisalabad in Pakistan and the German universities in Heidelberg, Berlin and Göttingen see a steady exchange of social scientists.

CHAPTER 5

Conflict Conflagration and Conflict Mitigation in the Context of Pakistani Diaspora: Permanent, Circular Migration and Political Refuge

Dr. Moonis Ahmar

Introduction

Pakistani diaspora is comprised of around four per cent of the country's population. Contributing about five per cent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the form of remittances, the overseas Pakistanis provide space to the economy in coping with the huge budget deficit and adverse balance of payments. Yet, despite this positive role, the nearly seven million Pakistanis scattered around the world, upon whom around eight per cent of the country's population comprising their families is dependent, shape and transform conflicts at different levels.

Since the 1950s, when migration from Pakistan began till now, at least three generations of overseas Pakistanis have been born and brought up among diversified cultures and religions. This process of circular and permanent migration has thrown up conflicts of cultural, social, family and societal nature both in their home country and in countries where they live permanently or temporarily. Whereas the great majority of the diaspora is only economically oriented there are groups and sections among them that are politically charged such as Baloch and Sindhi dissidents who from time to time organise protests to voice their demands and draw the attention of the western media to the alleged persecution of their communities in Pakistan.

This paper will examine the issue of Pakistani diaspora in the context of conflict conflagration and conflict mitigation by responding to the following questions:

1. What is conflict-generated diaspora and how it causes conflict conflagration and mitigation?
2. What types of conflicts are caused by the Pakistani diaspora?
3. How does the Pakistani diaspora shape the formation and transformation of positive and negative conflicts?

4. How do the political refugees cause social, political and economic tension in the country of their asylum?
5. How can the overseas Pakistani community be engaged in the process of conflict prevention, management, transformation and mitigation?

The paper will also examine in some detail social conflict transformation in Pakistani society because of the exodus of economic migrants, particularly to the West. Furthermore, the implications of Pakistani diaspora's presence in the Arab oil producing countries, particularly in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), on Pakistani society will also be highlighted. Since the oil embargo of 1973 by Arab states against countries supporting Israel, particularly the United States (US) and some European countries, the sharp increase in the price of petroleum products opened new job opportunities for blue and white collar workers in the Middle Eastern (ME) countries. The phenomenon of 'petro dollars' following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war coincided with the new liberal passport policy of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. As a result, millions of Pakistani nationals, regardless of their socio-economic status or educational qualifications, became eligible to get passports. The policy opened "floodgates" for illiterate and semi-literate Pakistani nationals to seek employment in the ME and virtually changed the complexion of Pakistani society. A new "petro dollar" class emerged in Pakistan which caused enormous social friction in the society. In the words of Roger Ballard:

> They (migrants) are usually regarded as uniquely privileged, and are the object of considerable jealousy. And it is not just their dependent kinsmen who are envious of their apparently boundless wealth, so too are the urban elite who are deeply affronted by the thought that mere peasants may now have access to television, washing machines, and so forth. This has even been formalised in the theory of 'Dubai syndrome,' which represents newly rich migrants' behaviour as misguided and disturbed.[1]

Thus societal and family conflicts in Pakistan got a new impetus as a result of mass exodus of skilled and unskilled workers, particularly to the oil rich ME countries. Unfortunately, several opportunities since 1973, when this exodus began, were missed in terms of social and economic development at the grassroots' level. As a result, the trickle-down effect of

[1] Roger Ballard, "The Political Economy of Migration: Pakistan, Britain, and the Middle East," in *Pakistani Diasporas: Culture, Conflict, and Change*, ed. Virinder S. Kalra (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 41.

Pakistani diaspora's affluence on bettering the societal conditions of Pakistan remained negligible. Long entrenched class conflict took a new shape when the petro-dollar migrants sought special status to the ire of the old middle and upper middle class.

Conflict Generated Diaspora

The phenomenon of diaspora is as old as human history. But, with the emergence of new states and modernization in the means of communication and transportation, the surge of diaspora population in different parts of the world became an obvious reality.

The term diaspora was originally coined to describe the circumstances of Jews who lived outside of Palestine after the Babylonian exile. Since then, its scope has been enlarged to include any group that has been scattered far from its original homeland, with most attention paid to the descendents of Africans who were forcibly removed from Africa and brought to the New World as slaves in the seventeenth century.[2]

Furthermore, "Diasporas are defined by self-identification and participation in networks engaged in activities designed to sustain homeland linkages. Behaviour and choice rather than a secretive identity, therefore, are critical to determining membership in a diaspora."[3] According to a study entitled, "The Diaspora Conflict-Nexus: A Literature Review," "the concept of diaspora has traditionally been connected to the dispersal of Jews, thereby carrying with it a strong conviction of suffering, loss and return. Overtime, the concept has also been used to describe other displaced groups, and from 1990s onwards, has particularly gained popularity in the field of cultural studies and social sciences. In recent years, the concept has entered the realm of policy-making and there has been a growing interest in diaspora as potential agents of development and peace-building."[4] Therefore, it is not wrong to argue that, "in recent years, the term diaspora has proliferated in academic, among governments and Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and among migrants and refugee groups, who have increasingly identified themselves as diaspora. Diaspora is usually defined as populations that are spread over several countries and who create a

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[2] Martin Griffiths & Terry O' Callaghan, *Key Concepts in International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2004), 78.

[3] Terrence Lyons, "Conflict-generated diasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia," *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 7, issue 4, (December 2007): 529, www.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ accessed on October 25, 2012.

[4] Pirkkalainen, Paivi & Abdile, Mahdi, "The Diaspora Conflict-Peace-Nexus: A Literature Review," Diaspeace, working paper, no. 1, March 2009, 7.

common identity around a concrete or imagined homeland."[5] Struggling to retain their identity which is under threat in their country of origin, diaspora groups use their resources and influence to save their future generations from possible annihilation. The diaspora is not a single or a homogeneous entity but has several variations. Growing sense of insecurity, fear, paranoia and mistrust are important factors which motivate diaspora communities to sustain their support for movements launched by their counterparts in their country of origin. The Tamil diaspora is a vivid example of how the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) motivated and used the Tamil diaspora to seek funding for an independent state of "Tamil Eelam" till the time it was militarily defeated by the Sri Lankan military in the summer of 2009.

Generally speaking, "there are three main types of diaspora. First, victim diaspora such as Jews, Armenians and Africans. These are groups whose history is one of systematic oppression in which they have either fled or been forcibly removed from their homeland. Second, there are labour and imperial diasporas, such as Indians and British, respectively. Many groups have moved from their place of origin and established communities overseas as a consequence of the history of imperialism. Finally, there are trade diasporas, such as the overseas Chinese or Lebanese groups whose entrepreneurial skills have enabled them to flourish outside their country of origin."[6] Fundamentally, it is a drive for a better economic future, freedom and preserving one's identity that generally characterise immigrant populations in different parts of the world. Ethnic and religious persecution no doubt act as a catalyst for migration and the emergence of the diaspora phenomenon, but it is also a deep sense of insecurity and pride which compels a section of the population to migrate and seek asylum in a foreign land. By influencing lobbies and interest groups in the country of residence and asylum, the diaspora community tries to create a favourable public opinion for their cause and compel local legislatures and politicians to put diplomatic pressure on their country of origin to help alleviate the plight of their counterparts.

Interestingly, the diaspora community can influence, shape and transform conflicts in their country of origin and at the same time can also be a source of conflict in the host country. Particularly, in Western societies, when for a long period of time, asylum seekers primarily from the third world countries took advantage of "soft " immigration and asylum laws, thousands of people from Asia and Africa applied for asylum because

[5] "Diaspora and conflict," Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, http://www/diis.dk/sw 46772.asp (accessed October 25, 2012).
[6] Ibid., 78.

of fear of political, religious and social persecution in their own countries. How far their asylum petitions were genuine or fake became an important issue and gave rise to local groups in the West who asked their governments to stop considering asylum applications as they felt threatened by "alien" people in respect of their culture and life style. Some of the European countries where "soft" asylum and immigration laws encouraged people from Asia and Africa to settle down there caused serious conflicts. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain and the Scandinavian countries experienced several waves of migration, from Pakistan among others, which put a serious pressure on their welfare system and capacity to absorb immigrants. The Pakistani community in United Kingdom (UK) and Norway composed of primarily blue collar workers has been settled there since the last five decades yet, the issue of their assimilation in local cultures remains unresolved to a large extent.

The rising phenomenon of diaspora is a cause of conflict conflagration and conflict mitigation because of three main reasons. First, the level of support which is rendered by a particular diaspora community to support its people engaged in an armed conflict with the government. This type of involvement, which is through funding and supply of weapons, can trigger and deepen the level of conflict. Second, the diaspora community itself may be divided as moderates and hardliners vis-à-vis the process of peace and conflict resolution. This is evident from the case of Palestinian diaspora which is divided over the issue of peace process with Israel. Likewise, the Jewish community in the US is also divided into moderates and hard liners in terms of peace with the Palestinians, Syria and Lebanon. The Irish diaspora was also divided on resolving the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland. Third, the diaspora community can play a positive role in mitigating conflict by supporting the peace process and providing resources for local development. The feeling of suffering and agony in the diaspora community because of its displacement from home country can help inculcate the thinking in their minds for saving their people from further destruction by supporting the process of dialogue and opposing violence.

On the linkage between ethnic conflicts and diaspora, two things should be taken into consideration. First, the plight of a suppressed ethnic group, whether a majority like the Bengalese in case of former East Pakistan or a minority like the Tamils in case of Sri Lanka, forced their kith and kin living in foreign countries to mobilise international support against that suppression. Second, diasporas provide material and other forms of support to sustain movements launched by their communities in their countries of origin. As rightly pointed out by Roger Ballard in his paper, "the political economy of migration: Pakistan, Britain and the ME,"

published in a book, *Pakistani Diasporas: Culture, Conflict, and Change* that,

> It is clear that ethnic conflicts, which usually have their roots in migration are to be found almost everywhere, and that in many societies they completely override class conflicts. Such conflicts have many dimensions, but the driving force behind racial and ethnic polarization is invariably to be found in competition for scarce resources.[7]

Therefore, "conflict generated diaspora are a particular category characterized by the source of its displacement. Conflict generated diaspora often have definite, categorical perceptions of homeland conflicts. These perceptions are influential in homeland politics because the diaspora plays a critical role in financing political activities and framing political debates. This potential to make conflicts more protracted may be transformed into a force for peace if a diaspora group shifts its support from the most militant leaders towards positions that support the leaders and movements for peace. The diaspora have the potential to be a source of ideas and support for peace making as well as forces making conflicts more protracted"[8] Further elaborating the role of diasporas in generating conflicts in different parts of the world, it is argued that,

> Diaspora groups link processes of globalisation and transnational migration to homeland politics and conflicts. In some cases, diaspora groups produced by a specific set of traumatic memories create conflict generated diaspora that sustain and often amplify their strong sense of symbolic attachment to the homeland. Conflict generated diaspora tend to be less willing to compromise and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protectedness of homeland conflict. Beyond resource however, conflict-generated diaspora frequently have a prominent role in framing conflict issues and defining what is politically acceptable. Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protracted nature of conflict.[9]

Major conflict related diaspora groups are the Tamils, Kurds, Armenians, Palestinians, Afghans and Syrians. They come under the category of asylum seekers and immigrants. The earlier diaspora groups

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[7] Roger Ballard, "The Political Economy of Migration: Pakistan, Britain, and the Middle East," 21.

[8] Terrence Lyons, "Conflict-generated diasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia," 532-33.

[9] Ibid., 529.

were Jews, Irish, Protestant and Catholics. Facing ethnic and religious persecution, these groups were compelled to leave their land of origin and take refuge in foreign countries. Referring to the level of external support sought by the diaspora groups for the propagation of their cause, Jolle Demmers argues that, "since the nature of external support for contemporary conflict has become increasingly transnational, diaspora communities have become the obvious group to mobilize external support. Since identity groups in conflict often lack formal international representation such as membership of the United Nations (UN) and a diplomatic corps, they largely depend upon their dispersed members (for the mobilization of) external support."[10] Elaborating "long distance interference" Jolle Demmers is of the opinion that, "by long-distance interference with the conflict in their homeland, diaspora communities are engaged in a sort of virtual conflict: they live their conflicts through the internet, email, television and telephone without direct (physical) suffering, risks, or accountability. Therefore, they are engaged in processes of conflict dynamics that differ from their identity group members in their homelands. Although hardly investigated this "delocalisation" of contemporary conflict and the long distance participation of diaspora communities are likely to have a complex and crucial, effect on the conflict."[11] According to the related literature on conflict and diaspora, "the debate on diaspora and conflict can be divided into three categories: first migrants or diasporas can be perceived as agents for promoting peace and development. The second and opposing conceptualisation is that those two groups can have a negative or even destructive impact. The third argument is that they can simultaneously be peace-makers and peace-breakers."[12] Certainly, "diaspora can have an effect on conflicts in their home country, just as they may influence peace negotiations, reconciliation, processes and post-conflict peace-building. The question remains whether refugees and migrants exacerbate wars and conflicts or whether they contribute to peace and reconciliation."[13] In terms of conflict generation and conflict perpetuation, migrants and diaspora communities are held responsible by authorities in the country of their origin and also the government of their host country. They are blamed from both sides because of their role in mobilising support for their cause by approaching lobbies and interest groups, thus in a way bringing the politics of their home country in the country of their refuge or

[10] Jolle Demmers, "Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long-Distance Nationalism, and Delocalization of Conflict Diaspora," *The Public*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2002)" 85, igtur-archive.library.uu,nl/let/2011-0011-200305/2002-/-demmers (accessed October 25, 2012).
[11] Ibid., 94.
[12] Pirkkalainen, Paivi & Abdile, Mahdi, 5.
[13] "Diaspora and conflict," Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier.

residence. One cannot expect a benign and docile role of immigrants forced to leave their country of origin because of adverse circumstances in view of a high degree of insecurity and paranoia.

Yosin Shain is right when he argues that, "diaspora's role in homeland population and conflict resolution can be so powerful that homeland leaders ignore diaspora preferences at their own peril. In confronting the kin state's conflict, the diaspora attempts to promote its own views of the ethnic community's identity and interests, a view which is not always congruent with the view of the homeland authorities." The diaspora may have organisational or political interests in their host countries that are affected by the homeland conflict or its resolution. Settlement of a homeland conflict may threaten long-cherished political institutions in the diaspora community.[14] Depending on the nature and dynamics of conflict, the diaspora community tries to influence local stakeholders and interest groups in order to seek a viable support for their cause. Particularly in developed societies, till the time the diaspora groups adhere to local laws, they are allowed to carry out activities which can be termed against the interests of their country of origin. The predicament of diasporas in the host countries is that: in some cases they are blamed for causing cultural and religious tension in their societies because of their diverse social backgrounds and inability to assimilate in local cultures. For instance, the Kurdish diaspora in Germany may not be able to assimilate in local culture and can have an identity problem. While feeling disturbed because of the Kurdish plight in Turkey or Iraq, they are blamed for augmenting the level of conflict in these countries, while at the same time are also not taken positively in their host country.

Conflict and Pakistani Diaspora

Away from home and still involved in Pakistan's complicated issues, the immigrant community is divided on conflicts at the societal level. Four major areas where one can see a direct and indirect involvement of Pakistani diaspora in its impact on conflict formation, transformation and mitigation are:

1. Political divide and schism.
2. Ethnic/nationalist movements.
3. Class and economic stratification.
4. Radicalisation and militancy.

[14] Yossi Shain, "The role of Disapora in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," *SAIS Review*, vol. 22, no. 2, (2002): 115.

These conflicts are at the micro and macro level marking what may be called structural contradictions in Pakistani society. As far as political divide and schism in Pakistan is concerned, overseas Pakistanis are affiliated to different political parties and groups. Furthermore, hundreds of Pakistanis sought political asylum during the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq on grounds of political persecution. Asylum was also sought, particularly in Western countries by those belonging to different minority groups. When there was the lawyer's movement for the restoration of the superior judiciary in 2007-2009, the involvement of overseas Pakistanis and different human rights' organisations in support of that movement was quite obvious. But such an involvement primarily reflected the political divide in the country as the Pakistani diaspora having affiliations with the opposition parties, particularly Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML-N) was quite active. But it is natural that millions of Pakistanis living abroad feel concerned when their country is in political turmoil. Their constructive role for ensuring political peace and stability is however obstructed because of inflexible and imprudent approach of various political parties.

Furthermore, as reported in an English Pakistani daily, "a group of Hindus that had travelled from Pakistan to Jodhpur in India for pilgrimage have sought asylum in the country. 171 Hindu pilgrims travelled to the state of Rajasthan by rail. A group of Seemant Lok Sangthan (SLS) an organisation that works for the welfare of Hindus, has requested the Indian government to grant them immigrant visas. Speaking to *British Broadcasting Corporation Urdu* (*BBC Urdu)* one of the members of the group said, you cannot understand our pain. Recently my father passed away and I did not even get space to perform his last rites, adding, we will not return to Pakistan and you may kill us here (India) instead. Increasing Islamic extremism causes us problems on a daily basis."[15] However, a parliamentary committee formed by President, Asif Ali Zardari to investigate on the reports of Hindus leaving Pakistan to seek asylum in India found such reports to be incorrect. The asylum of Sindhi Hindus from Pakistan in India in view of alleged religious persecution is not a recent phenomenon but has been going on since quite some time and is often a source of embarrassment for Islamabad.

As far as ethnic and nationalistic movements in Pakistan are concerned, these have their fallout on those sections of Pakistani immigrants who originally belong to various regions where ethnic nationalist movements are going on. The case of Baloch Nationalist Movement is relevant in terms of the Baloch diaspora in providing support

[15] "Group of Pakistani Hindus seeking asylum in India," *Express Tribune*, September 10, 2012.

to the cause of asserting their ethnic identity. In the recent past, the Baloch nationalist leaders in exile mobilised public opinion and interest groups in countries of their residence for seeking support. In the US, Britain, Switzerland and Germany, Baloch nationalist leaders have been quite active to project their cause in the local press, members of parliament and segments of intelligentsia. Sindhi nationalist diaspora is also a factor in shaping ethnic assertion by Sindhi nationalist groups in Pakistan. In fact, the World Sindhi Congress, which has representation of Sindhi origin people from Pakistan and India, has been an important forum to raise the voice of Sindhi nationalism. In the 1980s and 1990s when Sindh was in turmoil on ethnic grounds, Urdu speaking immigrants from urban Sindh calling themselves as "Mohajirs" (migrants) launched a massive campaign in the US and in Europe led by the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) — renamed as Muthaida Quami Movement — a decade ago. The purpose of Mohajir protest marches and demonstrations in foreign countries was to raise their voice against what they called as the "ethnic cleansing" of Urdu speaking population in Sindh during the military operation of 1992-1994 and later on the crackdown on the MQM in 1995 and 1996 by the security forces. With the co-option of MQM in the provincial and federal power structures by the regime of General Pervez Musharraf, the slogan of Mohajir nationalism and the campaign for a separate identity launched by the "Mohajir" diaspora came to a halt. The transformation of ethnic conflict in Sindh in the last two decades has managed Sindh-Mohajir conflict but at the same time augmented ethnic division between the MQM and the Pashtun dominated Awami National Party (ANP).

Remittances sent by Pakistani migrants in the last four decades changed the economic landscape of the country. With the generation of wealth in the hands of those who were from lower or lower middle class, the outcome was the generation of conflicts which transformed the family and class structures both in the rural and urban areas of Pakistan. The emergence of "petro dollar" class also had its impact on the villages as a large part of the overseas workers from Pakistan had a rural background. Accumulation of wealth as a result of remittances should have led to qualitative change in the socio-economic standards of the people of Pakistan but because of lack of planning and vision such an opportunity was lost.

Radicalisation and militancy in Pakistan is home grown but has also got an impetus from those Pakistani immigrants who have links with transnational network of terrorism. Sources of support in the form of funding and training particularly in the tribal areas of Pakistan to carry our terrorist attacks have been alleged. The sectarian conflict in Pakistan is considered a menace with lethal implications on the country's stability and

peace but some groups of overseas Pakistanis divided on sectarian lines are also involved in promoting sectarian schism.

Engagement in Positive Conflict Transformation

How can the Pakistani diaspora be engaged in positive conflict transformation and mitigation and to what extent they can help curb militancy and extremism in the country? Millions of Pakistanis scattered in different parts of the world can play a positive role for peace and stability in their country provided there is political will and determination on their part to play such a vital and critical role and obstacles are not created in their way for unleashing the process of positive conflict transformation.

In four major areas, the Pakistani diaspora can render their expertise and resources for transforming, managing and mitigating conflicts. First, they can fund investigative and original research for studying the causes and implications of conflicts in Pakistan at different levels. One is aware of the fact that there is a dearth of path-breaking research which can make a difference in terms of seeking a better understanding of conflicts at the inter and intra-state, micro and macro levels, low intensity and high intensity conflicts. This can be achieved by establishing a National Research Center on Conflict Studies[16] to do investigative and original studies on issues which trigger the outbreak of conflicts and methodology for their prevention, management, positive transformation and resolution. By playing a pivotal role in promoting policy oriented research in conflict studies, whether it is related to sectarian, ethnic or resource-based conflicts, overseas Pakistanis can substantially contribute in developing substantial interest for building peace and the management and resolution of conflicts. The absence of a culture of research in Pakistan is considered as one of the reasons for the lack of clarity and better sense of understanding about conflicts and the proposed Center will go a long way in bridging the gap in this regard.

Second, the Pakistani diaspora can play a pivotal role in conflict mitigation and resolution by training the youths of their country. The population of youths in Pakistan is more than 50 per cent and in view of their backward socio-economic conditions and lack of better educational/ employment opportunities they are vulnerable to extremism, militancy, radicalisation and terrorism. Particularly the youths from the lower and lower middle classes are easy prey to indoctrination by the hard line religious groups. They are the ones who require better education and

[16] The state initiative to establish an International Center for Conflict Resolution under the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in 2004 failed to materialize.

training so that they can utilise their energies in the best possible manner instead of being used by various extremist groups. Overseas Pakistanis may be involved in de-radicalising the youths of Pakistan, but there is no organised effort in this regard. They can play a useful role in helping reform religious schools and providing good quality education to those who are unable to afford the costs of their studies. Engaging youth in developmental activities will also help curb violence and terrorism in Pakistan and reducing the level of frustration and anger in their minds. An investment of this kind by the Pakistani diaspora will go a long way in neutralising those forces that have used the youth in fanning armed conflicts and using them as suicide bombers. Perhaps, the Ministries of Overseas Pakistanis and Youth Affairs can coordinate their activities as far as engaging Pakistani diaspora for de-radicalising the youths is concerned. By engaging themselves in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, the Pakistani diaspora can help neutralise the activities of those radical groups that are based overseas but are involved in fanning radicalisation and militancy in the country. Pakistan's image outside can be substantially improved if the youths of this country are de-radicalised and their energies are used productively.

Third, Pakistani diaspora can act as a catalyst and a pressure group to restrain political parties and groups from augmenting the level of polarisation and schism in the country. In view of genuine concern shared by the majority of Pakistani immigrants about violence and terrorism along with political cleavage between the government and the opposition parties, it makes sense if they try to help major stakeholders in Pakistani politics: diffuse crisis and control the level of violence in the country. Political parties can also seek the expertise and experience of noted Pakistani intellectuals and academicians settled in foreign countries for the purpose of formulating conflict management mechanism. Like disaster management mechanism, which aims to effectively deal with floods, cyclone, earthquake and other forms of natural disasters, conflict management mechanism will evolve a strategy to regulate conflicts and lower their intensity so that these conflicts do not transform in a violent manner. The role of overseas Pakistanis can be important in this regard. Conflict Management Mechanism will have necessary tools like early warning and early response, mediation, negotiations and arbitration. That mechanism can have state and non-state participation with the involvement of overseas Pakistanis so that their input is also taken into consideration while dealing with different types of conflicts. Fourth, overseas Pakistanis can help reduce class conflict by sponsoring various developmental projects and programmes to help bridge economic disparity. Poverty, social backwardness and under-development are the three major challenges faced by Pakistan which are also a source of

conflict formation, generation and escalation. Since 1973, when large number of Pakistani skilled and unskilled workers left for the oil producing Arab states to till today, around 200 billion dollars have been remitted to Pakistan, both through official and unofficial means, but that amount was not used for poverty alleviation, promoting good quality education and modernising the infrastructure. Wealth which came to Pakistan from overseas Pakistanis was largely spent by their family members to buy property or luxury items but was not used in areas which could have helped reduce economic disparity or provide modern and better education. It was high time Pakistani diaspora seriously thought in terms of investing in sponsoring developmental projects which can help reduce social backwardness and involve unemployed youth in the development process of their country.

Institutional arrangements involving overseas Pakistanis for positive conflict transformation will go a long way to eradicate violence and armed conflict. That is only possible if the overseas Pakistanis are sure that their investment and support will not go waste and will be used to resolve issues which cause crisis and conflict. If proper trust is established between overseas Pakistanis and the stakeholders in Pakistan about the right and proper use of their investment, much can be done to ensure their engagement and involvement in the areas of human development. However, even if overseas Pakistanis are ready to help the process of conflict transformation, management and resolution and if the situation on the ground is not conducive then in that case not much can be done. The conflicts in Balochistan, FATA and Karachi are deadly and require positive conflict transformation so that the energy released from these conflicts could be used for transforming the attitude, behaviour and perceptions of major stakeholders involved in these conflicts. Like the people of Pakistan, who have their stakes in resolving conflicts, the overseas Pakistanis also have their legitimate interest for peace and stability in their homeland.■

CHAPTER 6

International Migrations and Middle Class Nexus in Pakistan: A Preliminary Investigation

G.M. Arif

Introduction

The performance of Pakistan on economic and social fronts during the recent past has not been satisfactory because of low economic growth, high inflation, poor governance and deterioration in law and order situation. Pakistan is unlikely to achieve most of the time-bound Millennium Development Goals. However, despite this bleak picture, two recent developments are important. First, the emergence of a large Pakistani diaspora, around 7-8 million in different parts of the world, which has developed strong linkages back home by remitting more than US$ 10 billion annually. The total flows of remittances coming either through the banking channel or through the informal sources could be double of the documented remittances (Amjad et al., 2012). Second, it has recently been estimated that more than one-third of Pakistanis (35%) belong to the 'middle class' (Nayab, 2011). In many developing countries, strong diasporas and vibrant middle class back home have made significant contribution to economic and political stability as well as improving the well-being of their countries' population. The examples include China, India, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mexico.

However, the causality between overseas migration (or diaspora in a broad sense) and the middle class in a society is rather unclear. The existing literature leads to three types of linkages between them. First, the emergence of a middle class boosts overseas migration because local job opportunities do not match with the aspirations of the middle class (Ley and Kobayashi, 2004). This is what happened in Hong Kong and Taiwan from where a large number of young qualified individuals from the middle class went abroad in the 1980s, particularly to Australia (Chiang and Liao, 2008). Second, international migrants or immigrants joined the middle class of the destination countries because of their better educational background. In Australia and Britain, for example, while the first wave of immigrants primarily ended up as working class people but the second wave as well as the second generation of these migrants became largely the part of their

middle class because of better qualification and skills (Bologani et al. 2009). Many Indian migrants and their families in Dubai are also part of the middle class (Vora, 2009). Third, the emergence of a middle class in labour-sending countries, such as Mexico, Philippines, China and India, is, at least partially, linked to the contribution of their respective diaspora (Booth and Miroff, 2012).

This paper is concerned with this last category. Pakistan has a long history of overseas migration. It has received billions of dollars as workers' remittances. Moreover, a large number of Pakistanis have resettled in their communities of origin after completing overseas assignments. Are there any linkages between the overseas migration, remittances, return migration and middle class of Pakistan? This paper aims to investigate these linkages. More specifically it attempts to answer the question as to how overseas migration can fuel the middle class in Pakistan?

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the stock of overseas Pakistanis and return migrants, inflows of remittances and the size of the middle class in Pakistan. Conceptual framework and methodology used in the study are discussed in section 3. Remittances and sources of household income are the subject matter of section 4, followed by a discussion on the uses of remittances in section 5. Section 6 explores the occupational choices of return migrants. The socio-economic changes, as associated with overseas migration, are investigated in the penultimate section, followed by conclusions in the final section.

International Migration, Remittances and Middle Class in Pakistan: A Brief Review

Pakistani Diaspora and Return Migrants

According to Amjad et al., (2012), the stock of overseas Pakistanis or diaspora in a broad sense can be estimated from three sources of data: Bureau of Immigration and Overseas Employment (BIOE); Pakistan missions and embassies abroad; and National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), which issues the National Identity Cards for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) and Pakistan Origin Cards (POC).The data on the stock of overseas Pakistanis from these sources provide robust estimates. Table 1 presents country-wise data on the stock of overseas Pakistanis, which has increased from 3.97 million in 2004 to 6.7 million in 2012, an annual net increase of about 0.34 million workers. Some other sources show the stock figure as high as 7 million (Abbasi, 2010).A close look at Table 1 reveals that around 85 per cent of overseas Pakistanis are concentrated in seven

countries in the following order: Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA), United Arab Emirates (UAE), Canada, Oman and Kuwait. Within these countries, the table shows the large concentration of Pakistanis in the first four countries. The stock of overseas Pakistanis, as reported in Table 1, in fact shows the size of Pakistani diaspora across the globe since it includes temporary workers in the Middle East (ME) , migrants and their families settled permanently in UK, Canada, USA and Australia as well as professionals on temporary assignments and students. Although globally the Chinese and Indian diaspora are the largest in number, Pakistani diaspora is not small by any standard.

Table 1
Stock of Overseas Pakistanis (in millions) and their Share in Major Destination Countries

Destination Countries	2004	2009	2012
All Countries (million)	3.973	5.500	6.700
Share (%) in the stock	100	100	100
Saudi Arabia	27.7	21.8	25.4
United Kingdom	20.1	21.8	17.9
United States of America	15.1	16.4	13.4
United Arab Emirates	12.9	13.4	17.9
Canada	6.3	5.5	4.5
Oman	NA	2.8	3.0
Kuwait	2.5	2.7	2.2
Qatar	NA	1.5	NA
Others countries	15.4	14.1	15.7

Source: Amjad et al. (2012).

To see the association between the overseas migration and middle class, the return flows of workers are as important as the diaspora because they are likely to be part of the middle class after return through both their investment behaviour and occupational choices dependent heavily on their overseas experience. Unfortunately, there is no source of data about the stock of return migrants. The Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF) in the 1980s and 1990s collected data on return flows and shows that between 1982 and 1995, the annual return flows (permanent) were between 50 to 200 per cent of the annual placement of workers in the ME. These percentages reinforce the argument that

return migration is part of the temporary overseas labour migration. At the expiry of their contracts they need to get them renewed or return home, although the possibility of over-staying without proper documentation exists.

According to the BIOE data, between 1972 and 2012 more than 10 million Pakistanis have been placed only in the ME. During the last 3-4 years, the annual placement of Pakistani workers in the region is about 400,000. But, the stock of Pakistanis in the ME, as shown in Table 1, is around 3-4 million. So, the remaining 6-7 million Pakistanis who went to the region temporarily during the last 30 years have returned home, although the possibility of remigration of these returnees cannot be ruled out. Return migration from UK or North America, though at a small scale, is not uncommon (Bologani et al., 2009). Based on these very simple statistics, it appears that not only the Pakistan diaspora is large in size, a large number of returnees have resettled in the country.

Remittances

Table 2 presents data on remittances that came through the official sources (banking) from 1998 to 2012. The flows of remittances declined from US$ 1.5 billion in FY 1998 to around US$ 1 billion in FY2000. The decline can be due to the freezing of foreign currency accounts in Pakistan. Following 9/11 in September 2001 the total official remittance flows doubled from US$ 1.09 billion in FY2001 to US$ 2.4 billion in FY2002. Since then the annual flows of remittances have steadily increased to a level of US$ 13 billion in FY2012 (Table 2). This increase has been observed from all major countries where Pakistanis have settled permanently or temporarily including Saudi Arabia and Dubai in the ME, UK and USA. Amjad et al., (2012) have estimated that the annual flows of remittances could be more US$ 20 billion when the flows from informal sources such as *hundi* are taken into account.

The recent rise in remittances can partially be attributed to three factors (Amjad et al., 2012). First, the stock of overseas Pakistanis has increased during the last decade; the net annual outflow of workers is about 0.34 million. This increase in the stock during last decade could be one of the major reasons for rising trends in remittances. Second, the skill composition of Pakistanis has improved. On the one hand, the younger generation of expatriate Pakistanis has entered into more modern professions in USA and UK (Abbasi, 2010), and, on the other hand, fresh migrants, particularly those who left Pakistan during last 7-8 years, are equipped with new sets of professional skills (*Dawn*, October 3, 2011). Higher wages of these professionals have contributed to rise in remittances. Third, the State Bank of Pakistan has taken steps, such as Pakistan

Remittance Initiative (PRI) to boost and facilitate the flow of remittances sent home by non-resident Pakistanis. It appears that Pakistan is very much part of the global flows of capital as well as labour. Pakistani diaspora have retained their Pakistani identity and remain connected to Pakistan. They influence their homeland culturally and economically, keeping close ties to their roots by travelling to Pakistan and investing there.

Table 2
Official Remittances from Countries of Origin

	FY 1998	**FY 1999**	**FY 2000**	**FY 2001**	**FY 2002**
TOTAL	1489.55	1060.19	983.73	1086.57	2389.05
Saudi Arabia	474.76	318.49	309.85	304.43	376.34
UAE	207.70	125.09	147.75	190.04	469.41
Dubai	(101.01)	(70.57)	(87.04)	(129.69)	(331.47)
Abu Dhabi	(75.53)	(38.07)	(47.30)	(48.11)	(103.72)
Other GEC Countries	160.85	197.28	224.32	198.75	224.29
US	166.29	81.95	79.96	134.81	778.98
UK	98.83	73.59	73.27	81.39	151.93
Other EU Countries	35.87	26.48	24.06	21.50	28.80
Other Countries	66.38	34.03	35.28	67.71	256.24
Encashment FEBCs	251.87	184.64	70.24	64.98	48.26
	FY 2003	**FY 2004**	**FY 2005**	**FY 2006**	**FY 2007**
TOTAL	4236.85	3871.58	4168.79	4600.12	5493.65
Saudi Arabia	580.76	565.29	627.19	750.44	1023.56
UAE	837.87	597.48	712.61	716.30	866.49
Dubai	(581.09)	(447.49)	(532.93)	(540.24)	(635.60)
Abu Dhabi	(212.37)	(114.92)	(152.51)	(147.89)	(200.40)
Other GEC Countries	474.02	451.54	512.14	596.46	757.33
US	1237.52	1225.09	1294.08	1242.49	1459.64
UK	273.83	333.94	371.86	438.65	430.04
Other EU Countries	53.53	74.51	101.51	119.62	149.00
Other Countries	658.05	497.14	417.25	573.31	642.11

Encashment FEBCs	46.12	45.42	16.25	12.09	2.68
	FY 2008	**FY 2009**	**FY 2010**	**FY 2011**	**FY 2012**
TOTAL	6451.24	7810.95	8905.90	11200.97	13186.58
Saudi Arabia	1251.32	1559.56	1917.66	2670.07	3687.00
UAE	1090.30	1688.59	2038.52	2597.74	2848.86
Dubai Abu Dhabi	(761.24) (298.80)	(970.42) (669.40)	(851.54) (1130.33)	(1201.15) (1328.82)	(1411.26) (1367.62)
Other GEC Countries	983.39	1202.65	1237.86	1306.18	1495.00
US	1762.03	1735.87	1771.19	2068.67	2334.47
UK	458.87	605.59	876.38	1199.67	1521.10
Other EU Countries	176.64	247.66	252.21	354.76	364.79
Other Countries	530.39	609.00	577.37	653.26	562.14
Encashment FEBCs	2.40	0.48	1.02	0.07	13186.58

Source: State Bank of Pakistan; Amjad et al., (2012).

Middle Class of Pakistan

The middle class can be defined as the broad group of people in contemporary society who fall socioeconomically between the working class and upper class. More specifically, the middle class is characterized as:

> 'having a reasonable amount of discretionary income, so that they do not live from hand to mouth as the poor do, and defined it as beginning at the point where people have roughly a third of their income left for discretionary spending after paying for basic food and shelter. This allows people to buy consumer goods, improve their health care, and provide for their children's education' (Economist, 2009).

Several methods have so far been used to measure the middle class in a society. For Pakistan, Nayab (2011) has recently calculated the size of middle class by applying the composite weighted index on the micro-data of Pakistan Socio-economic Living Standard Measurement Survey (PSLM) carried out in 2007-08. The composite index has five components: education, income, occupation, lifestyle, and housing. Based on the scores of composite index, she divided the population first into seven classes and then grouped the middle class into three broad categories: 'strict middle class', 'expanded middle class' and 'broadest middle class' and found that

the 'strict middle class' category comprises one-fifth of the population. The `expanded middle class' boosts the proportion of those in the middle class to 35 per cent while the 'broadest middle class' shows only a marginal increase in the share of the middle class in the total population (Table 3). Based on the expanded middle class' categorization, Nayab (2011) has calculated the size of the middle class in Pakistan as 61 million people. The middle class is found to be more of an urban phenomenon and the upper middle class and upper classes are associated with professional occupations. The middle class is expected to have sufficient resources to fulfil their needs and at least some of their wants, have a surplus savings. Now the question is whether Pakistani diaspora, remittances and return migration have an association with the middle class of Pakistan.

Table 3
Size of the Middle Class in Pakistan Using a Weighted Composite Index

	Proportion (%)			**Numbers (in Millions)[2]**		
	Total	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Total**	**Urban**	**Rural**
Strict Middle Class (LMC + MMC + UMC)	18.8	32.9	8.6	32.5	22.6	9.8
Expanded Middle Class[1] (LMC + MMC+ UMC + ULC)	**34.6**	**53.7**	**20.9**	**61.0**	**38.5**	**22.4**
Broadest Middle Class[1] (ULC + LMC + MMC + UMC + UC)	35.0	54.6	21.0	61.6	39.1	22.4

Source: Nayab (2011).

Conceptual Framework and Methodology

The role of the diaspora in the growth of the middle class in their country of origin has not been examined systematically in Pakistan or even elsewhere, so there is no established framework to analyse the overseas migration–middle class nexus. To develop this nexus, there is a need to understand how does the middle class grow in a society? How can overseas migration or diaspora contribute in its growth? It is commonly argued that societies with a large middle class have more income and economic growth mainly because of its consumption behaviour. Moreover, the middle class

contributes to economic growth through entrepreneurship and innovation. It also creates better governance by promoting efficient and honest delivery of government services as well as public investment in education and infrastructure. These factors set the stage for economic growth and political stability.

The size of the middle class grows when the poor or lower classes enter the middle class. It has been shown that:

> The point at which the poor start entering the middle class by the millions is the time when poor countries get the maximum benefit from cheap labour through international trade, before they price themselves out of world markets for cheap goods. It is also a period of rapid urbanisation, when subsistence farmers abandon marginal farms to work in factories, resulting in a several-fold increase in their economic productivity before their wages catch up to international levels. That stage was reached in China sometime between 1990 and 2005, when the middle class grew from 15% to 62% of the population, and is just being reached in India now (Economist, 2009).

This very brief description of the middle class and its growth shows that people belonging to this class fulfil their basic needs and have some discretionary resources not only to buy consumer goods but also to invest in health and children's education. A higher share of income for the middle class in a society is linked with higher economic growth, more education, better health and less political instability and poverty (Leon, nd).

In this context, overseas migration can be a source for the growth of middle class at the place of origin through three channels: inflows of remittances, acquisition of new skills while abroad and successful reintegration of return migrants in the domestic labour market. At the initial stage of migration, better-off people, who can bear the cost of movement, generally go abroad, but as the social network develops over time and the cost of movement reduces at a bearable level, the poor segments of the society take the opportunity and find employment abroad (Mckenzie and Rapoport, 2004).

Migrants send home remittances almost regularly, providing their households with resources sufficient to meet their basic needs; and after some years of overseas employment, they are usually able to buy consumer goods, improve housing, and invest in health and children's education. The broad base of migration may result in its benefits accruing to a large number of households. This is what happened in remote rural areas of India (Deshingkar, 2010).

During overseas stay, workers also have a chance to learn new skills, which can be used upon their return. Return migration is intrinsic in all

types of movements, particularly the movement of labour for temporary overseas employment. The average age of remittances at the time of return is less than 40 years, so they have many years ahead for participation in the domestic labour market. For their successful reintegration in the domestics market, self-employment has a big advantage over other occupations. Persons entering self-employment are those possessing relatively more entrepreneurial ability (Lucas, 1978). It has been found that return migrants have the highest entrepreneurship among rural counterparts in Mexico (Mckenzie and Rapoport, 2004). Both entrepreneurial ability and skills of return migrants are precious human capital that could produce positive influence on the development.

This diaspora is not only potentially powerful agent of change and development at home but also a major source for the growth of the middle class. It is argued that despite low growth, poor governance, deteriorating law and order situation, Pakistani diaspora have played a key role in the emergence of middle class by:

(i) Increasing the flows of remittances
(ii) Uses of remittances
(iii) The promotion of entrepreneurship through self-employment upon their return.

This study is exploratory in nature, based on the existing data and literature. However, because of the data constraints, it is not possible to examine all the above-mentioned dimensions. The study has used four indicators to examine the role of overseas migration and diaspora in the growth of middle class in Pakistan. First, the share of remittances in the total household income is included the analytical framework, as a key factor to enable households to transfer money to savings and investment after meeting their basic needs. Second, an analysis of the household consumption expenditure has been carried out. It is probably the most important dimension in a sense that remittances enable the recipient households to have some discretionary resources to buy consumer goods and to invest in health, education and housing.

Third, it is common in the literature to associate the middle class with entrepreneurship and innovation. This association is assessed through the occupational choices of employed labour force. The occupational choices of return migrants can be critical since they, in most labour sending countries, make a transition to self-employment after their return. The self-employed, according to Lucas (1978), possess relatively more entrepreneurial ability. Mckenzie and Rapoport (2004) found that return migrants have the highest entrepreneurship among rural counterparts. The present study will examine the occupational choices of return migrants to see the changes, if any, are

associated with the experience of overseas migration. Fourth, the perception of migrants or their households about the economic and social mobility will be reviewed. The expectation is that overseas migration has contributed to enhance their socio-economic status through foreign remittances, their uses and occupational choices. Migrants' families may feel they are part of the middle income or social group.

However, this methodological approach as used in this study has several flaws. First, migration is not the only factor that contributes in the growth of middle class, which is likely to be influenced by other socio-economic developments in the society as well, and these developments have not been examined in this study. For example, if the middle class is an urban phenomenon (Nayab, 2011), urbanisation needs to be discussed. Second, it is very difficult to determine pre-migration economic class of migrants. It can be argued that most of the outgoing workers already belong to the middle class particularly in view of the heavy cost involved in overseas migration. However, this study takes the position that overseas migration, particularly temporary employment in the ME is now a more than three decades' old phenomenon. A strong social network, which has developed in the country over time, has given many poor families opportunity to send their members abroad for temporary employment. This network is also active in the case of permanent settlement in UK, Canada, USA and Australia. Third, for the present study, the household is the unit of analysis. It has not addressed the macro issues related to the middle class such as its contribution in the economy, governance and political stability.

Remittances and Sources of Household Income

Based on the household survey data, recent studies have shown that migrants remit home on average Rs 200,000 per annum (Arif, 2009; Irfan, 2011; Ahmed, 2012). These remittances enable households to diversify their sources of income. This diversification has been a major factor, particularly in rural areas, where employment opportunities are limited, in enhancing the socio-economic status of the respective households. For example, the relatively better-off position of rural households in northern Punjab compared to households of other regions is commonly linked to the diversification of their incomes from employment in urban areas such as Rawalpindi and Islamabad as well as overseas.

Data presented in Table 4 support this view and show the importance of remittances in migrants' household income, based on a survey of more than 500 households in rural and urban areas of Pakistan. The table shows that remittances constituted 41 per cent of the average monthly income of the households surveyed. However, it varies across the occupation of

migrants while abroad, from 48 per cent for professional workers to 36 per cent for unskilled workers. The other sources of household income include the salaries of family members in Pakistan, businesses and agriculture/livestock. Ahmed (2012) has recently calculated the share of foreign remittances in migrants' household income as 51 per cent; 56 per cent in urban areas and 50 per cent in rural areas. For internal migrants, the corresponding share is only 4 per cent (Table 5).

Table 4
Sources of Monthly Household Income

Sources	**All**	**Professional workers**	**Clerical/sale workers**	**Skilled workers**	**Unskilled workers**
Salaries	17.23	16.00	15.59	19.33	16.53
Businesses	20.64	21.01	11.23	20.79	18.73
Agriculture/ livestock	16.98	13.56	13.81	17.57	21.41
Remittances	40.59	48.15	42.55	37.99	36.22
Other sources	4.56	1.27	5.82	4.32	7.10
All	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Arif (2009).

Income from non-remittance sources constitutes approximately 60 per cent of the total household monthly income (Table 4). Based on these statistics, Arif (2009) argues that, on one hand, the larger share of non-remittance income shows the ability of households to save or invest part of remittances after meeting daily needs with non-remittance incomes. One the other hand, this shows less dependency on remittances, which are not the permanent source of income. He argues that it is likely, when a migrant returns home permanently he may be able to start a new business or be active in the existing one, thus generating an alternative source of permanent household income. From this very simple statistics, it is argued that the diversification of household sources of income, primarily through foreign remittances, set the ground for such households to make entry into the middle class through their consumption behaviour.

Table 5
Remittances as Proportion of Income of the International and Internal Migrants by Rural-Urban Origin

Variables	International Migrants			Internal Migrants			
	Foreign Remittances	**Annual Income**	**Remittances as % of Income**	**Domestic Remittances**	**Annual Income**	**Remittan-ces as % of Income**	**Ratios**
	1	2	3 (1/2*100)	4	5	6(4/5* 100)	7
Urban	238367	424875	56.10	105241	127289	82.68	2.26
Rural	219965	436672	50.37	54351	104620	51.95	4.05
Total	223174	434356	51.38	60568	107577	56.30	3.68

Source: Ahmed (2012).

Uses of Remittances

The uses of remittances are discussed in three ways. First, what change have overseas migration and remittance flows brought in the total household consumption expenditure compared to pre-migration expenditure? Second, how have the remittances been used? Or have the households been able to get some discretionary income from remittances to spend on non-food items such as consumer durables, health and education? Third, what proportion or how much remittance money has been used for investment to sustain the positive change associated with overseas migration?

Data presented in Table 6 show that the overall monthly expenditure of migrant households increased by 158 per cent in nominal terms during the average stay of 7 years abroad. The greatest increase was observed for the fifth quintile (wealthiest). Even the lowest quintile' households were able to increase their monthly expenditure by more than 90 per cent.

Table 6
Change in Household Consumption Expenditures by Quintile

Quintile	Duration of stay abroad (years)	Average monthly household consumption expenditure before migration (Pakistani rupees[a])	Average household monthly consumption expenditure at time of survey (Pakistani rupees[a])	Growth/change (%)
First quintile	7.69	1,167.92	2,283.42	95.5
Second quintile	8.71	1,586.99	3,036.09	91.3
Third quintile	7.56	2,222.91	4,317.71	94.2
Fourth quintile	6.86	2,078.65	5,445.36	162.0
Fifth quintile	6.72	3,727.99	11,622.46	211.8
Total	7.56	2,080.59	5,362.17	157.7

Source: Arif (2009)

Note: [a]US$ 1 = PKR 79.88

One of the major characteristics of the middle class is its ability to have some discretionary income after meeting the basic need to buy consumer goods and invest in health and children's education. With respect to the uses of remittances, the prevailing view in the literature on the subject is that the share of remittances channelled towards consumption is generally very high. However, the decision about the proportion of remittances to be spent on investment and that on consumption depends on many factors — the pre-migration economic position of households, the life cycle stages of migrants, access to household non-remittance income particularly during the migration phase, and length of stay abroad (Arif, 2009). The access to non-remittance income is important both as a supplementary source of income and as a disciplining factor regulating the economic behaviour of the family. The absence of any stable income implies that the earnings from overseas employment are likely to be used for the on-going maintenance of the households leaving little for savings and investment.

Table 7
Uses of Total Remittances Received (%)

	Total	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Punjab**	**Sindh**	**Others**
Food	17.75	14.83	22.06	13.76	18.02	28.30
Health	3.56	3.81	3.28	3.41	4.27	3.86
Education	4.51	4.21	5.00	3.06	4.50	7.90
Real Estate and agricultural Machinery	22.12	23.75	20.34	25.39	16.22	22.05
Durable items	8.06	8.82	7.13	9.06	10.17	5.62
Marriage	17.14	17.31	17.61	16.31	14.96	16.48
Loan repayments	5.52	4.84	6.52	5.81	6.17	3.87
Savings	14.08	15.18	10.70	15.30	20.55	4.40
Donations [a]	3.65	4.40	2.58	5.24	3.17	1.35
Others	3.61	2.85	4.78	2.66	1.96	6.16
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Arif (2009).

Table 7 presents data on the uses of total amount of remittances received since the migrants went abroad. The three most common uses claiming more than half of the total remittances were: real estate and agricultural machinery (22%); marriages (17%); and savings (14%). Of the total remittances received, only 18 per cent was spent on providing the family with food. Poorer families generally spend more than half of their total income on food items. The purchase of durable items (8%), loan repayments (5.5%) and donations (3.7%) were other important uses of remittances. Approximately 8 per cent of the total remittances were used for education and health services for household members. It appears that food, real estate, savings and marriage were important claimants of remittances in both rural and urban households. The pattern was the same across the provinces/regions. Ahmed (2012), based on the Pakistan Panel Household Survey 2010, has examined the preferences of migrants' households for the use of foreign remittances. They identified four priority areas: food, health, education and housing (Table 8).

Based on these statistics, it appears that households spend the remittances according to their needs and priorities. A considerable proportion of the remittances received has been used for education, health services and housing. So, the overseas migration provides substantial discretionary income to respective households for their choice needs. In terms of consumption behaviour, migrant households represent middle class trends. This is particularly so when this behaviour is compared with the consumption behaviour of the general population. According to the PSLM data, the share of food in the total household expenditure is around 50 per cent, which is much larger than the share of remittances used for food consumption. It seems that migrant households meet their food needs from non-remittance sources of income.

Table 8
Percentage Distribution of International Migrant Households by their Preferences Regarding use of Remittances

Use of Remittances	1st Preference	2nd Preference	3rd Preference
Food	66.51	3.77	1.42
Health	0.94	59.91	3.30
Education	0.47	2.83	35.38
Housing	0.00	3.77	11.79
Purchase of Land	0.00	0.00	0.47
Saving	0.47	0.47	2.83
Business	0.00	0.00	0.00
Marriages	0.94	0.00	0.00
Loan Return	3.30	2.36	5.66
Others	0.00	0.47	11.32
No Information	27.36	26.42	27.83
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Ahmed (2012).

On average, the sampled households were able to direct more than Rs 200,000 to investments and savings. This amount increases to an average of Rs 369,000 when households with no investments or savings are excluded. In the local context this investment is likely to have lasting positive effects on the household's economy. Arif (2009) found a positive relationship between the remittances and the amount invested. The greater the amount of

remittances received, the more likely it was the household would direct it to investment. He also shows that the households' non-remittance income during the migration period shows its statistical significance as a supplementary source of income: each additional rupee of non-remittance income increases the proportion of remittances directed to investments and savings. A higher proportion of overseas earnings went into productive investments probably because their day-to-day sustenance was drawn from other income sources. In short, remittances have not only enabled the recipient households to enhance their consumption level but also to have some money for healthcare, education and housing. Further, investment made by these households may bring sustainability in the consumption expenditure even after the return of migrants.

Migration and Occupational Change

Workers' original (pre-migration) occupational backgrounds compared to their post-migration jobs measure the impact of migration on occupational shifts after migration. To learn more about the occupational shifts over time, occupations held by returnees during their stay in the ME are also included in the analysis. However, this type of data are [is] not available for the recent period. This study has relied on the survey data produced in the 1980s, but supplemented by the experience of migrants in three Maghreb countries, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

Table 9 shows a concentration of workers in the production-service sector before going to the ME.[7] Approximately two-thirds of the migrants from urban areas and more than half from rural areas were in this sector before migration. In rural areas, 29 per cent were engaged in the agriculture sector, while, as expected, the proportion of professional-clerical workers was higher among the urban than among the rural sample. During migration, the production-service sector employment increased substantially: from 60 per cent before migration to 91 per cent while in the ME (Table 9). This indicates a substantial mismatch between the pre-migration and during-migration occupations of returning migrants. A transition matrix for movement from pre-migration occupations to occupations while in the ME shows that about 21 per cent of those who were professional workers before migration were production workers in the ME. In the case of migrants who were clerical workers before migration, 15 per cent were skilled workers and 26 per cent were unskilled workers abroad. More than two-thirds of agricultural workers switched to unskilled jobs in the ME.

Table 9
Percentage Distribution of Returning Migrants by Pre-migration and Post-return Occupation, Controlling for Geographical Location

Occupation	Urban			Rural		
	Pre-migration	During-migration	Post-return	Pre-migration	During-migration	Post-return
Professional/ Clerical	8.8	10.9	6.7	5.8	2.8	3.3
Agriculture	11.7	1.5	3.5	28.5	1.4	39.3
Business	14.7	2.3	42.3	8.6	1.4	26.4
Production/ Service	64.8	85.3	47.5	57.1	94.4	31.0
All	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Arif and Irfan (1997)

Note: (a) Indicates pre-migration occupational composition of returnees, while (b) shows occupations while abroad, and (c) reveals post-return composition.

After migration, Table 9 shows that production-service sector employment for all migrants declined substantially: from 60 per cent before migration and 91 per cent during migration to only 37 per cent after return. The share of unskilled workers declined from 21 per cent before migration and 39 per cent while in the ME to only 10 per cent after return. In turn, business sector employment increased from 32 per cent before migration to 60 per cent after return. In rural areas, concentration of migrants shifted to agriculture work, while in urban areas the importance of business occupation increased substantially.

The findings of Gubert and Nordman (2011) regarding the labour-exporting countries in Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) are not different. They have examined the changes in three periods by employment status, employer and self-employed (Table 10). These categories match with the business category of occupation discussed above in the case of Pakistan. Table 8 shows that the proportion of employers increased from 1 per cent to 15 per cent of the whole sample between the pre-migration and post-return periods. This increase arises largely because some of those

individuals who were wage workers prior to migration (31% of the whole sample prior to migration) became employers. This shift in employment status is particularly pronounced in the case of Tunisia, where the percentage of employers rose from 1 per cent to 23 per cent between the pre-migration and post-return periods. Another study of Tunisian return migrants by Mesnard (2004) also found that self-employment has increased among return migrants. Workers who are self-employed after return have accumulated much large amounts of savings during migration. They stayed abroad on average longer than other workers. The evidence from other countries, like China and India, is similar (Demurger and HuiXU nd; Czaika and Varella). In short, the occupational choices of return migrants in Pakistan as well as other labour-exporting countries are in the expected direction — a transition from wage employment to self-employment. Although return migrants' job as a self-employed worker may not match with their overseas work experience, remittances and a desire to earn a better livelihood may influence the choice of post-return occupation.

Table 10
Characteristics of Return Migrants

	Algeria			Morocco			Tunisia			All		
	Before	**After**	**Today**	**Before**	**After**	**Today**	**Before**	**After**	**Today**	**Before**	**After**	**Today**
Waged	37.5	25.3	25.9	19.0	21.3	21.6	36.6	25.8	26.7	31.3	24.2	24.8
Employer	1.8	9.3	11.1	0.7	11.9	15.9	1.2	23.4	28.2	1.3	14.9	18.4
Self-Employed	15.1	14.2	15.4	15.1	16.6	17.5	14.6	12.0	13.8	14.9	14.2	15.5
Seasonal worker	12.4	0.9	0.3	9.8	7.5	8.6	15.8	3.7	1.8	12.7	4.0	3.5
Family worker	2.1	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.6	0.6	3.4	1.8	2.1	3.7	0.8	0.9
Un-employed	17.2	13.0	11.1	9.8	18.8	14.9	9.9	10.5	6.4	12.4	14.0	10.8
Retired	0.3	31.3	31.3	0.3	5.3	5.7	0.0	15.4	16.9	0.2	17.5	18.2
Student	10.3	2.1	0.9	28.9	2.2	0.6	12.7	1.5	0.3	17.0	1.9	0.6
Inactive	3.3	3.9	3.9	1.0	3.4	3.2	4.3	2.8	2.1	2.9	3.4	3.1
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.8	12.2	11.4	1.2	3.1	1.5	3.5	5.0	4.2

Source: Gubert and Nardman (2011), MIR.M@EUI;authors' cakulation

Note: Not applicable.

Migration and Socio-economic Changes

In the literature on middle class, there is a common feature in the tendency to invest on children's education, health and housing. How this change has been brought about by migration and the overall change in economic and social status of migrant households is discussed in the following sections.

Children's Education

Table 11 shows that about 79 per cent of children of migrant households aged 5-15 years were enrolled in school at the time the survey was conducted. This percentage is very high and desirable by all standards. The resources generated through overseas migration have therefore contributed to keeping the children in school for a longer period. One important dimension of the data presented in table 11 is the small gap in school enrolment rates between urban and rural areas: 78 per cent of children in rural areas are enrolled in school compared to 90 per cent in urban areas. This finding is important because one of the challenges in achieving the education-related targets of both the government of Pakistan and the Millennium Development Goals is the narrowing of the rural-urban gap. The large gender gap in school enrolment in Pakistan, particularly in rural areas, is the other major challenge the country is currently facing. This gap exists in the migrant households as well, but it is much smaller than the national average. Overseas migration and remittances have contributed not only to increase in overall enrolment rate but also to narrowing the gender and rural-urban gaps in enrolments rates.

Table 11
School Enrolment Rates of Children 5-15 Years of Age by Gender (%)

Gender	Total sample	Urban areas	Rural areas
Total sample	78.9	80.4	77.9
Male	82.2	84.0	81.0
Female	74.4	75.3	73.7

Note: Enrolment rate=Number of children 5-15 years old enrolled in school x 100.

Total Number of Children 5-15 Years Old

Regarding the quality of education, Arif (2009) argues that:

> Since the early 1990s, there has been rapid growth in enrolment rates in private schools in Pakistan. The general perception is that the quality of education in these schools is better than that in public-sector schools. However, due to the relatively high fees of private schools, it is not possible for many households to enrol their children in them. In this context, the survey attempted to shed light on the behaviour of migrant households in terms of sending their children to private schools. Figure 1 shows a marked change in this behaviour after migration. Before migration, only 15 per cent of the children of the sampled households that were enrolled in school attended private schools. This percentage increased to 48 per cent after migration. In urban areas, more children were enrolled in private schools than in public schools. Even in rural areas, 40 per cent of the children enrolled in school were in private schools. Thus, overseas migration has brought a qualitative change in the education of the children of the households surveyed.

Figure 1
Percentage of Children in Private Schools Before and After Migration



Source: Arif (2009).

Use of Health Services

The poor in Pakistan do not have access to good quality health facilities; the sick generally consult traditional healers. Remittances can lead to improvement in the health status in mainly two ways; first they can be used to improve the nutritional status of the population, particularly children, through the provision of good quality food; second, this money can be used to access better health services in the case of illness. The use of health services was explored during the period before migration and at the time of the survey. Table 12 shows a shift from the use of traditional healers and public-sector health facilities to the sue of private doctors. Before migration, 44 per cent of the households visit public hospitals or dispensaries in case of illness. This proportion was relatively higher for rural households (47%). More than a quarter of the households used the services of traditional healers prior to migration. At the time of the survey, 90 per cent of the urban households and 75 per cent of rural households used the services of private doctors if a family member became ill. This behaviour was observed in all regions.

Table 12
Change in Use of Health Services (%)

	Use of Health Services Before Migration				**Use of Health Services After Migration**			
	Private doctor	**Govt. hospital**	**Other**	**Total**	**Private doctor**	**Govt. Hospital**	**Other**	**Total**
Urban	33.15	40.30	26.55	100	88.89	4.83	6.28	100
Rural	25.30	46.88	27.83	100	75.09	13.00	11.91	100
Punjab	23.17	44.79	32.04	100	64.39	18.94	16.67	100
Other regions	23.28	49.75	26.96	100	87.20	7.60	5.20	100

Source: Arif (2009).

Migration and Housing

A great body of literature has shown the interest of migrant workers and their families in in investing remittances in improving their housing (Gilani et al., 1981; Arif, 1999; Ballard, 2005). Table 13 shows that owning a residential house was common even before migration, but in both urban and rural areas, home ownership increased modestly after migration, from 78 to 84.5 per cent in urban areas and from 95.8 to 97.5 per cent in rural areas. The major change was in repairing the housing unit. Remittances have

enabled households to upgrade their homes in the *pacca style.* In rural areas, the proportion of migrant households who owned a *pacca* house increased from 42 per cent before migration to 62 per cent at the time of the survey. The change was also considerable in urban areas. Another major change was the addition of new rooms to the existing house.

Table 13
Migration and Change in Housing Conditions of the Household

Housing Situation/ Conditions	Total Sample		Urban Areas		Rural Areas	
	Before Migration	After Migration	Before Migration	After Migration	Before Migration	After Migration
Owns house (%)	87.2	91.2	78.0	84.5	95.8	97.5
Own pacca house (%)	59.5	74.6	78.0	87.9	42.3	62.3
Has access to electricity (%)	99.1	99.3	99.6	99.6	98.6	99.3
Has gas connection (%)	52.6	57.8	85.2	90.5	22.2	27.5
Has Phone (%)	39.1	65.3	62.9	83.7	16.9	48.2
Has water supply (%)	52.0	54.6	83.3	87.1	22.9	24.3
Has sewerage (%)	59.3	68.6	84.8	91.3	35.6	47.5
Number of rooms (mean)	3.4	4.5	3.5	4.6	3.3	4.3
Owns house with 5 or more rooms (%)	15.3	37.2	16.7	41.3	14.1	33.5

Source: Arif (2009).

On average, there was an addition of one room to the housing unit in both urban and rural areas, and the proportion of large houses (five or more rooms) more than doubled. While access to electricity was universal before migration, gas availability modestly improved in both urban and rural areas. Only 17 per cent of the rural households had a telephone before migration, and 48 per cent reported having one at the time of the survey. A modest improvement was observed in water supply and sewerage.

Changes in Economic Status

The change in economic status in the ranking of a household before and after migration is presented in Figures 2-4. This ranking shows the perception of the respondents regarding their overall economic status relative to that of the other households of the community. The ranking was estimated by Arif (2009) using a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 represented the highest status and 10 the lowest status. There is a marked difference between perceived pre-and-post-migration economic status. The majority of respondents selected numbers between six and nine when referring to their perceived economic status before migration, showing a relatively low pre-migration economic status. Regarding economic status at the time of the survey, most responses were between three and five, indicating an improvement in the status. For pre-migration economic status, the lowest number given (9) was selected by 15 per cent of the respondents. For their status at the time of the survey, only five per cent of the respondents selected this number. This change can also be observed in both rural and urban areas (figures 2 and 3). Almost all of the households with professional or educated workers abroad had a better status after migration. There is no major change, however, for those households who selected numbers 1 and 2 for their pre-migration household status; their status at the time of the survey remained the same.

Figure 2
Economic Status Before and After Migration
(Total Sample)



Source: Arif (2009).

Figure 3
Economic Status Before and After Migration
(Urban Areas)



Source: Arif (2009).

Figure 4
Economic Status Before and After Migration
(Rural Areas)



Source: Arif (2009).

Regarding the reasons for overseas migration, more than one-third of the sampled households reported that poverty was the main push factor. The data on the perceived economic status at the time of the survey shows that both the overseas work experience and the remittances had improved the economic status of the households. The data on the perceived economic status are not different from the absolute poverty figure of only two per cent. Keeping in mind that perceived poverty was one of the major reasons for both migration and the perceived low economic status prior to migration, the improvement in the economic status of the households after migration shows the great contribution of remittances to improving the overall well-being of the migrant households.

Changes in Social Status

The migrant households were asked to rank their social status in the community prior to migration and at the time of the survey. The ranking was done using a score of 1 to 10, with 1 representing the highest status and 10 representing the lowest status. As shown in figures 5-7, there is a marked difference between pre and post-migration social status for most of the households. The majority of respondents selected numbers between 6 and 9 when referring to their social status before migration, showing a relatively low perceived pre-migration social status (figure 5) among the respondents. For their perceived social status after migration the majority of the respondents selected numbers between three and five. This change is observed in both rural and urban areas (figures 6 and 7). Almost all of the households with professional and educated workers abroad perceived a high social status after migration. However, there is no major change between the time periods for those who had selected numbers 1 or 2. A social change associated with overseas migration is also witnessed in other countries, like Bangladesh (Dannecker, 2011).

In short, migration and remittances appear to have a positive social impact on the remittance receiving households. Remittances have contributed to improving the quality of children's education, improving access to better health facilities, and providing good quality housing. The overall economic and social status of the households has shown a marked improvement in both rural and urban areas. These improvements have brought about a class transformation making it possible for many migrant households to move to the middle class.

Figure 5
Social Status Before and After Migration
(Both Rural and Urban Areas)



Source: Arif (2009).

Figure 6
Social Status before and after Migration
(Urban Areas Only)



Source: Arif (2009).

Figure 7
Social Status Before and After Migration
(Rural Areas Only)



Source: Arif (2009).

Conclusion

The existence of a large middle class of more than 60 million is a positive development in the country. This study has shown that international migration is likely to have contributed in the growth of the middle class in

the following ways: first, about half of the foreign remittances received by the migrant households are used to buy consumer goods, to improve the housing quality and to invest on healthcare and children's education. These are the pre-requisites for a middle class — having some discretionary income after meeting the basic needs to use for improving the living standard. This is what overseas migration has provided to the respective households.

Second, a large number of migrants, probably around 7-8 million, has resettled in the country after the completion of overseas employment. The empirical evidence from Pakistan and elsewhere shows that they have the advantage, because of both remittance-induced savings and overseas experience, to start their own businesses after return. On the one hand, migration has resulted in promotion of entrepreneurship in the country and on the other; the business activities have provided resources to households to sustain their consumption expenditure even after the return of the migrants.

Third, following in the footsteps of the middle class, migrant families have kept their children in schools for a longer period. The selection [s] of private schools for their children's education shows their preference for quality education. The study has also shown an improvement in healthcare and housing of migrant families.

Fourth, based on the perception of migrant families, there is a movement from lower status to middle economic and social status. These families have begun to consider themselves as part of the middle class.

However, based on the simple analysis carried out in this study, it is not possible to claim that all of the migrants and their families have moved to the middle class. There could be cases of failure because of short duration of stay abroad, inefficient use of remittances and poor working conditions while abroad. It is recommended that:

- The role of diaspora in different economic and social activities may be increased through their involvement in community projects to bring economic and social stability in the country.
- Return migration may not be considered a burden for the economy. Their tendency for self-employment may be encouraged to boost entrepreneurship in the country.
- To boost the middle class, poor regions such as rural Sindh and Southern Punjab may be facilitated for overseas employment.■

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CHAPTER 7

Migrants' Rights And Pakistani Diaspora Communities

Dr. Sabiha H. Syed

"Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his/her own, and to return to his/her country"
Universal Deceleration of Human Rights, Article 13 (2)

Introduction

Historically international migration globally has been on the rise. In recent years, the number of migrants, mostly from developing countries, has doubled in one generation reaching approximately 200 million people. (IOM, 2011)[1] This phenomenon has led to the evolution and formation of 'diaspora communities' in many parts of the world. The distinction between migrants, migrant workers and 'diaspora communities' is not always clear. In this context it may be important to identify a simple definition that forms a paradigm to recognise the 'diaspora communities'. The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) provides a broad definition of diaspora as:

> "Members of ethnic and national communities, who have left, but maintain links with, their homelands. The term 'Diasporas' conveys the idea of transnational populations, living in one place, while still maintaining relations with their homelands, being both 'here' and 'there" (IOM, 2006).[2]

Furthermore, certain academic definitions help in better understanding the nature of such communities. Cho (2007) notes "Diaspora brings together communities which are not quite nation, not quite race, not quite religion, not quite homesickness, yet they still have something to do with nation, race, religion, longings for homes which may not exist. There are collectivities and communities which extend across geographical spaces

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[1] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effective about Migration* (Geneva: IOM, 2011).

[2] Dina Ionescu, *Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers*, Research Series Paper no. 26, ed. Ilse Pinto-Dobernig (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2006).

and historical experiences. There are vast numbers of people who exist in one place and yet feel intimately related to another."[3]

Pakistani Migrants

Today, Pakistan is in the top 10 countries sending migrant workers abroad. It is also in the 10 developing countries with the highest migration flows. Pakistani migrant flows into and from here have been important since independence in 1947. Millions of Muslims and non-Muslims changed their place of origin and made Pakistan, India or elsewhere their destination. The large numbers that moved to the new country, Pakistan, came to be known as 'Refugee' instead of Pakistani, for some unjustifiable reasons. Unfortunately even today their name reflects on their social and political status. At the time of or because of the Partition the persons and families who moved to other destinations than Pakistan or India were later categorized as communities of Indian or Pakistani in foreign lands.[4]

The separation of East Pakistan as Bangladesh too created a population who had sympathies with Pakistan and were listed as 'Standard Pakistanis' in Bangladesh, their fate is still not clear. The population transfers after independence from colonial rule has followed a pattern of somewhat similar nature among several countries in the world. In some cases colonists allowed these former subjects to become immigrants, residents and citizens. Besides colonialism other factors too were determinants of population movements from Pakistan to other destinations. Pakistani immigrants who became citizens of destination countries, however most retained their socio- cultural roots with Pakistan.[5] (Syed, 2003)

As regards the flows and trends, overtime there have been different types of migration flows from Pakistan to several parts of the world like United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU), North America, Middle East (ME), Africa and Asia and the Pacific. People are using different ways to migrate. It is estimated that 7 to 10 million Pakistanis are living across international borders in different countries. Pakistanis are found living and working in many countries around the world (Haour Knipe and Davies, 2008).[6]

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[3] Cho Lil, "The Turn to Diaspora," *Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies, TOPIA*, no. 17 (Spring 2007).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Sabiha H. Syed, *The State of Migration and Multiculturalism in Pakistan: The Need for Policy and Strategy* (Islamabad: *UNESCO*, 2003).

[6] Mary Haour-Knipe & Anita Davies, *Return Migration of Nurses* (Geneva: International Centre on Nurse Migration, 2008).

Another wave of population movement from Pakistan became important in the shape of 'Labour Migrants' who overwhelmingly responded to the demand for labour in the ME and Gulf Cooperation Countries. Today Pakistanis are living and moving abroad across countries and continents. These communities have become close to the concept of 'diaspora communities'.

The stream of migrant workers from Pakistan has been on the rise since 2002. As in Table 1, according to the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, Saudi Arabia has been the major destination country for workers during this period. Except for 2007, 76 per cent of Pakistani migrants were living and working there.

The government of Pakistan signed several agreements with the Muslim countries for large scale export of labour which included countries of the Gulf, Iran, Iraq and Libya.[7] This considerably increased the flow of immigration towards the ME. The government also established a Division of Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis in 1971 and the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Pakistanis Starting with a small number of immigrants it increased to 1.6 million in 1981.[8]

[7] Ibid.
[8] Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, Islamabad, Pakistan 2012.

Table 1

Major Destination Countries of Pakistani Migrants (200-2012)

Countries	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Saudi Arabia	104783	126397	70896	35177	45594	84587	138283	201816	189888	222247	293837	1513505
UAE	34113	61329	65786	73642	100207	139405	221765	140889	113312	156353	147469	1254270
Oman	95	6911	8982	8019	12614	32474	37441	34089	37878	53525	58820	290848
Qatar	480	367	2383	2175	2247	5006	10171	4061	3039	5121	6369	41419
Italy	48	128	581	551	431	2765	2876	5416	3738	2875	2850	22259
South Korea	564	2144	2474	1970	1082	434	1534	985	251	12	7	11457
UK	703	858	1419	1611	1741	1111	756	565	430	308	158	9651
Kuwait	3204	12087	18498	7185	10545	14544	6250	1542	153	173	2	74183
Bahrain	1022	809	855	1612	1630	2615	5932	7087	5877	10641	9228	47308
Malaysia	59	114	65	7690	4757	1190	1756	2435	3287	2092	1159	24604
0thers	454	396	381	562	523	706	934	985	952	1258	872	8023

Source: Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, Islamabad, Pakistan. (Data up to October 2012).

The above figures indicate that in the past 10 years most of the people were migrating for work towards Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. Unfortunately the migrants' rights in these countries are most likely to be violated as the number of migrants is decreasing towards European countries due to restrictive policies. However to some extent there is a change indicated in this trend and is rising towards Malaysia where it is seen to be increasing after 2005.[9] Another flow of international migration towards Iran and Iraq has drastically decreased, i.e., there were only 56 migrants who went to Iran and only 18 people went to Iraq in the last 10 years. These figures show that the situation has been affected by war in these countries.[10]

Diaspora's Role in Development

Pakistani diaspora communities abroad offer a great opportunity to the country as the diasporas elsewhere have played a significant role in building many nations; China, India, and Israel are some of the best examples. Brozozowski suggests that diaspora plays a vital role in development and progress of their countries of origin. On return to their countries, they bring social, physical and human capital they have accumulated abroad, thus contributing to economic development. Even after permanent settlement, in destination countries the migrants tend to send part of their income to their countries of origin in the form of remittances. These transfers in some cases like Pakistan form a large part of the national income. A futuristic and properly managed use of these remittances can help to boost the economic growth of the receiving countries. Brozozowski further posits that even while staying abroad the skilled migrants can contribute in the development and progress of their countries of origin by offering advice, skills, expertise or by investing their savings. Remittances sent by immigrants and diaspora communities are extremely vital for development of any country.[11] In Pakistan, one of the largest sources of foreign exchange is the remittances sent by diaspora communities and migrants which was US$ 2.4 billion (4% of the Gross National Product (GNP) in the year 2002 increasing to US$ 4.2 billion in 2003 (Brzozowski, 2008).

Several successful approaches of diaspora engagement are found in China[12] and India. However, several African countries also offer replicable and distinctive approaches for diaspora engagement. These practices/examples from African countries have used the following

[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Jan P. Brzozowski, "Brain Waste, Educational Investments and Growth in Transnational Countries," Social Science Research Network, Working Paper (June 7, 2007).
[12] Glen Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China* (London: Routledge, 2012).

approaches with positive results. The mechanisms adopted by these communities are based upon the following principles:

- Prefer self-help and self-reliance.
- Usually engage in small scale, local community based activities.
- Identity with locals is important
- Emphasize a new development paradigm.
- Stress on the human factor, processes and relationship and less on technical aspect of inputs and outputs.
- Focus on two-way processes between services and beneficiaries.

Migrants' Rights

Migrants' rights remain an issue in several countries around the world. The liberal democracies on one hand profess progress but on the other hand push the assimilation agenda along with neglect towards legislation on migrant's rights. A study states that approximately 2.2 million Pakistanis live in EU and UK. The author observes that, "the Pakistani Diaspora is, to a certain extent, integrated into its respective European countries. Nonetheless, like other minorities, it faces issues related to discrimination and assimilation due to the difference in culture and religion."

The author elaborates that Pakistani communities in some cases realize the advantage in their participation in the political system in host countries' especially in UK, Denmark and Norway.[13] It is a positive experience in some EU countries and in UK that diaspora communities participate in both conservative and liberal parties. Pakistanis have some elected positions including a few women who have risen to ministerial positions. However like other minorities, Pakistani communities are mostly residing in 'ghetto-like' housing conditions and generally prefer to marry within their families and communities. The second generation is showing signs of changing behaviour and perceptions. The younger generation is endeavouring to secure their basic human rights in the host/destination countries.

As the Pakistan government has a policy to encourage labour migration through regular channels, it is becoming aware of the need to address the issues arising in this area and the problems of labour migrants. Pakistan has also become a part of the Colombo Process (CP), which is a

[13] Nadia Mushtaq, "The Pakistani Diaspora in Europe and its Impact on Democracy Building in Pakistan," International Institute for Democracy & Electoral Assistance (2010).

regional consultative Process on the management of overseas employment and contractual labour for countries of origin in Asia.[14] It provides a great opportunity to its member states as well as to observers and external organisations of a non-binding and informal environment to engage in dialogue and cooperation on issues related to labour migration that are of common interest and concern. The Process is led and governed by ministerial consultations which make recommendations and action plans as are discussed and adopted by the ministers of the participating countries.

The first ministerial consultation for Asian labour-sending countries was held in 2003 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Since then two subsequent ministerial consultations have followed in Manila, Philippines in 2004 and Bali, Indonesia in 2005 to review and monitor the implementation of previous recommendations and identify areas of future action. The third ministerial consultation in Bali also included the participation of several countries of destination — Bahrain, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Korea, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[15] To date the consultations have evolved around three thematic foci:

1. Protection of and provision of services to migrant workers;
2. Optimising benefits of organised labour migration and;
3. Capacity building, data collection and interstate cooperation.

The 4th ministerial consultation was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh in April 2011. Pakistan has yet to host a meeting of this Process. Despite successes, several challenges remain in enhancing the protection of migrant workers, including reducing their vulnerability to irregular migration, safeguarding against illicit recruitment practices, providing welfare support to migrant families and offering reintegration support upon return. Successfully addressing these challenges requires investment in capacity-building to better implement and evaluate policies and programmes, as well as strengthening dialogue and partnerships among all actors and stakeholders. This Process provides a unique opportunity for member countries and observers to address certain challenges. Engaging in constructive dialogue to pursue areas of mutual interest greatly enhances the chances of member countries undertaking concrete actions.

At the global level acknowledging the current shortcomings of the international approach to migration, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General established the Global Commission on International Migration

[14] http://www.colomboprocess.org/ (accessed March 19, 2013).
[15] "Ministerial Consultation," Colombo Process, http://www.colomboprocess.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14&Itemid=11 (accessed March 20, 2013).

(GCIM)[16] to provide guidance on how the international community and the UN in particular should address migration issues. A high level dialogue on migration was held by the General Assembly in 2006; it provided an important opportunity for the declaration on the future of Refugees and Migration Policy which illustrates the growing awareness surrounding the need for global approach to international migration.[17]

After prolonged discourse a major tool to encourage international approach to migration is the UN Convention on Migrant Workers' Rights, "International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families". This convention has the Human Rights-based approach and is one of the most important initiatives taken so far by the international community with respect to migration. It sets a standard for the rights that should be granted to all migrant workers and to the member of their families throughout the world. It establishes migrants as a recognised category of people who need particular protection. The Convention also addresses the situation of both documented and undocumented migrants, and stresses that even undocumented migrants are human beings who deserve respect for their fundamental human rights. While the Convention came was formed in 2003, the number of states becoming its signatory remains limited. Therefore, efforts to manage migration on the basis of this convention will require the ratification by many more states, including receiving developed countries and sending countries like Pakistan who have however yet to ratify the convention.[18]

A few other aspects that are observed as violation of human rights as well migrants' rights are well known, that most of these persons are taking "3 D" jobs/occupations, that is 'Dirty' 'Dangerous' and 'Difficult or Degrading'. It is also well documented that such conditions as the 3D jobs is growing and in this process irregular or illegal migration also increases. Also from the point of justice these communities' rights are often compromised.[19] Given that they are mostly in 3D's occupation and often not having the status of citizenship they are not part of representation in labour unions or for government benefits.

The migrant's rights are also not highlighted by governments due to other reasons like:

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[16] "Summary of the Report of the Global Commission on International Migration," Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations, October 26-27, 2005.

[17] Ibid.

[18] United Nation Convention on Migrants' Rights, UNESCO, entered into force on 1st July 2003.

[19] Sabiha H. Syed, "Diaspora, a Central Asian Perspective," in *International Migration in Central Asia: Challenges and Prospects*, ed. Fiona Coxshall, (Almaty: UNESCO Almaty Cluster, 2005).

- Competition in labour market resulting in exploitation.
- Lack of regulated legal frame works and channels.
- Increase in xenophobia and racism.
- Lack of protection mechanism for them.[20]

Engaging Diaspora Communities in Protection of Rights

The role of diaspora in the discourse of migration and development issues can be of much significance throughout the migration policy process by the engagement of these groups on issues such as:

- Assistance to returning migrants, through social and economic development programmes to reduce their dependence on migration to sustain livelihoods.
- Provide economic incentives for investment of migrant earnings through the provision of financial and advisory services.
- Encourage the creation of returning/migrants professional networks.
- Assist migrant self-help programmes.
- Encourage the use of migrant remittances in the development of local community initiatives.
- Encourage the role of communication media in accurately reporting on the migration phenomena by presenting positive image of migrants.
- Including the use of Information Technology (IT) in portraying fair and accurate image of migrants and building positive perceptions.
- Facilitate social sciences research to further develop reliable, systematic data collection entities and networks, including improvement of national statistics and analysis of data on diaspora communities.
- Emphasize the importance of issues pertaining to migrant's rights, on job exploitation or violation of their rights.
- Diaspora's engagement both in origin and destination countries to be encouraged for exchange of knowledge on laws and other useful information.

[20] Patrick Taran, "Migrants' Rights and Role of Diaspora Communities," in *International Migration in Central Asia: Challenges and Prospects*.

- The government at both ends be encouraged for transparent and joint policies to protect migrant rights through advocacy activities
- Create awareness about violation of rights and play an advocacy role to safeguard the rights of migrant and diaspora communities.
- Information, technology and mass media channels should be used as a useful tool to protect and advocate migrants' rights.

In conclusion, the future trends in migration policies of receiving countries are likely to become restrictive and could lead to new labour migration procedures of divergent nature. Knowledge of such future trends in migration in destination countries are best known to the diaspora in each country. Therefore the sharing of this knowledge will be useful for Pakistan so as to plan its future framework on international migration.

It will also be important for sending countries like Pakistan to pursue a 'Human Rights' based approach to meet the challenges of harsh and restrictive measures adopted by several receiving countries. Migration governance is a global issue; it can be best addressed by promoting human rights, justice, social cohesion and sustainable development.■

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15. *World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effective about Migration.* Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2011.

Useful Sources of Information

UNESO, Social and Human Sciences
http://www.unesco.org/migration/convention

United Nations
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r158.htm

Migrants Rights International
http://www.migrantwatch.org

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. The position is currently held by Ms Navanethem Pillay from South Africa.
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/ i2othmig.htm

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division publish an International Migration Report every few years. The 2002 addition can be found at:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/ittmigrep2002.htm

International Labour Organisation
http://www.ilo.org/migrant

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
http://www.unesco.org/migration

CHAPTER 8

Diaspora and Economy: Effects of the Global Economic Slowdown on Remittances

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Introduction

The global economy contracted for the first time in 2009 after World War II. The recession directly hit the advanced economies and indirectly the developing economies. The economic downturn started with the sub-prime market collapse in the United States (US) economy and European Union (EU) followed soon (Charles Gore 2010). In 2009, Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita decreased in 60 out of 107 developing economies (United Nations 2009). The tremors of this crisis continue even as we enter the fifth year post-crisis. The United Nations (UN) Global Economic Outlook 2012 still forecasts a slow recovery which can be particularly difficult for developing economies having their export markets in the developed countries.

The developing economies witnessed the impact of financial crisis through several channels including: migration and remittance flows, aid inflow, foreign investment volatility, and uncertain trade environment (Ahmed and O' Donoghue 2010). However, it is important to understand that the net impact of economic changes during the peak crisis period includes the internal shocks that were taking place in these countries. For example, while there was evidence of Pakistani workers getting laid off in the Gulf countries, the coalition activities related to 'war on terror' inside Pakistan had implied reduction in formal sector jobs in provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. It was the workers from these regions that now started to look towards migration as an option but in non-traditional countries.

Remittances to Pakistan increased rapidly in this past decade. A number of workers are migrating abroad (particularly Gulf and Arab countries) and sending remittances to Pakistan which is becoming a significant source of Pakistan's foreign exchange. The remittances maintained an outstanding growth of 25.8 per cent in 2011 as compared to 2010 and in 2012 workers' remittances grew by US $2 billion over 2011 (see Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-12). In 2012, workers remittances to

Pakistan of around US $14 billion accounted for almost 75 per cent of net current transfers. In 2009, Pakistan was ranked 12th but in 2012 Pakistan ranked the 7th in the world in terms of overseas remittance inflows (figure 1).

Given the opening up of emerging market economies for outside workers, global remittances (particularly from non-traditional economies) to developing countries are estimated to go beyond US$ 400 billion in 2012 with a growth rate of 6.5 per cent over the previous year (World Bank 2012). It was observed that the remittances flows to developing countries have shown remarkable resilience vis-à-vis foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and private debt since the global financial crisis (figure 2), even in countries where remittances declined during the crisis.

Figure 1
Remittances and other Flows to Developing Countries



e: estimated f: forecast
Source: World Bank (2012).

Across the entire time series, it can be observed that remittances remained stable and countercyclical. The foreign workers are seen to contribute more in their home countries in times of economic downturn or natural disasters. For example, during the Mexican financial crisis of 1995, remittance inflow increased to unprecedented levels. A similar trend was observed during Asian Market crisis of 1997 in Philippines and Thailand. During the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and during the floods of 2010 and 2011 in Pakistan, diaspora contributed a significant share of short term recovery expenditure.

Pakistan: Macroeconomic Situation and Migration

Pakistan's economic growth pattern has followed a boom-bust cycle as exhibited in

Figure 2. The short spurts of growth were usually backed by external inflows particularly aid (including loans and grants). Sustaining these spurts proved to be difficult for Pakistan given the low domestic savings rate and the lack in ability to transform savings in to high-impact investments.

Figure 2
Real GDP Growth 1972 – 2012



Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan (various issues).

One of the key reasons for not sustaining economic growth is the low level of fiscal discipline. The government's own capacity to invest is constrained by its resources. Pakistan today has one of the lowest tax to GDP ratios in the world (hovering around 10 %). Even with regressive non-tax levies, the economic managers continue to struggle as regards the financing of capital expenditure in key productive sectors such as education and health.

On the expenditure side (Figure 3), debt servicing, public administration and spending on law and order continues to occupy a large budget share, leaving very little fiscal space for pro-poor expenditures which are essential for Pakistan's pursuit towards the Millennium Development Goals. Over the past five years, subsidies towards financing losses of public sector enterprises have not only distorted budget priorities but have also implied heavy government borrowing from the banking sector, in turn, crowding out the private sector.

Figure 3
Expenditure as % of GDP, 2001 – 2012



Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan.

The above mentioned graph is indicative of Pakistan's low capacity to create jobs (given low levels of private domestic investment and reduced fiscal space with the government). However, the labour supply in Pakistan has been increasing over the past decade at an average of above 3 per cent. On the contrary, the unemployment rate has been on the increase since 2007

Figure 4). The unemployed labour force naturally has a tendency to use savings in order to explore greener pastures abroad. Which is why we see between 2006 and 2012 that growth in outward migration remained positive except for two years 2009 and 2010. This, to some extent, reflects reduced demand for Pakistani labour abroad during the post-crisis phase.

Figure 4
Unemployment Rate and % Change in Migration



Despite the global financial crisis, the growth in workers' remittances to Pakistan is increasing. Despite the lower than *reservation wage* offers, workers stand ready to go abroad because of continuing depressed economic growth in Pakistan. The crisis in 2007–08 did result in some Pakistani workers being laid off in United Arab Emirates, however, this was substituted by workers exploring alternate and non-traditional destinations, particularly the emerging market economies. Workers from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province were particularly ready to accept lower wages and poor working conditions abroad owning to deteriorating local security situation.

The global economic downturn, however, did not affect the flow of remittance to Pakistan. One could argue that remittance flows could have been higher for Pakistan had global crisis not occurred during the tail end of the last decade. Before we move on to a disaggregated analysis, it is important to see what is the available literature on this subject and in what

manner others have tried to evaluate the impact of crisis on remittances and migration.

Literature Review

Global Crisis and Developing Economies

Barajas et al (2010) investigated the effect of economic slowdown on workers' remittances in Africa. They explored if there are remittance-dependent economies in Africa? Authors identify economies which are vulnerable to fall in remittances. They adopted two-step procedures to estimate the impact of remittances' fall on economies in 2009 and 2010. First, they forecast the change in remittances received by each African country, implied by the forecast changes in GDP in the migrants' host countries, then estimated the impact on income using a short run remittance multiplier. They exhibit that remittances declined in African countries between the ranges of 3-14 per cent. The impact of the global fall in remittances on African countries' GDP growth is expected to be fairly mild.

Ratha and Mahapatra (2010) argued that the global financial crisis has caused decline in remittance flows to low income economies. They estimated that remittance flows to developing countries declined by 6.1 per cent in 2009. Despite the global economic slowdown, remittance flows to South Asia have shown positive growth in 2008. Similarly, remittance flows to Pakistan increased by 23.9 per cent in 2009. They highlighted the risks such as currency instability, weak job markets and rising unemployment rate in destination countries and reduction in construction activities across Gulf countries which may affect the migrants' inflows.

Balan et al., (2011) evaluated the remittances and migration flows during the financial crisis in the European countries. The authors reported that the economic crises have significant impact on migration and remittance in Europe. The remittance outflows from European Union countries decreased by 7 per cent in 2009. The total outflow from European Union countries was recorded at €30.3 billion in 2009. The remittances decreased in some countries due to decline in emigration growth and currency depreciation. The authors commented that the gender migrant structure was also affected by the crisis.

Raihan (2010) examined the impact of global financial crisis on remittances, exports and poverty in Bangladesh. He commented in his study that Bangladesh's remittances have grown at an average annual rate of 19 per cent from the last three decades. He analysed the impact of global financial crisis on remittances using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulation approach. He highlighted the negative growth rates in

some major exports of Bangladesh in 2008 and 2009. The fall in remittances was observed to be 20 per cent during the financial crisis according to simulated results. He analysed that the negative shock in remittances will result in declining GDP by 0.1 per cent. At micro level any shock in remittance inflows will have negative implication on household consumption and welfare. He noticed that poor households are more dependent on remittances than non-poor households and that poor households would be more vulnerable during the fall of remittances.

Raihan (2010) explored the impact of global financial crisis on migration and remittances in Bangladesh. He conducted a survey based on a questionnaire of 217 households in three districts of Bangladesh. The sample unit of that survey was a household which had at least one member living or working abroad during August 2007 to September 2008. He reported that about 50 per cent of the total sample did not have any knowledge about global financial crisis. As a result of migration, only 15 per cent of total sample size reported that migrants gained new skills and knowledge. During the crisis, the number of family workers abroad declined on an average. The monthly income of the migrants' household declined by 2.15 per cent on an average during the global financial crisis. He noticed that the households receiving remittances declined by 6.4 per cent. The average amount of household investment and savings also declined by 25.8 per cent and 19.4 per cent respectively. He argued that there is macro-micro mismatch of remittance analysis during the crisis. The macro statistics showed positive growth in remittances during the crisis but there were large number of households which faced fall in remittance inflows by migrants.

Case of Pakistan

Ahmed et al., (2010) examined the impact of remittances on economy and household welfare using micro econometric analysis and the General Equilibrium model. They found that employment in urban areas, households with migrant workers abroad, and education level of household heads are negatively related with poverty. If a household receives remittances, its probability of being poor declined by 12.7 per cent. If remittances inflows fell to 50 per cent, the GDP growth declined to 0.7 per cent and investment and imports also decreased to 7.7 per cent and 6.4 per cent respectively.

Ahmed and Sugiyarto (2012) find that improvement of household consumption and investment are positively and consumer prices negatively associated with remittances using CGE micro-simulation approach.

Migration and Remittances in Pakistan

The Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) is responsible for managing a substantial share of workers pursuing formal employment abroad. The Bureau was established in October 1971 under the direction of the government of Pakistan. It has placed around 6.5 million Pakistanis abroad since 1971. Most of them have been placed in Gulf and Arab countries. The total migration in 2012 is about 0.45 million (up to September 2012), which is the highest number in a year since BEOE started registration of the workers. The first peak can be observed in 1977 and the second in 1981, but between 1981-1986 there was a downward trend. After the 1980s another peak came in the early 1990's after the Gulf War and migrants registered a record level of 0.19 million in 1992 (many of these were migrants who had returned during the Gulf War) and this trend started declining in 1997. This period of downturn continued as in the next year Pakistan also tested its nuclear capability and had to face partial sanctions. In 2003, the total number of migrants reached to about 0.21 million. Then with the coming of global recession, migrant flow started to diminish in 2008 though some recovery has been seen in 2010 (Figure 5).

Figure 5
Emigration from Pakistan 1971-2012



Source: BEOE data.

Unfortunately, the migration statistics are not comprehensively documented for the decades of 1950s and 1960s. In these decades, workers from Pakistan migrated to UK and other Western Countries (PILDAT 2008). The oil boom in the 1970s opened a great avenue for Pakistani workers in the Gulf. Since then Gulf has become the principal destination of Pakistani workers. BEOE started to keep the record of migrants in 1971. The era of 1970s witnessed the flow of emigrants towards Europe and Middle Eastern (ME) countries (Jan 2010). The total migrant workers registered in 1970s were 604,559 which in the 1980s reached 1,001,897; in 1990s this figure was recorded at 1,272,027. In the first decade of this century, the number has reached the record level of 2,472,319 (Figure 6). According to the BEOE, more than 6 million Pakistani migrant workers live abroad.

Figure 6
Decade-wise Migration



Source: BEOE data.

The unskilled workers represent around 45 per cent of the total Pakistani migrant workers. Approximately 40 per cent of these are categorized as labourers. In 2009 the growth in highly skilled, skilled and unskilled migrants except semi-skilled migrants started to decline.

Interestingly, the number of semi-skilled migrants increased in 2009. The decline in unskilled workers was relatively greater (Figure 7). Around 44 per cent migrant workers are classified as skilled labourers or skilled workers. Among the skilled workers, vehicle drivers are in the highest number followed by masons and carpenters.

Figure 7
Migrants by Skill Level



Source: BEOE data.

Approximately 96 per cent of the total migrant population of Pakistan is concentrated in six countries of the ME which are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. About 90 per cent Pakistani workers are seen to be located in just three countries, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Oman. Table 1 in Annex shows the country-wise number of Pakistani migrant workers. Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman are the top three destinations of Pakistani workers respectively. The migration trend to Saudi Arabia and UAE dropped in 2008 but it increased

in 2010. It dropped again for UAE in 2011. In case of Oman, it fell in 2009 but increased subsequently (Figure 8).

Figure 8
Migrants in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman



Source: BEOE data.

Only two per cent of the total migrant workers represent white-collar workers including doctors, engineers, accountants, teachers and managers. In other words we can say that qualified workers comprised only two per cent of total migrant workers since 1970s. An increasing trend was seen in early years of the last decade it fell in 2008 (Figure 9).

Figure 9
Migrants by Profession



Source: BEOE data.

The data in Table 2 of Annex shows that 52 per cent of the migrant workers are from Punjab, 27 per cent from KPK, nine per cent from Sindh, seven per cent from Azad Kashmir and one per cent from Balochistan. One needs deeper investigation in the case of Sindh. It is the second largest province by population. However, its share in total migration is only nine per cent. One explanation may be that the large business hubs comprising the big three cities of Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukhar capture the local labour force for domestic industry. The migration from KPK has been rapidly increasing since 2000 with some decrease seen in 2008 (Figure 10).

Figure 10
Total numbers of migrants by Province



Remittances Inflows in Pakistan

It has been observed that remittance flow to Pakistan increased post 9/11. The flow of remittance increased from US$ 136 million in 1973 to US$ 14 billion in 2012. After the oil boom of 1970s, the demand for manpower increased from the Gulf countries and increased the remittance inflow to Pakistan. Before the 70's the worker remittance source was USA, UK and Western countries. In 1973, UK was the largest source of remittance with 53 per cent share in the total inflow. By the tail end of 1970s, over 70 per cent of the remittances were coming from the Gulf countries. In the 1980s, this share increased to 76 per cent but in 1990s the share of Gulf countries

decreased to 67 per cent. Post 9/11, the remittance inflows to Pakistan increased tremendously. In 2002 workers remittances were recorded at US$ 2.3 billion which were more than double of the amount recorded in the year 2000. Today many economists predict that remittances from abroad will soon overtake the largest export receipt item on Pakistan's balance of payments i.e. textiles (

Figure 11).

Figure 11
Workers Remittances, 1973 – 2011



Source: State Bank of Pakistan.

The global financial crisis has impacted economies and remittances worldwide but it seems that remittances sent to Pakistan have not been affected by the crisis. It happened because the wider ME — key destination of Pakistani workers — remained insulated from the financial crisis (Figure 12). However, many argue that these remittance inflows would have been much greater had the financial crisis not come about.

Figure 12
Remittance Inflows to Pakistan 2002 – 2012



Source: BEOE Data.

There are some other reasons that may also manifest why the global financial crisis did not slowdown the remittance inflow. Apart from the traditional migrant economies remaining insulated we also see that post-2006-07 the Indian diaspora was less of a competition in the ME given the appreciation of Indian Rupee. The Indian workers had already started looking at greener pastures of continental Europe further west.

Secondly the weakening of Pakistani currency implied that the diaspora's consumer surplus increased when buying was done locally in Pakistan. This partially explains the substantial amount of remittances which have gone towards the purchase of durable goods in Pakistan.

Future Outlook

We split our analysis of future outlook into demand and supply side factors. On the demand-side we see that there is an expectation that the flow of remittances will continue to increase in the foreseeable future. Secondly, with tightening of regulations in US and Continental Europe, Pakistani migrants have embarked upon non-traditional workplace destinations as well. The government in Pakistan has also been exploring options for skilled workers in East Asia and Far East. Thirdly, for the diaspora a weak Pakistani currency implies a buyer's market. Therefore there is a view that diaspora savings will find their way in to sectors such as real estate.

Fourthly, the banking sector in Pakistan is now viewing the remittances as a major source of business and therefore several banks are in the process of designing targeted financial instruments for overseas Pakistanis.

On the supply side, we understand that the EU region will continue to remain in recession. Similarly, North America will continue to maintain its strict visa and related policy towards Pakistani migrants. Secondly, we have also seen from Saudi Arabia's case recently that their government has started to diversify their labour market away from South Asian migrants. This also protects against the risks of unionism. Third, the growth in China and East Asia implies that these will be the future engines of global economic growth. It will depend upon our government's policies on migration and labour supply agreements with these governments that seek to find how best Pakistan's potential migrants can benefit from the economic growth of these countries.

Apart from the demand and supply factors, one also needs to evaluate the economy-wide impact of unilateral transfers including remittances. In various economies, we see that a remittances-led growth model has distorted local production and consumption behaviour. This phenomenon is akin to what is termed as the *Dutch Disease* where increased remittances lead to appreciation in the value of local currency and in turn hurt price competitiveness of exports. As the exports become unattractive abroad, this curtails local production and brings about unemployment.

There are, however, safeguards against such a situation. First, the diaspora may be engaged beyond their monetary contributions. The example of the Chinese living overseas exhibits how their contribution in terms of knowledge and technology transfer has led to revolutionizing China's industry, in particular the large scale manufacturing. There are regional examples also such as Pakistan's Sialkot Chamber of Commerce which has engaged overseas Pakistanis towards investment in municipal activities. Similarly the Indian diaspora's own budget airline is now operational for Indians in the ME.

Second, the banking sector now needs to go beyond the Pakistan Remittance Initiative. The State Bank of Pakistan, in collaboration with the commercial banking sector, needs to come up with a strategy for directing remittances towards higher value added activities. There are examples from around the world where fiscal incentives have been allowed if the diaspora community brings foreign direct investment.

Third the migration policy (stated or otherwise) needs to be aligned with the development policy. There are three levels at which this recommendation can be operationalized. The first is the Planning Commission's Framework for Economic Growth which recognises Pakistan's entrepreneurial diaspora and points towards the need for a

comprehensive design whereby the overseas community's intellectual and physical capital can be engaged. Second is the federal budget which can allow fiscal incentives to those members of the diaspora community who wish to engage beyond their monetary contributions. Finally, the role of the Overseas Pakistanis Division of the Government of Pakistan needs to be revisited. This Division should now take a lead in organising the diaspora all over the world, provide them with advice on how to help Pakistan better and exhibit for the members of Pakistani community abroad the examples of contributions made by the Chinese and Indian diasporas in their respective countries.■

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Annex

Table 1
Total Numbers of Pakistanis Migrants by Countries during 1971 – 2012*

S.#	Countries	1971-2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
1	U.A.E.	645126	34113	61329	65786	75642	100207	139405	221765	140889	113312	156353	130603	1882530
2	Algeria.	716	5	0	4	0	1	5	37	73	37	7	2	887
3	Angola.	68	2	0	0	0	10	70	68	379	4	8	6	615
4	Bahrain.	67160	1022	809	855	1612	1630	2615	5932	7087	5877	10641	8426	113666
5	Brunei.	366	41	78	107	71	77	56	66	74	62	79	58	1135
6	Gabon.	289	0	2	0	0	6	1	0	1	0	2	0	301
7	Gut-Inland.	195	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	195
8	Greece.	428	2	8	6	30	36	6	12	14	0	0	0	542
9	Guinea.	61	0	17	30	2	12	5	5	2	10	15	12	171
10	Hong Kong.	107	7	13	6	12	16	16	22	20	33	26	12	290
11	Iran.	12546	1	5	12	6	3	3	3	3	4	14	2	12602
12	Iraq.	68133	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	12	68147
13	Jordan.	4556	39	61	140	102	43	67	106	55	172	178	174	5693
14	Kenya.	33	0	2	7	1	7	0	7	6	4	11	6	84
15	Kuwait.	106747	3204	12087	18498	7185	10545	14544	6250	1542	153	173	2	180930
16	Libya.	64414	781	1374	375	261	67	450	940	1293	2157	490	449	73051
17	Lebanon.	360	0	1	0	4	4	8	18	16	21	30	16	478
18	Malaysia.	2057	59	114	65	7690	4757	1190	1756	2435	3287	2092	1052	26554
19	Nigeria.	2035	21	66	14	25	55	57	105	125	162	166	108	2919
20	Oman.	215933	95	6911	8982	8019	12614	32474	37441	34089	37878	53525	53932	501893
21	Qatar.	52114	480	367	2383	2175	2347	5006	10171	4061	3039	5121	6040	93204
22	Saudi Arabia.	1745541	104783	126397	208596	35177	45594	84587	138283	201816	189883	222247	264627	3222830
23	Sierra Leone	124	0	0	0	0	7	3	4	0	0	0	0	138
24	Sudan.	705	128	27	93	360	140	128	60	109	324	227	247	2548
25	Singapore.	122	14	5	3	6	8	11	16	39	58	62	34	378

26	Somalia.	60	3	0	2	1	1	4	2	4	8	5	7	97
27	Spain.	521	389	202	254	290	185	176	85	16	6	3	10	2135
28	Tanzania.	350	3	46	53	65	39	41	65	75	76	63	48	923
29	Tunisia.	25	0	0	0	0	0	3	7	0	0	0	0	35
30	Uganda.	303	0	0	1	1	0	0	12	4	5	10	0	336
31	UK.	1859	703	858	1439	1611	1741	1111	766	556	430	308	142	11494
32	US.	1590	330	140	130	238	208	297	202	184	196	182	129	3830
33	Yemen.	3021	73	85	157	81	129	168	151	241	170	57	113	5239
34	West Africa.	307	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	311
35	South Africa.	27	8	59	7	38	65	45	93	314	184	195	220	1255
36	Zambia.	839	2	1	0	5	1	4	11	30	15	13	5	924
37	Japan.	115	10	12	13	22	53	33	45	48	30	48	49	477
38	South Korea.	3905	596	2164	2476	1970	1082	436	1534	985	251	12	4	15559
39	Croatia.	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	45
40	Turkmenistan	709	4	214	16	109	10	5	97	20	28	0	0	1212
41	Cyprus.	157	31	26	40	32	111	206	129	144	50	71	107	1100
42	Turkey.	152	3	1	0	0	2	7	3	2	33	14	9	226
43	China.	141	8	1	3	154	435	300	172	312	191	180	161	2058
44	Cameroon.	42	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	15	0	63
45	Morocco.	38	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	1	0	0	0	44
46	Italy.	1229	48	128	581	551	431	2765	2876	5416	3918	2875	2398	23216
47	Sweden.	48	0	0	8	15	3	3	8	21	28	84	66	284
48	Switzerland	26	3	5	4	2	4	9	15	15	17	18	20	138
49	Syria.	237	2	6	5	4	80	1	3	7	1	0	0	346
50	Germany	100	5	42	8	2	8	5	6	9	2	11	15	213
51	Azerbaijan	4	0	5	7	2	4	3	10	10	6	0	1	52
52	Others	3561	458	396	381	562	525	702	864	985	952	1258	810	11322

Table 2
Migration by Province of Origin

YEAR	*PUNJAB*	*SINDH*	*K.Pakhtunkhaw*	*BALUCHISTAN*	*AZAD KASHMIR*	*N/AREA*	*TRIBAL AREA*
1972-2005	1590837	299730	779860	39847	199640	2375	166984
2006	100181	14830	44937	3172	12041	364	7666
2007	154300	20426	76669	3952	19324	504	11858
2008	206284	31835	131342	6763	31881	378	21831
2009	201261	30779	114633	4480	31329	507	20539
2010	190547	31814	98222	3130	22535	458	16198
2011	228707	40171	130119	5262	33133	732	18769
2012*	253601	34451	128901	3352	28647	553	20827
Percentage	52%	9%	27%	1%	7%	0.1%	5%

**Up to Sept 2012.*

CHAPTER 9

Influence of Remittances on Disaster Management

Dr. Abid Qayum Suleri

The data collected through research to assess the role of remittances and disaster response was mainly on post earthquake (2006) and post floods (2010) situations. Both outside and domestic remittances were included in the data. After the 2005 earthquake, there were a number of development organisations distributing all sorts of livelihood support to the victims, ranging from poultry to cattle and from seats to bicycle and sewing machines etc. Major reliance of 60 per cent of households damaged in the earthquake in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) was on domestic and foreign remittances (especially from Middle Eastern countries). Cattle, e.g., goats and sheep were distributed among the victims and taking care of these cattle was a fatigue for most of them. The people who were interviewed were mostly women. The research highlighted the social negative aspect associated with the remittances: in other countries (Nepal, Philippine) many of the women (in the earning age) would be away from household but in case of Pakistan (especially in case of KPK) many of men would be away. Therefore, there is an additional social burden on females in Pakistan; it was an added fatigue for them to take care of the cattle etc., without men while living in disaster generated conditions in the wake of the earthquake.

Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) tried to tell the donors as well as the government agencies involved in post earthquake rehabilitation process that we need to understand first that where is the main reliance and if the reliance on remittances, fortunately the remittance provider is safe during disaster. Their major source of earning is safe and they are still earning. But in some cases people come back and because of emotional setbacks do not go back. However, most of them went back in the Pakistani case. Fifty-five per cent of households receiving remittances were living in concrete houses that also became a negative point because mostly concrete houses were demolished in the quake inflicting loss of life and severe injuries. But, as they also have some bank balance and social assets in the form of relatives in other cities, they were better off to cope up with the situation than those families who did not have anyone to send remittances to them. In case of Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Swat,

those whose bread and butter was in Swat valley, stayed in the camps but those who had additional sources of income and specially remittances, they managed to stay with relatives or arranged residence in Islamabad or other parts of the country. There was an element of preparedness in case of remittances. After the earthquake there was a 28 per cent increase in the flow of remittances. In case of Tsunami, there was a surplus of remittances. Similarly, the families receiving remittances in flood affected districts of KPK were also able to take care of losses.

It is important to discuss how we keep the flow of remittances intact in disasters. There are two theories about keeping remittances intact. One group proposes change in the mode of delivery. Due to the stringent rules on money laundering, the informal mode of delivery and its connection to terrorism has cautioned people and they prefer the formal mode of delivery. This school of thought says that though there is increase in remittances it is not as massive an increase as it is projected. The second theory of increased remittances is that in case of foreign currency accounts you don't have to mention the source of currency and there is also tax exemption. So it can be a tool of money laundering from Pakistan. Where people from Pakistan can send their money to Dubai they can bring it back in dollars. So they were able to do money laundering and avoid heavy taxes. How much is this true? It depends on the data and measuring the magnitude of remittances is always difficult. When we talk about destinations where the remittances are coming from, we can categorize two types of immigrants. One set of immigrants consists of highly skilled people who are well educated and who have the chances to naturalize in the western world and they will tend to take their families along. And when they would be able to take their family with them they would not send their money back. To me the regular flow of remittances is coming back from those who are not able to naturalize there and take their families along. And they have to send money back home regularly to support their families, which is doing a major role in disaster preparedness. In case of disaster relief, the diaspora living in the west who are naturalized and whose income is comparatively better than the diaspora living in Middle Eastern countries, they can make quick delivery of remittances though not on a regular basis.

The importance to Pakistan of migrants and the remittances they send, both during emergency or crisis and at normal times, cannot be denied. Governments and international development agencies need to acknowledge migration as one of the major sources of livelihood for countries. To build an economically resilient society, governments in developing countries should formalise and strengthen this economic lifeline by exploring bilateral agreements to provide opportunities for skilled and unskilled labour in developed countries. Once those opportunities are

identified, the government could facilitate securing of visas and travel to host countries, and sponsor labour counsellors in the host countries to take care of the welfare of its nationals working there. The sending government should institutionalize the mechanisms for looking after the dependent families of emigrants so that the latter may concentrate on their work without worrying about their family members. Last but not least, the sending government should devise a resettlement strategy for emigrants who return to their homelands so that they may transfer the knowledge and experience that they bring from their stay abroad to local society.

The government needs to work on a mobile banking system in disaster-hit areas. Government should also see how informal channels of *Hundi* and *Hawala* could be regularized and institutionalized with certain rules. Pakistani banks abroad should also be able to send remittances fast and without deductions.■

CHAPTER 10

Diaspora Philanthropy

Mr. Zubair K. Bhatti

Mr. Zubair K Bhatti, who is a banker, based his talk on a paper he had written on the philanthropic role of overseas Pakistanis based in United States (US). He divided remittances broadly into three categories: money for running expenditure of migrant's family, money for investment and donation to philanthropic purposes. Though the amount remitted towards charity was the smallest, it amounted to a substantial sum in the total remittances.

He cited the case of the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 super floods which drew a tremendous response from the migrant community. Much must have gone to the affected families but some of that must have been shared by affected neighbours also. That, he said, could be characterized as philanthropy to some extent. He said there were three main categories of the Pakistani diaspora according to location in the Middle East (ME) , the UK and US. The migrants in those three places differed in their characteristics as to their social class, education and culture etc., these characteristics also affected their philanthropic activities. The US category was also influenced by the philanthropic culture of the Americans who donate more to institutionalized charities than individuals in need of help.

He quoted a 1998-99 study by Agha Khan Development Network which put the total amount of charity donations by Pakistanis at around Rs.70 billion in 1998. This money went to *Zakat*, *Waqf*, *Sadqua* etc., but most of that must have gone to individuals which was the Pakistani tradition. The study puts that figure to around 94 per cent that went to individuals. He said that *Zakat* which was mandatory was also given mostly to individuals. Other than that, about 40 per cent of all non *Zakat* funds were also donated to individuals. Among organised bodies that received charity most were faith-based. That was the same in US where most charitable work was done through faith-based organisations. In Pakistan among them were mosques religious madrassas. Again, out of the cash given to organisations, 94 per cent of all the money went to some kind of faith-based organisation. Donations to development causes was pitiably small since Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were not trusted. The term itself carried a negative image, though since the 2005 earthquake NGOs had gained in respectability. But generally speaking NGO were not

the kind of bodies that people wanted to donate to. However, he said, people did want to give to health, education and disaster relief kind of causes but not to rights-based, research, policy and advocacy kind of work. Another characteristic of the Pakistani donor was that he was not concerned if his donation had helped in development of some kind. He was satisfied he had done something good in the name of Allah. The Pakistani philanthropist was not interested in looking at balance sheets, report cards or whatever could be the evidence of where the money had gone. About 98 per cent of donors cited religion as the motivation for their acts of charity. He quoted another study (by Dr Adil Najam) which said people did not like to disclose details but as much as 100 million dollars were donated in kind and cash by Pakistanis in the US alone. They invested another 50 million dollars of time and money in Pakistani causes in the US and another 100 million dollars to non-Pakistani causes in the US. That last figure reflected the shifting identity and sense of home among Pakistani migrants. He said these trends would have very big bearing on how the remittances pattern was expected to evolve in future.

Talking about Pakistani diaspora in the UK Mr Bhatti said that most of them were not very well uneducated. In fact they were the least educated community in the UK which affected their philanthropic practices yet NGOs like Edhi, The Citizens Foundation (TCF), al-Shifa, or Shaukat Khanum, raised about half as much money in UK as they did in the US. This was because it was easier for the NGOs to mobilize there and reach a large number of people unlike in the US where Pakistanis were a much dispersed community.

Discussing the identity issue among Pakistani diaspora in UK he asserted it was clear that it was generally moving from a Pakistani identity towards a more general Muslim identity particularly since 9/11 and 7/7. That change was specially visible among second generation Pakistanis. This was bound to affect their philanthropy practices as well. However the elderly first generation was still alive and guided the younger generation which was keeping the remittances size stable enjoyed strong.

He quoted an study by Akbar S. Ahmed which noted that immigrants from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Punjab donated for cementing village mosques as that showcased their charity. He said that around Khariaan one saw large houses and mansions which were lying vacant and mosques which were air conditioned and carpeted. But there were no credible males back home through whom they could channel their more strategic and more organised philanthropy.

He referred to Adil Najam's study which placed the Pakistani diaspora in the US at a higher social rung than the diaspora in the Middle

East (ME) and UK which was reflected in their share in total remittances and their contribution to welfare works like Edhi and Shaukat Khanum.

Mr. Bhatti also mentioned how some of the diaspora money was flowing to extremist groups through contributions to madrassas, particularly from the Middle East.

In terms of regional economic development that owed in some way to remittances he said that there were no migrants from rural Balochistan, rural Sindh and South Punjab. Whether it was a causal relationship or not between diaspora from a particular place and its development the backwardness of the areas mentioned could be studied in that context, too.

Towards the end of his talk Mr. Bhatti warned against changing attitudes among second and third generation Pakistanis in UK and what may be termed as disaster fatigue that might in the long run have an adverse impact on the growth of remittances. He said government must encourage strengthening of ties between the diaspora and the country through their involvement in development and other social and cultural activities.■

CHAPTER 11

Indian Model of Managing Diaspora (Non-Resident Indians)

Mohammed Abdul Kalam

Introduction

Going by the knowledge acquired subsequent to the results of the Human Genome Project, and the *Out of Africa Theory*, all of early *Homo sapiens'* history is a continuous saga of migrations originating from Lake Malawi in East Africa for the past 70,000 years or thereabouts.

Pre-1947 overseas migrations, both voluntary and forced, from the Indian subcontinent had been on since quite early times but major ones happened during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a way, these two migration spurts can be termed as old and new migrations. Also, there are post-1947 migrations, and again post-1971 migrations. So, we had migrations form the Indian subcontinent, then from India and Pakistan, and subsequently from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

It is quite interesting to see how events in the subcontinent have affected those who had migrated and were migrating overseas. Interpersonal relations, settlement patterns in places migrated to, and combating racial and other forms of discrimination in those places, were influenced also by events occurring in their home countries' contexts.

Indian Emigrants

Currently, according to some estimates, we find 30 million[1] Indian emigrants spread over all continents of the world. But as per statistics given on the website of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIF) of the Government of India, the population of Indians Overseas, as of May 2012, is about 22 million (21,909,875), comprising of 10,037,761 Non Resident Indians (NRI) and 11,872,114 Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) respectively, inhabiting about 180 countries[2]. The preamble on the MOIF website pertaining to Indians overseas says

[1] UNDP's 2010 Report.

[2] Population of Overseas Indians, The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, http://moia.gov.in/services.aspx?ID1=300&id=m8&idp=59&mainid=23.

In this increasingly inter-dependent and inter-connected world, Overseas Indians are becoming 'Global Citizens'. Even so, our shared culture and our shared values bond all of us together. The Indian Diaspora is a pluralistic community just as India is. It holds within its folds, people of different languages, faiths and regions. The spirit of India transcends the narrow barriers of religion, language, caste or class, both within and outside the Indian nation[3].

The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs elucidates the diversity of the overseas Indians further when it observes that India has the second largest Diaspora in the world. The overseas Indian community estimated at over 25 million is spread across every major region in the world. Yet, it is difficult to speak of one great Indian Diaspora. The overseas Indian community is the result of different waves of migration over hundreds of years driven by a variety of reasons-mercantilism, colonialism and globalisation. Its early experiences make up a saga of trials, tribulations and the eventual triumph of determination and hard work. In the last three decades of the 20th century the character of migration began to change and a 'new Diaspora' led by high skilled professionals moving to the western world and semi-skilled contract workers moving to the Gulf, West and South East Asia emerged[4].

Before we proceed further and analyse migrations of Indians in different contexts, climes and at different points in time, it is pertinent to deal with and attempt definitions and descriptions of certain terms and concepts that are relevant to our pursuit here and utilised in migration studies. One such concept is Diaspora which was hardly used in the context of migration studies till the early years of 1990s. While conducting a study in the Pittsburgh region in the United States (US) (where one of the largest temples outside India and dedicated to Lord Venkateswara was coming up then) and doing fieldwork among Indian migrants there till the middle 1980s, one almost never came across the term Diaspora. During the early 1990s while carrying out fieldwork among south Asians (Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in particular) in the Bradford-Leeds region in west Yorkshire in England, one did come across the term but rarely in academic writings. However, by the middle and late 1990s while researching among south Asians (Indians and Pakistanis) in Boston (Massachusetts) and in the Triangle Research Park area (Raleigh, Durham and Chapel Hill in North Carolina) in the US, the term was gaining a lot of spread in journalistic writings and was gradually creeping into academic writings too.

[3] The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, http://moia.gov.in/index.aspx.
[4] India and its Diaspora, The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, http://moia.gov.in/accessories.aspx?aid=10.

Diaspora

Arguably, the first academic work to utilise the term diaspora in its title was the 1989 publication *The Sikh Diaspora: Migration and the Experience Beyond Punjab*, Edited by N. Gerald Barrier and Verne A. Dusenbery (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Publications; Delhi: Chanakya Publications). Subsequently, the publication of the journal diaspora in 1991 acted as a catalyst and academics who had hardly utilised the term in their studies/writings joined the diaspora bandwagon in using the term quite freely and with almost no thought given as regards the origin, genesis, appropriateness and definition of the term (see Kalam 2002).

Indian academics working on overseas migrations, till the late 1990s, referred to overseas Indian migrants as Indians Overseas, Overseas Indians, Indians Abroad, Expatriate Indians, People of Indian Origin, Non Resident Indians, and the like.

The label Non Resident Indians (*NRIs*) is a misnomer when used in a blanket manner to refer to all Indians who live in varied overseas contexts. This is particularly so because, unlike Pakistan (also Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), the Indian state does not allow people of Indian origin living abroad to obtain citizenship there and yet retain Indian passports; in effect, dual citizenship cannot be acquired by Indians living abroad. Hence NRIs are those who continue to retain their Indian passports (and of course, Indian citizenship too). The class of NRIs gained currency particularly during the 1980s as Government of India, strapped for foreign exchange, endeavoured to attract remittances by providing various interest and tax benefits in bank transactions and concessions to Indian citizens with overseas income and remittances home. The Reserve Bank of India came up with a plethora of policies and schemes geared towards the overseas Indians. Anyone holding an Indian passport and living overseas continuously for 182 days (that is, for about six months) qualifies as an NRI. But later, to facilitate travel and other aspects, the Government of India has created categories like Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs).

In 1989 *The Sociological Bulletin* brought out a special issue on overseas Indian migrants and it was designated *Special Number on Indians Abroad*. There were a dozen articles in the issue besides the editorial, and interestingly, none of the contributors used the term diaspora in his or her article. Nor did the Guest Editor use the term in his editorial! In fact it is quite amazing (and also amusing) that the bandwagon effect was so significant and remarkable that by the late 1990s almost everyone, general public, journalists, and academics had developed a strong and abiding penchant to utilise the term for any and every overseas migrant group in any and every context.

As per the Concise Oxford Dictionary, diaspora refers to '(a) the dispersion of the Jews among the Gentiles mainly in the 8^{th}-6^{th} C. BC. (b) Jews dispersed in this way.' Implicit in this specific context is the search for a homeland and inherent here is the notion of forced exile and the desire to create and construct a motherland / homeland.

No doubt at various points in our early evolutionary history and later too, human societies in different climes and different historical contexts have migrated, either due to force or because of their own volition, due to religious, political, economic, social, or environmental factors. So can any dispersal or scattering of any people irrespective of time and space be construed as akin to what is designated in the context of the Jewish situation? Moreover, it is pertinent to explore if all migrant groups seek to return to their, not imagined or constructed, but real and existent, not construed, motherlands/homelands?

Slavery and (later) Indentured labour wherein people were moved under duress from one British colonial setup to another are archetypal instances of forced migration. They were mostly cut off from their origins and actual homeland moorings for varying lengths of time, no doubt, but not for as long as in the case of the Jews and not in a perceived way. Yet there have been no overwhelming and concerted attempts to go back to their homelands.

Also, as one has observed elsewhere (Kalam 2005:64), various other streams and strands of migrations from the subcontinent to Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Mauritius and Malaysia, South Africa, Fiji, Surinam and the West Indies, East Africa, Canada (British Columbia) and US (California) can be considered as old migrations compared to the ones that led South Asians to Britain and the US, starting from the 1940s and 1960s respectively. The last mentioned, of course, is the most recent of all, and there, migration is still continuing. No doubt South Asian (SA) migrants can be seen in many different countries besides the above mentioned, particularly so in the Middle (East ME). But these are not either in great numbers, as in the case of many European countries and Australia, nor have migrations to these locales been on for long periods; some are not even in the generally understood rubric of migrations, as in the case of the ME, where a large number of SA male workers have *stayed* on for quite some time renewing their work contracts every two or three years. The kind of demographic and socio-cultural reproduction that one associates with settled migrant groups has not yet occurred in some of the European countries and Australia where they are in relatively small numbers. While in the ME there is no possibility of these workers aspiring for citizenship of the states they are working in, even if they so desire, in some of the other contexts such possibilities have existed to varying degrees, even if it meant

only a second class citizenship, overtly, as in the case of Sri Lanka, Malaysia, South Africa and some areas in the Caribbean, and not blatantly so in the case of Britain, US, Canada, and some other countries because of racism and allied reasons.

With what degree of justification can we lump all these different migrant groups together ignoring space and time factors and refer to them as diaspora from the Indian subcontinent or from India? As regards the Gulf Cooperation Council/ME migrants the fact that a predominant majority cannot take their wives and children nor any one from their kindred with them, works in favour of the Indian state as they are compelled to remit home to their families a large part of their earnings. None of them have a chance of acquiring citizenship in countries they have migrated to nor can they aspire to stay on for as long as they would like to. That, in fact, is a dampener on any thought as regards investment in the migrant situation. It is another matter that neither they are allowed to buy any property nor most of them are in a position to do so given their meagre earnings and hand-to-mouth existence ordained by the fact that they have to tend to their families back home. A majority of them are engaged mostly in lower class occupations in the Gulf Cooperation Council/ME and have no other option but to look homewards and have inevitably to return home after varying stretches of time. Non-Arabs have no chance of getting naturalised in the Gulf countries even if they have been born there.

The other migrant groups (without the Gulf Cooperation Council/ME context) need not, or put another way, are not compelled to return home. In fact, it is not easy for many of them to return. Studies by Anwar (1979; 1980; 1986), pertaining in the main to those who have settled in England, go as far as to show that the return to roots and homeland bound phenomenon is a myth.

Given the above issues concerning migrants and those involved in the migration vortex, we need to complicate the understanding of the concept diaspora. It is to be extricated from its hitherto simplistic niche and inane moorings with its genesis from the Jewish context, in order to subscribe to and indulge in a non parochial and relatively more cross-cultural and universal academic exercise. While the catchall term may be useful in lay circles and as journalistic parlance, as an academic jargon it falls short and is bereft of analytical utility.

Migration Logistics, Guest Workers and Host Societies

Besides the above, in migration studies we also use epithets such as guest workers and monikers like host societies, but undeniably, these cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be translated as even near equivalents of guests

(*mehman*) and hosts (*mezban*). For people of the subcontinent and for those with an Arab background the notions/concepts of guest, host, and hospitality (*mehman nawazi*) evoke completely different and deep emotional experiences and nostalgia. A migrant group in the midst of an earlier existent native society/community hardly ever can envisage the place it lands up in as a *host* society! Besides, hardly ever have migrants felt as guests (with reference to guest workers in Germany, for instance) among natives, particularly so in the midst of white societies, due to inherent discrimination of the racial and other kinds against them.

Even in contexts where there are opportunities of obtaining citizenship or temporary or permanent settlement rights, constitutional grant of such rights hardly ever and in very rare cases bestows equal social, political and economic rights vis-a-vis the natives. In spite of, and being fully aware of such jeopardy, people do migrate, and do settle down in alien lands for varying lengths of time, or even inhabit foreign locales permanently, with little hope or desire, or aspiration to return to their places of origin.

One more important factor needs to be highlighted in the context of migration studies irrespective of whether we are talking about within the country migrations or international, cross-country migrations. Often, even in academic circles, migration is conceived of as a random, footloose activity. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Given the immense amount of material that has been generated on migration studies there is incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. A high degree of networking is involved in migrations. Networking, that may be based on family, kinship, village, region, language, caste and ethnic ties or a combination of some of these. One phenomenon that underlines such networking is the jump factor (see Kalam 2005:63) wherein migrants ignore (or jump) villages, towns, cities, regions, near to and in the proximity of their places of origin but go farther and cover longer distances. They ignore or discount many nearby and intervening places in their migration endeavours if they cannot or do not have a network there based on ties from their family, village, kin group, language, or caste, and go off to far-flung places because they have prior knowledge about the place and someone there is known to them who speaks the same language or with whom they share some common ethnic features. Also, they migrate across international borders skipping many industrialised cities or the capital of their own country. We have plenty of examples of people living in different villages of many of our states not migrating to Bangalore or Chennai or Patna but to Mumbai or Calcutta. Similarly, people from villages of Punjab on both sides of the border, or those from Sylhet, touch Delhi or Islamabad or Dacca respectively, for the first time in their life, only to take an international flight to London or Bradford or

Birmingham or Manchester. Village, caste and kin ties and an already existing established network enables them to do so[5]. Also, pertinent here is to point out that migration studies almost always dwell on why people migrate or talk about push and pull factors in a very clichéd manner. They do not try to probe as to why people do not migrate[6]. For instance, in spite of a high degree of industrialisation we have less than 30 per cent urbanisation in India. In many Latin American and African countries with far less industrialisation there are higher rates of urbanisation. But do we have probing studies to find out why our urbanisation is so low and why people do not migrate in large numbers, or why there is no exodus from the villages contrary to what is made out in the general rhetoric wherein migration is dished out almost as a footloose activity and not as an organised and highly networked exercise that it is. There is a strong nexus between space, territory and people's identity[7] (Kalam 2005:63)

Investments and Remittances

On remittances per se, it is interesting to recall what one of our former Ambassadors to the US, Abid Hussain, had famously remarked: Overseas Indians have their hearts in India but their money in Swiss banks.

[Unfortunately, as many recent events have shown, with proof, that it is true of those who live in the country too. These, at times, are pejoratively referred to as Resident Non Indians (RNIs)].

As regards the overseas Indians the MOIA website says

> To view the diaspora only through the looking glass of remittances and financial flows is to take a myopic view. Not all expatriates need to be investors and their development impact measured only in terms of financial contributions to the home country[8].

Who remits, why and under what circumstances? What people in the overseas migrant situations do with their earnings is an interesting phenomenon. To take up empirical examples spanning over two to three generations we could look at what is obtained in Bradford (Yorkshire) in general but true more or less all over England, since the 1940s. Emigrants from the Indian subcontinent in the pre-1947 period, many of whom were

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[5] M. A. Kalam, 1997 "Moorings and Mobility in an Indian Context: An Anthropological Perspective," in *Peasant Moorings: Village ties and Mobility Rationales in South India*, ed. Jean-Luc Racine (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), 79-95.

[6] For a perspective on why people do not migrate, see, *Peasant Moorings: Village ties and Mobility Rationales in South India*, ed. Jean-Luc Racine.

[7] See Kalam 2003 (pp.69-84).

[8] India and its Diaspora, The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.

former seamen started off with a lot of handicaps and drawbacks as the lowest of the lowly paid workers in the mills and factories of the expanding industries and booming economy of Britain. To start with there were only single male migrants from the subcontinent staying as lodgers and working shifts as a result of which there were, at times, three persons occupying a single bed *a la musical beds*! It was predominantly a serial male migration (like the different legs of a relay race) whereby a father would go back home and exchange the baton with his son, and a brother would do so with his sibling (Kalam 2005:65).

Prior to what has been said above, there were of course emigrants to Britain from the subcontinent but from a completely different class background, a "middle-class group", consisting of doctors, students and international businessmen (Robinson 1990:273). But in the 1950s there was a large-scale chain migration. Robinson says

> South Asians were no longer migrating in search of qualifications and professional experience but to fill gaps in the lower order of the British labour market. Migrants were largely unskilled and were drawn from specific areas of origin, sometimes even group of villages. They were young, often single, labour migrants seeking to meet financial targets set by the head of the extended family before returning to the villages of origin. They regarded themselves as economic transients and had a somewhat unfavourable opinion of British cultural and moral values (1990: 273-4).

The single male migrants, the economic transients, had to meet family expectations in terms of what they did with their wages/earnings. Given the conditions they lived in, the financial target was the prime goal facing them before they went back home and were replaced by a brother or another kin or came back themselves to work for a further stint. There was no desire for them to invest in the places they had migrated to as they were destined to go back home at some point sooner or later. And what did the family, back home in the subcontinent, do with the remittances? There seemed to be a sort of pattern as to how the remittance was utilised irrespective of whether home was in India or Pakistan (and later Bangladesh). First and foremost was the dwelling they lived in. Either they repaired, renovated or extended it if they owned one, or endeavoured to buy one if they did not own one. This exercise was in consonance with what was expected or considered as a norm in the *Biradari* or neighbourhood. Next, they went in to purchase agricultural land the extent of which depended on the situation or context; in some places it could be less than five acres and in others may go even beyond twenty acres. The critical point as to how much to acquire was dictated by local norms. On achieving the desired home goals the next step

in investment was in property in a nearby town or city. This pattern was repeated in many places and the older generation in Bradford (and elsewhere in England) took pride in narrating how the process was repeated in many families in different places among those who had migrated from the subcontinent to Britain. But "all this changed during the mid- and late-1960s when the British Government imposed restrictions on fresh migrant workers coming into Britain. Those workers who were already there, stayed back, brought in their wives, children, parents and siblings, became settled migrants, and demographic and socio-cultural reproduction occurred locally, that is, in Britain" (Kalam 2005:65). Once wives, children, parents and siblings joined and the migrants started settling in, the way the wages and earnings were handled took a different shape and a varied form of investment pattern started emerging. Remittances, in general, declined as most of the nuclear family members and units of the kindred were with the wage earners in an extended family kind of set up and there was no imminent need to send money back home. A strong urge to acquire a house in the place migrated to and not live in rented accommodation ran among the emigrants. Those who had already settled in for some time and were sort of pioneers encouraged and helped in mobilising funds from among the community, to the extent possible, and assisted those joining them later to go in for acquiring dwelling units. To own an abode and stay in one's own place was a sort of obsession and this practice ran across the different sections of migrants from different regional, religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds from the subcontinent. But the earlier pattern of remitting money home was not given up completely. Once they managed to pay for the unit they were living in in the migrant place some still sent money back home for the house, land and for the purchase of property outside their village, town, as was the case in the erstwhile situation among the economic transients.

Besides the economic one, social, cultural, ritual investments with home continued. Marriage alliances necessarily had to be with those back in their homeland. This persisted for a long time. In fact it was not uncommon to come across such alliances even during the early 1990s, and later too during 1996-97, while my fieldwork was on in the Leeds- Bradford region. There was an absence of a wide enough pool to choose brides and bridegrooms in Britain given the strong kin and village ties that guided marital alliances, in spite of the fact that a sort of community formation on the lines of a *Biradari* was indeed emerging in the migrant locales.

Something that does not find significant mention or much space in migration studies is how is death dealt with by the emigrants. What they did to their dead, whether they buried them locally or were the corpses still sent back home show us if a tendency to settle down was beginning to grip

them. Attempts towards a sort of permanency in the migrant places emerge once they decide to conduct burials locally. Gradually we observe that the practice of sending corpses back to their homelands declined, and many actually gave up the corpse repatriation practice.

As most remittances, at least initially, were through informal channels states woke up to this and made attempts at regulating the remittances as these involved highly valued foreign exchange and the impecunious nation states in the subcontinent were, as always, in dire need of it. India too wooed its overseas population, NRIs as also those who had obtained citizenship overseas, to channel their funds through the Nationalised banks and invest in state ventures such as public sector undertakings and the like.

Current estimates suggest that during the present financial year remittances from NRIs (as also PIOs and OCIs) will be $75 billion. This is a 19 per cent jump from the last financial year (2011-2012) when the figure was US $66 billion.[9] What is to be noted here is that during the last one year the rupee has tumbled and depreciated by about 25 per cent. Needless to say, due to the depreciation of the rupee there has been a positive impact on remittances. Remittances come in mainly from North America, Gulf and Europe. But due to unemployment rates going up in most of Europe except in Germany, remittances from Europe are likely to decline.

Management of Overseas Indians

While the efforts of the Government of India were geared towards mobilising and regulating the inflow of foreign funds of the overseas Indians, the latter too were making demands on the state for various services, facilities, concessions and the like. One of the most enduring, steadfast and persistent demands of the overseas Indians was for Dual Citizenship. Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, India has not been acceding to this demand. But due to relentless persuasion and constant pressure the Government of India set up a High Level Committee during the late 1990s to go into the Dual Citizenship issue and allied aspects concerning overseas Indians. The High Level Committee travelled to about 70 countries and interacted with Indians living there for varying lengths of time. As a final exercise the High Level Committee organised a three-day workshop jointly with the University Grants Commission's Centre for the Study of Indian Diaspora at the University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, and also invited academics engaged in migration studies and those who had

[9] "Remittances from NRIs likely to exceed $75 bn in FY13: Study," *Economic Times*, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-09-24/news/34061902_1_remittances-nris-indian-currency.

experience of working among the overseas Indians (see Kalam 2001). The High Level Committee submitted its Report in 2002 (available on the website of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, of the Government of India). The main demand of Dual Citizenship was not conceded but the Government of India attempted a kind of via media by creating categories called Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) and started issuing passport-looking like cards to Indians living abroad who have acquired citizenship of other countries, to facilitate travel to India without applying for a visa, and some other demands too have been met. In fact the setting up of a separate Ministry, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, was a big step vis-à-vis overseas Indians during the first term (2004 onwards) of the United Progressive Alliance Government.

Besides providing a Toll Free Number that directs the caller to a Call Centre, the Diaspora Services Division of the MOIF has listed the following as Services on its website to be provided for the overseas Indians as well as for those who are aspiring to go abroad:

> Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award, Overseas Citizenship of India Scheme, Know India Programme, Study India Programme, Overseas Indian Youth Club, Know Goa Programme, Scholarship Programmes for Diaspora Children, Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, Tracing the Roots, Gender Issues, Other Useful Information, Advisory for Indian Students, Memorial for Indentured Indian Workers, Notifications regarding voting rights for NRIs.

In fact the Call Centre also acts as a counselling hub to provide information as regards passport, visa, and related aspects to potential workers and wannabe migrants.

But the right to vote in elections in India has not been given to the PIOs and OCIs. However, the NRIs have the right to vote because they continue to hold Indian passports and consequently are Indian citizens. However, there is no provision for the NRIs to cast their votes overseas through the Indian Missions, Consulates, Embassies or High Commissions. Nor are they allowed to cast their votes through postal ballot as some countries allow their citizens to do. They necessarily have to travel back to India and cast their vote in the constituency where they are registered voters.

Recently NRIs in England invoked Gandhi's name besides that of Ambedkar and Vivekananda, all three of whom had resided abroad for varying lengths of time, to demand voting rights in Indian elections without travelling to their respective constituencies in India. They want postal or online voting. The Leicester-based campaign group, *Pravasi Bharat*

[Overseas Migrant India], gathered near Gandhi's statue at Tavistock Square, central London, and marched to India House to hand over a letter addressed to the Prime Minister to a High Commission official demanding facilities to cast their votes overseas.[10]

One of the by-products of the High Level Committee's visits and meetings/hearings with the overseas Indians has been the celebration of the *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* (Overseas Indians' Day), in different Indian state capitals since the first 2003 Delhi one during January every year to honour overseas Indians and is sponsored by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India.

Besides the above there is a proposal to set up an NRI/PIO University. The Bill known as Innovative Universities Bill is pending in the Indian Parliament; once the Bill is passed and enacted it will pave the way for the envisaged University which indeed will be an innovative one.

As we have seen above, NRIs are Indian passport holders and indeed Indian citizens. Who exactly are the PIOs and OCIs and what sort of connection do they have with the Indian state and with India at large?

The Indian government considers anyone of Indian origin up to four generations removed to be a PIO, with the exception of those who were ever nationals of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka. The prohibited list periodically includes Iran as well. The government issues a 'PIO Card' to a PIO after verification of his or her origin or ancestry and this card entitles a PIO to enter India without a visa. The spouse of a PIO can also be issued a PIO card though the spouse might not be a PIO. This latter category includes foreign spouses of Indian nationals, regardless of ethnic origin, so long as they were not born in, or ever were nationals of, the aforementioned prohibited countries. PIO Cards exempt holders from many restrictions that apply to foreign nationals, such as visa and work permit requirements, along with certain other economic limitations[11].

Persons of Indian origin are being issued the PIO cards since 15 September 2002. The PIOs are not allowed to vote and are not eligible for the inner line permit which is a requirement for Indian citizens too if they have to enter some areas of India, particularly the North East Indian states like Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland. The PIOs have to apply for a Protected Area Permit.

The other category of Overseas Citizen of India (OCIs) also came up as a result of the deliberations of the High Level Committee. The grant of

[10] The Hindu, October 22, 2012.

[11] "Non-resident Indian and person of Indian origin," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-resident_Indian_and_person_of _Indian_origin.

the Overseas Citizen of India card is a sort of recognition of Indian Nationality (not to be confused with Citizenship), if that person is of Indian origin and is from a country which allows dual citizenship in some form or the other. It can be granted to a person of Indian origin who is a citizen of another country and who was a citizen of India on 26 January 1950 or at any time thereafter. It inevitably keeps out old migrants, including those who went to the US and Canada during the 19th and early 20th century. Also, the ex-indentured labour too is out of the ambit.

Concluding Remarks

While the category NRIs is quite specific and has under it Indian citizens alone, the other two, namely, PIOs and IOCs, are a bit confusing for most people. However, the creation of the IOCs was subject to a lot of criticism from many quarters as the criterion of holding citizenship on the 26th January 1950 or thereafter turns up quite clearly and unabashedly in favour of those who are the new migrants. It so happens that such IOCs happen to belong to about sixteen countries in North America and Europe. As one sees it, these IOCs can be designated as Dollar-Pound-Euro Overseas Citizens of India. The old migrants, particularly the descendants of the indentured labour do not qualify under this category and have to rest with the title Persons of Indian Origin. There is talk now that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is contemplating merging these two, the PIO and OCI, and evolving one single category.■

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CHAPTER 12

The Chinese Model of Diaspora Management

Dr. Hong Liu and Els van Dongen

Introduction

This paper outlines the main features of the Chinese model of diaspora management. After a brief sketch of the changing relations between China and its diaspora since the late nineteenth century and the shifting policies that resulted from this, it discusses the specific policies towards the Chinese diaspora during the economic reform era (1978), focusing on the two main stages of 1978-2000 and post-2000. The paper pays particular attention to the main institutions and mechanisms of diaspora management, their position within the existing political structure, and their organisation and application on both central and local levels. Finally, the paper offers some tentative conclusions and discusses the implications of the Chinese model of diaspora management for Pakistan.

China and the Chinese Diaspora: Changing Relations and Policies

Today, an estimated 46 million ethnic Chinese reside outside of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.[1] Although high in absolute terms, if we consider this number in relation to the total Chinese population, numbering 1.344 billion in 2011 (World Bank data), we find that 3.4 per cent of the total Chinese population resides outside of the territorial borders of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In comparison, the population of Pakistan totalled 176.7 million in 2011 (World Bank data); its diaspora of 7 million (IPRI conference note) constitutes 3.9 per cent of its total population. From the perspective of the relation between the size of the diaspora and the size of the population, both countries hence face similar challenges. As the Chinese model of diaspora management goes back to the early PRC years—with precursors in the early twentieth-century—and as it has witnessed further institutionalization since the economic reform programme of 1978, it offers some interesting insights for Pakistan, where the institutionalization of "diaspora management" is a more recent phenomenon.

[1] However, figures need to be treated with caution, as (1) there is no central agency for Chinese emigration statistics; and (2) some older estimates include data from Hong Kong and Macau. Data are scattered around the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation.

Since diaspora policies are largely determined by the nature of the diaspora in question, it is important to gain an understanding of the historical formation of the Chinese diaspora and its various segments. Chinese migration and emigration is of all times, but it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that China witnessed massive emigration. One important factor behind emigration was the rise of Western imperialism — the Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860) consolidated the dominance of the European powers — and the declining Qing order. Another driving force behind emigration was the increasing demand for cheap labour and for merchants to act as middlemen between Westerners and Southeast Asians. Since the start of large-scale Chinese emigration in the nineteenth century, three main periods can be discerned (Wang Gungwu 2001; Liu 2005b; Liu 2006). During the first period (the 1850s–1950), the majority of Chinese, mostly labourers, emigrated from Guangdong and Fujian in South China to Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Until the end of World War II, most of them still considered themselves *Huaqiao* (Chinese Sojourners or Overseas Chinese), who were politically and culturally loyal to China.

During the second period (1950-1980), new ethnic identities and migration patterns emerged as the number of locally born Chinese living overseas increased, and as emigration from mainland China virtually ended with the founding of the PRC in 1949. Chinese émigrés settled abroad permanently and renounced Chinese citizenship. They gradually became *Huaren* (ethnic Chinese or Chinese overseas) who expressed political and cultural allegiance to their host countries, whilst at the same time privately preserving Chinese cultural values. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia became important places of emigration to the newly popular destinations of North America, Australia, Western Europe, and Japan. During this period, the demographic distribution of the Chinese overseas changed, as the fastest growing areas were located in the industrial nations of Europe, America, and, to a lesser extent, Oceania. Finally, during the third and most recent phase (1980-present), a rapid increase in emigration from China occurred. New migrants (*xin yimin*) from various locations in the PRC began to make up a greater proportion of overall Chinese emigration. The redistribution trend that started during the second stage of migration continued as the percentage of emigrants to North America and Oceania increased in relation to that of emigrants to Southeast Asia. Apart from the emergence of the new migrants, the increase of Chinese migrants in North America and Oceania was also due to natural population growth, and to re-migration from Southeast Asia.

Each of the three stages of migration mentioned above was characterized by a different form of interaction between the Chinese state and the Chinese diaspora, which needs to be understood in relation to both

China's international position and its internal situation (Thunø 2001: 910). Like previous dynasties — with the exception of some relaxation during the Ming (1368-1644) dynasty — the Qing (1644-1911) government banned emigration. By 1860, travel abroad was allowed, but leaving China was still considered a crime met with punishment until 1893 (Nyíri 2005: 148). A shift from the protection of overseas Chinese to the active encouragement of work abroad gradually occurred. During the second stage, between 1950 and 1980, the diaspora was primarily considered to be a liability rather than an asset by the Chinese state and many Southeast Asian countries. During the period of decolonization that followed the end of the Second World War, and in the context of the height of the Cold War, the ethnic Chinese who resided in Southeast Asia were distrusted by the new Southeast Asian regimes; they were perceived of as a "fifth column" (Fitzgerald 1972). During the first years of the PRC, Beijing claimed all Chinese residing abroad as Chinese citizens. Because of the diplomatic consequences of the "Chinese problem," an important policy shift occurred in 1955, with the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality. From then on, Chinese nationals residing in Southeast Asia were given the right to choose between two nationalities, which practically ended the PRC's claim to all overseas Chinese nationals. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) now had to engage in the difficult exercise of, on the one hand, detaching itself from the overseas Chinese for diplomatic reasons, and, on the other hand, reaching out to attract remittances, a problem that would reoccur during the early stages of reform in the 1980s (Thunø 2001: 914). During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), institutions that formulated and implemented policies towards the Chinese overseas were closed down and those connected to Chinese overseas discriminated against or even persecuted (Fitzgerald 1972).

It was only during the third stage of migration and after the policy of economic reform and opening up (*gaige kaifang*) that the Chinese government considered the Chinese diaspora to be a valuable asset. This change needs to be understood in relation to the changed identities of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, who were now oriented towards their host countries and hence no longer a political liability. In addition, with the economic reform programme, both foreign investment and Western business connections were badly needed, and the rapid emergence of the "new migrants" could serve this purpose (Liu 2011: 823). During the first phase of reform (1978-2000), after the landmark Third Plenum of the Eleventh Communist Party Central Committee in 1978, policies towards the Chinese diaspora began to take shape. Deng Xiaoping noted that the Chinese overseas had played an important role in China's development and considered them to be a "unique opportunity" — it was Deng Xiaoping who

connected the Chinese overseas with the development of China. In a 1978 article in *People's Daily* in which the new policy was put forward, it was mentioned that the "patriotic" Chinese had made "big contributions" and that they could play a crucial part in China's modernization.

In line with the perception that Chinese emigrants were a positive force to China's economic modernisation, emigration restrictions were loosened after the late 1970s. The control over overseas travel for private reasons was considerably relaxed. It is estimated that during the period of 1979-1985, the first six years of the Open Door Policy, around 350,000 Chinese citizens went abroad, both temporarily and permanently. A crucial change came in November 1985 in the form of "The Regulation Concerning Chinese Citizens Going Abroad and Returning," which established overseas travel as a basic right. Travel and emigration restrictions would further loosen after overseas flows continued steadily during the 1990s. From 2002 onwards, Chinese citizens who intend to go abroad no longer need to submit a foreign invitation as part of the application process, nor are they required to obtain prior approval (*chujingka*) from the local Bureau of Public Security (Liu 2005a).

During the 1980s, the focus of the newly-shaped policies was on the relatives of overseas Chinese — the so-called "domestic overseas Chinese," who were used as a means to liaise with Chinese abroad. In response to the discriminatory policies towards the relatives of Chinese overseas, their rehabilitation was a core aspect of the new policies. Their rights were protected in the 1982 Constitution (Barabantseva 2005). In 1990, in an effort to safeguard the interests of returned overseas Chinese and their relatives, special benefits were granted in the newly adopted "Law of the People's Republic of China concerning the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Returned Overseas Chinese and the Relatives of Overseas Chinese." As the importance of economic benefits decreased with the increasing living standards brought by the economic reforms, one benefit assigned in the 1990 law that is still significant today concerns special admission quota for institutions of higher education (Thunø 2001: 917; Barabantseva 2005: 12; Nyíri 2005: 150). In the field of protection of Chinese citizens abroad, in the Constitution of 1982, the policies of the 1954 Constitution were repeated, namely the protection of Chinese nationals only. In practice, however, protection was limited (Thunø 2001: 912).

After an initial reform phase during the 1980s, economic reform received a new impetus in 1992, with Deng Xiaoping's famous Southern Tour (*nanxun*). It was in this context of economic reform that the Chinese government designed new policies of attracting diaspora investment. During the 1990s, the CCP appealed more actively to Chinese overseas, and

an important change was that all ethnic Chinese were included in appeals. Gradually, the focus shifted from rehabilitation and the granting of social, political, and economic benefits to returned overseas Chinese (*guiqiao*) and their dependants (*qiaojuan*) during the 1980s to a more active policy of liaising with the "new migrants," in particular during the 1990s. Special importance was also given to the development of other traditional emigration areas, the so-called *qiaoxiang* or hometown areas of Chinese emigrants (Thunø 2001: 911, 918, 921, 928-929).

Apart from the economic assets of the Chinese overseas, another reason why they were mobilised was that it was more acceptable to involve those of Chinese descent in China's economic growth than to involve "non-Chinese foreigners" given the stress on self-reliance during the previous era. The involvement of the Chinese overseas in China's modernisation is reflected in the strategic choice of the so-called Special Economic Zones (SEZs), all of which were located in Guangdong and Fujian, the traditional emigration areas that were closely interlinked with the Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, and Southeast Asia (Bolt 1996: 470).[2] Since 2000, the Chinese state and local governments have changed the SEZ model to knowledge-intensive development models, building hi-tech industrial development parks, Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) laboratories, and other Research and Development (R&D) facilities and crucibles, to attract new generations of diasporic Chinese to invest in China. The hi-tech investors and technopreneurs have been disproportionately new Chinese immigrants who have resettled in the US, Japan, Singapore, and other advanced Western countries.

With the advent of the twenty-first century, the economic reforms entered a new stage. Further integration of China into the global economy followed with its entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. Since then, increasing attention has been paid to the attraction of Chinese talents overseas because of their technical know-how and their exposure to international practices. Under President Jiang Zemin (1993-2003), overseas Chinese work (*qiaowu gongzuo*) became a crucial concern, and attention was not only paid to capital, but also to technological knowledge, business networks, and talent. This focus on talent was manifested in new policies towards Chinese overseas students in particular. It is against this background of the two phases of economic reform since 1978, namely 1978-2000 and post-2000, and the increasing attention paid to the so-called "new migrants" since the 1990s and especially after 2000, that we need to

[2] The four first SEZs were Xiamen (Fujian), Shenzhen (Guangdong), Zhuhai (Guangdong), and Shantou (Guangdong); they were established in 1979 and 1980.

understand the current policies towards the Chinese overseas and their specific mechanisms.

The Reform Era: The "New Migrants" as a Focus of Policies

Although there is no consensus on the total amount of "new migrants" since 1979, it can be estimated that this number well exceeds six million. Four factors have contributed to the rapid increase in the so-called "new migrants," generally understood as those who left China after 1978. Firstly, there was the globalisation of migration. The rise in emigration numbers was not just particular to China, but part of the time-space compression inherent in the globalisation process. Secondly, there were the changes in the political economy of China. As outlined, emigration restrictions were loosened since the start of reforms, which, in combination with new policies for students, led to an increase in emigration for education purposes in particular. At the same time, economic and population pressures and the inequality of reform in China remained important push factors for both labourers and irregular emigrants. Thirdly, there was an increasing labour demand in receiving countries. Finally, the proliferation of intermediary agencies for chain migration, overseas studies, contract labour, and irregular migration facilitated emigration (Liu 2005b: 8-15).

These new migrants consisted of four main types: students-turned-migrants or those who stayed outside of China after graduation; emigrating professionals who sought residence in Western countries based on educational credentials and professional experience; chain migrants or those who joined their families and relatives who have obtained foreign citizenship or permanent residency status abroad; and undocumented immigrants or those who used the channel of human smuggling or who over-stayed their temporary visas. Whereas the majority of emigrants during the 1980s still consisted of chain emigrants, the 1990s witnessed the rise of both students-turned-emigrants and emigrating professionals. Also, there was an increase in undocumented emigrants, a major issue that affected both China and the countries of destination (Liu 2005a: 293).

During the 1990s, the Chinese government paid increasing attention to this new type of migrants, and an effort was made to engage them in China's development. As opposed to the earlier generation of migrants, these were mostly first-generation Chinese emigrants who retained PRC citizenship. This meant that appealing to them was less politically sensitive than appealing to ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia had been. Also, it was easier to maintain their attachment (Thunø 2001: 922). In addition, a large segment of this group was well-educated, even before departure, but unskilled migrants nevertheless continued to make up a part of the new

migrants. The term "new migrants" that was used in official discourse also concealed the former official distinction between *huaqiao* or Chinese citizens residing outside of China and *huaren* or those of ethnic Chinese descent residing abroad (Nyíri 2001: 636). The term allowed for a more inclusive approach. In addition, the term revealed an adjustment on the part of the CCP to recent trends in migration, in which migrants not necessarily settled abroad (Thunø 2001: 922).

Indeed, an important distinction between the "new migrants" and former generations of Chinese emigrants was that the former were "transnational migrants" (Basch et al. 1994) or "transnational Chinese" (Liu 2008) who lived between several countries and who were characterized by a strong mobility and multiple identities rather than by the unilinear movement between sending and receiving countries. Many of them had no wish to return to China for a longer period of time. The new migrants also possessed wide transnational networks. An important advantage for China was that those who returned to China, the so-called *haigui* (returnees from overseas or "sea turtles") retained professional and family contacts and networks with Western countries (Zweig et al. 2004).

Policies towards these new migrants were and are put forward and implemented concurrently at two fronts: bringing the transnational Chinese migrants back to the domain of the nation-state and projecting the nation-state agendas to the diasporic Chinese communities. The former is intended to involve the Chinese diaspora in China's domestic economic development, whereas the latter needs to be situated in the international realm and has clear cultural and political implications. At the level of involving the Chinese diaspora in China's domestic development, so-called "overseas Chinese talent," which mainly consists of the group of students-turned-immigrants, were and are encouraged to serve the country. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping reiterated the importance of the so-called Four Modernisations, namely agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. After the relative isolation of the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976), the importance of knowledge exchange in the field of science and technology was now acknowledged and students were encouraged to go abroad for study. A policy of "sending more students abroad through various channels" (*guangkai qudao, lizheng duopai)* was initiated. These channels included sponsorship by state organisations, by working organisations, and self-funded. Contemporary student migration has become a growing trend since early 1990s. China is one of the largest source countries of foreign students. About 2.25 million students were sent abroad between 1978 and 2011, and more than 60 per cent obtain employment and immigrant visas upon completion of their studies.

By the mid-1990s, however, it became clear that many students intended to stay abroad more permanently. In response to this, the Chinese government launched the policy of "supporting overseas studies, encouraging the return of Chinese students, and upholding the freedom of their movement" (*zhichi liuxue, guli huiguo, laiqu ziyou*). Simultaneously, the official slogan of "returning to serve the country" (*huiguo fuwu*) was replaced with "serving the country" (*weiguo fuwu*), which meant that one could be patriotic without physically returning to China (Liu 2005a: 302-303). The encouragement of return was accompanied by a number of incentives, such as "green cards" for professionals with portable skills and the creation of a number of industrial parks that were specifically intended to employ the students-turned-migrants. In 2001, a policy document entitled "Issues Concerning the Encouragement of Overseas Students/Scholars to Serve the Country in Various Manners" was issued. It was aimed at attracting highly qualified overseas students and scholars to return to China for a longer period through, among others, the introduction of visas valid for between one and five years. Also, efforts were made to sponsor the research of returned Chinese scholars in an attempt to attract foreign educated Chinese to Chinese universities. An amount of 200 million RMB was invested for both long-term and short-term returned Chinese scholars. (*Xinhuawang*, 21 January 2002).

In 2004, a Green Card or permanent residence card system was officially introduced, preferring those high skilled returnees with global experience.[3] In 2006, a new policy was announced by the Ministry of Personnel to facilitate the return of highly talented Chinese overseas. Three groups of new migrants were encouraged to return: those who could contribute to technological and social advancement, those who could advance China's connectedness to the world, and those with global experiences and an international scope. In 2008, this recruitment of highly skilled Chinese was lifted to a higher plane when the powerful Ministry of CCP Organisation launched the "one-thousand-talents scheme," offering top salaries and funding to attract top scientists and other talented Chinese overseas back to China. In 2009, Wan Gang, the Vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and Deputy Chairman of the China Zhigong Party's Central Committee, reiterated the important focus on new migrants and on

[3] In 2010, the system was amended to include certain types of dependants and those buying real estate. Currently, efforts are made to simplify the application process. In October 2012, it was also announced that requirements for applications will be lowered. See "Green Cards Easier to Acquire for Overseas Chinese," CRI English. com (October 18, 2012), http://english.cri.cn/6909/2012/10/17/2982s727597.htm (accessed November 8, 2012).

Chinese overseas students in overseas Chinese work. Building relations with these students and helping them to understand the Chinese stage of development, its political system and culture after many years abroad would be a crucial task in engaging them in China's modernization.

At the international level of bringing the Chinese nation-state to the Chinese diaspora, officials from several agencies and of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (*Qiaoban*) in particular, are sent off to connect with the Chinese diaspora through meetings with leaders of the respective communities; delegations from the Chinese overseas are also invited to China. This is referred to as "going out and inviting in" (*zou chuqu, qing jinlai*). The new migrants constitute an important focus of this policy. Two important objectives can be discerned here. One is to engage the Chinese diaspora in activities related to opposing Taiwanese independence and promoting unification with Taiwan (*fandu cutong*) under the "One Country, Two Systems" (*yiguo liangzhi*) formula that was first proposed by Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s. Another objective is the promotion of traditional Chinese culture among Chinese communities abroad. As such, the government brings the Chinese nation-state to the Chinese diaspora, both in the form of a geographical entity and as a cultural symbol (Liu 2005a: 303).

An important role in this process of interaction between, on the one hand, Chinese officials and non-official delegations and, on the other hand, the Chinese diaspora is played by the associations and voluntary and business organisations of the Chinese overseas. These organisations have become pragmatic in their orientation and their structure differs from the "segmentary structure" of the older Chinese organisations that were organised on the basis of kinship, locality, and dialect (Nyíri 2001). In addition, an important trait of these organisations is their transnational orientation (Liu 1998). Since the early 1980s, these associations have been involved in the organisation of global conventions and congresses, the most famous one of which is the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention (WCEC). The latter was founded by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI) in 1991, and biannual conventions have been organised since then. Officials take part in these conventions to appeal to the Chinese overseas. At the 2001 World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention, Li Ruihuan praised the Chinese overseas for their achievements and their role as bridge-builders, and he urged them to "make fresh and greater contributions" to the development of their host countries, China, and the world (Li 2001).

Institutions and Mechanisms to Manage the Chinese Diaspora

For "overseas Chinese work" (*huaqiao shiwu gongzuo*), a system of five interrelated institutions has been set up, which operate on several levels, from the national to the local. Often referred to as the "five bridges" (*wuqiao*), these five institutions work together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries to formulate and implement policies towards the Chinese overseas (Liu 2010b). The five institutions are:

- The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) of the State Council (*Qiaowu bangongshi* or *Qiaoban*)
- The Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee *(Huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui*) of the National People's Congress (NPC)
- The Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Compatriots and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
- The China Zhigong Party (*Zhigongdang*)
- The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (*Zhonghua quanguo guiguo huaqiaolianhehui* or *Qiaolian*)

Among the five, the most important government agency dealing with overseas Chinese affairs is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) of the State Council. Reinstalled in 1978, it has a policy-making and policy-implementing function and it operates as a ministry under the State Council. Its predecessor was the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee (OCAC), which was founded in 1949 and reinstalled in 1974. All provinces (with the exception of Tibet), autonomous regions, and municipalities have their own OCAOs up to the administrative level of the township (*xiang*) (Barabantseva 2005; Thunø 2001). The Overseas Chinese Committee of the NPC was founded in 1983 and has a legislative, consultative, and monitoring function. It is responsible for research and policy recommendations with regard to policies towards the overseas Chinese. The Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the CPPCC has a similar consultative function as the OCC of the NPC.

The China Zhigong Party, which was founded in San Francisco in 1925 and which goes back to an organisation that supported Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary activities, consists of returned overseas Chinese and their dependents. It plays a role in the implementation of policies regarding the overseas Chinese and its members also strengthen ties with the overseas Chinese through their own networks. The All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC) was reinstalled in 1978. It was initially set up in 1956 in order to function as a bridge between relatives of overseas Chinese, returnees, and the CCP, but it was dismantled during the Cultural Revolution. Its local branches operate at province, city, and autonomous

district level, but affiliated organisations are also active below these levels (Barabantseva 2005; Thunø 2001: 916).

During the 1990s, two affiliated organisations were added, both of which had the goal of strengthening ties with the overseas Chinese. In 1992, the China Overseas Exchange Association (*Haiwai jiaoliu xiehui*) was established as an organisation affiliated to the OCAO. In 1997, the China Overseas Friendship Association (*Zhonghua haiwailianyihui*) was founded under the CPPCC (Thunø 2001: 923). Apart from these formal institutions based in China, all major Chinese embassies have consular departments dealing with overseas Chinese affairs, and the consuls (*qiaowu canzang*) are, as a norm, dispatched by the OCAO on a secondment basis. They report not only to the respective ambassador, but also to the OCAO in Beijing. Hence, these consuls serve as a bridge between China and diasporic Chinese communities. Together, all these bodies have actively engaged in encouraging Chinese overseas to contribute to China's modernization. Apart from activities to attract investment, such as sending representatives to the Chinese overseas and sponsoring trade fairs, these offices have also founded their own enterprises. These enterprises are engaged in business consulting, but also in real estate or development projects that require investment from overseas Chinese. In addition to these five institutions, at local levels, other institutions and organisations, as well as provincial and local authorities, are often involved in overseas Chinese work.

At present, China's policy toward overseas Chinese has shifted further, aiming not only at exploiting the financial, human, and social capital resources from the Chinese diaspora to fuel China's economic development, but also at strengthening networks with immigrant organisations, fostering technological and cultural exchanges, and supporting the development of Chinese communities abroad as a means of promoting China's "good image" and facilitating its "peaceful rise." Apart from the institutional mechanisms, another dimension of how the state manages the Chinese diaspora is mobilisation through discourse. In official media, the message is communicated that the Chinese abroad, who were considered traitors in previous eras, are successful and patriotic, and are part of the state's modernisation project (Nyíri 2001). This emphasis on patriotism, however, is not always beneficial, especially in the context of the problematic history of the Chinese in Southeast Asia (Bolt 1996). In response, the Chinese government has balanced calls for investment based on ethnic and patriotic appeals (blood ties, Chinese nationality, love of the motherland) with an emphasis on the investment climate and economic benefits (Bolt 1996: 471).

The Chinese diaspora has played an important role in the modernisation of China during the first decades of the twentieth century (Godley 1975). During the reform era, the diaspora's role in China's economic development is well-documented. From 1979 to 1997, more than two-thirds of all foreign capital flowing into China came from ethnic Chinese (Kang 2007: 6). The majority of investments, both in terms of capital and number of enterprises founded, between 1978 and 1994 came from ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia in particular (Bolt 1996: 475). The Chinese overseas have contributed particularly in the form of FDI, which is often contrasted with India, where the amount of remittances has been higher. In comparison, whereas the Chinese diaspora contributed 70 per cent of all FDI in the 15 years since 1990, the Indian diaspora contributed less than 10 per cent of all FDI for India (Zhu 2007: 284-285).[4] Before 1978, the Chinese overseas contributed mainly in the forms of remittances to family members because of instability in China. After 1978, a stable China was able to attract investments from the ethnic Chinese, which in turn attracted other investments (Bolt 1996). Legislation in 1983 and State Council policies in 1985 were designed to attract more investment from ethnic Chinese by granting special privileges.

While the older generation of overseas Chinese possessed the economic capital to support the economic reforms during the initial two decades, the new migrants, being culturally linked to China as first-generation emigrants, possess the cultural and social capital, such as know-how, international experiences, and intellectual and business networks. The Chinese government is aware of this, and has therefore expanded its earlier focus on economic investment with a broader focus on attracting highly-educated emigrants. In the field of bringing the nation-state to the diaspora, the promotion of Chinese culture abroad has also been a major part of Chinese policies. Cultural and emotional ties between the state and the diaspora have hence been strengthened. For the first time in history, the relation between the Chinese state and the diaspora is shaped by China's rise instead of by its decline, a factor that has impacted the dynamics of interaction. In brief, the state benefits from the collaboration with the diaspora and vice versa. From the perspective of the state, the transnational Chinese take part in the advancement of the globalisation process, which brings important benefits for the state. For the Chinese diaspora, its transnational networks are strengthened by the state's support.

[4] Foreign investment numbers in China, like emigration numbers, need to be approached with caution, as the same pattern of "overestimation" due to Hong Kong and Macau numbers being included occurs here. In addition, the same problem of the "scattered data" is also present here.

Implications for Pakistan: Comparative Notes

From the description above, it can be seen that the Chinese model of diaspora management contains a number of basic features. Firstly, since the start of the economic reform and opening up (*gaige kaifang*) in 1978, the cultivation of diasporic financial and knowledge capital has been part of national policies. Since 2000, the attraction of global talent of Chinese descent has been a particularly prominent element of policies. Secondly, the model contains a sophisticated set of institutional mechanisms that have counterparts up to the local levels of government. These institutions have been intimately embedded in China's bureaucracy and political structure.

In addition to these institutions, other mechanisms have been designed to support and facilitate overseas Chinese policy, such as consular departments in overseas embassies, and a variety of research institutions and universities that provide policy consultations and training to *qiaowu* officials. For example, there are two universities — Jinan University in Guangzhou and Huaqiao University in Fujian — that operate directly under the OCAO. These institutions help formulate and disseminate a series of discourses pertaining to the important roles of Chinese diaspora. Together with institutions and mechanisms, laws and regulations have also been drafted to support and facilitate policies, although laws remain limited in number. The strategic courting of the Chinese diaspora through appeals based on patriotism and on the objective conditions of economic investment has also been a core aspect of policies.

Thirdly, the state policy toward the Chinese diaspora has been pragmatic in nature and changing in its focus, in tandem with China's changing priorities in national development. Hence, while "attracting trade and luring capital" (*zhaoshang yinzi*) constituted the focus of overseas Chinese policy in the first two decades after reform, "attracting talent and luring knowledge" (*zhaocai yinzhi*) became the catchword for the new policy formulation that focuses on recruiting global talents of Chinese ethnicity, especially those new migrants who were born and grew up in China. This strategy is in line with China's new national policy of moving away from being a low-end production workshop of the world to becoming an innovative country that produces high value-added products.

Historically, this model has some precursors in the post-1949 period, and its re-establishment after 1978 means that, after around three decades, it has reached a certain degree of maturation. As noted, there are two sides to the policy: on the one hand, policies are designed to lure talents back to China; on the other hand, the PRC makes strong efforts to connect with the diaspora and to strengthen ties with Chinese in their respective countries of residence. This is done through sending delegations abroad that connect

with Chinese communities. The promotion of Chinese culture constitutes an important element of this policy of bringing the Chinese state to the diaspora; consular departments play an important role in this process. Finally, it needs to be noted that there is also an important political dimension to China's diaspora policies, as both the Republic of Taiwan (ROC) and the PRC have appealed to the Chinese diaspora in order to gain their political support. For the PRC, the Chinese overseas are an important force in campaigns that oppose Taiwanese independence and that promote unification.

If we compare the Chinese system to the Pakistani system, there are some important observations to be made. Firstly, the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis has only become an independent ministry in 2008, which means diaspora management is in its initial stage.[5] Although the Pakistani government started to engage with its diaspora during the 1960s and 1970s in the context of the oil boom in the Gulf, there was no systematic apparatus for this purpose. The main focus has been, and to a large extent still is, on the regulation of migration and on the protection of emigrants (Smitra 2012). After thirty years, the Chinese system is more elaborate. In addition, the system is unique in its nature, as it is not only incorporated into several branches of government (executive and legislative), but as it also operates from a central to a local level. All these organs have actively reached out to ethnic Chinese abroad, which means the "management" aspect is much more than "containment" — it is "encouragement" towards the diaspora to actively get involved in China's economic and social modernization project.

On the Ministry for Overseas Pakistanis website, the following is mentioned:

> The establishment of [sic] Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis, on 3rd November, 2008 was an initial step, but a major leap forward of the present Government for exclusively dealing with all the matters and affairs of the overseas Pakistanis; attending to their needs and problems, intending schemes and projects for their welfare and working for resolution of their problems and issues. The rationale behind setting up this Ministry was to analytically study the core problems of the citizens abroad and find [sic] solution to them. This needed "participant observation" and close liaison with the Pakistani diasporas to assess their genuine needs and reach to the core

[5] The Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis was previously the Overseas Pakistani Division of the Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis. In 2004, the Overseas Pakistani Division became an independent division. On November 3rd, 2008, it was renamed Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis. Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis website, http://202.83.164.28/moopsm/frmDetails.aspx?opt=basic&id=1 (accessed November 7, 2012).

> problems and finding, suggesting their solution and initiating remedial measures (MOP website).

The fact that the word "problems" is used four times in this brief paragraph illustrates that policy-making is still mainly oriented at problem-solving and more *ad hoc* than institutionalized. In addition, the strong focus on returnees is reminiscent of China's focus on the "domestic overseas Chinese" during the second stage of migration, before it actively reached out to Chinese overseas. In this context, it is mentioned on the website that "rehabilitation" of returnees is to be facilitated through schemes in housing, education, and healthcare. The Ministry focuses on the process and problems of reintegration of returnees rather than on the strategies to attract emigrants back to Pakistan.

However, on the same page, the importance of remittances is also mentioned — and their increase from US $6.451.24 million between 2007 and 2008 to US $7.811.43 million between 2008 and 2009 — as well as the role of the Pakistani citizens abroad "in strengthening [sic] national economy." Apart from welfare issues and problem resolution, the purpose of the Ministry is to increase foreign exchange remittances. Under the programme for 2009-2010, objectives listed include the increase of remittances and the increase of the number of Pakistanis working abroad. To increase employment abroad, the Ministry collaborates with training institutes and it cooperates closely with the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, which was founded in 1971 (MOP website).[6] This Bureau not only controls, but also facilitates employment abroad through so-called Overseas Employment Promoters (OEPs) in the private sector, 1119 in number, which are listed on the website with contact details and license number. In addition, the Bureau gathers emigration data as a basis for planning and policy formulation. According to these data, 3.27 million Pakistanis have been employed abroad between 1971 and 2003 (Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment website).

As can be seen from the above, the OEPs play a similar role to that of the agencies for employment and study abroad in China, but the latter do not operate in relation to the Chinese government. In Pakistan, there is clearly an emphasis on controlling emigration and on combating illegal emigration. In addition, whereas Beijing is focusing on luring its talented

[6] The Bureau combined three federal government departments, namely the National Manpower Council, the Protectorate of Emigrants, and the Directorate of Seamen's Welfare. The Bureau was set up in the context of the lack of manpower in the countries of the Gulf and the Middle East, which became a popular destination of emigrants from Pakistan (and India) after previous migration waves to Europe, the USA, Canada, and the UK. Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment website, (accessed November 7, 2012).

Chinese overseas back to China, Pakistan is actively encouraging emigration as a means to reduce unemployment at home (due in part to its annual population increase of 2.26 %) and as a means to increase foreign exchange remittances.[7] Since the current strategy to increase remittances consists of increasing work abroad, the Chinese case might serve as an example of how this model could be expanded and how the increase of remittances could be obtained through means other than the encouragement of employment abroad. Mechanisms to reach out to those already abroad and to liaise with them are an important element of this strategy.

One mechanism for liaising with overseas Pakistanis that currently exists is that of posting Community Welfare Attaches (CWAs) in those countries and cities with a large Pakistani diaspora population. Twenty-one CWAs are listed on the Ministry's website, the majority of whom reside in the Middle East and the UAE, but some European, American, and Southeast Asian cities are also represented. Whereas China's model is clearly based on the attraction of foreign investment since the economic reforms of 1978 in particular, the Pakistani diaspora still contributes in the form of remittances instead of FDI. It is estimated that they contribute around 5 per cent of Pakistan's Gross domestic product (GDP), or US$ 13 billion per annum (IPRI concept note). If we compare this to the 70 per cent of FDI in China, it is clear that the strategies China has used are more efficient.

China's approach has been to locate initial development zones (SEZs) strategically in those coastal areas that had been traditional areas of emigration (*qiaoxiang*) and that were hence closely tied with Chinese overseas capital in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and Southeast Asia respectively. Pakistan may not have a wealthy Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Macau at its borders, but a focus on areas in which wealthy emigrants reside might be useful. Currently, the focus in the CWA system is mainly on the number of Pakistani emigrants present, which leads to an emphasis on the ME and the UAE. We see a similar focus on the ME and the UAE in Indian diaspora policies, as exemplified by the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) of January 2013, which featured sessions on the Gulf diaspora. This policy naturally makes sense given the additional fact that most countries in the ME do not allow Pakistanis to become nationals of their countries of residence and often do not relocate their entire families, which leads to a high return in remittances.

[7] Annual growth rate data from "Role of OEPs and Their Problems," Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, http://www.beoe.gov.pk/Role_of_OEPs_and_Their_Problems.asp (accessed November 7, 2012).

However, the emphasis should also be on the type of diaspora population: currently, out of the total diaspora population of Pakistan, 80 per cent of the unskilled workers are located in the ME. Professionals, knowledge migrants and those with technical know-how in North America and Europe receive less attention, although 50 per cent of all skilled workers in the Pakistani diaspora are located in industrialized countries (Tiwari 2012). As the salary of the skilled workers is significantly higher, and as they could contribute to Pakistan's development in terms of know-how as well, the focus on industrialized countries should increase. The focus on the "new migrants" in China is very instructive and could serve as a model, as there is an overlap between the destinations of the "new migrants" and those of the Pakistani skilled workers. As mentioned earlier, the nature of the diaspora is important for the determination of specific policies; as the Pakistani diaspora now also contains a highly educated segment, efforts need to be made to reach out to this segment and the knowledge capital it could offer. The Higher Education Commission of Pakistan could play an important role in this process. As the case of China demonstrates, the inclusion of the diaspora in the state's development project should transcend a narrow focus on economic contributions—human capital is equally important.

The current Chinese policy is characterized by inclusiveness: the Chinese state reaches out to both Chinese citizens and ethnic Chinese. By making use of the term "new migrants," the demarcation line between citizens and those of Chinese origin is eradicated and makes room for a policy that has wider appeal and that includes students and temporary workers. As in China, Pakistan also faces growing emigration for education purposes. Liaising with students abroad could be an important aspect of policies, in combination with additional policies to attract talented Pakistani citizens and those of Pakistani origin back to Pakistan. Also, the current emphasis is placed on citizens abroad, thereby excluding those who have taken up nationality in countries with which Pakistan has no dual nationality agreement. To reach a broader audience, consular departments could play a more active role in the promotion of culture abroad.

In terms of reaching out, there is the Overseas Pakistani Foundation, founded in 1979, which is controlled administratively by the Ministry and whose board of governors consists of National Assembly Members, Secretaries of several Ministries, persons from financial institutions, and Overseas Pakistanis. As the slogan on its website demonstrates, "Dedicated to Serve: Providing Relief and Services to Overseas Pakistanis," a logic of problem-solving similar to that in the Ministry is at work here. Whereas the Chinese model operates on two levels, namely bringing the Chinese nation-state to the diaspora and bringing the diaspora to the Chinese nation-state,

the focus here is on how the nation-state can serve the diaspora, but the diaspora is neither actively encouraged to contribute to the nation-state through a focus on common ties, nor is the nation-state brought to the diaspora in the form of delegations or the promotion of Pakistani culture. One reaching-out aspect, though, is the giving of grants to community centers, mosques, and libraries overseas, as well as grants for the organisation of seminars and national day events (Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF) website). Instead, the focus is on domestic Overseas Pakistanis (relatives and dependants of Overseas Pakistanis) and returnees. The Foundation focuses on welfare, housing, education, and pension schemes. One example concerns the provision of financial aid to family members of Overseas Pakistanis who died abroad (OPF website).[8]

Another important aspect that needs to be considered is the attitude towards investment. If Pakistan seeks to attract more remittances from its diaspora population for purposes of balance of payment, what are the attitudes towards this among the diaspora and do efforts need to be made to change these attitudes? In the case of India, for example, FDI historically had a negative connotation as a form of imperialist exploitation tied to the colonial system (Zhu 2007: 289). Does a similar negative attitude exist among the Pakistani diaspora because of the common colonial heritage? In other words, socio-cultural elements need to be taken into consideration as well. In addition, is the focus on remittances sufficient? Remittances, although they lead to higher living standards for the receivers, generally remain in family hands and do not lead to structural investment that generates development. In this respect, the Foreign Exchange Remittance Card (FERC) Scheme that was launched by the Ministry of Finance through OPF in September 2001 is a valid initiative to diminish home remittances and to encourage remittances through normal banking channels (OPF website).[9]

In spite of its short history, the Pakistani system of diaspora management also offers some insights for China. Concerning political participation, the creation of seats for Overseas Pakistanis in the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies and granting voting rights to Overseas Pakistanis has already been put on the agenda (MOP website). On the

[8] Website of the Overseas Pakistani Foundation, http://www.opf.org.pk/home.aspx. (accessed November 7, 2012).

[9] In return, those who apply for a Foreign Exchange Remittance Card receive "duty credit," the amount of which depends on the type of card issued (Silver, Silver Plus, Golden, Golden Plus, and Platinum). Other benefits include special counters at airports and free issuance and renewal of passports. Since the launch of the scheme, 73.313 cards have been issued, for which a total amount of USD 887. 126. 116 has been received. See, "Foreign Exchange Remittance Card Scheme," Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, http://www.opf.org.pk/fercallowance.aspx (accessed November 7, 2012).

website of the High Commission for Pakistan in the UK, one of the benefits listed under the National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) is that one could "cast vote as a Pakistani national."[10] Although currently, this right does not exist in practice, nevertheless, the topic has been raised earlier in the integration process than was the case in China. In China, the debate on dual citizenship first occurred in 1999, but so far, no concessions have been made. In addition, although the 1951 law did not allow dual citizenship, since amendment of the law in 2002, Pakistan has dual nationality agreements with 16 countries.[11] However, dual nationality holders are not permitted to run for public office, bureaucratic office, the military, and the judiciary (article 63 (1) (c) of the Constitution), which has caused significant debate.[12]

A final element that needs to be noted is the importance of transnational organisations as a means to reach out to the Pakistani diaspora. One of the main driving forces behind the Chinese diaspora in the last decade in particular has been the creation of large-scale voluntary organisations that differed considerably from traditional organisations based on kin, locale, or dialect. These new organisations were constructed around common interests or for business purposes. In the case of China, these organisations are actively supported by the government and are used as a bridge to connect with communities overseas. The OPF mentions 804 organisations of Overseas Pakistanis. Ties with these organisations could be strengthened in order to add the dimension of both regional and transnational organisations to state-based policies. In the field of diaspora engagement, transnational organisations and fora have also emerged in recent years. One example concerns the National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP), which was created at the first Global Diaspora Forum in Washington, D.C., in May 2011. On a regional level, the South Asian Diaspora Convention (SADC) was held in Singapore in July 2011 (ISAS Workshop Concept Note). Given the commonalities of the South Asian diaspora—such as the large concentration of workers in the Gulf—these transnational initiatives can offer extra insights on those aspects that the Chinese model lacks because of the different nature of its diaspora.■

[10] The High Commission for Pakistan in United Kingdom, http://www.phclondon.org/nadra/nicop.asp (accessed November 8, 2012).

[11] These countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the USA.

[12] In July 2012, Rehman Malik, advisor to the Prime Minister on Interior and member of the Senate, resigned as a result of the controversy over his dual nationality (British and Pakistani). "Malik Quits Senate over Dual Nationality," Paktribune, July11, 2012, http://paktribune.com/news/Malik-quits-Senate-over-dual-nationality-251376.html (accessed November 7, 2012).

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CHAPTER 13

Vision for Overseas Pakistanis 2050: Imperatives and Challenges

Dr. Muhammad Hafeez

Background

After the Second World War, many new nation-states emerged; Pakistan is one of them. The institution of United Nations (UN) got established and a new form of world order/governance started to take shape. As new countries appeared on the world map, large scale migrations across international boundaries occurred. These large scale migrations created new environment in sending and receiving countries. Accordingly, internal migrations were also observed to fill the vacuum created by international migrations. The factor of technology and opportunities for employment created 'push and pull' factors for migrants in different geographical areas of the world.

The international migrations resulted in a new phenomenon called 'diaspora'. This new name (diaspora) is a synonym for 'overseas communities', 'ethnic communities', 'ethnic minorities', 'expatriates', 'migrants' etc. The term diaspora originates from 'dispersion'. When foreign immigrants get organised, develop into an effective entity, or become a 'collective entity' for sending or receiving countries, it takes the form of 'diaspora'. The word 'diaspora' connotes distinctiveness and it occurs when the migrants in a country are not allowed to, or fail to integrate with the host communities. It may happen due to major cultural differences between the larger society of host countries or due to deliberate socio-economic policies of receiving countries. In actuality, the assimilation of immigrants into a society is a function of both sending and receiving countries. According to Moghissiet. et al. (2009), integration of migrants is a two-way process which requires ready acceptance by host societies for their full social and economic participation. Usually, the 'ready acceptance' by host communities remains a major bar for immigrants to lose their own identities and become an integral part of host communities.

During the last five decades, multinational corporations (MNCs) have started boundary-less businesses. They have developed so much collective power that they influenced state policies within and across nations. During

the recent years, products by some of the MNCs are named after companies (made by ..... company, not made in …… country). The economic interests of the MNCs have significantly influenced the trends of international migrations. On account of profit/business opportunities, the MNCs shift their businesses across nations; hence changes occur in migration flows.

Internet and social media have also played a significant role towards creating diasporas in different parts of the world (Parham 2005, Nancy 2006). These media have increased the psycho-social value of diasporas all across the world. The media had been portraying distinctive character of immigrants in different parts of the world and creating their sense of identities. In turn, these identities resulted in the collective feelings of distinct entities; and thereby diasporas are created. While the diasporas develop their sense of identities, they tend to feel their collective importance and learn to appreciate their potential in terms of their socio-economic contribution to their motherlands and also for their receiving countries.

Gabriel Sheffer defines diaspora as "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin-their homeland". "Ethnicity is playing an increasingly important role in the global economy, with some claiming that ethnicity is bypassing the state as a fundamental organising unit" (Bolt 1996). The burgeoning phenomenon of globalisation stresses the importance of five global tribes (Jews, British, Japanese, Chinese and Indians); according to Joel Kotkin, (Kotkin 1994) the success of these nations depended upon their ethnicity. Among immigrants, networking, trust and language helped build teams/groups to work for a common cause or for a desired goal for their collective benefit, of their host communities, or their native countries. Anecdotally, it has been reported that Germans have contributed towards the development of American space programme and the Indians/Pakistanis have contributed to medicinal development in the United States (US).

These overseas Pakistanis are vibrant communities in many geographical parts of the world (Asia, Europe, North America, Asia, Australia etc.,). They play important roles in economic, social and political spheres of their host countries. Several Pakistanis participate in top level political activities in the US and the United Kingdom (UK). Sir Pervaiz Iqbal Cheeema and Lord Nazir in UK; Mr Shahid Khani and Mr Safi are examples. A Pakistani-American M. Ali Raza initiated a debate on hiring policies at California State University System and ended up influencing the university system (as mentioned by Kamala Visweswaran, University of Texas, Austin). In other words, Pakistani diasporas are important

communities/entities in different parts of the world possessing even a greater potential for promoting growth in the sending and host societies.

Introduction

It is easy to (i) produce strategic 'plans' and related 'documents' but very difficult to (ii) implement such plans and attain desired results. I have tried to focus on both the dimensions. The concept of vision (a word in the title of this article) entails a pathway to achieve desired results over an extended period of time. Being a futuristic idea, 'vision' needs to be adjusted (as time passes) due to unforeseen factors or unintended consequences of certain acts of the past. Another definition of diaspora of Pakistanis can be stated as a conscious collective entity of Pakistanis living in different countries throughout the globe. Just to explain further, diasporas are usually expressed as minority social formations whose physical existence and cultures in their host countries are often at risk due to the pressure of the main culture of the receiving societies (Larkin 2006).

The size of Pakistani diaspora is large enough to become a socio-political constituency in itself for the overall development of Pakistan. A large majority of overseas Pakistanis working overseas is generally unskilled or semi-skilled. Only a small proportion of nearly 7 million Pakistani expatriates (Akbar 2011) are professionals like engineers, doctors, professors, bankers etc. Some Pakistanis are running highly successful and large business organisations in the US, UK, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Europe.

Pakistani expatriates are quite diverse and talented. This 'diasporal' heterogeneity can be used as a great developmental factor as China has used its diaspora for its socio-economic and political development (Parker 2005; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2005; Cohen 2005, Wei 2011). According to Smart and Hsu (2003), "the great majority of foreign direct investment into China has come from Chinese diaspora". This talent must be appropriately used for the development of Pakistan and also for the host countries. As individuals, they are making their economic and social contributions to their host countries. At the same time, they also make economic contribution to Pakistan through remittances. Social contribution by making their families (in Pakistan) learn from their exposure to many cultures around the world is also a factor; they make them learn about different systems that exist in different cultures around the world.

It may be mentioned here that the total socio-economic and political contribution of Pakistanis in their homeland remains partial; their contribution is not duly used by Pakistan and Pakistanis. Their collective impact on Pakistan can be enhanced significantly if the host-country-wise

diaspora could be duly organised. Their contributions could be integrated and be aligned with area-specific and national interests. By doing so, the net positive impact on Pakistan can be enhanced manifold. It may be mentioned here that the synergetic effect is always greater than the fragmented and isolated effect of anything on anything.

Many individual overseas Pakistanis have unique and significant material/non-material resources which can be utilised for launching appropriate business/institutional projects in Pakistan. Some individuals own and operate multi-billion dollar organisations in the US, UK, UAE, and Europe; they can be invited to use their organisational and financial resources for establishing sister organisations in Pakistan.

These proposed/potential organisations can have a ripple effect in Pakistan. It may be mentioned here that in many large cities of Pakistan (Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Faisalabad, and Peshawar), many commercial ventures (branded shops, multinational companies, certain manufacturing units, and modern educational institutions) have been launched by overseas Pakistanis. Through developmental activities, Pakistani expatriates have been changing the social fabric of certain communities in Pakistan. If it is put to use systematically and with long term planning, the cumulative effect of localized social and economic contribution can become a huge resource/effect to change the socio-economic fabric of Pakistan as a whole.

Statistical Overview

This paper attempts to envision the role of Pakistani diaspora in the years to come and to make some suggestions for its better contribution towards the overall development of Pakistan in the years to come. The thoughts in this paper focus on the (i) quality and personal skills of Pakistanis living/working overseas, (ii) changing their mostly unskilled configuration into skilled (or towards their greater socio-economic contribution), and finally (iii) evaluating their impact on Pakistan and their host countries. The nature of worldwide Pakistani diaspora is like a pyramid: the bulk at the bottom is unskilled labourers (construction and factory workers) followed by semi-skilled/skilled (transport and equipment) workers. Towards the top of the pyramid are the professionals (doctors, engineers, professors, managers etc.). Only a few persons are high level businessmen running their own business organisations in different parts of the world. Table 1.1 shows per cent distribution of total number of expatriate Pakistanis by their occupation in the year 2012. The data show that out of a total of 6.28 million Pakistanis living overseas, 55.91 per cent were ‘construction workers’ followed by ‘factory employees’ (14.05 %). Exactly 13.06 per cent emigrants were employed in transport and production sectors. The sum

of these three figures shows that nearly 83 per cent of expatriate Pakistanis were employed in these low paid professions. Only 2.17 per cent expatriates were employed in better paid occupations in professional and administrative positions. The net contribution to Pakistani society/economy by low paid and low quality overseas workforce remains shallow. In other words, the per-capita remittances of Pakistanis remain low at approximately US$ 2000 annually whereas the comparative figure for the Chinese emigrants is around US$ 6000.

It may be noted that the figures for Pakistanis in North America are grossly wrong. According to American data nearly 363,699 Pakistanis lived in the US in year 2010 (excluding students and those who live in dormitories). However, Pakistan Embassy calculated nearly 0.7 million Pakistanis living in the US in 2005 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistani_American downloaded on November 25, 2012). The data show that nearly 29.6 per cent Pakistan-born Americans were professionals and 17.1 per cent were self-employed and 15.1 per cent were working as managers. There are about 16,000 Pakistani doctors in the USA and nearly 10,000 Pakistanis operate taxis in that country. Proportionately, a large number of Pakistanis are working in skilful professions in Canada. Similar proportions of Pakistani diaspora are likely to be found in Canada. These findings suggest that Pakistanis have important skills that can be put to use for business development in Pakistan.

Table 1.1
Per cent Distribution of Expatriate Pakistanis by their Occupation in 2012

Occupational category	**Number**	**Percentage**
Professional, Technical, etc.	74901	1.19
Administrative and managerial	61729	0.98
Clerical etc.	77776	1.24
Sales	87654	1.40
Total service workers	51205	0.82
Domestic worker/caregiver	95656	1.52
Agriculture	215592	3.43
Total production, transport, equipment worker	1222287	19.46
Manufacturing and factory	882477	14.05
Construction	3512284	55.91
Total	**6281561**	**100**

Source: Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment (BEOE) [www.beoe.gov.pk] downloaded in November 2012.

The occupational profile of Pakistani diaspora demands attention by the appropriate authorities in Pakistan so that their skills could be improved. By providing appropriate training, Pakistan should also improve the quality of future emigrants. The ministry of overseas Pakistanis must make plans to improve the quality of Pakistani labour force to work overseas. By doing so, the net contribution of overseas Pakistanis to Pakistani society and economy can increase significantly.

It may be noted that the skill levels of Pakistanis emigrating in the recent past remains similar; it demands attention from the concerned authorities in Pakistan and the relevant quarters overseas (for example the expatriate organisations like Pakistani American Doctors Association). Table 1.2 shows per cent distribution of Pakistanis emigrated during the year 2006 and 2012 by their occupation (for which data were available). The data show that 55.61 per cent of Pakistani emigrants in 2012 comprised construction workers followed by 17.38 per cent in transport/production sector. About 15 percent of the Pakistanis emigrating during the year 2012 were employed in factories and manufacturing concerns. Only a tiny proportion of 2.18 per cent migrants were employed in professional/technical/managerial sectors. The occupational profiles of the entire Pakistani diaspora worldwide and that of recent emigrants show a similar and low-paid structure. These comparative data show that the skill levels of Pakistani emigrants had not been improving. It may be noted that the number of universities increased four-fold during the first decade of the 21st century but its impact is yet to occur on Pakistanis immigrating to other countries. These data suggest that the vast majority of migrant workers were low paid and used their money for meeting the living expenses for themselves and their families at home and abroad. In other words, there were/are low chances of saving money (by this category of workers) for investment and growth for themselves and their home country. The goal should be to increase the proportion of highly paid workers (professionals and managerial); to do that, Pakistan should provide good and relevant training through its universities and other training institutions.

Table 1.2
Per cent Distribution of Overseas Pakistanis Emigrated during the Year 2006 & 2012 by their Occupation

Occupational category	Number 2006	Percentage 2006	Number 2012	Percentage 2012	Increase
Professional, Technical, etc.	3914	2.14	5139	1.09	31.3
Administrative and managerial	4197	2.29	5104	1.09	21.6
Clerical etc.	1827	0.99	3345	0.71	83.0
Sales	4115	2.25	5266	1.12	28.0
Total service workers	1683	0.92	4936	1.05	193.3
Domestic worker/ caregiver	2787	1.52	3782	0.80	35.7
Agriculture	10780	5.88	12027	2.56	11.6
Total production, transport, equipment worker	31900	17.42	98775	21.00	209.6
Manufacturing and factory	32897	17.96	70403	14.97	114.0
Construction	89091	48.63	261555	55.61	193.6
Total	**183191**	**100**	**470332**	**100**	**156.7**

Source: Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment (BEOE) [www.beoe.gov.pk].

Table 1.3 shows per cent distribution of expatriate Pakistanis by their country of destination in year 2012. More than one-half (51.42 %) of the expatriate Pakistanis lived in Saudi Arabia and a little less than one-third (29.97%) lived in UAE. About 7.99 per cent of the Pakistani diaspora lived in Oman and nearly 7.31 per cent lived/worked in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Libya. Reportedly, only a tiny proportion of less than two per cent lived in other countries including Europe and the North America. The data provided by the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment show less than 4000 (?) Pakistanis working in North America. This is grossly wrong. In other words, the actual occupational profile will change significantly when the true data from North America and Europe is added to the table.

Table 1.3
Per cent Distribution of Expatriate Pakistanis by their Country of Destination in Year 2012

Country of destination	Number	Percentage
UAE	1882530	29.97
Saudi Arabia	3229836	51.42
Oman	501893	7.99
Kuwait	180930	2.88
Qatar	93204	1.48
Bahrain	113666	1.81
Libya	73051	1.16
China	2058	0.03
Malaysia	26554	0.42
Republic of Korea	15359	0.24
Japan	477	0.01
Europe	36553	0.58
North America	3830*	0.06
Other countries	121620	1.95
Total	**6281561**	**100**

Source: Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment (BEOU) [www.beoe.gov.pk] downloaded in November 2012.

*This grossly low figure is the result of official and procedural matters. Actually, more than one-half million Pakistanis reside in the US.

Table 1.4 shows per cent distribution of overseas Pakistanis emigrated during the years 2006 and 2012 by their country of destination. The data show 156.7 per cent increase in the total number of emigrants finding employment in different countries between 2006 and 2012. However, the bulk of the increase in emigration numbers occurred in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar. The number of emigrants from Pakistan to North America decreased in 2012 as compared to that in 2006. Apparently, there is no appropriate planning for finding useful recruitment by State agencies/organisations (like OEC and Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis). There is a lack of planning and no serious efforts to promote employment for Pakistanis in foreign countries. There should be a well-thought out plan for promoting overseas employment and then expecting them to come back

to Pakistan for playing their due role in the domestic economy and society through investment and also through establishing useful organisations.

Table 1.4
Per cent Distribution of Overseas Pakistanis Emigrated during the Year 2006 &2012 by their Country of Destination

Country of destination	Number 2006	Percentage 2006	Number 2012	Percentage 2012	Increase/ (decrease) %
UAE	100207	54.70	130603	27.77	30.3
Saudi Arabia	45594	24.89	264627	56.26	480.4
Oman	12614	6.89	53932	11.47	327.5
Kuwait	10545	5.76	2	0.00	--
Qatar	2247	1.22	6040	1.28	168.8
Bahrain	1630	0.89	8426	1.79	416.9
Libya	67	0.04	449	0.10	570.1
China	435	0.24	161	0.03	(170.2)
Malaysia	4757	2.60	1052	0.22	(352.2)
Republic of Korea	1082	0.59	4	0.00	--
Japan	53	0.03	49	0.01	(8.2)
Europe	2517*	1.37	2937*	0.63	16.7
North America	202*	0.11	129*	0.03	(56.6)
Other countries	1241	0.68	1921	0.41	54.8
Total	**183191**	**100**	**470332**	**100**	**156.7**

Source: Bureau of Emigration& Overseas Employment (BEOE); www.beoe.gov.pk]downloaded in November 2012.

* This grossly low figure is the result of official and procedural matters. Actually, more than one-half million Pakistanis reside in the USA.

Based on Pakistan's well-thought out long-term needs, an appropriate authority should be created at the federal level with its provincial wings. It could invite individual expatriates (in a systematic way) to launch organisational projects in different parts of Pakistan. These business projects may focus on such fields as education, manufacturing, food and restaurants, tourism, international trade, and research and development. It is certain that many expatriate Pakistanis will be highly motivated to invest their energy/resources for the development of their homeland. This is an emotional need of most human beings to become happy and make long-term contribution to their native communities. However, confidence and

trust in Pakistan's government is a fundamental requirement for making appropriate decisions to invest their energy and resources in Pakistan. The launching of such developmental activities should have a cumulative/significant effect on Pakistan. The continuation of such developmental activities should continuously build Pakistan materially, socially, and politically.

To make a better use of Pakistani diaspora, we need to understand their characteristics deeply, particularly in an interactional frame (the relational impact of different diaspora located in different countries). The complimentary dimensions of Pakistani diaspora must be duly understood for attaining optimum use and effect of this great resource of Pakistan. For example, we may have a large flow of remittances from the Middle East (ME), but business organisational skills may be available from the UK, the US, and the UAE (sometimes from a few persons individually). Just to emphasize, many individuals are running their own large business operations in many parts of the world; they can be invited to open up their sister concerns in Pakistan. They should be duly supported by the federal and provincial governments in Pakistan. The challenge is how to harness the potentials of overseas Pakistanis located in different parts of the world. This relational potential must be duly studied; recommendations should be made, and then implemented.

Figure 1.1 is a model showing a mechanism through which diaspora-induced development can be realized throughout Pakistan. Firstly, an appropriate authority (Pakistani Diaspora Commission (PDC) may be established. This Commission should be duly represented by overseas Pakistanis from different regions of the world. The PDC should launch a series of research/policy development projects to plan and implement the role of Pakistani diaspora in all the fields and in all the geographic areas of Pakistan. The Commission should have active presence of appropriate expatriate Pakistanis from different regions of the world based on their possible contribution to the commission, and for achieving the larger developmental objectives in Pakistan. This will develop their ownership and will have a great development effect on Pakistan.■

Figure 1.1: A Model Showing the Possible Mechanism of Developmental Contribution by Pakistani Diasporas Worldwide



* Selected due to proportionately greater potential of trade / development opportunities.

Note: All development activities should be governed by strategic national interests to be determined by national institutions like Pak Army, Ministry of Foreign Affairs etc.

Based on Pakistan's well-thought out long-term needs, the PDC (proposed to be created at federal and provincial levels) could invite individual expatriates (in a systematic way) to launch organisational/developmental projects in different parts of Pakistan. It is certain that many expatriate Pakistanis will be highly motivated to invest their energy/resources for the development of their homeland (particularly their native towns and villages). This is an emotional need for most human beings; they would be happy to make such long-term contributions to their native communities. The invitation for such developmental activities would have cumulatively significant effects. The continuation of such developmental activities, as mentioned before, should continuously keep on building Pakistan materially, socially and politically. It may be noted that the effect of anything depends upon how we opt to use it; analogically, the developmental impact of Pakistani diaspora would depend on how we actually end up using it.

The model suggests that the Pakistani diaspora should be divided into regions/countries; and studied according to geographical regions (US, UK, Europe, Japan, China, Malaysia, Singapore, UAE, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries and Africa). These studies should highlight prospects and potentials of Pakistanis in terms of opportunities and the needs of Pakistan (in short, medium and long terms). It may be noted that the opportunity-potential is more important than the size of the diaspora in a given country. Accordingly, although China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey, and Iran have small Pakistani diaspora, but there are great socioeconomic opportunities in these countries (on account of several other country-specific factors). For example, Turkey is a booming Muslim economy having great spiritual relations with Pakistan; China is growing rapidly and is to become the largest economy by the year 2016 and has strong historic relations with Pakistan; Iran is a neighbouring Muslim country with a great potential of supplying energy to Pakistan and also has a great potential of trade; Singapore is becoming a hub of education for the region. Pakistan can benefit from this potential greatly. Malaysia is a Muslim brotherly country with a great potential of trade and organisational development; Africa may provide a great opportunity to sell Pakistani goods. Finally India being a large neighbouring country with similar culture and language can be a useful trading partner (however, this country poses a special challenge because it may bring up issues due to longstanding disputes over Kashmir and other matters).

There should be an on-going monitoring system that could assure desired results. The commission should be proactive, reflective, and progressive. It must have a good grasp over the future course/vision for Pakistan (keeping regional and global trends in view). Every five years,

there should be a major review of plans as the vision will focus on the targets to be achieved until 2050 (cumulatively from the start). One of the targets could be to increase the Gross domestic product (GDP) contribution from the present five per cent to 10 per cent or more; and also to raise the per-capita income of Pakistanis from the present (US$ 1200) to US$ 10,000 in the year 2030 (in today's prices) (however, income and wealth disparities should be kept low).

The Commission's Plans for development should be duly aligned with long-term national priorities and also with five year development plans of the country (if these are in operation). This is to emphasize the importance of integrated approach to development for larger and sustainable development.

Conclusion

There is a large size of Pakistani diaspora located in many countries around the world; they are making a great contribution to the social, economic, political dimensions of their host countries. In certain countries, they are well-recognised communities and in some countries, certain individuals are playing highly significant socio-economic and political roles.

The largest Pakistani diasporas in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Middle Eastern countries send huge amounts of remittances to their families. These remittances amount to over US$ 10 Billion and this money is about five per cent of the total GDP value in Pakistan.

The size of Pakistani diaspora in any country is important. However, some Pakistani diaspora in certain countries (Japan, China, India, Turkey, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, and Africa) may be small in number but can provide significant opportunities towards the development of Pakistan. The proposed Pakistan Diaspora Commission (PDC) should be established for attaining integrated, enhanced, and rapid development of Pakistan.

Recommendations

1. We should have creative and new ways of using Pakistani diasporas in different countries for the development of Pakistan. These methods and mechanisms should be developed through our own indigenous ways.
2. PDC may be established to induce and integrate the positive effect of Pakistani diasporas on our homeland.
3. The PDC should learn from Chinese and Indian experience to formulate diaspora-related policies in Pakistan.

4. Pakistan should focus on social, economic, and political dimensions. The focus should not be on attracting remittances only; rather an integrated policy is needed to harness their contribution in economic, social and political dimensions.
5. Pakistani diaspora should become an active part of planning and development in Pakistan. This could be one of the important roles of the PDC.
6. Small sized Pakistan diaspora located in different countries (Japan, China, India, Turkey, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, and Africa) should especially be tapped. It should be done with due care to sensitive issues.■

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