

## IMPLEMENTING KASHMIR STUDY GROUP (KSG) PROPOSAL

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### Abstract:

*The dispute over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between Pakistan and India is one of the oldest and most complex issues of post-Second World War era. Since its inception in 1947, a number of solutions/options have been offered for its settlement. In 1998, a group of American and other academicians and foreign policy specialists known as Kashmir Study Group (KSG) presented a Proposal (Livingston Proposal) for its solution. The group put forward revised proposal in 2000, which again was modified in 2005. These proposals have evoked considerable interest in Pakistan, India and among Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) for their innovative approach and unique features. In view of uninterrupted Indo-Pak peace process, unprecedented flexibility demonstrated by Pakistan, and agreements on a number of Kashmir specific CBMs, the recommendations contained in the KSG Proposal are most relevant to the idea of soft borders or making borders irrelevant in Kashmir as presented by President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, respectively.*

### Introduction

Pakistan and India have been engaged in talks to peacefully settle all outstanding bilateral disputes, including the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, through a composite dialogue process, since early 2004. Under this process, the two countries have already completed three rounds of high level discussions; while the fourth round is underway. Although no tangible result or a dramatic breakthrough has been achieved in the area of conflict resolution, Islamabad and New Delhi have expressed satisfaction over the progress made so far on both military and non-military Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), especially in the area of friendly exchanges and people-to-people contacts. More notable success is the agreement on a number of Kashmir-specific CBMs. Following the start of Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service in April 2005, the two countries opened five entry points on LoC after the devastating earthquake of October 2005. The two countries are also poised to open trans-LoC trade and have agreed to start Muzaffarabad-Srinagar truck, and a second bus service between Poonch

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and Rawalakot. After achieving commendable success in conflict management, it is but logical that Pakistan and India should move to the area of conflict resolution. In other words, the stage has arrived where the two countries must look for the solution of more contentious, more complex and more difficult issues like Jammu and Kashmir, which undoubtedly has been the root-cause of Indo-Pak conflict for the last six decades. The two sides are reported to be already engaged in search for an acceptable settlement of the dispute through official and back-channel contacts. A number of proposals/ideas are also said to be under consideration of the two countries. In this regard, the four-point proposal made by President Pervez Musharraf, is especially significant.<sup>1</sup> It would, therefore, be pertinent to revisit a proposal — Kashmir Study Group (KSG) Proposal — made and revised a couple of times, to examine its relevance to an acceptable solution of the Kashmir dispute. After four years of bilateral talks under composite dialogue process, new ideas and views have emerged on the possible solution of Kashmir issue. It would be, therefore, useful to examine the prospects of implementation of the KSG Proposal in the light of new perspectives, as we are able to discover increasing similarities between some of the elements of the Proposal and new ideas, voices and views from Pakistan, India and from both sides of LoC on the possible solution of the dispute.

KSG, comprising academics, foreign policy specialists on South Asian issues and prominent American legislators was formed in August 1998. In its statement of purpose, the Committee forming the Group announced its plan to develop ideas that “can lead to a resolution of the Kashmir conflict,” through a process of continuous contacts with a broad spectrum of government officials, political leaders and other figures, who, in Committee’s view, shared its concerns. During the last about one decade, the Committee has expanded its membership and contacts to reach other countries, groups and organisations.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and discuss the new perspectives, voices and views and examine, in their light, the prospects of implementing KSG Proposal 2000 and revised Proposal 2005 in resolving Kashmir dispute. For this purpose, the paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, we will briefly describe main features of the Proposals and report of the KSG and try to find out as to what extent these two proposals address the fundamental issues in J&K in the current situation. In the second part, we will identify and discuss the new perspectives on Kashmir that have emerged under the impact of new developments in the region and try to find out as to

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<sup>1</sup> The four-point proposal made by President Musharraf in December 2006, calls for ceasefire and military disengagement, joint control, self-governance and autonomy, and free movement across Line of Control, while retaining the same borders in Kashmir.

what extent, the ideas contained in the Proposals, find their reflection in the perspectives. The third part of the paper will form the conclusion, in which we will examine the prospects of the implementation of the KSG Proposal in the light of the findings of the first two parts.

## Background

Since the beginning of Indo-Pak conflict over Kashmir in 1947, a number of attempts have been made and various options presented for the settlement of the dispute. The search for a solution to the Kashmir dispute began with the adoption of two resolutions by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, respectively calling for determining the future of the state in accordance with the will of the Kashmiri people to be ascertained through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite under the aegis of the United Nations (UN). The UNSC passed another resolution on January 24, 1957, which reaffirmed the principle of free and impartial plebiscite as the basis of final settlement of the Kashmir problem. Since the adoption of these resolutions by the UN, a number of solutions/options have been suggested for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.<sup>2</sup> But Kashmir continues to defy a solution. Rather, with the passage of time, it has become more complex and almost intractable. Nevertheless, proposals/options based on new ideas and realities continue to be presented for its settlement. One such option/proposal was developed by KSG in 1998 known as Livingston Proposals, entitled, “Kashmir: A Way Forward.” The 1998 Proposal recommended the reconstitution of former princely state of J&K “as a sovereign entity (but one without an international personality) enjoying free access to and from both India and Pakistan”. The reconstituted state was to have its own “secular and democratic constitution as well as its own citizenship”. The existing LoC was to remain intact but borders with Pakistan and India were to remain “open for the free transit of people, goods and services in accordance with the arrangements to be worked out between India, Pakistan and Kashmiri entity”. In the view of the movers, the proposal represented “a practical framework that could satisfy the interests of the people of Kashmir, India and Pakistan,” relax Indo-Pak tension and “offer enormous economic benefits not only to Kashmir but also to India, Pakistan and all of South Asia region”.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> A list of about 17 options suggested during the last about five decades has been published by Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad. See Yousaf Faisal, *Kashmir: An Array of Options*, (Islamabad: Kashmir Institute of International Relations, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> *Kashmir: A Way Forward*,  
<http://www.kashmirstudygroup.com/awayforward/proposal.html>.

The Proposal was the subject of discussion and comments by journalists, academics and politicians in Pakistan, India and both parts of Kashmir, divided by Line of Control (LoC). These discussions and comments provided a useful feedback in the form of suggestions to further develop the idea contained in the Proposals. Consequently, a more extended set of proposals was put forward in September 1999. After minor changes in the 1999 draft, a set of new proposals was issued in January 2000.

### **Kashmir: A Way Forward, KSG Proposals 2000**

The crux of the proposals are the four model solutions of the Kashmir problem in the shape of alternate hypothetical Kashmir state or states, designated as Versions A, B, C, D, E and F.

The first (Version A) envisages two hypothetical Kashmir states, with no change in the LoC or territorial exchanges between Pakistan and India formed with the concurrence of both countries on either side of existing LoC. These two states will be self-governing in all essential respects but without an international personality as described in the 1998 Livingston Proposals, "Kashmir: A Way Forward." Under Version B, again with the concurrence of Pakistan and India, a single Kashmir state straddling the LoC is proposed. Under Version C, which is proposed as an alternative to one or two sovereign states (Versions A and B), the creation of a new Kashmir state is suggested on the Indian side of the line only. The new state involves no territorial exchanges between Pakistan and India. The hypothetical Kashmir state or states with territorial exchanges between Pakistan and India under Version D and E assume the concurrence of Pakistan and India in its creation within the area of erstwhile state of J&K of either one or two sovereign, self-governing entities without an international personality, East and West Kashmir, one on each side of the line, separating areas controlled by Pakistan and India (Version D), or of a single entity straddling that line (Version E). The creation of these new states would be accompanied by a "mutually beneficial exchange of territory between India/East Kashmir and Pakistan/West Kashmir".

The Proposals also indicate separately the "desirable territorial exchanges along and beyond the LoC in J&K ...". The proposed territorial exchanges involve the areas to the north and west of the drainage divide between the Neelam/Krishanganga and Jehlam River that would be transferred to West Kashmir; while two much smaller areas in the vicinity of Uri would go from West to East Kashmir. Under the suggested territorial exchange, the whole of Poonch district, except a small part of Rajauri tehsil in the same district, would go to Pakistan/West Kashmir. There are other areas in the northeast of Kashmir, which may opt to join India/East Kashmir. These territorial exchanges may result in some loss/gain to the two proposed

states; but over-all ethnic composition of the population would not be affected.<sup>4</sup>

Another hypothetical Kashmir state is proposed under Version F, “with such territorial exchanges that would guarantee relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity. The net effect of territorial exchanges in both directions under this version would result in a somewhat higher proportion of Kashmiris in the total population of the potential new Kashmir state”.<sup>5</sup>

The Report and Recommendations of KSG did not get a favourable response in India and Pakistan. A former Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan, General (retd.) Mirza Aslam Beg, described the report and recommendations as nothing but a “ritualistic intellectual endeavour to rationalize what suits the Indian strategic interests in Kashmir”. A well known Pakistani political analyst, while commenting on the report said: “The KSG report confirms the apprehension that so called independent team of fact finders from the US do not have either the will or ability to see beyond the framework of the official US prescription for peace in the region.”<sup>6</sup> Dr Shireen M. Mazari called the report “intellectually dishonest” that in her view paved the way for American policy on Kashmir.

The negative response to the KSG Proposals, especially in Pakistan, was understandable. The Proposals had failed to address questions, which Pakistan held fundamental to any just and lasting solution of the Kashmir problem. These questions were about the legality of Indian occupation of Kashmir in 1947; the principle of plebiscite as provided under the relevant UNSC resolutions, to determine the future of the State; and what Pakistan called the atrocities against the civilian population and violation of human rights in the valley by the Indian security forces. Rejection of LoC as permanent border between Pakistan and India, and a solution of the Kashmir through an impartial, fair and UN supervised plebiscite formed the core of Pakistan’s traditional and official stand on Kashmir. Every government of Pakistan, without exception, reiterated this stand on every international forum, including the UN, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The main thrust of Pakistan’s Kashmir diplomacy had, right from the beginning, been directed towards mobilizing support from international community, its close friends and the Muslim countries on the basis of these two principles with varying degrees of success. But this support had shown signs of decrease with the signing of Simla Agreement in 1972, which had been referred to by an increasing number of countries, including

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<sup>4</sup> “Hypothetical Kashmir State or States,”

<http://www.kashmirstudygroup.com/awayforard/mapsexplan/hypotheticalDE.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Khalid Mahmud, “Search for Kashmir Solution,” *News* (Rawalpindi), December 25, 1997.

some of the closest friends of Pakistan, as a valid framework for seeking solution to the Kashmir problem through direct talks and peaceful means.

But in late 1990s, there was another important reason for an overtly adverse reaction to the solution suggested in KSG Proposals by Pakistan. It was a widely held belief that India, if not forced out of the valley, could at least be forced to come to negotiating table with Pakistan on Kashmir through armed struggle waged by *jibadi* organisations in the valley. With the establishment of pro-Pakistan Taliban regime in Afghanistan, this belief had further been reinforced as some of the *jibadi* organizations active in the valley had maintained close links with Taliban in Afghanistan. There were reports that some of them such as *Lshkar-e-Taiba*, had established bases in Afghanistan, where they reportedly received training in the use of arms and guerrilla warfare. The basis of this belief was that if a super power like the Soviet Union could be expelled from Afghanistan through *jihad*, there was no reason to believe why similar struggle could not succeed against India in Kashmir. What is important to note is that both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, although heading the popularly elected democratic governments in the decade of 1990s, accepted this logic and acquiesced in the continuation of official support, patronage and open encouragement to the parties and organizations carrying out *jihad* in Kashmir. Indo-Pak talks held during the decade of 1990s, could not lead to any tangible result chiefly due to the reason that both Pakistan and India strictly maintained their long standing and rigid positions on the issues of Kashmir and normalisation of bilateral relations.

Another reason why KSG Proposals were received in Pakistan with scepticism was the widely held belief that these proposals were in fact the part of US agenda for an independent Kashmir, which the Americans planned to use as a base against China. However, the reports did make an attempt to address some of the fundamental issues and concerns of Pakistan, India and the people of Kashmir.

From the perspective of Pakistan and the Kashmiri leadership on both sides of LoC, the most fundamental issue is the question of state's accession to India and the exercise of right of self-determination by the people of J&K to decide their future. This issue finds an echo in the oft-repeated assurance by Pakistan and international community that the final settlement of the dispute would be in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. The issue is also reflected in the demand made by the leadership in the Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir (IJK) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) that Kashmiris must be associated with the ongoing composite dialogue process between Pakistan and India, which also covers, among other areas, the dispute on J&K.

The Proposals endorsed the Pakistani and Kashmiri point of view that LoC could not be transformed into a permanent international boundary; but suggested small territorial adjustments (Versions D&E). India has repeatedly

offered to make LoC as permanent border with minor adjustments as an option, but both Pakistan and Kashmiri leadership have rejected it. However on close examination, it would be found that option based on territorial exchanges offers win-win positions for both Pakistan and India as territorial adjustments are minor, involving only 5.3 per cent of the total pre-independence area of the state. At the same time, Pakistan and Western Kashmir, according to the Proposals, would secure control over the whole of two presently divided river basins. According to the Proposals, the suggested territorial adjustments “would be wholly consistent with the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and would, in fact, facilitate the fair division of waters within the Indus drainage basin, for which the Treaty provides”. This view is supported by Niaz A. Naik, a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, who was the architect of Chenab Formula that provided for division of IJK along Chenab River ceding western side to Pakistan. According to Niaz A Naik the KSG Proposals are very similar to Chenab River formula, which was likely to become the basis of talks between former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif and former prime minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee on Kashmir, had Kargil not derailed the Lahore peace process initiated by the historic bus journey to Pakistan by the Indian Prime Minister in February 1999.<sup>7</sup>

Although KSG Proposals do not go into the question of state’s accession to India and do not recommend the resolution of the dispute through the implementation of UNSC resolutions, the Proposals impliedly reject the Indian claim that Kashmir is an integral part of India and that its accession to India is final. Similarly, implicit in the recommendations of the Proposals is the recognition of right of self-determination of the people of J&K in providing for a mechanism to ascertain the wishes of the people in various regions of the state to join suggested entities.

From the Indian perspective, any division of Kashmir on the religious basis, was bound to undermine secular character of its political system. The Proposals were, therefore, careful to underline the importance of maintaining the secular character of the entities. Instead of religion, the Proposals recommended to make cultural linkages (*Kashmiryat*) as the basis of separate entities. These provisions also support the stand taken by the nationalist Kashmiri groups like Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) on maintaining the secular character of J&K.

Under territorial adjustments, the Proposals also seek to address the security concerns of India by providing “a protective apron of territory to the north of national highway, especially in the vicinity of Kargil”. The Proposals

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<sup>7</sup> Author’s meeting with Niaz A. Naik. For details of Chenab Formula, see Yousaf, Faisal, op. cit.

are also expected to “widen the territorial buffer protecting the major, newly constructed Uri hydroelectric facility”.<sup>8</sup>

The KSG Proposals, no doubt, received extensive coverage in the media of Pakistan, India and both parts of Kashmir. According to Niaz A Naik, the back channel diplomacy on Kashmir, known as Track II, used the ideas contained in the KSG Proposal 2000 (Versions D&E) as the basis of evolving their concept of soft borders between IJK and AJK. This led to Indo-Pak agreement on starting bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad from 7 April 2005.<sup>9</sup>

As far as the revised Proposal (Kashmir - A Way Forward 2005) is concerned, it has been received with a mixed reaction from the Kashmiri leaders belonging to All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) AJK, Pakistani leaders and opinion leaders in both Pakistan and AJK. According to Mohammad Farooq Rehmani, Chairman APHC (AJK) and Chairman J& K People’s Freedom League, KSG proposals failed to create any consensus among the Kashmiri leaders. The biggest objection to the KSG proposals, according to Rehmani, is that they do not deal with the question of Indian expulsion from Kashmir. He was also critical of talking about “options” on Kashmir as, according to him, such talk would divert the attention from the fundamental objective of the freedom struggle i.e., end of Indian rule over Kashmir.<sup>10</sup>

Sardar Khalid Ibrahim, the son of a former president of AJK, and now closely associated with various efforts for finding a solution to Kashmir problem, calls the KSG Proposal a non-starter as, in his view, India would never agree to the recommendations contained in the revised Proposal. Regarding the revised Proposal for reconstituting five entities of J&K, Sardar Khalid Ibrahim said that it would further make the Kashmir issue complex and intractable. According to him, Kashmir is already divided into two parts; its further division into five entities on religious and ethnic grounds would lead to more confusion. The Kashmir issue is a political issue; the creation of five entities would transform it into religious and ethnic issue, which would neither be in the interest of Kashmiri people nor in the interest of India and Pakistan. He conceded that the recommendations of the revised Proposal bear similarities to the “Kashmir options” suggested by President Pervez Musharraf, but the Government of Pakistan has refrained from giving an official endorsement to the Proposal.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> KSG Proposals, *Desirable Territorial Changes Along and Beyond Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir*,

<http://www.kashmirstudygroup.com/awayforward/mapsexplan.desirable.html>.

<sup>9</sup> Author’s discussion with Niaz A. Naik.

<sup>10</sup> Author’s discussion with Mohammad Farooq Rehmani.

<sup>11</sup> Author’s discussion with Sardar Khalid Ibrahim.



Ammanullah Khan, President JKLF rejects the proposals of KSG, as they violate the unity and territorial integrity of Kashmir and deny the state an international legal status. Both Ammanullah and Khalid Ibrahim are of the opinion that Kashmiris, who are already opposed to the partition of Kashmir into two parts, would not agree to further division of Kashmir, as envisaged by KSG proposals.<sup>12</sup>

A serious flaw in the KSG Proposal 2000 is that it does not provide for a permanent solution of the Kashmir dispute. The LoC is retained as a border between the two sets of entities until such time as India and Pakistan decide to alter it. This contrasts with the stance repeatedly announced by both Pakistan and India that any negotiations started to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute must lead to its final and permanent settlement. The Proposal also clashes with growing perception of international community that any lingering of Kashmir dispute would be a perennial source of Islamic extremism and terrorism. The preferable choice before both India and Pakistan is that the ongoing process should lead to a final and permanent settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

### **Kashmir - A Way Forward 2005**

In 2005, KSG revised its earlier Proposal and recommended the reconstitution of portions of J&K into five — three on the Indian and two on the Pakistan side of LoC self-governing entities enjoying free access to each other and from both India and Pakistan. On the Indian side, there are to be established entities of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh. These three entities are to create Coordinating Council to look after areas of mutual interest like trade, tourism, power, water, etc. On the Pakistani administered side, two entities of Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas are to be created that will create a Coordinating Council to look after areas of mutual interest like trade, tourism, environment, power, water, etc.

The revised Proposal also recommends to set up a “supra” Coordinating Council comprising members from each of the five entities and from India and Pakistan to look after areas of mutual interest.

The new entities would have their own democratic constitutions, as well as their own citizenship, flag and legislature, which would legislate on all matters except defence and foreign affairs. India and Pakistan would be responsible for the defence and foreign affairs of the entities, which would maintain police forces for internal law and order purposes. The revised Proposal while keeping LoC “in place until such time as both India and Pakistan decided to alter it” calls for “open” borders between the entities and demilitarisation of the area included in the entities.

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<sup>12</sup> Author’s discussion with Ammanullah Khan.

A memorandum by Hurst Hannum, discusses issues raised in the revised Proposal from the perspective of international law. According to the memorandum, the five entities would have to enter into agreement with India and Pakistan, to determine the degree of self-government. It has suggested that entry passports possessed by the citizens of entities be subject to endorsement by India and Pakistan. While the revised Proposal recommends separate citizenship for the entities, the memorandum proposes either some form of shared citizenship between the entities, or that of India or Pakistan.

The memorandum says that the entity legislatures should enjoy substantive powers in areas of direct concern to their residents, such as provision of health and social services, taxation, education, language policy, transportation, regional economic policy, adoption of civil and penal laws, police, exploitation of natural resources, planning and local government. The memorandum recommended delegating “some degree of legislative and administrative authority” to the coordinating bodies. Commenting on the recommendation of the revised Proposal that defence and foreign affairs of the entities should be reserved for India and Pakistan, the memorandum says that despite the reservation, the entities could participate in various aspects of foreign affairs, like engaging in “commercial and promotional activities of some kind”. Regarding the provision for demilitarisation, the memorandum suggests, “additional guarantees beyond the simple withdrawal of troops may be necessary”. Regarding the provision for open borders and free movement of people, goods and services within the Kashmir entities and between the entities and India and Pakistan, the memorandum says that it will raise serious issues of control and security. “So long as recognized border remains,” says the memorandum, “the security of that border will normally be considered to fall within the jurisdiction of internationally recognized states of India and Pakistan, rather than any Kashmir entity.” An open border, according to the memorandum, does not necessarily mean a border without control. The memorandum rightly links the successful functioning of inter-entity coordinating bodies with the friendly and cooperative relations between India and Pakistan, “without which the net work of coordination envisaged will be difficult. Keeping in view the long association of the UN with the Kashmir dispute and its strategic importance, the memorandum suggests, “consideration should be given to calling on the UNSC to play a role in overseeing any agreement reached between India and Pakistan.” The memorandum also says: “Some means should be found to ensure that any agreement on the status of Kashmir reflects the wishes of a majority of population of the region.”

The memorandum elaborates and critically examines various recommendations of the revised Proposal of KSG in the light of contemporary practices and precedents of common and international law. It fills in a number of gaps in the provisions of the revised Proposal, which were

left by KSG for the sake of brevity. The memorandum clarifies certain aspects of the Proposal, which may have serious political and security implications, like the recommendation of open borders. In many ways, the suggestions of the memorandum improves upon certain aspects of the revised Proposal, like expansion of the jurisdiction of the entities' legislatures, association of the UN, effectiveness of the coordinating bodies, and above all friendly and cooperative relations between Pakistan and India, as a guarantee for a successful and smooth implementation of the recommendations under the revised Proposal.

The KSG Proposal was a significant departure from the conventional thinking on Kashmir as they contained innovative ideas based on the recognition of diverse nature of society in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The previous proposals, ranging from plebiscite to making LoC as permanent border between Pakistan and India, granting maximum autonomy to the state within the Indian constitutional framework, Indo-Pak joint control over Kashmir, international mediation, Trieste-like Formula, Chenab Formula, Dixon Plan, UN Trusteeship, regional plebiscite and demilitarisation of the state, largely saw Kashmir as only a dispute and zero-sum game between Pakistan and India, with little role for the Kashmiri people in determining the terms of the settlement. Coupled with it were the rigid positions adopted by Pakistan and India on Kashmir. While Pakistan was content with nothing less than the implementation of relevant resolutions of UNSC, India insisted on calling the state of J&K as its integral part.<sup>13</sup> The gap between the two extreme positions of Pakistan and India seemed unbridgeable, until new approaches and new ideas based on accommodating the vital interests of Pakistan, India and Kashmiri people were advanced. The KSG Proposal was such an attempt.

Unlike the past formulae for solution of the Kashmir problem, the KSG Proposal provided a win-win-win positions for Pakistan, India and the people of Kashmir. This proposal took into account the features of physical geography, demography, languages and religion as they have evolved during the different periods of long history of the state, while suggesting three options for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The recommendations of the Proposal are made while keeping in view the fundamental principles of political systems, security concerns and vital economic interests of both India and Pakistan. The Proposal pays due consideration to the economic interests and unity of the people of J&K on the basis of their common cultural values, language and religious ties while suggesting territorial adjustments under the

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<sup>13</sup> For Pakistani and Indian perspectives on Kashmir, see, Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Islamabad's New Approach to Kashmir," and P. R. Chari, "Sources of New Delhi's Kashmir Policy," respectively, in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif and Cyrus Samii, *Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches*, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), ch. 8,9.

plan for creating three separate entities. What distinguishes the KSG Proposal from the past ideas is that it is accompanied with “a historical perspective of the Kashmiri region and the origin of the present state of J&K together with information on physical geography, population, languages and religions of the region to facilitate the comprehension of the logic of the suggestions put forward” in the Proposal.

### **New Perspectives**

Imperatives like accentuation of violence and gross violation of human rights in the valley as a result of clashes between militants and the security forces, nuclearisation of South Asia, escalation of tension between Pakistan and India and war on terror in the wake of terrorist attacks in the United States on 9/11, have led to the emergence of new perspectives, new voices and new views on Kashmir.

The decision of Pakistan and India to become overt nuclear powers by carrying out atomic tests in May 1998 not only added a new dimension to the issue of South Asian security, it also made Kashmir a focus of international attention as a nuclear flash point.<sup>14</sup> The nuclearisation of South Asia provided urgency to finding a solution to the Kashmir problem, which had escalated tension between Pakistan and India and could lead to nuclear exchange between the two neighbouring countries.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States caused a fundamental transformation in the geo-strategic situation in South Asia, as the region became a focal point in the war against terrorism due to its proximity with Afghanistan. Soon the shadow of Afghanistan came to be felt over Kashmir. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had a direct impact on Kashmir as the US urged Pakistan to curb the activities of *Jibadi* organisations in the country and put an end to what was alleged as cross-border terrorism. The continuation of activities of *jibadi* organisations having close links with militant groups in Kashmir was perceived by the US as a serious threat to its war against terrorism. The increase in violence in Kashmir as a result of intensified clashes between the militants and the Indian security forces further convinced the US about the need to put more pressure on Pakistan to rein in the *jibadi* organisations and check infiltration across the LoC.

The dramatic events following 9/11 convinced the Government of Pakistan that *jihad* was no longer a viable option in Kashmir. The only option was a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir problem, for which Pakistan and India were required to initiate a dialogue. This was suggested under a four step formula by President Musharraf in March 2002, calling for (a) initiation of

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<sup>14</sup> For a linkage between Kashmir and nuclearisation of South Asia and responses from the international community, see John Thomson, “Kashmir: The Most Dangerous Place in the World,” Sidhu, op. cit., ch. 12.

dialogue; (2) recognizing the centrality of Kashmir issue in relations between Pakistan and India; (3) eliminating whatever is unacceptable to India and whatever is unacceptable to Pakistan; and (4) arriving at a solution acceptable to both in a spirit of compromise with the wishes of the Kashmiri people.<sup>15</sup>

The Joint Statement issued on 6 January 2004 after the historic meeting between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee held in Islamabad on the occasion of 12<sup>th</sup> SAARC Summit reflected the same ideas, when the two countries pledged to resume composite dialogue with the confidence that it “will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir to the satisfaction of both sides”.<sup>16</sup> The Joint Statement provided an important framework for not only pursuing the goal of Indo-Pak normalization, it also raised the prospects of movement towards a solution to the Kashmir problem as it contained the most clear and direct reference to Kashmir after Simla Agreement.

However, the Statement implied the two countries were to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem through bilateral talks, and there was no reference to the Kashmiri people as a third party. This led to protests from APHC leadership in the IJK and government and political parties in AJK. In a statement former Chairman APHC, Mir Waiz Umar Farooq, while recognising the importance of ongoing Indo-Pak peace process for promoting prospects of resolving the Kashmir dispute, said: “We do want better relations and good understanding between the two countries,” but, he added that the APHC believed that if there was any solution possible to the Kashmir conflict, it was not possible without the inclusion of the people of J&K. If the people of J&K were not involved in the process, he further said, it would be a futile exercise.<sup>17</sup> This view is being increasingly shared by Pakistan and international community as well. In the last four years, Pakistan and India have completed four rounds of composite dialogue, holding talks on a range of bilateral disputes, including Kashmir. While reviewing the progress under three rounds

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<sup>15</sup> Government of Pakistan, *President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the International Media in Japan National Club, Tokyo, 13 March 2002*, (Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Media Development 2002), 14.

<sup>16</sup> For the text of the Joint Statement, see *Dawn* (Islamabad), January 7, 2004.

<sup>17</sup> *Dawn* (Islamabad), September 5, 2004.

Mir Waiz Umar Farooq had also met Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri in New Delhi in early September 2004 and told him that the dialogue process between Pakistan and India was having no impact on the ground situation in Kashmir. “We told him” (Mr. Kasuri), Mir Waiz was reported to have said, “We feel that the Government of Pakistan and India need to adopt a step by step approach to the Kashmir issue.” He was further reported to have stated, “You (Pakistan and India) have been talking since 1947 but all your agreements have failed because the main party has never been taken into confidence.” See *Dawn*, (Islamabad), September 6, 2004.

of composite dialogue before starting the fourth round, the foreign ministers of the two countries expressed their satisfaction. But whereas substantial progress has been achieved on CBMs front, there has been no headway on Kashmir.<sup>18</sup>

But the Indo-Pak agreement to start Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service from 7 April shows that the Joint Statement of 6 January 2004 is still a valid framework for pursuing the efforts towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, despite the fact that there still exists a wide gap between the officially stated positions of the two countries on Kashmir. This is evident from a statement by President Musharraf, wherein he said that both governments have shown flexibility on the Kashmir issue by concluding agreement on the bus service.<sup>19</sup> In IJK, the start of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service is being seen as first important step in the movement towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In a statement, Mir Waiz Umar Farooq called for “further steps on political front” and “restoration of telecommunication links between the two regions and extension of bus to other local destinations” as, according to him, time was ripe for such movement as a result of efforts by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.<sup>20</sup>

The agreement on bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad amounts to Indo-Pak acceptance of LoC as a ground reality notwithstanding the official stands of the two countries on the future of Kashmir. It is an important movement on the concept of soft borders between IJK and AJK. President Musharraf’s loud thinking on proposing certain options is also based on the recognition of ground realities that have remained as durable features of the state of J&K for the last 60 years. These ground realities correspond to the seven regions of the state identified by President Musharraf according to their demographic, linguistic and geographical characteristics.<sup>21</sup>

Although President Musharraf’s statement on seven zones does not fully tally with KSG Proposal of five entities in Kashmir, it nevertheless, implies the recognition of ground realities on which the KSG Proposal is

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<sup>18</sup> See the statement of Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman, *Dawn* (Islamabad), January 4, 2005. In a later statement, Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri also expressed the same view that there had not been much progress on substantive issues under composite dialogue with India, but people to people contacts and means of communication were much better. Press conference in Tokyo, *Dawn* (Islamabad), February 24, 2005.

<sup>19</sup> *Dawn* (Islamabad), March 25, 2005.

<sup>20</sup> *Dawn* (Islamabad), March 26, 2005.

<sup>21</sup> According to the zones identified by President Musharraf, five are located in IJK and two are in AJK. Of the five zones falling in IJK, two (Kathua and Jammu) have non-Muslim majorities; while Leh and Laddakh have Buddhist majorities. The Muslim majority zones in IJK comprise Kashmir valley (95 percent Muslim), Poonch, Rajauri and Doda of Jammu area and the Kargil district.

based. For this reason, KSG Proposal can work as a basis for further elaborating and clarifying the proposal for seven zones in Kashmir.

### **Conclusion**

A survey of opinion on KSG proposals would reveal that the policy makers and politicians in Pakistan and AJK are not well aware of the details of the recommendations of KSG Proposal 2000 and revised Proposal of 2005. The Proposals, therefore, have not been a subject of a serious debate or discussion in Pakistan or in AJK. However, when explained, the immediate reaction from a number of political leaders of AJK is to call it a non-starter because of inflexible Indian attitude. But people like Niaz A. Naik, have a different view. According to him, KSG Proposals are very similar to the ideas of President Musharraf under which he has identified seven zones for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the Kashmiri people for joining India or Pakistan or opting for independence. The proposal for demilitarisation made by President Musharraf is also similar to the one contained in the KSG Proposal. The four-point proposal made by President Musharraf further reduces the gap between KSG Proposal and Pakistan's point of view. People like Khalid Ibrahim object to the KSG proposals on the ground that these call for further division of Kashmir, whereas Kashmiris have already suffered due to the partition of Kashmir into two parts. This will render the issue of Kashmir more complex and almost intractable. APHC (AJK) leadership is of the view that KSG Proposals represent the American agenda on Kashmir, which aims at loosening the hold of both India and Pakistan over Kashmir to pave the way for an independent Kashmir. For this reason, says Rehmani, there is a dominant opinion in the APHC (AJK) that search for a solution of Kashmir dispute should be deferred, as the prevalent international situation was not favourable to Pakistan.

However, dominant opinion in Pakistan, India and on both sides of LoC, shared by international community is that Pakistan and India should not miss this opportunity, must maintain the momentum of the ongoing peace process and reach a permanent settlement on Kashmir. The KSG proposals contain the basis of this compromise formula as recommendation for reconstituting five Kashmir entities corresponding to the existing realities in the state of J&K. The successful operation of a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad followed by the opening of five entry points on LoC, Poonch-Rawalakot bus service, Muzaffarabad-Srinagar truck service and agreement to start trans-LoC trade suggest that Pakistan, and more importantly majority of the Kashmiris on both sides of LoC, are slowly becoming reconciled to retaining LoC as border between the two parts of Kashmir. The set of proposals put forward by KSG under various versions had three common elements: One, LoC be retained with minor territorial

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adjustments; two, people and goods should be allowed to move freely across LoC; and three, there should be economic cooperation between Kashmiri entities, Pakistan and India. If we look at how things have shaped up on Kashmir during the last about four years, we find that Pakistan and India are already implementing the aforementioned suggestions of KSG, though in their own way. The agreement on ceasefire along LoC reached in November 2003 is being observed by both sides. The idea put forward by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for making borders irrelevant in Kashmir and President Musharraf's proposal for soft border have received popular support among the Kashmiris on both sides of LoC, because it holds promise for larger and easier movement of the people across LoC. Pakistan and India are also preparing to start trans-LoC trade, which the two countries as well as people of AJK and IJK consider absolutely essential for not only strengthening the economies of two parts of Kashmir but also eliminating militancy in the state.

Kashmir is an old and highly complex issue. The experience of the last six decades shows that no single formula/solution/proposal can be applied to the issue. But each option contains elements that can work as useful basis for evolving a mechanism for reaching a final solution. The set of proposals put forward by KSG also falls in the same category. When we compare the new ideas and perspectives on Kashmir, such as, proposals for soft borders or making borders irrelevant in Kashmir, we find KSG proposals much similar to them. ■



## NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION: CHALLENGES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Muhammad Khurshid Khan\*

### Abstract:

*Currently the world is confronted with different kinds of proliferation threats including stealing a complete weapon system or developing radiological dispersal devices by non state actors. The Illicit Trafficking Database maintained by the LAEA revealed that during 1993-2005, there were 827 confirmed incidents of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Future trends indicate that over the next 3 to 4 decades, due to envisaged increase in number, nuclear reactors would be more vulnerable to external and internal threats. If the world wants to control nuclear proliferation, it will be prudent to limit the capacity of states to have complete nuclear fuel cycle. Nothing would reduce the nuclear threat to civilisation and increase the credibility of the nonproliferation regime more than the US and Russia making progress towards nuclear disarmament. The countries which are expected to become role model are continuously busy in refining/improving their nuclear arsenal. Under these circumstances, proliferation is likely to maintain upward trends internationally. It is equally important to highlight the measures adopted by Pakistan to ensure control over its nuclear activities. Consistent with its commitment, Pakistan formally instituted an elaborate National Command Authority, with Strategic Plans Division as its secretariat to ensure the safety of its nuclear arsenal.*

### Preamble

Primarily, there are three pillars of nuclear non-proliferation system, namely safeguards, physical protection and export control. Nuclear proliferation history demonstrates that countries developing weapons build indigenous production facilities, which rely extensively on imported equipment, material and technology for these facilities. In the same context, networks of procurement agents' brokers and front companies systematically manoeuvre around and through national export control efforts to procure commodities for such facilities. There is a general consensus that commercial interests have been one of the fundamental factors that have played an important role in proliferation of nuclear technology. It was because of this reason that companies and individuals from different countries including the US, the UK, France, Germany, Russia, Switzerland,

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Israel and even Norway remained intimately involved in the development of nuclear programmes of recipient countries, such as India and thereby contributed to those countries' development of nuclear weapons.<sup>22</sup>

International efforts remained generally focused on arms control rather than disarmament. Even the concept of arms control has been applied selectively by technologically advanced countries including the US. At one end, the US is advocating others to exercise restraint but, on the other, it is busy evolving new doctrine envisaging the use of nuclear weapons in pre-emptive mode even against non-nuclear weapons states, plans to develop "usable" nukes, is intimately involved in developing Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) system, progressive militarisation of outer space and promotion of selective non-proliferation by applying discriminatory conditions for peaceful nuclear cooperation.<sup>23</sup>

The possibility of proliferation of nuclear technology poses a challenge to the international community. We should be mindful that proliferators need to obtain many key materials and equipment; it is, therefore, essential that if we want to control proliferation of nuclear technology, we need to exercise control over the strategic material, equipment and technology that enables proliferators to develop such weapons. In the same context, awareness and familiarity with controlled items by export controls implementing agencies are equally essential for identification and interdiction. To curb such tendencies, we need to reinvigorate the spirit of international regimes and arrangements that are in place since late 1960s and early 1970s.

The issues discussed in this paper have been divided in following three main sections: One, the nature of nuclear proliferation challenges; two, international responses to possible nuclear proliferation including its implications for various regions; and finally, a brief account of Pakistan's initiatives to control the possibility of proliferation of nuclear technology.

### **Nature of Challenges**

Today, the international community is confronted with different kinds of threats starting from the use of conventional munitions to the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) by terrorist groups working outside states' control. Nuclear terrorists' threat includes stealing fissile material and building a gun type weapon, and stealing a complete weapon system, which is practically unlikely to be used because of technical reasons. The next category

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<sup>22</sup> M. Yousaf Saeed, "India's 'exceptional N-record'," *Dawn* (Islamabad), October 1, 2005. See also Adnan Gill, "Roots of nuclear proliferation," *Statesman* (Peshawar), September 7, 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Henry C.K.Liu, "US Unilateralism Non Proliferation and Unilateral Proliferation," <http://henrycklui.com/-2006-07-01.htm>.

includes radiological dispersal devices (RDD) using radioactive material, which is the most likely means of creating panic and crisis. The use of RDD by non-state actors would lead to massive panic; involve evacuation, long term cancer risks, heavy de-contamination and rebuilding which might cost billions of dollars. No matter how protected the nuclear reactors may be, the trends indicate that due to the increased number of nuclear reactors around the world over the next two decades, these reactors would be more vulnerable and prone to physical attack by non-state actors and terrorist groups causing serious crisis for human lives, living around such facilities.

In addition, the use of chemical/biological agents by non-state actors is also a possibility. There is enough empirical evidence available to suggest that such weapons have been used in the past. The use of sarin gas (Tokyo Bay incident during 1995) and use of anthrax by non-state actors in the US after 9/11 are the recent examples.

Proliferation of Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) is also a threat to the human beings though it has no linkage with nuclear factor. Since their development in 1960s, more than 20 countries have produced an estimated 1 million MANPADS. In 2004, the US Government Accountability Office estimated 500,000-750,000 weapons in existence worldwide out of which 5,000-7,000 missiles are out of states' control. In 2003, Colin Powell, the then US Secretary of State, warned that, "No threat is more serious to aviation than MANPADS."<sup>24</sup>

## **Nuclear Weaponisation**

During the last several decades over eight countries have been nuclearised. It was the US that took the lead to develop nuclear weapons during early 1940s and set the pace for others to follow. Realising the implications of existence of large scale nuclear weapons, some efforts were made by the US President Harry S. Truman, who proposed "international arrangement looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atom bomb". Although this proposal was blocked at that time due to obvious reasons, nevertheless, it laid the foundation for the eventual development of international safeguards.<sup>25</sup> The proposed idea of "Atom for Peace" during 1953 to discourage others from developing such technology was another attempt. The proposal was aimed at developing nuclear technology for peaceful uses with an independent body to monitor implementation. These initiatives were rejected by former Soviet Union, which had already embarked upon developing its own nuclear weapons by carrying out nuclear explosion

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<sup>24</sup> Matt Schroeder, "Countering the MANPADS Threat: Strategies for Success," *Arms Control Today*, vol. 37, no. 7, September 2007.

<sup>25</sup> Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson, "Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards: Special Committee to the Rescue?," *Arms Control Today*, December 2005.

in September 1949. Thereafter, there was a race between the UK, France, and China and by the time Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed; five countries had already developed nuclear weapons.

The next nuclear explosion was conducted by India during 1974 by using nuclear technology which was provided by the suppliers for peaceful purposes only. The Indian action forced the US led technological advanced countries to form Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) to regulate nuclear related trade by evolving comprehensive guidelines.<sup>26</sup> From 1974 till 1998, there was a pause; nevertheless, during this period, two other countries, namely Brazil and South Africa gained mastery over nuclear technology to develop nuclear weapons. However, both gave up this option and signed NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. In addition, many other countries, including Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Libya, Iraq and if recent US intelligence disclosures are to be believed, the Iranians have also given up their nuclear weapons programmes. Nuclear explosion by both India and Pakistan during 1998, and later North Korea during 2006, brought these countries into nuclear club. Although, Israel is not known to have tested nuclear device, empirical evidence indicates that it had mastered the nuclear weapons technology by late 1960s with the help of the countries like France and the UK.

Though a sequel to NPT, the situation has been encouraging against John F. Kennedy's dire prediction that by mid 1970s, we would live in a world of 20 or more nuclear powers, which never became a reality and today only ten countries have nuclear weapons technology, including Iran. Indeed, it appears that over the past 30 years, more countries have given up nuclear programmes than have initiated new ones. However, each nuclear power increases the risk of a further acceleration of proliferation.<sup>27</sup>

As per estimates, there are 5,968 strategic warheads, more than 1,000 operational tactical weapons and about 3,000 reserve strategic and tactical warheads with the US, while Russia possesses 4,987 strategic warheads, about 3,500 operational tactical warheads and more than 11,000 stockpiled strategic and tactical warheads, sufficient to destroy this world many times over. The countries like China, the UK, France, India, Israel and Pakistan also retain approximately 420, 200, 350, 45-95, 75-200 and 30-50 warheads, respectively. North Korea might also have enough plutonium stocks which could yield 8-10 nuclear weapons.<sup>28</sup> There are potential nuclear weapon states, which can

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<sup>26</sup> Praful Bidwai, "Sanctifying mass destruction," *Frontline*, vol. 24 Issue 18, September 8, 2007.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Rhle, "A Nuclear Iran: Implications for the Non-proliferation Regimes, NATO's Nuclear Policy and Missile Defense". See also Neil Joeck, "The U.S. - India 'Global Partnership': The Impact on Nonproliferation," Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, October 26, 2005.

<sup>28</sup> *Hindustan Times*, May 3, 2005. See also Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Offers Evidence to Rebut Uranium Claims," <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.

develop such weapons if they so desire like South Africa, Brazil, Japan and South Korea, etc. There are various other states which may also embark upon this track, if their security concerns are not addressed by international community.

### **Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Radioactive Material**

IAEA is maintaining Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) to which Pakistan is a party. The ITDB and other records of unauthorised activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials and radioactive contaminated material revealed that since 1993 and up to 2005, there were a total of 827 confirmed incidents reported by participating member states of the ITDB. A few of these incidents involved seizures of a kilogram quantity of weapon grade nuclear material. Out of 827 confirmed incidents, 224 incidents involved nuclear material; none is attributed to Pakistan. Since 1993, nine trafficking cases involving uranium ore, yellowcake and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) have been recorded in India.<sup>29</sup> Since 2005, quite a large number of related incidents have been registered with ITDB.

These reported incidents, and many others that could have escaped detection and reporting, underline the severity of the threat of any such material falling into wrong hands. The available database may not be the most accurate tool to point fingers towards a particular state or a region but it cannot be overlooked either, especially because the list includes some advanced countries with stringent security mechanisms like Germany, France, Japan and the US. However, ITDB indicates that some of the states that were part of the former Soviet Union would continue to be a major source of international concern. The above-referred incidents fortunately did not cause any harm, but do not guarantee that they will remain harmless in future as well.

### **Future Trends in the Use of Nuclear Technology**

As of today, there are a total of 439 nuclear reactors in operation in 30 countries providing 16 percent of the worldwide electricity that rose from less than one per cent in 1960, with France at the top with 78 per cent of electricity followed by the US with 20 per cent. A total of 30 nuclear reactors are under construction, mostly in developing countries, while planned number is 74 with proposed 182 nuclear reactors over the next 3 to 4 decades.<sup>30</sup> Given the cost increase in oil and natural gas and rising concerns about climatic change, many in the nuclear industries hope for a three to four fold increase

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<sup>29</sup> Mark Fitzpatrick, *Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks - A net Assessment*, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), 130-131.

<sup>30</sup> *Nation* (Lahore), October 30, 2007. See also *The Bahrain Tribune*, July 8, 2007.

in global nuclear capacity by the year 2050. The IAEA latest projection predicts that nuclear energy generation will grow to between 447 to 679 GWe by 2030 from the current level of 370 GWe.<sup>31</sup>

In view of the latest trends in the use of nuclear energy, the recent announcement by the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to explore development of nuclear energy, also sent a shudder through the non-proliferation community. In addition to GCC, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya and Yemen have all said that they want to pursue peaceful nuclear projects.<sup>32</sup> Arab countries of the Gulf are wary of the Iranian nuclear ambitions, fearing that Iran could be trying to develop nuclear weapons.<sup>33</sup> Countries like Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia, do not want to lag behind. Whatever the future of nuclear power may be, if we want to control proliferation of nuclear technology, it is important to limit the spread of national gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. In other words, limit the capability to have complete nuclear fuel cycle because it can easily be converted to the production of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.

While such trends do contribute towards nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, these also have serious implications for safe operation of such huge numbers of nuclear reactors, scattered all over the world, because people have not forgotten the two historical incidents like Chernobyl accident in Ukraine during 1986 and Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island Plant accident during 1979. There are increasing concerns about energy security.<sup>34</sup> Despite technological advancement, there is always a risk of such accidents which can prove fatal for human beings residing around such facilities. In addition, increase in the number of nuclear reactors around the world also brings vulnerabilities to such facilities, which could be exploited by non-state actors, causing serious concerns to the international community. The nuclear waste produced during the process is potentially more problematic not only from the mining aspect but from the high level radioactive waste that a commercial nuclear reactor is going to produce. Security analysts argue that this inevitably increases the risk that plants will become a terror target, despite being given extra protection.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> "New Nuclear - IAEA report predicts nuclear growth," *World Nuclear News*, October 25, 2007, <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org>.

<sup>32</sup> Linda Heard, "Egypt's Bold N- Step," *Arab News*, November 6, 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Syed Rashid Hussain, "S. Arabia Proposes Joint Plan for N-fuel," *Dawn* (Islamabad), November 3, 2007. See also *Arms Control Today*, op. cit., 38-39.

<sup>34</sup> Statement by Dr El Baradei at UNGA, *ibid*.

<sup>35</sup> Laura Smith, "US Eyes Boom in Nuclear Reactors" *BBC News*, Washington, October 11, 2007. See also Harold A. Feiveson, "Faux Renaissance: Global Warming, Radioactive Waste Disposal and the Nuclear Future," *Arms Control Today*, vol. 37, no. 4, May 2007, 13-17.

## Global Fissile Material

Almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia still retain stockpiles of about 10,000 nuclear weapons each as indicated earlier and have committed only to reduce to about half that number by the end of 2012. There are seven other nuclear weapon states, besides US and Russia with the exception of North Korea, which is on its way to de-nuclearisation. Their nuclear weapons range from a few simple warheads to several hundred high-yield thermonuclear weapons. There are growing concerns about a loss of momentum in the nuclear disarmament process, and additional states acquiring nuclear weapons that increase the possibility of nuclear terrorism. As of early 2007, the global stockpiles of HEU totaled between 1400 and 2000 metric tons. The uncertainty reflects mostly the fact that Russia has not revealed how much HEU it has made.<sup>36</sup>

During 2006, Russia blended down 30 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium to LEU. In the US, a total of 87 tons of excess HEU had been blended down as of mid 2007. Russia and the US retain for weapons a combined total of 600 to 1200 tons of HEU — sufficient for 25,000 to 50,000 nuclear warheads. The US has set aside almost all its excess weapon-grade uranium for use as naval-reactor fuels, enough for 5,000 more nuclear warheads. Russia and the UK also have large reserves of HEU for naval fuel.

The current global stockpile of separated plutonium is about 500 tons. India, Pakistan and probably Israel, continue to produce more plutonium for weapons. Both India and Pakistan are expanding their production capabilities but, on July 14, 2007, North Korea has agreed to shut down its plutonium production reactor (hopefully permanently). On the other hand, Japan has shifted from reprocessing abroad to reprocessing at home. In 2006, it began to operate a new \$20 billion domestic spent-fuel reprocessing plant. In the US, the Bush Administration has proposed to reverse a three decade old moratorium on domestic reprocessing.<sup>37</sup> These trends indicate that possibility of nuclear related incidents/accidents is on the increase signaling a serious blow to the ongoing efforts to address the issue of nuclear technology proliferation.

## Progress Towards Nuclear Disarmament

Nothing would reduce the nuclear threat to civilisation and increase the credibility of the nonproliferation regime more than the US and Russia cutting their weapons and associated fissile-materials stockpiles much more deeply. However, no substantive work has been done by the P-5 to

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<sup>36</sup> Second Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) on Global Fissile Material Report 2007. See also “Fissile Facts,”

<http://www.carnegiedowment.org>, op. cit.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

implement the important NPT clause related to general and complete disarmament. Though the issue is under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Geneva, along with other core subject, i.e., Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT), Negative Security Assurances (NSA) and Prohibition of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), but on priority list, general and complete disarmament issue, probably goes down to the bottom of the CD agenda because of the vested interest of leading countries of the world.

Though President Bush has urged international community many a time to secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological material but practically the US has not demonstrated the political will as it has so far failed to ratify CTBT. Instead of bridging gaps in the NPT, the US, by entering into nuclear deal with India in violation of the principles of NPT, is likely to encourage potential nuclear weapon states to pursue their nuclear programmes. NSG that was created to discourage India from acquiring nuclear technology has now been encouraged to amend its guidelines to accommodate India by creating India specific provisions.

### **Current Approaches to Address Ongoing Nuclear Proliferation**

The current international approaches are not fully tailored to address ongoing nuclear technology proliferation challenges. The countries which could become role model for others are continuously busy in refining/improving their nuclear arsenal, including their missile capabilities. The US has planned to develop new state of the art nuclear warheads with a strategy to use them in pre-emptive role against even non-nuclear weapon states. The US Administration sees expanded role of nuclear weapons.<sup>38</sup> The US Nuclear Posture Review that was made public in 2002 and NATO's strategy documents also contain such provisions. The Pentagon is preparing to develop satellite guided bunker busting bombs containing 2404 kilograms of explosive which will have more than 10 times the explosion power as compared to the bunker buster bombs that exist on the US inventory today.<sup>39</sup>

The US believes that ballistic missile threat to America has been growing for decades. In 1972, just nine countries had ballistic missiles capability but today that number has grown to 27. The US that embarked upon a programme of ABM system for over three decades has also encouraged India to board upon the same track. The US is also working with Japan on a joint missile defence programme which has been regarded by Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov as an "object of concern" which

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<sup>38</sup> Tusher, "Strategic Security Blog - A Response to Congresswoman," *Non Proliferation Review*, <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/10/30.htm>.

<sup>39</sup> *Daily Times* (Lahore), January 18, 2007; *Nation* (Islamabad), October 26, 2007; *Hindustan Times*, May 3, 2005.



could be directed against Russia and China.<sup>40</sup> Chinese have also expressed similar concerns. The US is also working closely in this area with countries such as Israel, Italy, Germany, Netherlands and the UK. The US intends deploying such system in Europe including deployment of ten ground based interceptors located in Poland and X-Band tracking radar located in the Czech Republic to defend the US and its NATO allies against threat emanating from Middle East, especially Iran.<sup>41</sup>

Meanwhile, countries like Russia, Iran and North Korea are continuously testing their strategic weapons to ensure that they do not lag behind the US in security related areas.<sup>42</sup> Russian President Putin has conveyed to the US that due to the change in security environment around Russia, his country would find it difficult to stay in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty, signed in December 1987 that obliges two countries to destroy all ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500-5500 kilometres which led to the scrapping of 2692 missiles in total.<sup>43</sup> Instead of exercising arms control, Russia is likely to deploy seven more of its new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and test at least five more ICBMs. On another strategic front, Putin announced on August 17, 2007 that after a 15 years lull, Russia would resume regular long range patrols of its strategic bombers.<sup>44</sup> Putin also said that Russia plans new types of nuclear weapons as part of its wider plan to strengthen its defence against emerging threats.<sup>45</sup>

In the South Asian context, both India and Pakistan are still busy improving/refining their nuclear/missile technology. In case of India, it is involved in ICBMs project as well. India's ABM programme is another destabilising factor in this region. India's well-developed space programme that also has the support of Israel is a point of concern in Pakistan.<sup>46</sup> Though Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) initiated during 2004 between India and Pakistan have been going in the right direction, no substantive progress has been achieved on important issues, including the core issue of Jammu & Kashmir. The nuclear doctrine/strategies of both sides are obscure and opacity still exists. India's nuclear policy is even more disturbing when it says

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<sup>40</sup> *Dawn* (Islamabad), October 14, 2007.

<sup>41</sup> *Arms Control Today*, op. cit., May 2007, 30.

<sup>42</sup> *The News* (Rawalpindi), October 30, 2007.

<sup>43</sup> *The News* (Rawalpindi), October 29, 2007.

<sup>44</sup> *Arms Control Today*, op. cit., September 2007.

<sup>24</sup> Guy Faulconbridge, "Russia Could Quickly Resume Missile Output: General," October 16, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. *The News* (Rawalpindi), October 27, 2007.

<sup>46</sup> Statement by Livia Link, Israeli representative (to the 4<sup>th</sup> Committee UN New York) in 62<sup>nd</sup> Session of the UNGA-Agenda Item 31 - International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, October 29, 2007, *The News* (Rawalpindi), October 27, 2007.

that its official policy of “no first use” would be reviewed in case of a chemical or biological attack, or India reserves the right to use nuclear weapons “any where”, if Indian forces are attacked even with chemical or biological weapons.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, in the presence of unclear nuclear policies and serious disputes between the two countries, the element of uncertainty in this region will continue to exist. In addition, with the conclusion of Indo-US nuclear deal and their ongoing cooperation in conventional field, the existing strategic/security balance is likely to change in India’s favour thus inviting arms race in both conventional as well as in nuclear fields, as maintaining “minimum nuclear deterrence” would require Pakistan to review its nuclear policy.

Under the circumstances as indicated above, proliferation of both nuclear/missile and conventional side is likely to maintain upward trend internationally, despite the existence of a number of international treaties and regimes and other arrangements, which were introduced by the US in the aftermath of 9/11.

### **Response to Nuclear Technology Proliferation**

As indicated earlier, primarily there are three pillars of nuclear non-proliferation system, namely safeguards, physical protection and export control. In the past, the countries involved in nuclear activities exploited the weak links in these three pillars and managed to transfer nuclear technology illegally to other countries, which did not have this technology, primarily because of commercial interest. However, immediately after the use of nuclear weapons by the US against Japan, there was a realisation that if this technology remained unchecked, it might cause havoc in future; therefore, some efforts were devoted to discourage states from acquiring nuclear technology for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons. As indicated by Neil Joeck, the US nonproliferation policy goes back to the 1940s with the “Baruch Plan” and the “Acheson-Lilienthal Plan”, which met with resistance from the former Soviet Union. The US launched another initiative though at a belated stage, with “Atoms for Peace” approach which was introduced in 1953 by the US President Eisenhower, in which he emphasised that nuclear technology might be used for peaceful purposes only under the supervision of an independent organisation.<sup>48</sup>

Since then, a number of initiatives have come into existence that include legally binding international treaties, conventions, regimes/arrangements, treaties having regional implications like Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) as well as establishment of monitoring/implementing bodies working under the United Nations like IAEA and NSG.

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<sup>47</sup> Mark Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, 37.

<sup>48</sup> Neil Joeck, *ibid.*

This paper does not cover bilateral treaties/arrangements agreed between the US and former Soviet Union. Some of the important initiatives include:

- *NPT* was opened for signature in July 1968 and entered into force in March 1970. It is a discriminatory treaty that recognises only five countries as nuclear weapon states, which tested their nuclear weapons prior to the signing of this treaty and forbids all other states from developing/acquiring nuclear weapons technology. As of today, only Israel, India, Cuba, North Korea and Pakistan, are not the members of *NPT*.
- *IAEA* was established in 1957 that implements safeguards (serves as *NPT* inspection arm) and facilitates peaceful nuclear cooperation. Additional protocol that was introduced by the *IAEA* later during 1997 further strengthens the *IAEA* in implementing safeguards.
- *CTBT* is presently in the freeze mainly because of the US Administration's attitude towards it.<sup>49</sup> *CTBT* requires ratification by 44 states for its entry into force including P-5. The treaty has not entered into force because the US and China have not yet ratified this important treaty.
- *FMCT* is on CD Geneva's priority agenda item along with other core international issues. The US-led West is keen to address this agenda point on priority, leaving other three core issues to be dealt subsequently. Most of the member states including Pakistan maintain that negotiations on this important subject ought to be non-discriminatory, internationally verifiable and multi-lateral. Primarily, the verification aspect of this issue is controversial which needs consensus.
- *UNSCR-1540* was adopted on April 28, 2004, that requires member states to enact domestic legislation and regulatory measures to prevent proliferation of WMDs, their delivery systems and related materials as well as establish financial controls to prevent the financing of such transactions so as to control non-state actors from acquiring nuclear technology. In case of violation, there is an explicit reference of acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.<sup>50</sup>

*IAEA* being an implementing body with regards to safeguards, there are other conventions/arrangements that facilitate both the *IAEA* as well as the member states in ensuring safe operation of nuclear power plants being used for peaceful purposes. Some of the *IAEA* related important conventions/arrangements include:

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<sup>49</sup> Henry C. K. Liu, op. cit.

<sup>50</sup> George Bunn, "Enforcing International Standards: Protecting Nuclear Material from Terrorists Post-9/11," *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2007.

- *Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)* was launched in early 1980s and was later amended in 2005 to create a legal obligation to secure nuclear materials in storage and while in transport and to criminalise acts of sabotage against civil nuclear facilities.<sup>51</sup>
- *Nuclear Safety Convention (NSC)* was adopted on June 17, 1994. Through this convention, IAEA ensures that while applying international standards, all peaceful nuclear reactors are well maintained by the member states.<sup>52</sup>
- *IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification* was established in 2005 to explore ways to strengthen the ability of IAEA to monitor and enforce compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.<sup>53</sup>
- *ITDB* is being maintained by the IAEA. All member states are required to report any such incident to ITDB, which has already published the report of all kinds of incidents related to illicit trafficking covering up to 2005.

In addition to the above, there is a total of 13 international conventions on combating international terrorism. Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, signed in April 2005, provides legal basis for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of those who commit terrorist acts involving radioactive materials or a nuclear device. There are a number of other important regimes/arrangements, which have come up in the aftermath of 9/11. These are primarily the US initiatives supported by other likeminded countries which aim at discouraging non-state actors as well as other states aspiring to acquire sensitive nuclear technology illegally. The important initiatives are:

- *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)* was launched by President Bush on May 31, 2003. Over 80 countries have so far subscribed to this arrangement. There are some major hold out countries like China and India, while Russia has joined during 2005. It has a legality problem, Pakistan has attended some PSI exercises as an Observer, and the latest was “Exercise Pacific Shield 07”, held in Japan on October 12-15, 2007, in which a total of 40 countries participated including 6 non PSI participating countries.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid. See also “Fact Sheet: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/15.htm>.

<sup>52</sup> IAEA INFIRC/449, July 5, 1994.

<sup>53</sup> “Fact Sheet,” op. cit.

<sup>54</sup> Text of President Bush’s speech on WMD proliferation, *Daily Times* (Lahore), February 12, 2004. See also *Arms Control Today*, vol. 36, September 7, 2006, 37, 47.

- *Container Security Initiative (CSI)* aims at scanning all cargoes destined to the US ports by using non intrusive radiation detection technology. CSI is bilateral agreement between the US and some other states.<sup>55</sup> Pakistan has also bilateral agreement with the US which is being implemented since March 2007.
- *Mega Ports Initiative (MPI)* has a broader scope which is currently operating in six countries. It envisages enhancing their ports ability to screen cargo by installing radiation detection equipment to screen for nuclear or radioactive materials and to share data with the US on detection and seizures that may result. The point of exit includes sea, air and ground routes.<sup>56</sup> Pakistan is in the process of finalising the agreement with the US.
- *The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)* aims at developing international cooperation to combat nuclear terrorism. Interested parties can join this programme by endorsing the Statement of Principles and expressing their commitment to implement them on a voluntary basis consistent with their national legal obligations. This initiative applies to civilian nuclear facilities and activities. Pakistan has recently joined this initiative.<sup>57</sup>
- *Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)* was launched in 2004 by the US, which aims at identifying, removing, securing and facilitating disposition of nuclear material from all over the world especially in former Soviet states. As indicated by President Bush, while addressing National Defense University on Missile Defence during October 2007, the US has removed enough material for developing more than 30 nuclear bombs from around the world.<sup>58</sup>
- The initiative for creating *Global Partnership* against the spread of WMDs was launched at the G-8, 2002 Summit with an aim to support Nunn-Lugar programme. Nunn-Lugar programme that aims at helping former Soviet states find productive employment for former weapons scientists and also dismantling, destroying and securing weapons left over from the Soviet WMD arsenal. During

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<sup>55</sup> "Fact Sheet," op. cit.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> "Press Release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, June 9, 2007; *Arms Control Today*, September 2006, 37; as well January/February, 2007 ed., op. cit.; "Fact Sheet," op. cit.; David E. Sanger, "U.S. and Russia Will Police Nuclear Terrorists," *New York Times*, July 15, 2006.

<sup>58</sup> President Bush Speech on Missile Defence at National Defense University published on October 23, 2007 in Council of Foreign Relation.

the Summit, it was agreed to provide \$20 billion over the next 10 years, half of it from the US to support such programme.<sup>59</sup>

Since early 1970s, industrialised Western countries have teamed up to devise many “technology denial and control” regimes, which often target dual use items, also having legitimate applications in civilian industry. Some of the technology control regimes/agreements include:

- *Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)*, which was formed in 1975, sets up methodology for trade related to nuclear and other sensitive dual use technology by evolving comprehensive guidelines amongst the nations that hold such technologies. The decisions to share such technologies with countries outside the NSG are taken by consensus. Group also extends technology within the member states.<sup>60</sup>
- *Zangger Committee* was named after its first chairman Professor Claude Zangger and is an informal group of nuclear suppliers’ countries, which are state parties to NPT. The Committee was set-up in 1971, with the purpose of agreeing on the detailed implementation of Article III-2 of the NPT, which obliges state parties not to transfer nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapon states for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissile material shall be subjected to the safeguards required by the Article. The UK was the founder member of the Zangger Committee.<sup>61</sup>
- *Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)*, on export controls for conventional arms and sensitive dual use goods and technologies got final approval by 33 co-founding countries in July 1996 and began operation in September 1996.<sup>62</sup>
- *Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)* was established in 1987 with an aim to control exports of missiles capable of delivering WMDs, as well as related equipment and technology. The 34-member MTCR that takes decisions by consensus constitutes an important international arrangement, which sets significant non-proliferation standards and contributes to global peace and security. The initial focus of the MTCR members was on missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), with a range of 300 kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms. The regime, however, does not regulate the indigenous development of any delivery system. MTCR Annex is divided into “Category I and Category II” items. Greatest restraint in

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<sup>59</sup> “Fact Sheet,” *ibid*.

<sup>60</sup> Henry C.K. Liu, *ibid*.

<sup>61</sup> <http://www.berr.gov.uk/non-proliferation>.

<sup>62</sup> “U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security-Wassenaar FAQs,” November 18, 2004, <http://www.bx.doc.gov/Wassenaar/WASSFAQs.html>.

transfer is applied to Category I items that include complete rocket system and UAVs systems and production facilities for such systems etc.

- *The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC)* sets up some kind of international guidelines and controls on those states which have developed indigenous ballistic missiles development capabilities beyond the purview of the MTCR regime. The HCOC excludes cruise missiles and other advanced delivery systems from its purview and focuses on some less advanced states with ballistic missiles programme and also omits specific mention of 300 kilometres/500 kilograms. Both MTCR and HCOC focus only on horizontal proliferation and leave the vertical proliferation. Both regimes are not forthcoming on the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes such as civil space programmes.
- Realising the use of *MANPADS* a real challenge, the US has initiated many steps including tightening export controls, stockpile security, destruction program and weapons collection program for which \$1.5 million was kept during 2003. The US has suggested that the states that produce MANPADS should develop and install launch control devices that also limit the utility and lifespan of lost, stolen and diverted missiles.<sup>63</sup>

### **Creation of World Nuclear Fuel Bank**

President Eisenhower first broached the idea of an international uranium bank in 1953 but as the Cold War intensified, no country wanted outside control. The fuel bank idea made little headway over the next two decades, despite a flurry of initiatives. A fuel bank would not be “a cure-all, but an added layer of oversight,” says Tariq Rauf, the IAEA head of verification and security policy coordination. Multilateral control of the fuel supply is no silver bullet, experts say, but only one prong of what ought to be multi-front campaign, though none of these steps reduces the risk to zero.<sup>64</sup>

The current reprocessing capacity worldwide is about 5000 tons of heavy metal per year. The IAEA estimates that enrichment capability is sufficient for projected nuclear energy growth until 2030 while other estimates suggest that substantial reactor orders would require “heroic efforts” to expand uranium mining and enrichment.<sup>65</sup> There are three main approaches to this concept, one each led by the US, IAEA and Russia:

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<sup>63</sup> Matt Schroeder, op. cit.

<sup>64</sup> *Daily Times* (Lahore), February 12, 2004.

<sup>65</sup> Sharon Squassoni, “Risks and Realities: The New Nuclear Energy Revival,” *Arms Control Today*, vol. 37, no. 4, May 2007.

- The US proposes that the world must create a safe, ordinary system to field nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The US proposal forbids technology transfer to countries that do not already have an advanced system. The US envoys have been encouraging countries that had frozen their programmes to get inside this proposed business. The US has also proposed to the NSG that it should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. The US has also proposed that only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import nuclear technology for their peaceful programmes.<sup>66</sup> Amongst the most prominent is the US proposal for Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) which aims at supporting the expansion of domestic and international use of nuclear energy, pursuit of proliferation resistant recycling of spent fuel including the establishment of reliable global fuel services by a consortium of suppliers.
- The IAEA proposal is another approach that emphasises economic incentives, a “guaranteed” supply at low market prices. El Baradei envisages some form of multinational control both effective and equitable, involving the IAEA as a guarantor or manager of a nuclear fuel bank. The key difference between the two approaches is that one employs a restrictive strategy, while the other emphasises on cooperative one as the IAEA recognises the inalienable right of non-nuclear weapon states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination as per provision of Article IV of the NPT in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. El Baradei’s proposal has also been encouraged by Germany.<sup>67</sup>
- Russia is seeking to consolidate its civil nuclear activities into a single state owned company that can compete in the global nuclear market as a supplier of nuclear fuel cycle services and reactors. Russia owns about half of the world’s uranium enrichment capacity and has recently proposed to build a multinational enrichment plant that will be open to the IAEA safeguards.<sup>68</sup>

Another important development, where to stave off a nuclear arms race in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, along with other GCC countries, has suggested the setting up of a Gulf consortium in a “neutral country” to take care of

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<sup>66</sup> *Daily Times* (Lahore), February 12, 2004; Michael J. Jordan, “UN nuclear watchdog ponders international ‘fuel bank’,” September 18, 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com>.

<sup>67</sup> Statement by Dr El Baradei at UNGA, *ibid.*; Michael J. Jordan, *ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM), *op. cit.*, Summary, 7.



uranium requirements of Iran and other countries of this region seeking to harness atomic energy. Under the reported GCC plan, its members — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates — would establish a uranium enrichment plant in a neutral country outside the Middle East (like Switzerland) that would be properly monitored by international observers. The plant would produce nuclear fuel that would then be given to Iran and other Middle East countries. Iran has been invited to join this joint venture.<sup>69</sup>

### **Pakistani Initiatives**

It would be equally important to know about the measures adopted by Pakistan to ensure effective control over its nuclear activities. As a responsible nuclear weapon states, Pakistan fulfils its national obligations and abides by the provisions of NPT, although it is not a party to this Treaty. With respect to CTBT, Pakistan's position is that it neither started nuclear testing in South Asia, nor shall it be the one to resume nuclear testing. Pakistan will not come in the way of entered into force of the CTBT, when it is ready for implementation. Since 1998, Pakistan has been maintaining unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Pakistan exercises complete control over its nuclear and dual use technology and related activities. It has placed stringent measures to regulate legal trade in nuclear and dual use technology.<sup>70</sup>

Pakistan has a strong commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation of WMDs. Consistent with its commitment, it has nationally instituted comprehensive legislative, administrative and security measures to strengthen its export control system and ensure the safety and security of sensitive materials, facilities, technologies and equipment.<sup>71</sup>

Internationally, Pakistan remains a partner in efforts to stem proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery. The CSI is being implemented in Pakistan, and the country is also engaged with the US on MPI. Pakistan has been participating as an Observer in the PSI exercises. It has also been interacting with representatives of international export control regimes. Delegations of NSG and MTCR have been visiting Pakistan to coordinate their positions on export control and other issues of common interests related to peaceful use of nuclear technology. Pakistan has also been participating in NSG outreach activities in Vienna. However, with respect to the HCOC, being discriminatory in nature, Pakistan does not subscribe to it.

With regard to export control, the Ministry of Commerce, Pakistan, remained involved in regulating all kinds of trade since 1950. Over the past

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<sup>48</sup> Syed Rashid Hussain, op. cit. See also *Daily Times* (Lahore), November 5, 2007.


<sup>70</sup> Mark Fitzpatrick, op. cit. 107-118.

<sup>71</sup> "Press Release" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, December 12, 2006. See also Mark Fitzpatrick, *ibid.*

few years, Pakistan has taken several steps to further strengthen its export control system. These include adoption of Export Controls on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery systems under Export Control Act 2004, and published Control List in pursuant to the Act in 2005 which are based on European Union model.<sup>72</sup>

To harmonise and streamline the implementation and enforcement of export controls in Pakistan, Pakistan has established a Strategic Export Control Division (Figure-1) which comprises officers of all concerned agencies and organisations responsible for enforcement of the ACT. It serves as an inter-agency mechanism for further institutionalised implementation of export control policy in line with the legislative requirements, formulation of rules and regulations for export of controlled items and issuing licenses. The authority will also conduct industrial outreach programmes. An Oversight Board, to independently review the implementation of export controls, has also been established.

**Figure-1**  
**Organisation - Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV)**




Pakistan's strategic assets are under strong organisational, administrative and command and control structures since 1999. Consistent with its obligations as a responsible nuclear weapon states, Pakistan formally instituted an elaborate National Command Authority (NCA), chaired by the

<sup>72</sup> Shakil Shaikh, "Cabinet approves tighter N-controls," *The News* (Rawalpindi), May 6, 2004. See also *Nation* (Islamabad), May 6, 2004. See also Staff Report, "Cabinet bans wheat exports: provinces asked to curb smuggling," *Dawn* (Islamabad), May 6, 2004.

President of Pakistan that oversees custodial controls of all strategic assets (Figure-2).

**Figure-2**  
**Organisation - National Command Authority (NCA)**




Pakistan's strategic assets are completely safe and secure and the highest level of protection is accorded to them by having multilayered security and safety mechanisms. Security Division, established under Strategic Plans Division (Figure-3), having a potent force of over 8000-10000 trained people, with latest vision to implement Human/Personnel Reliability Programmes, plays an important role in implementing physical security of Pakistan's nuclear activities.<sup>73</sup> On the eve of the latest test fire of Hatf-VII (Babur) on December 11, 2007, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Tariq Majid who was the chief guest on the occasion, while referring to recent threats to nuclear assets of Pakistan, assured that "we remain alert to such threats and are fully capable of handling these. Pakistan's nuclear assets are very safe and secure and the nation needs not to worry on that account. There is a very

<sup>73</sup> Mark Fitzpatric, op. cit.

strong security system in place, which can ward off all threats, internal as well as external.”<sup>74</sup>

**Figure-3**  
**Organisation - Strategic Plans Division (SPD)**



Pakistan is party to international terrorism related conventions and has recently joined GICNT. In order to ensure safety and security of its peaceful nuclear activities, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority are working efficiently in close coordination with the IAEA. Pakistan is party to NSC as well as CPPNM and follows international standards as laid down in these conventions, while conducting its peaceful nuclear activities.

In the regional context, Pakistan is involved in nuclear CBM process with India and both countries have signed three important nuclear related bilateral agreements that include no-attack on each other's nuclear installations, pre-notification of flight-testing of ballistic missiles, and an agreement on reducing the risk of accidents related to nuclear weapons. It is an ongoing process that plays a significant role in confidence building between the two countries.

With regard to the supply of nuclear fuel, Pakistan would support a mechanism that would ensure the supply of nuclear fuel on a non-discriminatory basis to meet worldwide demand for nuclear energy. In this

<sup>74</sup> Danny Kemp, "Army vows firm response to N-arsenal grab attempt," *Khaleej Times*, December 12, 2007; *Dawn* (Islamabad), December 12, 2007.

respect, Pakistan's position is that such a mechanism should include all states with advanced fuel cycle capabilities without discrimination as explained by Munir Akram, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN, while speaking in the 192-member UN General Assembly's debate on a report of the IAEA in which El Baradei stated that his agency was weighing a proposal for "an actual or virtual reserve fuel bank of last resort under IAEA auspices" for supplying nuclear fuel. Munir Akram affirmed that with a sizeable civilian nuclear programme, Pakistan is uniquely placed to offer cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing countries under the IAEA safeguards.

### **Conclusion**

To reduce the envisaged threat of nuclear technology proliferation and the use of WMDs, despite a number of ongoing international, regional and bilateral measures, the future of non-proliferation efforts seems unpredictable and uncertain. The ongoing ambitious plans to generate nuclear energy worldwide indicate that possibilities of nuclear technology proliferation will continue to maintain an upward trend. In order to tackle this core issue, probably there has been a lack of sincerity and political commitment by the leading countries of the world, especially the P-5. Discriminatory and intentionally customised approaches to address such problems have not worked in the past and there is no possibility that selective approaches will achieve desired results in the future as well.

The past act of the individuals working as part of international nuclear black market network must not become reason for repeating the same story in future by any state or individual. We must give up blame game and take collective responsibility for all that has happened in the past. Taking lead from the past, a wholesome approach involving the entire international community would be required to address this core issue. Awareness both at the national and international level would be an important contributing factor to achieve the desired results. All treaties, conventions and arrangements, must be taken seriously and implemented by all states in letter and spirit.

The core international issues, which may include among others the Kashmir dispute, must be addressed on priority for which economically advanced countries will have to take lead without discrimination. Mutual confidence between the nations must be restored by assuring the countries of disturbed regions that their national integrity will be respected. Settlement of the issues by using force without carrots is likely to backlash and may generate more threats rather than bringing peace and stability in the world at large.

Based on ground realities, there is a need that international community should revise the strategy to address the threat of the use of WMDs by terrorist groups or non-state actors for which the US

administration may have to take a leading role and seriously consider the valuable suggestions made to them from time to time by renowned think tanks including Washington based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institute, if a sincere desire exists to bring peace and stability in the world. ■

## NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY: THE COLD WAR AND THE UNRESOLVED CONTRADICTIONS

Hayatullah Khan Khatttak\*

### Abstract:

*Although, nuclear strategy during the Cold War became the cornerstone of both the NATO and Warsaw alliance's grand strategy, the two terms — “nuclear” and “strategy” — have never sat comfortably together. Nuclear arsenals became the linchpin of the Cold War deterrence stability but the abstract nature of the debate, mainly due to absence of a nuclear war experience, did not prove that deterrence was secure, particularly during the period from 1945 to the end of the Cold War. The political role of nuclear weapons is a central theme running through the article, and here it is argued that the apparent contradictions of “nuclear strategy” should be viewed more in their usefulness as a political instrument rather than weapons of combat utility. Finally, although some of the logic of nuclear strategy might be transferable across time and space, the deterrence has worked, so far, in the context of South Asia.*

### Introduction

The meanings in the term “Nuclear Strategy” have immense potency. “Nuclear” has connotations of centralism, concentration and energy. “Strategy” can be about the art of war or management, but is certainly to do with all encompassing, over-arching concepts and plans for future action. In this definitive sense, the two words are contradictory in that they appear to differ fundamentally in terms of scale. Yet the point about “nuclear” is its potential – the question whether the two words have sat comfortable together during the age of the Atomic and Thermo-nuclear Bomb, is the essence of this paper. The interaction of these concepts with the evolving technology was manifested in the debate during the early years of evolution of “nuclear strategy” and the period when the adversarial relation between the super-powers – the USA and the USSR – was at its peak. In a sense, what would appear to be the inherent contradictions in the term “nuclear strategy” and the political role nuclear weapons play is another aspect, together with the lessons for the subcontinent, in the evolution of nuclear strategy. These issues are discussed in this study.

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## The Dimensions of Strategy

Traditionally, strategy has been defined in Clausewitzian terms as “the use of engagements for the objective of the war”.<sup>1</sup> Such strategy was the concern of traditional military historians but the First World War showed that it had become almost impossible to analyse such a struggle purely in military terms. Its outcome was influenced by political, social and economic factors as well as military ones. Indeed, the purely military factors of morale, tactics and leadership could only be satisfactorily considered, by also taking non-military elements into account. The subordination of war to policy virtually has been universal, but Clausewitz’ view of strategy is perhaps too battle oriented. It is no surprise, however, that Clausewitz had exhibited some foresight in stating that the aims and resources adopted by a belligerent “will conform to the spirit of the age and its general character”.<sup>2</sup> The First World War reflected the “phenomenon of mass” – an era of mass politics and mass production with the beginning of mass destruction. Many of the Generals of that era seemed to persist in thinking of war as “a thing in itself”. But the survivors began to look at strategy in more purposeful, controlled and economic terms.

Social, economic and technological factors had widened the concept of what comprises military strategy and served to emphasise that war should be, as Clausewitz had asserted, a “rational instrument of national policy”.<sup>3</sup> A more helpful definition of strategy therefore might be that suggested by Liddell Hart: “The art of distribution and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”<sup>4</sup> This definition has at least two advantages. First, it is equally applicable in peacetime and war; the second, it hints at the subordination of war to politics.

Most contemporary observers would accept that strategy implies an overall plan for the utilisation of armed forces in coercion, in company with economic, diplomatic and psychological instruments of power, in order to further the aims of the state. Such acceptance implies a belief that the international system is competitive and is likely to remain so, and that it is unlikely that any international authority will take control.

Michael Howard stresses the need for care with the term of strategy, because it “needs continual definition”.<sup>5</sup> He praises Clausewitz for making a distinction between the “maintenance” (logistics) of armed forces and their “use” (operations). Clausewitz emphasised the latter, but the former

<sup>1</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 128.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 87. See also Hayatullah Khan Khattak, “Clausewitz on War: An Interpretation,” *The Citadel*, vol. XXIII, no. 2, (Winter 2005), 65-77.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>4</sup> Basil Liddell, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1954), 84.

<sup>5</sup> Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimension of Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 57, no. XX, (Summer 1979), 975.



dimension in warfare has at times proved as significant as the operational – the campaigns in North Africa in the Second World War offer many examples to support this point. Clausewitz’ stress upon the “social” dimension of strategy is applauded by Howard, yet many of the ideas of Western nuclear strategists have been less than convincing due to lack of a social dimension. “Everyone of the three elements, that Clausewitz defines as being intrinsic to war – political motivation, operational activity and social participation – are completely absent from their calculations.”<sup>6</sup> Howard is particularly critical of how it is often assumed that technological prowess reduces the need for operational effectiveness. He adds the “technological” dimension as complementing Clausewitz’ “remarkable trinity” of “operational instruments, political objectives and social passions” – all perceived as being the fundamentals of strategy.

The important, yet simple point that Howard makes is that when strategists pay an overdue attention to technology, and there is failure, or frustration with the strategy in being, then the other dimensions grow enormously in importance. There is much evidence to suggest that this thinking applied to the state of strategic thinking between the nuclear powers. Given the economic, moral and possibly ultimate sacrifices that the opposing societies have to make, and the significance of cities and populations in certain strategic calculations, it is odd that there has not been a broader and certainly more social and political emphasis in nuclear strategic thinking. However, present and future strategists are going to have to consider “popular passions” to a greater extent than they have done so in the past.

### **Nuclear: The Sheer Destructiveness**

Atomic and especially thermo-nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons in a number of fundamental ways. The word “nuclear” as an adjunct to “strategy” is necessary because of the difference that nuclear weapons have made to traditional strategic parameters. Nuclear weapon stockpiles are massive and pose incredible horrors for the whole world should a mistake or a planned nuclear war takes place. The sheer scale of destruction that nuclear weapons can create, has to be a constant consideration. Nuclear weapons can destroy societies, in a matter of hours. Also, the delivery system that was developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and continues to be developed, has reduced warning time to minutes – space and time, traditional and crucial aspects of strategic planning, have all but lost their defensive value in the nuclear context.

Given these preceding definitions of strategy and brief considerations of the nature of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to look at some of the nuclear strategic thinking that has taken place in the 1960s and 1970s, laying the foundation of current nuclear strategy. With the advantage of hindsight,

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 982.

consideration will be given to the question, why strategies have changed during the period under consideration, and how reactive they have been and whether they bear some relation to realities of the time or not.

### **The Early Debate: The Dominance of the Air Prophets**

In the mid-1940s, the general concept of war remained, as Howard has argued, a contest of armed forces to obtain a position of such superiority that the victorious power would be in a position to impose its political will. This was seen as likely to be a lengthy process, entailing the mobilisation of superior resources and the maintenance of civilian morale at home; a substantial domestic “mobilisation base” in terms of industrial potential and trained manpower; effective deployment of these resources, which depended on command of sea and air; and interdependence on surface and air operations.

The advent of nuclear weapons seemed to make markedly little difference in a conflict between two powers of the size of the US and the USSR, according to much of the official thinking of the late 1940s and indeed early 1950s. Obviously, the new weapons would inflict extensive damage much more rapidly than had been experienced in World War II; but in the years following the War stockpiles of bombs were low, bombers were vulnerable to interception and had to operate from bases which had to be protected by land armies, which, in turn, had to be supplied by sea. Hence, when the frame work for NATO was established at the end of the 1940s, the planners had to think about what could be done with the weapons that were available not with those which might, or might not, be developed a decade later. However, some scientists and strategists were thinking ahead, although it seems that they had very little immediate influence in the period up to 1949. Bernard Brodie, whose ideas were to influence much of western thought on nuclear strategy, in his book, *The Absolute Weapon*, rejected the whole concept of a mobilisation base and by outlining the notion of a stable balance of nuclear forces so as to deter aggression by the “fear of substantial retaliation in kind”. His concern was not about how to win the next war but rather about how to avert it.

During the second half of 1940, many argued, especially the military, against what they perceived as the exaggerated effects of atomic weapons on war. The military pointed to the fact that the worst city attack of World War II, the worst of all time, was that which occurred on the south western portion of Tokyo during the night of May 23, 1945. Four thousand tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on an area of 11 square miles. This created a firestorm, such as that had been experienced in Dresden and subsequently took place at Hiroshima. Casualties have been estimated at up to 100,000 dead. In comparison, Hiroshima was a comparable but not a greater horror with fewer fatalities – the revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons and its potentials with further developments in technology was to be realised yet. Nevertheless,

people were killed and disfigured by radiation as well as by fire; but to the survivors, and to the dead, the way in which the injury was inflicted was less significant than its gravity. The Atomic Bomb, therefore, did not appear immediately to call for new strategy. The main implications of these early atomic bombs were held to be logistic – they provided bigger bangs with a smaller delivery effort, so facilitating the sort of strategic bombing campaign mounted in World War II. Contrary to the military view, was the determination of President Truman not to see the Bomb as “just another weapon” – but as a weapon of “last resort”. This was an important factor in delaying a central place for the Bomb in US Strategic thinking. Until 1948 and the introduction of long range B-36 Bombers, the Bomb was hardly a “military weapon” in the sense that it was not a part of strategic planning.

Perhaps the most remarkable consequence of Brigadier Giulio Douhet’s ideas on strategic air power had been their swift and complete acceptance by all the world’s major air forces because he provided a rational not only for a separate arm but a decisive one. His strategy was twofold: a disarming first strike to gain command of the air, and the ensuing aerial monopoly would then allow the bombing of cities in order to crack civilian morale which would lead to prompt surrender. It has been held that the failure of strategic bombing in World War II, which Brodie judges to have been a more than fair test, proved Douhet wrong on all counts. But poisonous gas was not used and this, the greatest terror weapon in the popular mind, could well have cracked morale – hence the elaborate precautions taken in some countries particularly in Britain. Nevertheless, gradually Douhet’s ideas have been accepted for nuclear weapons, and new delivery systems have provided a swift and accurate destructive power.

In terms of strategic thought, Hiroshima did not signal a “nuclear revolution” but merely indicated that theory and technology were almost in step. This is an important point for henceforward technology-led theory with new weapon systems emerging pell-mell only to have to await a strategic rationale. Further, there has been a growing tendency to view strategy in terms of technological possibilities taken in isolation. Attention was increasingly placed on the “means” of destruction – the problems of miniaturisation of bombs and longer range yet more accurate delivery systems. The problem with this was that “strategy became increasingly separated from diplomacy and from the analysis of interests, values, and motives”.<sup>7</sup> The technological imperative remains a potent cultural force in the US today, where all problems, social, economic or strategic, appear to require a technological solution.

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<sup>7</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 48.

### **The Empire Strikes Back: The USSR and Evolving Concepts**

Thermo-nuclear weapons are demonstrably different to atomic bombs. Thermo-nuclear weapons are not just a “bigger bang for a buck”, they represented a quantum jump in destructive capabilities of tremendous proportions. The destruction they have promised could not fulfill any rational aims hence the move to war avoidance, through deterrence, rather than war fighting. Clausewitz was bound to be sidelined off the main line of thought in this process, as all out war could no longer be regarded as a rational instrument of national policy. It was with the development of thermo-nuclear weapons and the beginning of a Soviet capacity to strike at the US homeland that the validity of waging all out nuclear war was gradually discarded. Also, as the Soviet Union came to be viewed as the potential enemy as the Cold War developed, the US and Western analysts began to have a target against which to theorise and plan. After the Berlin Blockade and the formation of NATO, East-West divisions were formalised. Military balances became more significant in any security calculations and the Bomb a more important weapon in US deliberations. When the Soviets broke the US monopoly in August 1949, the US had to begin calculating Soviet capabilities and intentions – the US had to devise a “Nuclear Strategy”. From that time the US has been “locked ... into a nuclear strategy”.<sup>8</sup> Brodie’s logic based on war avoidance – deterrence, was first developed by the British with their “Great Deterrent” in 1952. According to Sir John Slessor, the then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, “The aim of Western policy is not primarily to be ready to win a war with the world in ruins .... It is the preventions of war.”<sup>9</sup> He went on to enthuse about the bomber, and gave priority to V-Bomber development and the strong wartime bombing experiences of the Royal Air Force. The weakness with this idea and many of the future thoughts on bombers and tactical nuclear weapons was how the emphasis was about a particular weapon system rather than truly strategic matters. Much controversy ensued about the lack of officials’ distinction between a possible first use against a Soviet conventional attack and itself. The force was seen by many to be politically suspect in the first role and technically suspect in the second. However, the British deterrent force was designed to operate within the context of the Western deterrent force as a whole, in order to deter rather than fight war; also, it was viewed as an effective military force within a peace-time economy.

Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles’ “Massive Retaliation” speech, August 12, 1954, caused a much more intensive controversy in the USA. Again the idea was to gain “more basic security at less cost”,<sup>10</sup> by utilising the great

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 982.

<sup>9</sup> Sir John Slessor, “Strategy for the West,” in B. Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 53.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 249.

capacity to retaliate at the disposal of the US. Weariness with the Korean War and a desire to return to a cheaper form of defence were political reasons behind the Dulles speech. However, there were a number of logical fallacies: the US invulnerability to Soviet nuclear strikes would not last; US nuclear monopoly had not deterred conventional war – the Korean War had been fought when the US had begun to acquire a sizeable arsenal of nuclear weapon; and the announcements of the doctrine proved to be irrelevant with regard to the Indo-China conflict. Significantly for strategic considerations, nuclear weapons have proved to be of limited use in diplomacy.

In November 1954, Brodie began a debate on the place of limited war in rational strategy; William Kaufmann discussed a “spectrum of deterrence”<sup>11</sup> – focusing on limited war and later to be developed by McNamara. Robert Osgood and Henry Kissinger<sup>12</sup> argued against the traditional rigidity of the US approach to war and peace when contrasted with the flexibility of the Soviet approach. The idea of having sufficient conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons to compliment or rather to avoid the use of strategic nuclear weapons, was gaining ground. Freedman has drawn attention to the “misnomer” of talking about “tactical” nuclear weapons.<sup>13</sup> Strategy is about the overall relationship between military means and the ends of policy while tactics is concerned with the specific application of military means for direct military means.<sup>14</sup> Blame is laid with the “airmen’s” misuse of the term to distinguish between attack on the enemy’s homeland and support for ground forces.

By the late 1950s, the credibility of Soviet capabilities began to have a significant influence on US thinking: it was gradually perceived that the USSR did not just present a threat that had to be countered, but because of the potential destruction of nuclear weapons, and fear of accident and/or miscalculation, she had to be regarded almost as a “partner” whose collaboration was essential. Albert Wohlstetter argued that the “balance of terror”<sup>15</sup> was much less stable than had hitherto been assumed, that if some

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<sup>11</sup> William W. Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” in William W. Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

<sup>12</sup> Osgood argued that limited war had become the most likely form of armed conflict and the US should develop military policy on this assumption. See Robert Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). Henry Kissinger published his extremely influential book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957). Kissinger argued for the reorganisation of the US forces into strategic forces and tactical forces ready for combat for war in general and limited use.

<sup>13</sup> Freedman, op. cit., 117

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>15</sup> A. J. Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 2, (January 1959), 211, 234.

form of stable balance could be achieved, the prospect for a lasting peace appeared reasonable. Bernard Brodie drew the strands of mid-late 1950s strategic thinking together in his book, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, in which he reduced the requirements of a nuclear strategy to three: an invulnerable retaliatory force; a substantial capacity for dealing with both local and limited aggression by local application of force; and provision for saving life on a vast scale if the worst came to the worst.

However, Brodie gave little or no guidance about how nuclear war should be conducted beyond suggesting that the most important problem was not so much how to conduct the war, but how to prevent it. Herman Kahn, however, after having access to classified information was able to go further than anyone before and discussed what was likely to happen if deterrence did fail. Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War* reintroduced the concept of an operational nuclear strategy, which had been almost entirely missing since the beginning of the thermonuclear age a decade earlier. The US and the USSR with their huge economic and technological resources applied to producing bombs and delivery systems were clearly going to be in a league of their own, this bilateral "adversary relationship" had already begun to be of significance and would be even more pertinent for future strategists.

### **From Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to Flexible Response**

The character of the 1960s was one of strategy by the systems approach – very rational and linked tightly to policy. Brodie is critical of how this generation of strategists was a little too sure of itself because of its "scientific"<sup>16</sup> approach to strategic analysis. There was also a faulty assumption that the Soviets would easily and readily understand US deterrent theory. Michael Howard refutes any linkage between Clausewitz and these "systems analysts" who appear to have derived their calculations of political, social and operational content.<sup>17</sup> Improved US missile accuracy allowed further options to be considered – counter force strategies with reduced "collateral damage" allowed for greater flexibility – should deterrence fail. Flexible Response which was finally adopted by NATO in 1967 was the most important example of the limited war thinking that had been evolving for years. The strategy was acceptable to the Europeans because it offered cheap war avoidance through nuclear deterrence and to the Americans because it offered tactical and conventional thresholds. Basically, strategy was shaped to fit existing weapons and force levels, which is really the wrong way around. Tactical nuclear weapons, which had been regarded since the mid 1950s as a kind of dramatic artillery, were employed to compensate for NATO's numerical inferiority.

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<sup>16</sup> Brodie, op. cit., 406.

<sup>17</sup> Howard, op. cit., 982.

The idea of a distinct theatre balance posed considerable problems for existing strategies. Tactical nuclear weapons raised the difficulty of constructing a distinct threshold of violence as part of a spectrum of response by the USA. Theatre weapons, which include traditional strategic systems such as SLBMs, imply a geographic threshold – US/USSR nuclear exchanges fought out in Europe. Such difficulties had encouraged ideas of “European” deterrent forces subject to European control (Beaufre’s ideas and alternatively the concept of a nuclear-free Europe as postulated by E. P. Thompson). Alliance and Arms Control factors were of increasing significance for strategic thinkers as technology provided many more options.

### **Putting the Threads Together: Nuclear Strategy**

“Strategy is a feature of war not a type of war.”<sup>18</sup> Nuclear strategy is a type of strategy that has been inadequate in relation to past strategies in the sense that the US and the USSR adversarial relationship has been analysed too narrowly. Pre-nuclear strategists were concerned with societies, politics, and economics; otherwise they made little sense in reality. It ought to be stated that deterrence logic (theory in fact) preceded the discovery of nuclear weapons – therefore, the strategists of the nuclear age deserve less recognition than they are given. Deterrence has not been entirely successful. It is hard to prove that deterrence has “kept the peace” but it can be shown that it is neither universal nor a substitute for conventional forces (i.e., Korea, Vietnam). The Nuclear Age has presented strategic thinkers with weapons of awe inspiring proportions, in terms of destruction, range, speed and large economic costs. Yet, they have had to deal with perhaps deceptively simple factors too: only two actors – the super powers, and essentially one weapon – the Bomb. The nub of the problem of working out a realistic strategy that will last for sometime is the incompatibility of weapons of total destruction to any ideas of rationality. But should strategy be essentially rational? Perhaps strategic logic is sometimes too neat – being both rational and understandable although wars are seldom either. But often strategy has had to adapt itself to new technologies for, as Zuckermann has pointed out “Major technological innovations that have transformed our world have not emerged as the result of clearly thought-out needs”.<sup>19</sup> Hence weapon systems are rationalised into strategy, consequently US strategy is “characterized ... by an infatuation with the most technical aspects of East-West military relationships, often to the exclusion of political aspects. Strategy shaped by technologists who have little understanding of its broader setting is a good example of the “instrument shaping the will”.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Freedman, op. cit., 118.

<sup>19</sup> Lord Zuckerman, “The Deterrent Illusion,” *The Times*, (London), January 21, 1980.

<sup>20</sup> Freedman, op. cit., 397. See for a discussion on rationality vis-à-vis strategy.

Most strategic analysis is American analysis and naturally is formed by a US perspective. D. M. Snow draws attention to the “mirror imaging”<sup>21</sup> that can lead to kind of “cultural blindness” to an adversary’s logic. Consequently, any rationality is likely to be unilateral and possibly dangerous. Western perceptions of the Soviet threat often was too Euro-centered, a glance at the Cold War world map can offer a better picture of the security problems faced by the Soviets. The problem was not just to do with cultural reason – secrecy, distance and intelligence interpretation problems all compounded the problem.

Another difficulty for both sides, especially for the Americans, was making accurate assessments of capabilities and intentions. Ken Booth has argued that in fact intentions remain relatively constant whilst capabilities can change wildly. Worst case assumptions can be highly inaccurate – e.g., the Bomber Gap, Missile Gap, etc. Service interests in shaping technological procurement and hence strategy can be yet another way in which a strategic debate can be warped; the debates involving ABM systems, cruise missiles and particle beam weapons are relevant examples.

Nuclear Strategy has been the product of objective reasoning. Determined and rational men have struggled to maintain political control over irrational weapons. But in this process the subjective “frictions” of war have more than often been excluded. Clausewitz wrote:

Even the most civilized of peoples ... can be fired with passionate hatred for each other. Consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion .... That would be kind of war by Algebra.<sup>22</sup>

Michael Howard criticises any acceptance that the strategy of the West was just about deterrence, or even of crisis management. “It is the business of the strategist to think what to do if deterrence fails, and if Soviet strategists are doing their job and those in the West are not, it is not for us to complain about them.”<sup>23</sup> There certainly does seem to have been many constrictions in Western strategic thinking. There was almost a naïve belief that events would turn out to meet expectations – which is, the Soviet Union would play out the Western interpretation of the conflict. Inconsistencies between Flexible Response thresholds and Soviet strategic pronouncements were one set of worries that hint at a somewhat unrealistic approach by the West. Very little attention was paid in the West to what would happen if some kind of nuclear exchange did take place – although this war fighting and defensive aspect of

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<sup>21</sup> Donald M. Snow, *Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World – American Policy in the 1980’s* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1981), 11 -12.

<sup>22</sup> Clausewitz, op. cit, 123.

<sup>23</sup> Howard, op. cit., 983.



nuclear war would come to the fore, because of the various interest groups that gained prominence in Western societies. A social and political element had already been injected into the nuclear strategic debate by Western protest groups – the growth in political awareness in Western societies had made the social dimension too significant to be ignored.<sup>24</sup>

The problem with any consideration of strategy and nuclear weapons is that we know very little about what might happen. There is much uncertainty, only the technology is reasonably predictable. Significantly, the technologists are constantly active – perhaps for decades, whereas the politicians come and go. Academic strategists also have the advantage of time and learning through patient study and from experience. Unfortunately, the decision making strategists are invariably pressured by time, lack of experience and demands of office. A major theme of this paper has been about the technological imperative in Western (i.e., US) strategic decision making. It is interesting to note that Soviet military theorists reject the notion that technology (i.e., weapons) decides strategy. They perceive the relationship to be the reverse: Strategic objectives determine the procurement and application of weapons.<sup>25</sup> However skeptical the West was, at least it appears to have been aware of the correct order of priorities.

Speculation has more than often been the main device for strategists in the nuclear age. Of course, strategists have always had to speculate to some extent – the “friction of war” might intervene at any time. However, a “Schlieffen” or a “Guderain” would have been able to plan in much more detail and any “educated guesses” stood some chance of success given that they were able to draw upon the lessons of the past.

Deterrence does not create change, it prevents it. Deterrence is about holding on grimly to the status quo, only weapon developments have appeared to be the main motors for change in strategic thinking. The obvious but important point is that the Soviet Union and the US influenced each other’s strategic planning. Because the relationship was dynamic, “the power to deter is the power to deter a particular adversary in a particular situation”.<sup>26</sup> Crisis situations as well as the more gradual change in capabilities (Ken Booth states that capabilities change, intentions remain relatively stable) have to be faced. The former, short term crisis is dealt with as efficiently as the situation demands, but the latter longer term problem is more difficult to assess and in any event is likely to require a fundamental re-thinking of strategy. Success (i.e., the achievement of security) with either problem depends on the quality and ability of decision makers and strategists to be open and realistic in their deliberations. A lot depends on whether there are suitable forums that are not

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 984.

<sup>25</sup> Snow, *op. cit.*, 18.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 15.

too “in house”, so that there is a lively debate about strategy – and there are sufficient “bridges” between the theorists and the decision makers. Snow offers a useful framework for analysing the strategic policy process that consists of “Internal” and “External” environments and technology vis-à-vis strategic doctrine. By just taking one component, the “Internal environment,” which refers to domestic factors such as history, government system, leadership attitudes and ideology, it is apparent that this is fertile material and significant in terms of a state’s decision making process and possible intentions.

Nuclear strategic thinking in the West has had a sterile character because of the apparent downgrading of social, operational and political factors. Nonetheless, it is unsettling to remember how little policy makers and strategists know about nuclear weapons and their use “in anger”, especially when this lack of experience and uncertainty is related to the enormous nuclear weapon stockpiles and efficient delivery systems now available to the super powers, and lesser powers. Any nuclear strategy for the future should aim to be more realistic and positive than some of the unconvincing theories of the past and present. In future, nuclear analysis will have to continue to be as rigorous as in the past, but at the same time encompass a broader perspective of social and political realities in order to evolve a “strategy”.

To reiterate: the introduction of nuclear weapons is revolutionary in terms of their destruction capabilities. One bomb can level an entire city and end civilisation between nuclear armed powers. As Colin Gray has eloquently argued, these weapons uniquely were capable of cancelling the strategic effect of all other weapons and in terms of efficiency, fewer aircraft were needed to deliver them: a single atomic bomb by a B-29 on Hiroshima caused as much damage as 300 planes. Turning to the speed, nuclear weapons could cause mass destruction within a few hours and as Freedman has noted, they “remain still the most developed and best understood means by which whole countries can be destroyed in an instant”.<sup>27</sup> But as Jarvis has noted, in terms of traditional military concepts, there was the impossibility of victory in an all-out nuclear war – both sides would lose so much that neither would win. Herein lays the contradiction of “Nuclear Strategy”, when looked at purely in terms of military confrontation.

But a final conclusion can not be reached in this respect without a brief examination of another viewpoint. Militarily, nuclear weapons would seem to have been almost useless in the environment of the Cold War, because using them would bring about unacceptable damage to oneself. Thus, it would seem that they have little strategic utility. However, some scholars, such as Colin Gray point out that the strategic effect can be generated whether

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<sup>27</sup> Freedman, *op. cit.*, 67.

or not forces in question engage in battle,<sup>28</sup> because strategy is about “the threat or use of force for *political purposes*. Strategic effect is the influence of that threat or use of force upon the course of events.”<sup>29</sup> If strategic weapons can have strategic effect, with the effect being deterrence, then, nuclear strategy is not a contradiction in terms. As Gray notes, it may depend on the level of analysis one uses. If viewed operationally or tactically, nuclear weapons may have little strategic utility, but they do have strategic utility at the grand strategic level, and on policy.

In the Cold War, to use nuclear weapons may have been suicide. However, they simultaneously provided great incentive for the other side to be prudent in its policy decisions concerning using its nuclear weapons (deterrence). Although nuclear deterrence is not entirely reliable, especially in a post Cold War security environment, its contribution remains vital.

However, the strategic environment on the South Asian region raises interesting issues and traditional questions raised during the Cold War. What strategic effect do nuclear weapons have on India and Pakistan’s policies regarding each other? Do nuclear weapons make them more circumspect in decisions that could lead them to war?

Nuclear strategy is constituted in abstract as it lacks nuclear war precedent. Nevertheless, the Cold War strategic debates were not lost on Islamabad and New Delhi in evolving a nuclear strategy. Both sides’ nuclear postures indicate that nuclear weapons are “weapons of deterrence” rather than “weapons of combat”. It would not be out of place to argue that the South Asian nuclearisation has deterred both India and Pakistan from military adventurism. Ultimately, the 1999 Kargil episode and the build up of 2001-2002 were events marking that nuclear weapons were here to deter war.

Without question, nuclear weapons have had a strategic effect on the subcontinent’s strategic environment. India and Pakistan’s strategic behaviour has immensely altered in the post May 1998 environment. They have entered into an uninterrupted composite dialogue, despite the unresolved core issue of the Kashmir dispute. At the same time, Islamabad and New Delhi have been acquiring, developing and testing their weapons to augment credibility of nuclear deterrence between them. The strategic debate in both countries establishes that makers of strategy are well versed in nuclear strategic thinking of the Cold War. The lethality of nuclear weapons and the destructive nature of nuclear war is understood. The continuing updating of nuclear command and control systems is in line with evolution of strategic doctrines. In effect, they have been behaving rationally and chalking out strategies to avoid inadvertent and accidental nuclear war between them. For instance, a regular

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<sup>28</sup> Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 349.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 322 (emphasis added).

occurrence in the adversarial relations is the exchange of nuclear facilities lists on every 1<sup>st</sup> January, and prior notification of ballistic missile tests.

The nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan would appear to be deterring war between them. But it does not mean that war as an alternative means to resolve the issues between the adversaries has ceased to exist. Importantly during the Cold War, the NATO and Warsaw alliances engaged in an arms race despite the continuous stalemate of nuclear deterrence between them. Similarly, nuclear deterrence may have prevented major conflicts between Pakistan and India without capping the arms race between them. The continuity of arms race reflects the possibility of failure of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, entailing total war between them in the future. This reality compels belligerent neighbours to chalk out strategies, refurbish military arsenals and be prepared for war. ■

## WHY NATO MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN IS FAILING?

Dr Ishtiaq Ahmad\*

**Abstract:**

*NATO mission in Afghanistan is the alliance's first military operation outside Europe. It is considered as a test-case for the alliance's global agenda backed primarily by the United States. NATO has thus far failed in its primary mission of securing and reconstructing Afghanistan, despite consistently expanding its military operations, security reforms and reconstruction activities. There are at least five reasons why NATO's mission in Afghanistan is failing. These are: a) the insufficiency of NATO troops available for combat operations in Afghanistan; b) the flawed nature of NATO-led Afghan reconstruction and security sector reforms; c) the indigenous sources of Taliban-led militarism in the country; d) the continued support to Taliban from Pakistan's tribal regions; and e) the increasingly hostile Afghan and regional perceptions about NATO's mission in Afghanistan. If NATO continues to falter in Afghanistan, it will not be able to play an effective role in international peace and security.*

Afghanistan is North Atlantic Treaty Organization's the largest and the first ground operation outside Europe. Its outcome will have important implications for NATO's post-Cold War role in managing regional threats to international peace and security. This article argues that NATO has, thus far, failed in its primary mission of securing and reconstructing Afghanistan, despite consistently expanding its military operations, security reforms and reconstruction activities in the war-torn country, especially in the past four years. It discusses the main reasons behind the failure of NATO's mission in Afghanistan and the various steps NATO needs to address them effectively. Although the current threat from extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan is largely indigenous, with Pakistan perhaps being its foremost regional victim, it can assume an international dimension — as was the case with Afghanistan under the Taliban rule becoming a safe haven for Al Qaeda's global terror campaign — if NATO-led security and reconstruction mission in Afghanistan continues to falter.

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When the United States started Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in October 2001, it invoked NATO's mutual defence clause but chose not to let the alliance take the lead in the war against Taliban. Several NATO countries, instead, contributed troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was mandated by the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, to secure and reconstruct Afghanistan. Until August 2003, when NATO took over its command, ISAF played only a peacekeeping role only in and around Kabul. Since then, it has gradually assumed the charge of peacekeeping and combat operations for the whole of Afghanistan. In October 2006, NATO-ISAF took command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led Coalition. As of January 2008, some 41,700 troops (including National Support Elements) from 39 countries, were providing support to the Afghan authorities throughout the country, with the aim of boosting efforts to provide reconstruction and development. However, some 8,000 US troops still operate under the separate US command as part of the Operation Enduring Freedom.<sup>1</sup>

The principal aim of NATO's mission in Afghanistan is to "help establish the conditions in which Afghanistan can enjoy – after decades of conflict, destruction and poverty – a representative government and self-sustaining peace and security". ISAF's key military tasks include "assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country; conducting stability and security operations in coordination with the Afghan national security forces; mentoring and supporting the Afghan national army; and supporting Afghan government programmes to disarm illegally armed groups".<sup>2</sup>

NATO's expanding operational engagement in Afghanistan in the past four years should have significantly improved the security environment in the war-torn country. Instead, the reverse is happening. Taliban attacks against NATO troops, mostly in the shape of suicide and roadside bombings, have intensified, causing much more physical loss to NATO forces than the previous years. For instance, attacks on US/NATO forces increased from 900 in 2005 to 2,500 in 2006.<sup>3</sup> From January to August 2007, US/NATO forces suffered a total 135 casualties, including 68 US and 67 NATO soldiers. From October 2001 to August 2007, a total of 425 US and 226 NATO soldiers had

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<sup>1</sup> For preliminary information about ISAF, see its official website, <http://www.nato.int/issues/isaf/index.html>. Also see Associated Press, "NATO Assumes Control of Eastern Afghanistan," *New York Times* online, October 5, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Afghan-NATO.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ron Martz, "NATO's New Boss Set to Face Taliban," *Atlanta Journal - Constitution*, January 6, 2007.

lost their lives in battling the Taliban-led forces in Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> There is no, and cannot be, any better evidence of NATO's failure in Afghanistan than the rise of the Taliban forces, emergence of Afghanistan as a narcotics state, and the persistence of the warlord phenomenon.<sup>5</sup>

### **Reasons for NATO's Failure in Afghanistan**

There are at least five reasons why NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan is failing. These are: a) the insufficiency of NATO troops available for combat operations in Afghanistan; b) the flawed nature of NATO-led Afghan reconstruction and security sector reforms; c) the indigenous sources of Taliban-led militarism in the country; d) the continued support to Taliban from Pakistan's tribal regions; and e) the increasingly hostile Afghan and regional perceptions about NATO's mission in Afghanistan.

#### *Lacking Troop Commitments from NATO*

The foremost reason behind NATO's current failure in Afghanistan, is the insufficient number of its troops available for combat operations, amid growing militancy by Taliban-led forces. It is not just that NATO needs more troops on ground, but the troops from several NATO countries that are already deployed are restricted from engaging in combat operations in Afghanistan by their governments. Known as national caveats, these restrictions limit deployment areas and types of missions for particular national contingents.<sup>6</sup> The United States, Britain, Canada and the Netherlands, which have done most of the fighting against Taliban, have had tremendous difficulties in getting support from other NATO countries for counter-Taliban

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<sup>4</sup> James Cogan, "Afghanistan: Mounting Attacks on US/NATO Troops," *World Socialist Website*, August 14, 2007, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/aug2007/afgh-a14.shtml>.

<sup>5</sup> Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "NATO Needs New Strategy in Afghanistan," *Daily Times* (Lahore), December 5, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Cameron Scott, *Assessing ISAF: A Baseline Study of NATO's Role in Afghanistan* (London/Washington, D.C.: British-American Security Information Center, March 2007), 5, <http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/afghanistan.pdf>. Scott's analysis of the ISAF mission is the most comprehensive academic attempt on the subject so far, and the present paper shares his analysis of NATO's shortcomings vis-à-vis the war effort against growing Taliban-led militarism in Afghanistan. However, like most writings on Afghanistan emanating from Western scholars and think-tanks, the author has attempted to assess the counter-terrorism effort in Afghanistan from the perspective of the success or failure of what the US-led West would like to secure in the war-torn country, thereby ignoring the peculiar historically-rooted intricacies of the ground realities in Afghanistan and its neighbourhood as well as the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Afghan and regional populace affected by an exclusively force-based US-directed NATO strategy for Afghanistan.

operations.<sup>7</sup> Major European countries such as France, Italy, Spain and Germany have refused to take part in operations that could involve fighting the Taliban.<sup>8</sup> Only six of NATO's 26 countries, have placed no caveats on their ISAF forces.<sup>9</sup>

Facing reluctance on the part of NATO countries to the idea of more troops, US/NATO commanders have sought the dropping off of restrictions on the deployment of troops into combat zones in the south and east of the country. They secured an agreement at the November 2006 NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, on calling troops from other countries present in Afghanistan, into combat zones from the areas of their regular deployment. However, the summit succeeded only in obtaining promises for marginal increases in manpower and equipment. Subsequent meetings of senior NATO officials in Brussels in January 2007 and Seville in February 2007, have likewise failed to convince NATO states of the need to make further contributions in money, personnel and material.<sup>10</sup>

One of the reasons why NATO countries hesitate from contributing more troops or refusing their combat use is that they consider Afghanistan as a high-risk combat theatre, where the results of military operations have not been too positive or visible.<sup>11</sup> Another reason is the rising death toll of NATO troops, which has caused public support to waver in countries suffering from heaviest casualties, particularly Britain and Canada.<sup>12</sup> Such losses are doing little to increase support for the war in other NATO states where long-term support for the NATO mission is seriously lacking.<sup>13</sup> These countries feel that the Bush Administration is using NATO forces to "clear the mess" created by Operation Enduring Freedom. Moreover, smaller European countries see NATO deployment in Afghanistan as a result of excessive bullying by a US administration that wants them to take on an ever-larger share of what is still a US-led war on terrorism.<sup>14</sup> Finally, growing instances of NATO air strikes targeting Afghan civilians have received severe criticism from the Afghan government and international human rights organisations. They have also

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<sup>7</sup> Daniel Dombey, Stephen Fidler and Farhan Bokhari, "NATO Discord Mars Progress on Afghan Mission," *Financial Times*, November 30, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Ahmed Rashid, "Nato's Afghanistan Troop Dilemma," *BBC News* online, December 26, 2006, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/4526150.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4526150.stm).

<sup>9</sup> Helle C Dale, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test Case for Future Missions*, Backgrounder No 1985, The Heritage Foundation, December 6, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1985.cfm>.

<sup>10</sup> See Toby Helm, "Nato Still Split over Forces for Afghanistan," *The Telegraph*, November 30, 2006; *ibid*; Scott, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> Ramtanu Maitra, "Pakistan Plans To Bury NATO in Afghanistan," *Executive Intelligence Review*, March 23, 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Scott, *op. cit.*, 4.

<sup>13</sup> "NATO's Afghan Test," *Washington Post*, September 15, 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Rashid, *op. cit.*



caused great alarm among European people already weary of the war effort in Afghanistan.<sup>15</sup>

Clearly, NATO and the Americans are divided over strategy in Afghanistan. Bush Administration officials have often lamented that NATO nations are unwilling to take the kinds of risks and casualties necessary to confront the Taliban.<sup>16</sup> Across Europe, officials complain the United States never really focused on reconstruction, and they blame American forces for mounting air attacks on the Taliban that cause large civilian casualties, turning Afghans against the West. Since the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Bush Administration has been accused of diverting crucial resources from the war and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to Iraq<sup>17</sup> — a factor that explains the surge of Taliban in southern and southeastern Afghanistan as well as the US strategy, to shift the burden of Afghan war on NATO's shoulders, both developments occurring in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraqi invasion.

The reluctance on the part of NATO's some European members to send more troops or allow the troops already present in Afghanistan for combat operations has had two negative consequences for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. One, southern and southeastern Afghan provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar and Oruzgan have particularly seen a significant rise in the power of Taliban.<sup>18</sup> Secondly, it is difficult for the ISAF mission to develop a positive image for itself among the Afghans outside Kabul when NATO forces seem far more concerned about their own security than the security of the Afghans they are supposed to protect.<sup>19</sup>

This factor, plus the growing Afghan civilian casualties as a result of US/NATO air-strikes, has made the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan a reason for growing support for Taliban-led militarism. Such a perceptual problem could be overcome only if limited use of force is accompanied by a strategy of dialogue with pro-Taliban warlords, an option that the British commanders partly pursued in Helmand. Insofar as NATO's combat operations in Afghanistan are concerned, their success is hampered by a number of factors, which also proved crucial in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, such as the country's difficult mountainous terrain, local sympathisers of the Taliban cause and, above all, the fact that the Alliance's exclusive reliance on the use of force has to produce a countervailing domestic militant response.

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<sup>15</sup> Time Albone, "Civilian Deaths are Making Nato the Enemy," *Times Online*, March 5, 2007, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1473092.ece>.

<sup>16</sup> Michael A. Fletcher, "Bush to Urge NATO to Commit More Troops to Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, May 22, 2007.

<sup>17</sup> David Rohde and David E Sanger, "How a 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad," *New York Times*, August 12, 2007.

<sup>18</sup> Cogan, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> Rashid, op. cit.

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*Faulty Reconstruction and Security Sector Reforms*

If NATO has failed to tackle the immediate challenge of fighting Taliban-led militancy, its broad-based efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan and reform the country's security sector, have also produced minimal results.<sup>20</sup> Reconstruction and security sector reforms — including the creation of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), Disarmament, Demilitarization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, and countering narcotics — are longer-term solutions to Taliban-led militarism and consequent under-development and insecurity in Afghanistan. NATO's failure in realising these broader goals, thus, directly impinges upon its current military mission in Afghanistan.

NATO troops currently oversee the operation of some 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across Afghanistan, which combine civilian and military personnel to coordinate security and reconstruction efforts for the designated provincial area. Each PRT is led by an ISAF national contingent and features different ratios of military to civilian personnel depending on the lead nation.<sup>21</sup> German soldiers oversee PRTs in the northeast, the British in the north, and Italy and Spain in the west. PRTs have been a mixed success to date, as civil and military actors have not necessarily communicated well, and disagreed over the role of military forces in aid and development work. Moreover, several NATO countries have either not made the required financial contributions or have failed to fulfill their financial pledges to make the PRTs a success.

The United States has spent an average of \$3.4 billion a year reconstructing Afghanistan, less than half of what it has spent in Iraq. US assistance to Afghanistan dropped by 38 percent, from \$4.3 billion in fiscal 2005 to \$3.1 billion in fiscal 2006. The US plan to provide \$9 billion in aid to Afghanistan in 2007, twice the amount of any year since 2001,<sup>22</sup> has also not made any difference on the ground. Due to rampant insecurity, US expectations from international organisations, such as the United Nations and the European Union to contribute more to Afghanistan's reconstruction — a task that a defense organisation like NATO is professionally incapable to lead — have not been realised. At present, however, the security situation has deteriorated to the extent where many NATO forces, particularly in the south and east, are involved more in offensive military operations than reconstruction efforts.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Scott, *op. cit.*, 3, 8-10.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>22</sup> Rohde and Sanger, *op. cit.*

<sup>23</sup> For details about PRTs, including problems facing them, Michael McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Military Review* (Winter 2005-2006); Scott, *op. cit.*; Rashid, *op. cit.*; and Maitra, *op. cit.* Reconstruction is different from rehabilitation, a task which the United Nations

Under the Bonn Agreement, the United States had taken the responsibility of developing an indigenous army for post-Taliban Afghanistan. The target goal for the ANA, as established in the Afghanistan National Compact (ANC), is to have 70,000 fully trained and equipped servicemen by March 2009, and to be fully operational by March 20, 2011.<sup>24</sup> Even though the current troop strength of the ANA, stands at over 40,000, they are still incapable of conducting operations independently, and are suffering from basic problems such as inexperience, illiteracy, insufficient equipment and defections.<sup>25</sup> NATO's ISAF mission is, therefore, far from a situation where the Afghans themselves take on the fight against the Taliban without depending on foreign troops for the purpose. Creating an effective police force that could enforce the rule of law across Afghanistan, has been another task assigned to ISAF. Even after NATO assumed the command of ISAF in August 2003, this essential objective has not been realised. The target goal for the ANP, as established in the ANC, is 62,000 personnel, fully trained and equipped, by March 20, 2011.<sup>26</sup> Well over half of this number of police personnel is currently operational in the country, but they are under-paid, ill-equipped and known to be incompetent. There are widespread allegations of corruption, and even disloyalty, against the ANP. Germany, the country assigned the task of developing the ANP, is yet to develop a comprehensive plan for the purpose.<sup>27</sup>

The NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, has also failed to counter Afghanistan's growing drug problem. In 2006, Afghanistan produced 92 per cent of the world's opium — 165,000 hectares under cultivation represented a 59 percent growth in production from 2005.<sup>28</sup> According to the

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Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is required to undertake by accommodating millions of Internally-Displaced People (IDP) across Afghanistan and millions of Afghan refugees still living outside the country, particularly in Pakistan. However, when the reconstruction process itself is hampered by continuing insecurity, it is impossible to visualise a viable outcome of the international effort aimed at rehabilitating Afghan IDPs and refugees.

<sup>24</sup> Scott Baldauf, "A 'Half-Full' Afghan Army," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 10, 2006.

<sup>25</sup> Renee, Montange,, "Afghan Army Making Progress, Still Reliant on NATO," *NPR Online*, November 17, 2006, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6499377>; Ishtiaq Ahmad, "Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Protecting the World's People," in Angela Drakulich, ed., *A Global Agenda: Issues before the 60th General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations Association of the USA), 37-112.

<sup>26</sup> Matt Prodder, "New Afghan Police Force Deployed," *BBC News Online*, November 17, 2006, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/6157920.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6157920.stm).

<sup>27</sup> "Afghan Police Paid Less Than Taliban Fighters, Take Bribes from Suspects, U.S. Report Finds," *The Associated Press*, December 4, 2006; Scott, op. cit, 9.

<sup>28</sup> UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005*, [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg\\_survey\\_2005.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg_survey_2005.pdf).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan will produce more than 80,000 tons of opium in 2007, a one-third increase over 2006.<sup>29</sup> The opium trade, which currently amounts to almost half of Afghanistan's GDP, is the principal financier of Taliban-led militarism in Afghanistan. The Taliban-led violence is taking place in areas such as Helmand, which are notorious for poppy cultivation and opium trade.<sup>30</sup> Drug production and trafficking have increased at alarming rates, providing the Taliban with resources and local support for the protection they provide to the poppy cultivators.<sup>31</sup> The efforts by the United Kingdom, the country assigned to combat opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan under the Bonn Agreement, have not produced any concrete results, as NATO countries, including the US, do not allow their troops to get involved in either interdiction or eradication<sup>32</sup> of poppy cultivation and drug trade from Afghanistan.

#### *Indigenous Sources of Taliban-led Militarism*

Beyond the purely military-specific causes of NATO's failure in Afghanistan, are some domestic realities that explain the success of Taliban-led militarism in the country. NATO leaders do not seem to recognise the fact that Taliban-led militancy in Afghanistan is currently not entirely motivated by religious factor alone; rather an important cause behind it is continued alienation of the majority Pashtuns from Afghanistan's present government structure. Afghanistan's previous wars against two great powers, Britain and the former Soviet Union, revolved around the expression of Afghan nationalism and its conventional resistance to the presence of foreign forces. In these wars, Pashtuns raised the flag of Afghan nationalism, mobilised resistance and paid the heaviest price in human and material terms. Even though there has been good progress in securing greater Pashtun representation in Afghanistan's power structure since the 2005 parliamentary elections, it has not been sufficient to address Pashtun ethnic grievances — a situation that has helped transform what was purely a radical Islamist movement of the Taliban into an ethno-nationalist movement of the Pashtuns, with radical religion continuing to be a potent factor.

The largely indigenous dimension of the Taliban movement is acknowledged by no less a person than Ronald E. Neumann, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, who had replaced Zalmay Khalilzad in 2004. A *New York Times* report published in August 2007, quotes him as saying: "While suicide bombers came from Pakistan, most Taliban fighters in southern

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<sup>29</sup> "Afghanistan's Drug Challenge," *VOA News Online*, September 5, 2007, <http://www.voanews.com/uspolicy/2007-09-06-voa7.cfm>.

<sup>30</sup> Rizwan Zeb, "Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 2 (2006), 72.

<sup>31</sup> Rais, op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> Rashid, op. cit.

Afghanistan were Afghans. Captured insurgents said they had taken up arms because a local governor favoured a rival tribe, corrupt officials provided no services or their families needed money.”<sup>33</sup> In the words of columnist William Pfaff, the Taliban represent “a nationalist and religious movement of indigenous origin and strictly local horizons, ambitions and reach”.<sup>34</sup> It is a fact that the Taliban were never properly defeated following the US-led invasion in 2001. In the initial few years of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, they were able to withstand the severe military assault that the United States waged with the help of its superior air power. Over time, however, the Taliban-led forces have been able to re-group in Pakistan’s tribal regions as well as in south and southeastern parts of Afghanistan. They have mustered enough resolve to inflict significant damage despite their relatively simple weaponry and sizeable losses in fighting the foreign troops. In the past couple of years, Taliban have for the first time begun to target NATO forces with suicide attacks. Suicide attacks and roadside bombings by the Taliban rose by as much as 25 percent in spring 2007. The past couple of years have also seen a significant growth in instances of kidnappings-for-ransom of foreign journalists and aid workers in Afghanistan, the most prominent being the kidnapping of two dozen South Korean missionaries — a saga that continued for over a month in 2007, claiming the lives of two male missionaries. Afterwards, Seoul decided to withdraw its limited contingent from Afghanistan, which had no military engagement. Suicide bombings and kidnappings are clearly part of a deliberate Taliban strategy to frighten countries contributing their troops to NATO mission in Afghanistan, so that they should withdraw their respective commitment to secure and reconstruct the war-torn country.

US/NATO military operations, especially those claiming civilian Afghan lives, may have helped Taliban win more local recruits for their nationalist-religious cause against foreign forces. The Taliban infiltration from Pakistan’s tribal regions, may have also contributed to the growing Taliban power in Afghanistan. However, a fundamental factor compounding NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, is the failure of the government led by President Hamid Karzai. This failure is visible from lingering issues, such as the lack of proper Pashtun representation in post-Taliban governance, rampant corruption, slow progress of reconstruction, widespread poppy cultivation and continued power of local warlords and militias. Despite so many successes

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<sup>33</sup> Rohde and Sanger, op. cit.

<sup>34</sup> William Pfaff, “Failure in Saigon, Baghdad and Kabul,” *International Herald Tribune*, February 6, 2007.

achieved as part of the DDR programme, over 4,000 illegally armed groups remain to be disarmed and demobilised.<sup>35</sup>

Over the past two years, Kabul has successfully reduced the power of warlord-governors by reassigning them away from their geographic power base, but their networks continue to influence provincial administrations. Meanwhile, former factional commanders who are appointed to government positions in police and civil administration have loaded their offices with their unqualified supporters and corrupt cronies.<sup>36</sup> The exploding drug trade is both a symptom and a source of instability and corruption. It is not just a case of evil drug traffickers taking advantage of a good but ineffective government to facilitate terrorism and insurgency, as frequently portrayed. The traffickers and their agents are all too often corrupt government officials themselves, who forge alliances of convenience with insurgent groups, including Taliban, to protect their businesses and distribution routes.<sup>37</sup> These interconnected issues require redress if the Afghan government is to establish legitimate authority across the country; but lie outside the core mission and competency of NATO's ISAF forces.

#### *Support to Taliban from Pakistan*

NATO's failure to co-opt Pakistan for jointly managing the threat from Taliban and their militant-extremist sympathisers in Pakistan's tribal regions bordering Afghanistan, is another major challenge facing the NATO mission in Afghanistan. There is no doubt that Pakistan's tribal regions have served as an important base for Taliban re-grouping and infiltration across the Durand Line into Afghanistan. Preventing Pakistan's tribal regions from becoming a safe haven for Taliban, requires close collaboration between NATO command in Afghanistan and Pakistan's security apparatus. Pakistan has, indeed, been a part of the Tripartite Commission tasked with ensuring security in Afghanistan's border areas, with Afghanistan and US/NATO being its two other members. But the NATO leadership has preferred in much of the past four years of its ISAF command to side with the Afghan and US leadership in blaming Pakistan for not "doing enough" to prevent Taliban re-grouping in its tribal regions and their infiltration into Afghanistan.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), *Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact Benchmarks, March-October 2006*, Bi-annual Report (Kabul: JCMB, November 2006), 7.

<sup>36</sup> Ali A. Jalali, "The Future of Afghanistan," *Parameters*, Spring 2006, 6.

<sup>37</sup> Nick Grono and Joanna Nathan, "Defeating Afghanistan's Drug Fix," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 31, 2007.

<sup>38</sup> "Karzai Says Pakistan Wants to Enslave Afghanistan," *Dawn* (Islamabad), December 13, 2006; "US Again Accuses Pakistan of Providing 'Refuge' to Taliban," *Agence France-Presse*, January 26, 2007; Carlotta Gall, "At Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge," *New York Times*, January 21, 2007.

This is despite the fact that Pakistan has deployed over 90,000 soldiers in these regions and suffered far more troops' casualties than NATO in Afghanistan.<sup>39</sup> If the growing Taliban clout in Pakistan's tribal regions is a cause of rising Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan, the reverse is also true: NATO's failure in combating Taliban-led militarism in Afghanistan fuels the extremist and terrorist wave in Pakistan's tribal Pashtun belt bordering Afghanistan, because it is Afghanistan's majority Pashtun areas in the south and south-eastern parts of the country that have directly faced the wrath of US/NATO troops' military assaults. Consequently, if the Afghan side of the Durand Line has seen a purely Taliban movement increasingly transform into a nationalist Pashtun movement, the Pakistan side of the Durand Line has undergone an opposite trend, whereby the extremist religious clergy has replaced the traditional Pashtun Maliks in the tribal governance of the semi-autonomous regions.<sup>40</sup>

The backlash from the military operations in the tribal regions compelled the government of Pakistan to negotiate a couple of peace deals with the Ulema-led tribal jirgas in South and North Wazirsitan agencies of the tribal regions in 2004 and 2006, respectively.<sup>41</sup> However, these deals met considerable opposition from the US/NATO and Afghan leadership, which accused Pakistan of encouraging Taliban and their extremist affiliates, including Al Qaeda, to make the tribal regions a safe haven for their terrorist operations in Afghanistan and beyond. Fencing parts of the Durand Line, registering the daily traffic of people at a few border crossing points on the Durand Line and increasing the number of security check-posts along the Afghan side of the Durand Line, were a few other measures proposed by Pakistan to check the cross-border Taliban traffic,<sup>42</sup> but all of these proposed measures have received cold response from the Afghan leadership. Due to consistent US/NATO pressure on the infiltration issue, and because of domestic extremist upheavals, such as the military operation against the Red Mosque in Islamabad and consequent extremist backlash, the Pakistani government is currently left with no option but to militarily operate against pro-Taliban forces in the tribal regions. Its controversial peace deals in the tribal regions have consequently broken down. In fact, the last few months have seen a spate of suicide bombings specifically targeting Pakistani security officials, and a number of instances of Pakistani troops' kidnappings in South and North Waziristan, the most notable involving the kidnapping of some 300 security personnel in South Waziristan.

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<sup>39</sup> Zeb, op. cit.

<sup>40</sup> For details about this transformation, see International Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants*, Asia Report no. 125, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 11, 2006).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

The stiff resistance that Pakistan military has received from pro-Taliban extremists in the tribal regions indicates that preventing the re-grouping of Taliban in these regions and their infiltration into Afghanistan is quite a huge task that Pakistan alone may not be able to perform. Had the US/NATO and Afghan leaders been more forthcoming on the measures Pakistan proposed to institutionalise new security arrangements along the Durand Line within the framework of the Tripartite Commission, the said problem could have been solved considerably over time. The establishment of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center in Kabul, where ISAF, Afghan and Pakistani officials share intelligence on Taliban and terrorist networks, is an important step in building the necessary links with Pakistani intelligence that will be invaluable to defeating the Taliban.<sup>43</sup>

However, insofar as the issue of Pakistan's tribal regions acting as a safe haven for Taliban fighters in Afghanistan is concerned, much more needs to be done, including the socio-economic development of these regions and the repatriation of Afghan refugees from there. Millions of Afghan refugees are still camped in Pakistan's tribal regions. The Afghan refugee camps are an important source of Taliban militancy. As long as Pakistan's tribal regions are beset by extreme poverty and illiteracy, they will remain an ideal place for generating extremism and terrorism. Given the prevailing state of insecurity in the tribal regions, the US plan to develop them economically has not materialised. Likewise, the deterioration in Afghanistan's security has dissuaded the Afghan refugees from returning to their country. Building Pakistan's tribal regions and repatriating Afghan refugees from Pakistani soil, however, remain important pre-requisites for the success of NATO mission in Afghanistan, even if they do not directly fall into its purview.

#### *Hostile Perceptions about NATO's Afghan Mission*

A final, perhaps more important, reason for the failure of NATO's mission in Afghanistan is the increasingly hostile domestic and regional perception about NATO's mission in Afghanistan. The UN had mandated ISAF to secure and reconstruct post-Taliban Afghanistan. Instead, its primary mission, even after NATO assumed its command in 2003, has been to secure the Karzai government in Kabul, which, as stated before, is perceived to be unrepresentative of the majority Pashtun interests, especially in Taliban-infested predominantly Pashtun southern and southeastern parts of the country. The Pashtun Afghans have historically distrusted a strong central authority, which in the present case has turned out to be corrupt, inefficient and dependent on foreign support for its very survival.

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<sup>43</sup> "Afghanistan, Pakistan, NATO Open First Intelligence Hub," *Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe*, January 25, 2007.



The Afghan people are weary of war and long for an opportunity to rebuild their shattered hearths and homes. The question now is if the Afghans face a crisis of hope, and is there more disenchantment with the reconstruction programme that the Taliban exploit? Is there greater disappointment with the political process, which has failed to end exploitation of the people by the warlords? Are the foreign forces increasingly seen as the ultimate protectors of the corruption seeping through the new economic system?<sup>44</sup> The significant rise in civilian deaths, caused by ill-planned NATO air-strikes, has alienated the very civilian population<sup>45</sup> whose support is essential for the success of NATO mission. At least 348 civilian deaths resulted from US/NATO operations in Afghanistan in the first six months of 2007.<sup>46</sup> Given that, it is but natural for the Afghan people living in southern and south-eastern regions, and in the firing line of US/NATO operations, to increasingly perceive NATO as a hostile or even “occupation” force.

It is not just in Afghanistan but also in the country’s neighbourhood, particularly Pakistan and Iran, that NATO’s Afghan mission has generated hostile public reaction. In the past couple of years, on a number of occasions, NATO also adopted a threatening posture vis-à-vis Pakistan’s tribal region bordering Afghanistan. In order to stop the alleged infiltration of Taliban from the region into Afghanistan, NATO and Afghan forces have, in a number of reported instances, exchanged fire with Pakistani troops posted along the Durand Line.<sup>47</sup> Since 2004, the rules of engagement for elite US special forces have authorised “hot pursuit” of anti-occupation fighters into Pakistan without seeking prior approval of Islamabad.<sup>48</sup> Consequently, during this period, the United States has allegedly struck several suspected hideouts of Al Qaeda and Taliban in the tribal regions. The collateral damage from a few of such major strikes, which went bad, has enraged tribal people and caused hostile public reaction in Pakistan.

Since NATO is leading the combat operations in Afghanistan, US “hot pursuit” of Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal region, is publicly perceived there as well as across Pakistan as a proof of NATO’s expansionist regional strategy. Even at the time of the devastating earthquake of October 2005 in Pakistan, the deployment of 1,000 strong medical and technical

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<sup>44</sup> Tanvir Ahmad Khan, “Kabul: The Frequently Asked Questions,” *Daily Times* (Lahore), May 26, 2006.

<sup>45</sup> S. Mudassir Ali Shah, “Mired in a Vortex of Terror & Drugs,” *Dawn* (Islamabad), October 1, 2007.

<sup>46</sup> Mark Townsend, “Civilian Death Toll Rises in the Bloody Battle of Helmand,” *Observer*, August 12, 2007.

<sup>47</sup> Peter Symonds, “US Military Bombards Targets Inside Pakistan,” *World Socialist Website*, August 29, 2007.

<sup>48</sup> Scott Lindlaw, “US Gave Troops OK to Enter Pakistan,” *The Associated Press*, August 24, 2007.

personnel of NATO's Response Force in the country's earthquake-hit Frontier and Kashmiri regions, had invited strong condemnation from opposition parties and triggered public speculations that the underlying motive behind NATO's relief mission was to establish its bases in Pakistan to contain China. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the leader of Jammāt-e-Islami in Pakistan, and the President of the six-party religious alliance, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, had then described NATO's presence in the country as "not for the earthquake relief operations but [is] part of the alliance's 'greater Middle East plan' ... which includes Muslim countries from Morocco to Pakistan and NATO wants to contain these countries against what they say is a threat of Islamic governments".<sup>49</sup> There might not have been any truth in what the leader of a radical Islamist organisation in Pakistan had then said about NATO's humanitarian relief effort in the country's earthquake-hit areas, but his regressive discourse did help create negative public perceptions about NATO's humanitarian role in the country. Consequently, NATO decided to withdraw its humanitarian contingent from Pakistan in early 2006.

In Iran, Afghanistan's next important neighbour in the southwest and not far from the areas of intense Taliban-led militancy, public perceptions about NATO's role in Afghanistan and beyond are no different than those existing in much of Afghanistan and Pakistan — but for an additional reason: Unlike Pakistan, Iran was staunchly anti-Taliban and a key supporter of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. US/NATO's failure to enlist Iranian support to secure and stabilise Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001,<sup>50</sup> therefore, constitutes an important reason behind growing Taliban-led militarism in Afghanistan and consequent NATO's failure to provide security and stability in the war-torn country. Since US attempts to up the ante over Iran's nuclear issue, have taken place, side by side, with NATO's expanding operational mission in Afghanistan, it is but natural for the Iranians to perceive the former as indicative of NATO's US-dictated expansionist policy vis-à-vis Iran. Even in India, NATO's presence across the Line of Control in Kashmir, was looked at with suspicion.

In retrospect, therefore, NATO's military mission in Afghanistan neither has the requisite domestic public approval nor is it perceived as friendly in countries bordering Afghanistan, including perhaps Central Asia as well, where regimes' preference is to consolidate ties with China and Russia within

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<sup>49</sup> "Pakistan: NATO Troops Will Not Leave, Says Islamic Leader," December 15, 2005, <http://www.khalifa.com>.

<sup>50</sup> Gareth Porter, "How Neo-Cons Sabotaged Iran's Help on Al Qaeda," *Inter-Press Service*, February 22, 2006, <http://www.ipnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32249>; "Arms Seized in Afghanistan Sent from Iran, NATO Says," *Washington Post*, September 22, 2007.

the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In the absence of Afghan public approval and friendly regional climate, the NATO mission in Afghanistan will continue to hang in the balance. The current NATO-led war effort in Afghanistan needs to be compared to the 1980s international fight against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, which not only had the required support of the Afghans, primarily the Pashtuns, but also Iran and Pakistan, each of whom accommodated millions of Afghan refugees on their soil. The support for this war in the two countries was not only from their state establishments but also from the people by and large. NATO's present Afghan mission lacks this crucial factor. It does not enjoy the requisite public support in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The Iranian government may have an interest in the ultimate demise of Taliban, but US/NATO leaders have made sure it plays no role for the purpose. Pakistan's proclaimed role as a frontline state in this war also remains suspect in the eyes of Afghan government and US/NATO leaders. Much more important factor is the growing Afghan public disaffection with the Karazi regime and its US/NATO saviours.

### **What NATO Needs to Do**

The underlying causes of each of the five reasons mentioned above for the failure of NATO's current mission in Afghanistan are difficult to address in the prevailing circumstances. The above discussion makes it amply clear that NATO has not functioned as a coherent military alliance with a clear mission and objectives in hand and necessary support of governments and people in the region. A security-cum-reconstruction mission, led by foreign forces that do not have the required domestic and regional support, may not succeed in crushing extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan. Not only does the NATO mission in Afghanistan lack commitment from several of the alliance states for more personnel, money and equipment, it also suffers from a crisis of credibility, caused by its failure in realising the desired goals of reconstruction and security sector reforms.

Afghanistan's present security predicament is caused by a number of intricate factors, mostly rooted in the past over thirty years of warfare. Given that, the recent rise of Taliban militancy in Afghanistan, and its linkage with Pakistan's tribal belt, cannot be seen in isolation from the 1980s internationally-sponsored jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the regionally sponsored intra-Afghan warfare in the country during the 1990s, which produced the Taliban phenomenon, and the situation in the country since the start of the anti-Taliban war in 2001. It is within this broader historical context, an explanation of which is beyond the scope of this paper, that the underlying causes of NATO's failure in Afghanistan actually lie. Finding a single cause of a complex problem — such as considering Taliban's re-grouping in Pakistan's tribal regions and their infiltration into Afghanistan,

as the principal source of Taliban insurgency there — is simplistic and dangerous.

The aggravating drug problem, the continuing power of warlords, the faltering reconstruction and development, the un-representative nature of the regime in Pashtun perceptions, the existence of alleged Al Qaeda/Taliban safe havens in Pakistan's tribal belt, the rise in civilian casualties in US/NATO operations and its negative impact on the Afghan public opinion, are some of the sources of the growing extremist-nationalist anti-US/NATO movement in Afghanistan today. As long as these issues remain unsettled, Taliban-led militancy will continue to gain momentum. Likewise, the issue of Taliban re-grouping in Pakistan's tribal regions and its linkage with Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be tackled without the required Afghan-US/NATO response to Pakistan's proposed measures for tightening security along the Durand Line, in the presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan's tribal regions, and the continuity of US/NATO "hot pursuit" tactics as well as the absence of development there.

All of these are very complex, historically rooted problems characterising the current ground realities in southern and southeastern Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal regions. Each one of them requires a long-term agenda for its settlement, something that NATO's current mission in Afghanistan lacks acutely. It is not that NATO needs to make a drastic increase in troops to make a difference in its war effort in Afghanistan, the main problem, as identified above, is the unwillingness of several NATO members to commit more troops for combat role. NATO has to overcome this problem, by convincing all of its members to lift respective restrictions imposed on their operational role in Afghanistan. For the purpose, however, the alliance has to address all the concerns being expressed by its European members regarding the war effort in Afghanistan. Accommodating Pashtun interests in the power structure of Afghanistan is another precondition for NATO's success in Afghanistan, one that cannot be realised as long as genuine representatives of Afghanistan's majority population remain politically an aggrieved party in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

NATO-ISAF command in Afghanistan also has to realise that the battle against Taliban and their extremist affiliates cannot be won by military means alone. At the end of the day, a two-pronged strategy based on the use of force against the Taliban and their extremist affiliates directly engaged in terrorism, and the pursuit of dialogue with those among the Taliban who are willing to compromise for the sake of legitimate political and economic benefits, will most likely succeed. Pakistan did set a precedent by concluding a couple of deals with the pro-Taliban tribal groups in South and North Waziristan, a soft approach to prevent extremists from siding with terrorists that was emulated by the British in Helmand. But, then, Pakistan came under severe US/NATO/Afghan criticism for allegedly pursuing dialogue with the

terrorists. Even the Afghan government has overtime shown some willingness to talk to insurgent Taliban forces for the sake of reconciliation and peace in the country — with the lower house of the Afghan parliament, Wolesi Jirga, even issuing a call in early 2007 for granting amnesty to key Taliban and other extremist leaders, like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami. Subsequently, the joint Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga in Kabul reiterated the option of having dialogue with the Taliban. Given that, NATO has to adopt a flexible approach on the issue, rather than relying upon a single option of using force to combat Taliban-led militarism in the country.

Afghanistan's NATO-led security sector reforms, including the expansion of Afghan national army and police and realisation of Afghan reconstruction goals, depend upon how quickly the manifold causes of Afghanistan's insecurity dilemma are addressed effectively. Apart from Pashtun alienation from the country's power structure, these include the culture of warlordism and its close affinity with the drug problem, the continuing problem of refugee presence in Pakistan's tribal region and its linkage with insurgency in Afghanistan, and the negative local and regional perceptions about NATO's Afghan mission. By using force alone as a principal counter-insurgency means, and without taking forceful steps to combat drug problem and warlords involved in it, NATO cannot hope to achieve credible results in its current security-cum-reconstruction mission in Afghanistan. And, obviously, if NATO fails in Afghanistan, it cannot hope to play an effective role in international peace and security. ■

## THE UNITED STATES, MARITIME TERRORISM AND PAKISTAN'S NEEDS

Muhammad Azam Khan\*

### Abstract:

*As the Global War on Terrorism enters its seventh year, the new US Maritime Strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Sea Power," unveiled at the International Sea-power Symposium XVIII, aims to inspire and support the greater maritime community to secure peace and prosperity across the maritime domain. Being a major non-NATO ally, Pakistan has played a crucial role in prosecuting this war since it commenced with the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan, the maritime component of the operation comprises of a multinational naval task force — Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) — taken from several countries including Australia, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US. Pakistan Navy was the first regional navy to join CMCP and holds the unique distinction of twice spearheading the Task Force. As a coalition partner, Pakistan Navy has been actively combating maritime terrorism in the North Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. However, with multifarious tasks to be performed and insufficient strength of the needed platforms, Pakistan Navy currently deploys only one unit in the CTF 150 on rotation. Meanwhile, Pakistan's multi million dollar Gwadar port on the western fringes of the Makran coast (Balochistan) is now fully functional. Pakistan's maritime commercial and military infrastructure also continues to expand rapidly. Given the current state of volatility in the North Arabian Sea as also the disturbed political situation in Balochistan, the need to bolster the Pakistan Navy and other national Maritime Agencies has perhaps never been as necessary as it is today.*

Following the 11<sup>th</sup> September deadly attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, the US redefined its foreign policy objectives. Accordingly, the National Security Strategy published in 2002, became the first strategic policy document of the US Administration. A revised strategy was later released in March 2006.

"War is a continuation of policy by other means."<sup>1</sup> It is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."<sup>2</sup> As an element

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<sup>1</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (London: Penguin Books, 1982), 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

of national power, the military instrument is used to achieve specific policy ends (objectives) through the application of military force (means). Before examining Pakistan's requirements in the backdrop of maritime terrorism, the US National Security Strategy and the US National Strategy for Maritime Security merit a closer look.

### **US National Security Strategy (NSS 06)**

At the outset, the document underscores that America is at War.<sup>3</sup> The NSS 06 is thus termed as wartime National Security Strategy. The policy outlined therein, is an extension of NSS 2002 guided by the previous neo-con vision of the US as a unique superpower, with military without a peer leading the worldwide struggle to advance freedom and democracy and to proactively fight enemies abroad by strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism.<sup>4</sup>

The policy paper reaffirms the American declaration first made in September 2002, to "anticipate and counter threats using all elements of national power before the threat could do any grave damage".<sup>5</sup> This, of course, is a powerful reiteration of US administration's strong belief in the right of pre-emption.<sup>6</sup> It also indicates the resolve to sidestep the UN and other world bodies should, at any occasion, the US believes that its security interests at home or abroad are threatened.

It is evident that policy makers in the US are determined not to have American authority challenged as it was during the Cold War. But the realisation of such a policy can be thwarted by two emerging centres of power, China and the Muslim World. However, while China may have the ambition and capacity to become an economic and military super power,<sup>7</sup> that will not happen in the case of the Muslim World. The rhetoric of militant organisations operating out of the fringes of some Muslim countries aside, the Muslim community has shown that it can hurt the West. Hence, it must be restrained. No wonder, NSS 06 reiterates the policy framework enunciated in 2002, which shifted from "deterrence and containment towards a more aggressive stance and introduced the notorious doctrine of pre-emption".<sup>8</sup>

Among other threats that continue to deeply concern the US is the proliferation of WMDs. In this context, the NSS 06 points out that its 2003 initiative commonly known as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which

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<sup>3</sup> Letter of Promulgation by President George Bush, US National Security Strategy 2006.

<sup>4</sup> US National Security Strategy 2006, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> "New US Security Strategy," *Dawn* (Lahore), April 1, 2006.

<sup>7</sup> "America's New Imperatives," *Dawn* (Lahore), March 21, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> "US National Security Strategy," *People's Democracy Weekly of Indian Marxist Party*, vol. xxx, no. 15, April 9, 2006.

more than 70 countries have joined either voluntarily or through diplomatic persuasion, has been most successful.

While India receives praise in NSS 06 for being a great democracy with shared values for the foundation of good relations, reference to Pakistan is brief and in passing. America's limited agenda with Pakistan is spelled out as "America's relations with Pakistan will not be mirror image of our (US) relations with India".<sup>9</sup>

### **US National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)**

The NSMS is the culmination of President Bush's directive issued to various US departments in December 2004. These aimed at integrating and harmonising departmental strategies and thereby developing a comprehensive national strategy for effective and efficient maritime security. The merits of greater synergy have accordingly increased in importance since President Bush signed the NSMS in September 2005, calling for a fully coordinated effort to protect US interests in the maritime domain — whether close to the 95,000-mile long US coastline or in forward operating areas halfway around the world.<sup>10</sup>

The document is explicit in affirming that nations have a common interest in achieving two complementary objectives, i.e., to facilitate the vibrant maritime commerce that underpins economic security, and to protect against ocean related terrorists, hostile criminals and dangerous acts. "Since all nations benefit from this collective security, all nations must share in the responsibility for maintaining maritime security by countering the threats in this domain",<sup>11</sup> asserts the policy paper.

Smuggling of people, drugs, weapons and other contraband as well as piracy and armed robbery against vessels are identified as threats to maritime security. In unambiguous terms, the paper also suggests that "maritime drug trafficking generates vast amounts of money for international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations".<sup>12</sup>

The strategic objectives in NSMS, therefore, stress upon improving security in the maritime domain. This is intended to be accomplished by way of "comprehensive and cohesive"<sup>13</sup> efforts among the United States and various cooperating nations to protect the common interest in global maritime security.

<sup>9</sup> "New US Security Strategy," op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> Thad Allen and Mike Mullen, "America's National Fleet: A Coast Guard-Navy Imperative," *Proceedings*, August 2006, 17.

<sup>11</sup> "Introduction: Maritime Security," *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, 2.

<sup>12</sup> "Threats to Maritime Security," *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, 5.

<sup>13</sup> "Strategic Objectives," *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, 7.



## Maritime Security Today

Security of Sea Lines of communication (SLOC) is the key role of any navy. SLOC-security always had a military nuance in naval doctrines, with focus on controlling maritime choke points. However, 9/11 brought non-traditional threats, like terrorism and organised crime under intense focus. The present day enemy, unlike the former, is amorphous and ubiquitous; has no organised structure and has no border on space or time. The maritime security environment has consequently undergone a sea change. Today, the emerging naval platforms and sensors aim at targeting the concentrated zone of new threats, *i.e.*, the littoral expanse. It is widely believed that maritime lifelines have become lucrative targets for terrorism. Besides, the potential for illegal transfers of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to non-state actors cannot be underrated. Given the concurrent importance of SLOC and growing terrorism threats, states have begun to realise the exigency of cooperative-security.<sup>14</sup>

## Economic Globalisation and Maritime Security

In today's economy, the oceans have increased importance, allowing all countries to participate in a global marketplace.<sup>15</sup> While almost all inter-continental merchandise<sup>16</sup> trade moves by sea, half of the world's commercial vessels carry only fossil fuel resources or hydrocarbon products.<sup>17</sup> In 2004, world trade worth \$ 8.3 trillion was carried by merchant ships<sup>18</sup> while each year about 1.9 billion tons of petroleum is shipped using maritime transportation – approximately 60 per cent of all the petroleum produced.<sup>19</sup> Simply put,

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<sup>14</sup> S. Gurpeet Khurana, "Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation" *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 31, no. 1, January-February 2007, 140.

<sup>15</sup> *The US National Strategy for Maritime Security*, Section I, Introduction, 3.

<sup>16</sup> According to Admiral Sir Jonathan Band, First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Naval Staff, United Kingdom, more than 90 per cent of intercontinental trade is sea based. It is quoted to be 80 per cent in some documents. See also, *The US National Strategy for Maritime Security*, Section I, Introduction, 3. As stated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), an estimated 85 per cent of the world's trade volume (7.1 billion tons of goods) was shipped by sea in 2006. Carried by at least 46,000 ships calling at over 4,000 ports worldwide, the maritime sector employs more than 1.3 million people, seafarers and port workers. The majority of consumer goods are shipped by as many as 15 million containers making over 230 million journeys per year (over 230 million container movements each year). See, Lorenz Akiva J., *Al Qaeda's Maritime Threat*, Intelligence and Information Centre at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Centre, Paper no. 3, May 2007, 4.

<sup>17</sup> Khurana, *op. cit.*, 139.

<sup>18</sup> Arun Prakash, "Maritime Challenges," *Indian Defence Review*, January-March 2006 vol. 21 (1), 51.

<sup>19</sup> On January 1, 2006, 10,400 tankers, 3,514 container ships and 16,540 mixed cargo ships were registered. Overall 50,000 ships (*larger than 300 tons*) cruise the oceans. See

economic globalisation has brought about a phenomenal increase in the exchange of goods. Consequently, maritime traffic and sea lines of communication are crucial issues<sup>20</sup> today, not only for the littorals but for hinterland states as well.

By the same token, maritime security is not just an issue of individual nations and covers a whole range of activities to ensure free flow of maritime traffic. From detection, location, tracking and interdiction of vessels engaged in illegal activity like smuggling, terrorism and migration, it also encompasses protection of exclusive economic zones.<sup>21</sup>

### The US Predicament

America spends more than \$200,000, per minute on foreign oil or \$13 million per hour. More than \$25 billion a year goes for Persian Gulf<sup>22</sup> imports alone.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, there are growing concerns<sup>24</sup> in Washington about extreme dependence on imported energy sourced increasingly from the Persian Gulf.<sup>25</sup> In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush acknowledged the obvious, when he said, “America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world.”<sup>26</sup> But “breaking its dependence the Middle East for its addiction through fresh research for alternative energy sources may not come soon or too easy.”<sup>27</sup>

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also Jurg E. Kursener, “Straits of Malacca and Singapore – Unique Choke Points” *Naval Forces*, International Forum for Maritime Power, vol. XXVIII, no. II/2007, 23; and “The 1,000- Ship NAVY Global Maritime Network,” *Proceedings*, November 2005, 15.

<sup>20</sup> Kursener, op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> Sir Jonathan Band, Admiral, First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Naval, Staff United Kingdom, “The Changing Nature of Maritime Operations,” Talk at the PN War College, Lahore, September 5, 2007.

<sup>22</sup> The name of the waterway remains controversial between the Iranians and the Arabs. The former insist the name to be Persian Gulf while later claim it as the Arabian Gulf. In British Admiralty charts however, the sea stretch continues to be shown as the Persian Gulf.

<sup>23</sup> “Safe Strong and Secure: Reducing America’s Oil Dependence,” <http://www.nrdc.org>. In 2025 the US is projected to consume 28.3 million barrels a day — 44 per cent more oil than today with domestic production meeting a mere 30 percent of that need.

<sup>24</sup> The US deems its dependence on oil as a threat to national security and economy. Growing demand and shrinking domestic production means America is importing more and more oil each year — much of it from the world’s most unfriendly or unstable regions.

<sup>25</sup> Sharma Ashok. “India and Energy Security,” *Asian Affairs*, vol. XXXVIII. no. II, July 2007, 158.

<sup>26</sup> President Bush, Fifth State of the Union address to Joint session of Congress, January 31, 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Muhammad Azam Khan, “The United States, the North Arabian Sea and Pakistan,” *Proceedings*, May 2007, 38.

For the past 30 years, the Gulf has been in the crosshairs of influential group of Washington foreign policy strategists, who believe that in order to ensure global dominance, the United States must seize control of the region and its oil.<sup>28</sup> To that end, the United States believes that it must not only be able to project its military forces anywhere and at any time, it must also control key resources, chief among them oil, especially Gulf oil.

The present global oil consumption is around 80 million barrels a day.<sup>29</sup> In terms of per annum the figure is said to be 3767.1 million tons.<sup>30</sup> As vital as the Persian Gulf is now, its strategic importance is likely to grow exponentially in the next 20 years. Nearly one out of every three barrels of oil reserves in the world, lie under just two countries: Saudi Arabia with 259 billion barrels of proven reserves and Iraq with 112 billion.<sup>31</sup>

### The ISS

In the wake of 9/11, the long-established and US Navy sponsored International Sea power Symposium (ISS)<sup>32</sup> centred its theme on building capacity through cooperation. The ISS provides a forum to US policy makers to restructure and remodel their maritime security strategy in concert with partners. The projected theme of the ISS XVIII<sup>33</sup> was:

*to create and solidify solutions within a global network of maritime nations to voluntarily harness the power of the international community, in ways that are in the interests of individual nations, in order to effectively and efficiently confront the challenges and threats within the maritime domain.*<sup>34</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Dr Akhilesh Chandra Prabhakar, "India's Energy Security of Supply and the Gulf," *India Quarterly*, vol. LX, no. 3, July-September 2004, 124.

<sup>29</sup> According to Energy Information Administration (EIA), the world oil demand is expected to grow from 80 million barrels per day in 2003 to 98 million barrels per day in 2015 and 118 million barrels per day in 2030. For more information see "World Oil Markets," *International Energy Outlook 2006 Report*, June 2006.

<sup>30</sup> "Energy Security," *Indian Defence Review*, April-June 2007, vol. 22(2), 124.

<sup>31</sup> Prabhakar, op. cit., 126.

<sup>32</sup> ISS is held every two years at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

<sup>33</sup> Conducted from 16-19 October 2007, the ISS XVIII participants included some 69 Chiefs of the Naval Staff/Operations representing different world navies, 21 Commandants of Coast Guards, 16 War College Presidents and several senior officials of the United States. The US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns also addressed the audience via video teleconferencing. Participants from Pakistan included Admiral Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, Commodore Tahseen Ullah Khan, Commandant Pakistan Navy War College, and Rear Admiral Tayyab Ali Dogar, Director General Pakistan Maritime Security Agency.

<sup>34</sup> The stated objective of ISS XVIII was: "*the participation of maritime forces in a voluntary network to find solutions to enhance security in the maritime domain, in areas that align with their own national interests. Such interests may include increasing capacity to ensure maritime security in*

## Maritime Terrorism

The term maritime terrorism is evolving and may encompass a wide range of events, such as direct attacks on vessels, hijackings and the transport of individuals and material in support of terrorist groups and activities.<sup>35</sup>

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group, has offered an extensive definition for maritime terrorism:

*...the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.*<sup>36</sup>

This definition, however, does not really define terrorism and whether it would merely include maritime attacks against civilian (merchant) vessels or also attacks against military crafts.<sup>37</sup>

The opportunities that maritime transportation offers to terrorists are identical to those provided by other forms of transport. Like cars and airplanes, hijacked ships can also be used with equal destructive power. However, on account of size, the control and prevention of terror in maritime environment is much more daunting. This is the kind of environment that al-Qaeda and other terror outfits are constantly looking for; surroundings that may cause wholesale destruction. "Al Qaeda is believed to have a large fleet and a stated commitment to disrupt global economy".<sup>38</sup> Intelligence sources in the United States indicate that the al-Qaeda group is suspected of owning or chartering 15-18 bulk/general cargo vessels.<sup>39</sup>

Apprehensions of major acts of maritime terrorism by Jihadi terrorist organisations, which are members of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF), continue to be high.<sup>40</sup> Of all terrorist organisations around the

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*their own territorial waters and approaches, improving their ability to surveil their Exclusive Economic Zone's (EEZ), participating in regional security initiatives and, for those navies so capable, exporting maritime security to their regions of the world either in the form of maritime operations or security assistance."*

<sup>35</sup> Donna J Nincic, "The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat Identification WMD and Regime Response," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 28, no. 4, August 2005, 620.

<sup>36</sup> Lorenz Akiva J., op. cit.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> "Threats to Oil Transport," Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, <http://iags.org>; and "Terrorism Goes to Sea," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 83, no. 6, November/December 2004, 65-66.

<sup>39</sup> Whitlam John, "How Can the Royal Navy Prepare Itself for Operations Against Rogue Merchant Vessel Threat?," *The Naval Review*, Royal Navy, vol. 94, no. 3, August 2006, 211.

<sup>40</sup> B. Raman, "Maritime Terrorism: An Indian Perspective," South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 1154, International Conference on National Security in a Changing Region, Singapore, October 29, 2004.

world, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka continue to have the most well developed capability for maritime terrorism.<sup>41</sup> The LTTE has often hijacked commercial ships in the past, either for their cargo or for smuggling narcotics and weapons. The LTTE's Sea Tigers have clearly demonstrated their highly specialised skills to carry out maritime, including even underwater, attacks on the Sri Lankan naval crafts.<sup>42</sup> The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, recently claimed that during a series of battles which took place from September 10-11, 2007, the Sri Lankan Navy destroyed three LTTE vessels — described as floating armouries — 600 nm southeast of Sri Lanka's southern tip, Dondra Head.<sup>43</sup>

But despite critical susceptibility and gaps in global sea arteries, the number of terrorist attacks at sea have been miniscule compared to the terrorists attack overall.<sup>44</sup> This is so since the conditions necessary for a successful terrorist attack can be fulfilled on water only with difficulty. Terrorists have not operated at sea to any great extent so far, because they can operate more easily and effectively on land.<sup>45</sup>

In other words, the innate difficulty, except for suicide attacks, to get away easily after commission of the act is what may have kept terrorists at bay. This intrinsic aspect, coupled with some intense sea policing, of the vital maritime trade routes and choke points, by the coalition forces and the functioning maritime regimes, have allowed sea commerce to flow relatively unharmed in the post 9/11 period.

### **Regional Maritime Environment**

The rising Asian economies and accompanied growth has, in recent years, generated a rush competition for grab of energy resources. Countries like China, India and Japan, while endeavouring to diversify their energy resources, are vigorously competing with each other, particularly in areas, washing the shores of the North Arabian Sea Basin.

Though India is virtually insular in terms of land communication, its trade interests are increasingly focused on the maritime domain.<sup>46</sup> India imports nearly 90 million tons of POL annually from the Gulf which is likely

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Khurana, op. cit., 142-143.

<sup>43</sup> "LTTE Navy is 'defunct', says Sri-Lankan MoD," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, September 26, 2007, 14.

<sup>44</sup> According to RAND Corporation's Terrorism Chronology Database and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, incidents of maritime terrorism account for only 2 per cent of all the terrorism incidents recorded over the past 30 years.

<sup>45</sup> Martin N. Murphy, "Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security," *Adelphi Paper*, no. 388, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 45.

<sup>46</sup> Khurana, op. cit., 139.

to increase to 260 million tons by 2015.<sup>47</sup> There is, therefore, little doubt, that in times to come, Indian Navy will play a crucial role in India's external security dynamics.

Japan, meanwhile, is excessively import-dependent for its energy and food supplies. Since 92 percent of its oil imports are sourced from West Asia and Africa (88 percent and 4 percent, respectively), the international shipping routes transiting the Indian Ocean are critical for its economic sustenance.<sup>48</sup>

Located only 290 nm from Pakistan's western coastal edge, traffic clearing from Hormuz towards Red Sea-Europe-US or transiting east for onward voyage to Malacca and Australia criss-cross close to Gwadar (Makran coast). The International community's vital stakes in the shipping lanes of the Gulf and the North Arabian Sea (NAS) make this expanse important, not only for regional countries but also for global powers. Besides, Pakistan's strategic location at the confluence of the Middle East and Central Asia has significant impact upon the country's security situation.

### **Pakistan's Sea Commerce**

At the national level, more than 95 per cent of Pakistan's trade is transported through sea. "100% of Pakistan's oil imports are from the Gulf. Therefore, continuous flow of energy through the vital Straits of Hormuz, is essential for sustenance of country's economy."<sup>49</sup> The yearly volume of Pakistan's sea borne trade is around 37.5 million tons. Of this figure, exports constitute roughly 6.5 million tons while imports make up 31.0 million tons, giving an export-import ratio of 1: 5. However, only 5 per cent of cargo is currently shared by the country's small merchant fleet.<sup>50</sup> Pakistan's growing trade of \$ 50 billion<sup>51</sup> remains largely dependent on foreign shipping lines and their local agents who increase freight cost at will. This renders the country's exports uncompetitive and its imports expensive. The freight charges to foreign shippers result in a drain of over US\$ 2 billion per annum.<sup>52</sup> This is a colossal amount, given the country's small economy, having a negative trade balance of

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<sup>47</sup> Admiral Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Chief of the Naval Staff Pakistan Navy, addressing Staff Course participants at the PN War College Lahore, June 8, 2007.

<sup>48</sup> Khurana, op. cit.

<sup>49</sup> Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Admiral, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, Message, "The Pakistan Navy-Today and Tomorrow," *Naval Forces*, International Forum for Maritime Power, Special issue 2007, vol. XXVII, 7.

<sup>50</sup> Pakistan Navy Shipping Corporation has 1 Bulk carrier, 10 Cargo vessels and 4 Tankers. Some Tankers were urgently procured following Pakistan-India stand-off in 2001 when international shippers raised cost. For more information, <http://www.pnsc.com.pk>.

<sup>51</sup> "Upgrading of the shipping fleet," *Dawn* (Lahore), Business Review, November 26-December 2, 2007.

<sup>52</sup> "Speedy privatization of Pakistan National Shipping Corporation urged, World Bank Report," *Dawn* (Lahore), January 22, 2007.


\$ 12.8 billion and foreign exchange reserves worth 11 billion dollars only.<sup>53</sup> This amount could rise considerably in the event of an act of terrorism in the North Arabian Sea or Pakistan's Makran coast, whereby international shippers may stipulate higher freight prices.

Ensuring an unhindered flow of sea commerce, particularly crude oil, remains a crucial component of Pakistan's national security calculus. It also underscores the significance of preserving sea lines that sequentially act as the country's economic arteries. In short, a robust maritime security is an assurance of Pakistan's energy safeguard and its economic well being.

### **Pakistan Coast – a Terrorist Haven?**

Pakistan's 960 km long coast runs from a swampy spot south east of Karachi called Sir Creek — a muddy puddle by the Arabian Sea that remembers a

#### **Disputed Sir Creek**



British official who settled a row about firewood there, and which should mark the still un-delimited maritime border between India and Pakistan<sup>54</sup> — to the Iranian border in the West.

In broad terms, Pakistan's coastal area is divided in two distinct regions. The Sind coast mainly contains marshy areas of the Indus Delta while the Makran coast extends 730 km west of Karachi to Gwatar Bay on the fringes of the Gulf of Oman. The Makran coast consists of sandy beaches, high cliffs, rocky headlands, pocket bays, lagoons and shifting sand dunes. The narrow plain west of Karachi rises rapidly into several mountain ranges. It is sparsely inhabited, with much of the poverty stricken population concentrated

<sup>53</sup> *Economist* (London), December 16-22, 2006, 100.

<sup>54</sup> "Up Sir Creek," *Economist* (London), January 20-26, 2007, 34.

in a string of small ports and several less significant fishing villages. Whereas the sandy beaches offer a straightforward landing site to drug peddlers and human traffickers, the cliffs in the nearby hinterland present perfect hideouts to terrorists and anti-state elements.

### Gulf of Oman, Makran Coast, Balochistan, Sind and Gujrat Coast



### Escalating Pakistan's Sea based Oil Imports?

In recent times, oil import in Pakistan gained impetus on account of depleting water in rivers, inter-provincial political wrangling over the construction of new dams and a shortage of natural gas supply from the province of Balochistan due to political disturbances. The scarcity of natural gas supply from Balochistan holding the country's largest reserves, has resulted in the closure of several gas fired electricity generation plants.<sup>55</sup> This has further catapulted oil demand from 4.5 million tons in 2005 to 18 million tons. Meanwhile, a 9.3 percent increase in electricity's consumption was recorded during 2007. As a consequence, Pakistan's petroleum bill in 2007, rose by 10 percent from \$ 6.7 billion to \$ 7.3 billion.<sup>56</sup> There has been, accordingly, an appreciable increase in the number of POL tankers, berthing at Karachi port.

A laden tanker blown up next to Pakistan's coast or in the port vicinity through an act of terror would have destructive consequences including closure of the port and damage to marine ecosystem. Therefore an appropriate expansion in the national maritime security arrangements embracing patrol and surveillance platforms with fitting sensors plus port monitoring facilities is deemed an essential need of the hour.

<sup>55</sup> In December 2007, WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) thermal (oil & gas) units production dropped from around 3000 MW to 1800 MW causing a short fall of 1200MW, *Dawn* (Lahore), December 13, 2007.

<sup>56</sup> "Petroleum import bill jumps to \$ 7.3 billion," *Nation* (Lahore), August 1, 2007.



## Gwadar Port

The coastal town of Gwadar in the province of Balochistan, 390 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz, is strategically located to monitor approaches to the crucial international energy outlet. The port is expected to expand commercial trade activities and reduce reliance on Pakistan's only other port at Karachi, some 250 miles to the east.<sup>57</sup> Gwadar Port will offer direct road access to Afghanistan, Central Asian States and China. Its location at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and at the opposite end of the strategic choke points of the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, enhances its value.

The port houses 13 multipurpose berths, each 200 meters long with a 5-kilometre approach channel and a capacity for vessels up to 50,000 DWT container ships, 100,000 DWT dry bulk carriers, and 200,000 DWT oil tankers.<sup>58</sup> The port is expected to generate revenues up to US \$10 billion per annum.

## The Port and Oil Politics

In the intricate settings of the Indian Ocean geopolitics and global energy scramble, the development of Gwadar port has assumed a central position. The port is considered to be the terminus of gas pipelines from CARs including multibillion dollar pipelines reaching either from Daulatbad's fields in Turkmenistan, South Pars fields in Iran, or from Qatar.<sup>59</sup> Gwadar port and future plans of cross-national oil pipelines traversing Balochistan, enhance the region's strategic value.

At the junction of South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia, Gwadar can provide a strategic base to China for expanding her stakes. Flanking the sensitive area of the Strait of Hormuz, the port can play an important role in the future containerised trade in Asia.<sup>60</sup> The United States and India see China's huge investment in Gwadar as having strategic objective to oversee the important energy outlet of Hormuz and counter rising Indo-US nexus in the region.

All in all, the developments in the surrounding region of Gwadar, unrest in Balochistan, America's control of Afghanistan, the emerging role of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the big powers quest for energy, are indicative of oil politics, brewing up in the region.

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<sup>57</sup> Azam Khan, op. cit.

<sup>58</sup> *Pakistan and Gulf Economist*, July 9-15, 2007, 23.

<sup>59</sup> "Gwadar and Oil Politics," *Dawn* (Lahore), Business Review, January 15-21, 2007.

<sup>60</sup> Large crude containers of up to 0.5 million tons form a crucial part of international oil movement today. See also "Gwadar and Oil Politics," *Dawn*, op. cit.

### **An Ominous Situation?**

Geographically, the Makran coast falls within the jurisdiction of Balochistan province, now simmering with political instability and where, as reported in *New York Times*, Taliban continue to resurge.<sup>61</sup>

For the past several years, the newly completed Gwadar port has been the Baloch insurgents' principal target. Continued rocket attacks and kidnappings, common during the construction period, could deter the international shipping from opting Gwadar port as a first choice. This may consequently cut down economic dividends expected from the multimillion dollar commercial venture.

A considerable amount of critically important military infrastructure, exists along Pakistan's Makran coast. This includes naval and air force bases as well as the newly established and functioning Jinnah Naval Base of the Pakistan Navy. Several other mega maritime projects, both at Gwadar and along the Makran coast, have been planned for the near future. Such maritime infrastructure presents a lucrative target to terror syndicates.

Given the geographic milieu, transnational oil politics and political unrest in Balochistan, Pakistan's maritime region and coast stand ripe for acts of maritime terrorism. The intelligence networks of neighbouring countries and great powers could conveniently exploit the situation to their advantage.

### **A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Sea Power**

During the ISS XVIII, Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations US Navy, unveiled the first new US Maritime Strategy in more than 20 years. The document entitled *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Sea Power* is said to represent a historical first since never before have the maritime forces of the United States i.e. the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, come together to create such a unified maritime strategy.<sup>62</sup>

The document signifies an approach to integrate sea power with other elements of US national power as well as international partners to protect and sustain the global interconnected system.<sup>63</sup> Guided by objectives expressed in the US National Security Strategy, National Strategy for Maritime Security and other security policy documents, the new maritime strategy calls for unified action by the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It aims to secure homeland from direct attack, secure strategic access, retain global freedom of

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<sup>61</sup> "At Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge," *New York Times*, January 21, 2007. "More evidence of Taliban leader hiding in Pakistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 19, 2007.

<sup>62</sup> *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Sea power*, Introduction. See also *Proceedings*, November 2007, 14.

<sup>63</sup> *Proceedings*, November 2007, 15.

action, strengthen existing and emerging alliances and establish favourable security conditions.

The strategy reaffirms the use of sea power to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore. It is also explicit in asserting that the global reach, persistent presence and operational flexibility, inherent in the US sea power, will be employed in pursuance of strategic imperatives. Given this backdrop, Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (IOR), with focus on the Arabian Gulf, are identified as regions of concentration of combat power and fostering cooperation.

### **Weighing Up the New Strategy**

The new strategy is a product of lessons culled from the earlier ISS,<sup>64</sup> a series of high level war games, and protracted inter-agency and intra-agency discussions with allies. It aspires to develop and employ the US sea power fused with like-minded nations to protect global interconnected maritime lifeline system, on which hinges the world's prosperity.

In 1997, the US international trade was valued close to \$ 1,600 billion.<sup>65</sup> Around 98 percent of this commerce was sea based. At the current growth rate this trade is likely to triple by 2020.<sup>66</sup> Accordingly, the US deems its security and prosperity to be inextricably linked to other nations and desires to protect and sustain the global interdependent network of sea borne trade.

At the nucleus of the new strategy is a globally postured sea power that secures the US from direct attack and advances Washington's interests around the world. The expeditionary character, agility and versatility of naval forces render the US navy the most effective military instrument available to Washington to pursue its global strategic objectives. However, for quite a few reasons, the US Navy alone cannot embark on the much needed national policy objectives far and wide. Teaming up with partner navies and coast guards is, thus, an unavoidable need of the United States.<sup>67</sup> This fact becomes all the more crucial, given the continuing colossal economic drain in sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the projected cost of ongoing wars expected to exceed USD 1.6 trillion (Euro 1.1 trillion) by 2008<sup>68</sup> and amidst

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<sup>64</sup> ISS XVII was held at the US Naval War College, Newport in September 2005.

<sup>65</sup> "US Exports/Imports History," Bureau of the Census, Washington D.C., 1998.

<sup>66</sup> Charles Bookman, "US Seaports: At the Crossroads of the Global Economy," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Fall 1996, 71.

<sup>67</sup> Embedded in the strategy is the doctrinal concept of Global Fleet Station (GFS) also loosely referred as a "1000 ship navy" or "Sea Base". The concept calls for widely distributed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners, pre-emption of non-traditional threats, and global response to crisis in regions around the world.

<sup>68</sup> "Cost of US wars in Afghanistan, Iraq doubles to 1.6 tr.," *Dawn* (Lahore), November 14, 2007.

rising domestic taxes, these concerns weigh heavily on the American public mind.<sup>69</sup>

The two regions, identified by the US in its new strategy for concentration of combat power, i.e. the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean, are the hub of emerging global realities. Besides home to some of the world's most critical sea lines of communication, the IOR enfolds the world's largest cluster of countries, holding both known as well as untapped energy resources. A large volume of international long haul maritime cargo from the Gulf, Africa and Europe transits through the region. The total trade that passes through the Indian Ocean amounts to US \$ 1 trillion of which US \$ 260 billion<sup>70</sup> worth of oil flows through the Straits of Hormuz, close to Pakistan's Makran coast. This sea borne trade, primarily oil, affects the daily lives of most people around the world.

India, Japan, the US and several littorals, including Pakistan, rely greatly on the Arabian Gulf for their energy needs.<sup>71</sup> Preserving order in this region is consequently as important for littorals, as it is for the international community, particularly the US.

### **The Cooperative Strategy and the Four-way “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”**

As Washington and New Delhi continue to expand their strategic partnership<sup>72</sup> and the new Cooperative Strategy unfolds, ties between the two Navies (USN-IN) are already evolving to become the domineering strategic alliance in the IOR. The two navies recently conducted some of the largest naval manoeuvres as far and wide as the North Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and the Pacific.<sup>73</sup> In August 2007, the Indian Navy hosted a major exercise off

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<sup>69</sup> “America votes 2008,” Democrat and Republican candidates Presidential debates telecast live on *CNN* in December 2007. Most of the questions posed to the Presidential nominees by the audience related to the issues of war in Iraq, Afghanistan and domestic tax cuts.

<sup>70</sup> Admiral Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, addressing Staff Course participants at the Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore, Pakistan June 8, 2007.

<sup>71</sup> *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 31, no. 1, January-February 2007, 140.

<sup>72</sup> In his televised address to the audience during the ISS XVIII on October 18, 2007, the US Undersecretary of State, Nicholas Burns spelled out the key objectives of American policy. Foremost was the advancement of strategic partnership with India.

<sup>73</sup> Revitalised after 9/11 and increasing both in scale and dimension, the Malabar series of USN-IN exercises are today the most imposing naval manoeuvres in the region. Malabar 2005 involved Indian Carrier INS Viraat and US Naval carrier strike group 11 led by USS Nimitz. The Malabar 07-1 was conducted by the two sides in April 2007 off Okinawa in the Pacific. In the exercise conducted in August 2007 in Bay of Bengal, Carriers USS Kitty Hawk, USS Nimitz and a Los Angeles class nuclear

its east coast, wherein, besides USN and IN, Japanese and Australian navies also participated. The exercise triggered concerns in Beijing about an incipient anti China grouping. Be that as it may, the increasing defence cooperation between the four countries, termed by the Japanese PM as a four-way “arc of freedom and prosperity”,<sup>74</sup> sent ripples across the region.

### **Increasing Sway?**

The stated aim of the recently announced new military Headquarters, AFRICOM<sup>75</sup> aside, the US seems determined to secure oil flows from a continent that is already a key source of its energy imports in a volatile world. Somalia, next to a huge US military base in Djibouti, sits over lucrative and untapped deposits of oil, gas and uranium.<sup>76</sup> Gulf of Guinea producers like Nigeria and Angola too, will shortly supply a quarter of US oil imports. In addition, the deserts and mountains of the Horn of Africa and the arid Sahel have become a new frontier in the US global war on terror in which sub-Saharan oil suppliers may be vulnerable to violent Muslim militancy infiltrating down from the north. Iran, at odds with the US, neighbours the strategically vital Arabian Gulf and can easily disturb the regional maritime traffic plying to and from the Strait of Hormuz.

A rising China, making inroads in the Indian Ocean and securing energy pacts in Iran and Africa,<sup>77</sup> meanwhile presents a formidable challenge to the US regional dominance. AFRICOM will unmistakably weaken the increased presence of China in the region and concurrently aid the US to promote its strategic interests in the region.

### **Cutting Back Regional Friction**

From the regional perspective, perhaps the most constructive proposal announced during the ISS XVIII, was the setting up of an Indian Ocean Naval

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powered submarine, USS Chicago, were among 21 other combatants from four countries.

<sup>74</sup> “Four-nation naval cooperation worries China,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, August 29, 2007, 14.

<sup>75</sup> Dedicated solely to operations in Africa, AFRICOM is the first new US headquarters since the Northern Command was established in Djibouti in 2002. AFRICOM formally came into being on October 1, 2007 and is branded to help stop the continent from careening into conflict while also serving US interests abroad.

<sup>76</sup> “What makes the US intervene in Somalia,” *Dawn* (Lahore), 20 January, 2007.

<sup>77</sup> China which imports nearly half of its oil needs consumed 7.16 million barrels a day in 2007. According to IEA, China’s demand is expected to exceed that of the US soon after 2010. Beijing already has a commanding presence in Africa, building roads, railways and petrochemical installations. When President Hu Jintao visited Africa in early 2007, it was his third trip in less than three years.

Symposium (IONS) by the Indian Navy. Its inaugural session is due in New Delhi in February 2008.<sup>78</sup>

Through its consultative and cooperative mechanism, the IONS could become a cornerstone in reducing maritime security concerns, thereby cutting back regional friction. The non-resolution of maritime boundary disputes and an acrimonious past has, for long, kept the region on tenterhooks. *While the response of the Pakistan Navy to the Indian invitation remains to be seen, there cannot be two opinions that the entrenched walls in mind will fall only if the two sides talk to each other. A small step to cut the mistrust or draw closer, may ultimately transform into a giant leap for the regional stability and prosperity.*

### **Maritime Policing in Pakistan**

Maritime policing in Pakistan is largely performed by the Pakistan Navy (PN) and the Maritime Security Agency (MSA); the latter, a semi military organisation. Both have a complementary zone of responsibility in the area stretching from the Sind-Makran coast to about 200 nm seaward.

### **Pakistan Navy and Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP)- Combined Task Force 150**

In early January 2007, President Bush awarded the ‘Legion of Merit’, to Admiral Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, during the latter’s visit to the US. The award pinned by Admiral Michael G. Mullen, CNO, US Navy at a ceremony in Washington, was in recognition of Admiral Tahir’s efforts to promote bilateral cooperation in the regional maritime and security affairs and his firm commitment to the global war on terror.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Vice Admiral Nirmal Verma, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy was a panellist in the ISSXVIII seminar discussion. He read a paper on ‘Humanitarian Assistance’. Admiral Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Chief of the Naval Staff Pakistan Navy was the Chairperson in the same panel. Addressing the naval luminaries at the symposium, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy, stated that in order to further the process of constructive engagement amongst littoral states of IOR, the Indian Navy has this year itself taken the initiative of setting-up an inclusive and consultative regional forum to be known as ‘Indian Ocean Naval Symposium’ (IONS), where the Chiefs of Navy of all littoral States of IOR can periodically and regularly meet to discuss issues that bear upon regional maritime security. He further added that to formally launch the IONS Initiative, ratify its Objectives, and establish Charter, the Indian Navy has already extended invitation to the Chiefs of Navy of the nation-states of IOR littoral to an inaugural IONS Seminar 2008 being hosted by Indian Navy, at New Delhi from February 14-16, 2008 on the subject of ‘Constructive Engagement’ in the maritime domain.

<sup>79</sup> ‘Naval Chief gets US Award,’ *Dawn* (Lahore), January 25, 2007.

Despite its resource constraints, Pakistan Navy has contributed significantly towards regional maritime security. A sustained<sup>80</sup> participation in the Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP), the maritime component of Operation Enduring Freedom,<sup>81</sup> is a demonstration of PN's commitment to the cause.

During the first year (2001) of Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistan Navy provided logistic support to the coalition forces from its bases along the Makran coast. Today, Pakistan Navy participates as the only regional navy in the Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan and has the distinction of spearheading the coalition's multinational Combined Task Force (CTF 150) twice.<sup>82</sup> Within the coalition plan, Pakistan Navy is principally involved in duties in parts of the northern Arabian Sea region and along Pakistan's southern coast besides the oil rich Persian Gulf region. With an existing fleet of only six British Type 21 frigates, Pakistan deploys one unit to the CTF on rotation.<sup>83</sup> Type 21s are the only platforms in the PN inventory that can undertake operations beyond coastal waters. "With the availability of required resources and assets, we will be able to enhance the level of our contribution in CMCP",<sup>84</sup> says the incumbent Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy.

### **Proliferation Security Initiative and Pakistan**

The US sponsored initiative, PSI was announced by President Bush in May 2003. The initiative's purpose is to stop illicit trade of WMDs and associated delivery systems to and from states of proliferation concern. Accordingly, "the PSI aims to improve coordination among its partner states in intelligence, diplomacy and operational techniques in order to improve their capability to detain, inspect and seize suspected cargo."<sup>85</sup> Core PSI countries also include declared states of proliferation concern. With eleven founding member countries, PSI today boasts of more than 70 states on its list.

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<sup>80</sup> Pakistan Navy has been contributing in this international campaign since April 2004. Also, "Pakistan Navy assumes command of MTF," *Dawn* (Lahore), August 2, 2007.

<sup>81</sup> Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Admiral, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, Message, "The Pakistan Navy - Today and Tomorrow," *Naval Forces*, International Forum for Maritime Power, special issue 2007, vol. XXVII, 7.

<sup>82</sup> Rear Admiral Shahid Iqbal assumed command of TF 150 on behalf of Pakistan Navy on April 22, 2006; Commodore Hasham bin Saddique of Pakistan Navy assumed command of TF 150 on August 1, 2007, *Dawn* (Lahore), August 2, 2007.

<sup>83</sup> Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Admiral, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, Interview, *Jane's Navy International*, April 2007, 34.

<sup>84</sup> Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Admiral, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, Message, "The Pakistan Navy - Today and Tomorrow," op. cit.

<sup>85</sup> Dana H. Allin, Gilles Andréani, Philippe Errera, Gary Samore, "Repairing the Damage: Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Consensus," *Adelphi Paper*, no. 389, 51.

Apparently, the principal states of proliferation concern are Iran and North Korea. However, the possibility of PSI being used against other states cannot be ruled out. The initiative is professed as an activity and not as an organisation on ground with a secretariat or a fund. Member countries conduct regular interdiction exercises. One such exercise codenamed “Team Samurai-04” was hosted by Japan in October 2004.<sup>86</sup> Though it is hard to point concrete examples of successes due to the classified nature of interdiction operations, the initiative is highly acclaimed and probably has a significant deterrent effect.<sup>87</sup>

### **Legal Status**

Although PSI claims to be founded on national as well as international laws, the legal position of PSI is quite murky. Viewed from a legal stance, PSI does not have an explicit UN sanction but claims to be consistent with the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 1992 and is supported by EU and G-8. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that guarantees freedom of navigation on high seas is the main impediment in PSI's strict running and in some countries' reluctance to join the initiative. The US has addressed this curb by concluding bilateral agreements with countries which flag the bulk of sea trade. Nonetheless, PSI remains outside UN's legal sanction and hence, many countries continue to voice their concern.

### **Pakistan's Dilemma**

Unfortunately, Pakistan figures prominently in PSI literature. It appears both as a potential ally as well as a nation of concern. Possibility of the initiative being used against Pakistan at any time in the future cannot be ruled out entirely. However, given the country's established strategic capability, a direct military strike, is a remote possibility.

In the maritime district, Pakistan's entry in the PSI<sup>88</sup> could lead to several consequences. This includes boarding of its merchant vessels by PSI forces (as deemed essential and at a time and place of their choosing), involvement in hot pursuits, against the UNCLOS that allows traditional freedom of navigation at sea and perhaps a more difficult proposition of boarding vessels of a brotherly country like Iran.

It may not, therefore, be in the larger interest of Pakistan to become a member of the PSI. However, to avoid being isolated, a constructive engagement with core members, remains a valuable option. Pakistan Navy's unreserved participation in CMCP is illustrative of the country's contribution to PSI, albeit without official commitment.

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<sup>86</sup> Khurana, op. cit., 148.

<sup>87</sup> Dana H. Allin and others, op. cit.

<sup>88</sup> In 2004 the US offered Pakistan to join PSI.



### **Recent Initiatives by Pakistan Navy (PN)**

To augment counter-terror operations, the PN recently acquired few Turkish made vessels commonly known as VBSS (Visit Board Search and Seizure). With displacement of around 90 tons and speed in excess of 40 knots, these craft operate within coastal waters and supplement the policing effort of the Pakistan Navy. VBSS is designed to carry 12-15 personnel and has a 12.7 mm gun as the only weapon onboard. While PN endeavours to acquire a few more vessels of the kind, such platforms may not come soon enough, given the financial constraints and other operational priorities.

For quite sometime, Pakistan Navy has also been pushing to expand its fleet size, so as to increase its participation in the Task Force 150. Pakistan has asked the US to supply it with six Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates to augment its fleet of surface ships.<sup>89</sup>

### **A New Set Up**

In February 2005, the Pakistan Navy instituted a new command set up called Commander Coastal Area (COMCOAST). The organization, comprising Special Services Group and Pakistan Navy Marines, is headed by a Rear Admiral who commands four diverse Battalions. One of these is exclusively dedicated to counter terror operations in the intricate web of coastal creeks. The Creek Battalion, as it is called, guards an area with a frontage of around 187 kilometres and a radial depth of 57 kilometres. Its meagre assets include a few hovercrafts, military assault boats, small arms like G-3, MG1A3, MP 5 and rocket propelled grenades. These are by no means, enough to maintain an effective watch in the allotted area. During a recently concluded major exercise (Sea Spark 2006), the Pakistan Navy determined the command articulation of this newly raised Coastal Command.

### **On Road to Indigenous Construction**

Time and again, Pakistan has suffered military embargoes, slapped by the US. Both during and following the Cold War, a relationship advanced on expediency, precluded any long term investment in laying foundations for a strong domestic military industrial infrastructure. Despite liberal US military assistance during the Afghan War, PN weapons could not be upgraded due to low priority accorded to the service in the overall national security scheme. The package of P-3C Orion aircraft procured during the period remained non-operational while eight US frigates of the Brooke Garcia classes obtained on

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<sup>89</sup> In the recent past US showed inclination to supply PN with second hand *Oliver Hazard Perry* class frigates. With displacement in excess of 3000 tons, the ships configure a helo and variety of sensors and weapons including SSM, SAM and 76 mm guns. See also, Interview, Admiral Muhammad Afzal Tahir, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, *Jane's Navy International*, April 2007, 34.

lease were called back in 1991.

The situation today is, however, quite different. Pakistan Navy is well on the road to indigenising much of its platform construction wants.<sup>90</sup> But naval missions, conducted in response to non-traditional asymmetric threats, now require not only novel approach and techniques but modern platforms equipped with distinctive sensors.<sup>91</sup> Given the diverse task, extraordinary times and exceptional challenges, the need for Pakistan Navy to be, right away, provided with mission specific platforms cannot be overstated.

### The Needs

As to the wide spectrum of mandated tasks, Pakistan Navy's running complement of Type-21 destroyers is overly inadequate. Moreover, having served as the fleet's mainstay for over a decade, these ships are now on the edge of their operational life.<sup>92</sup> To fill the void, addition of 3-4 suitably equipped large combatants<sup>93</sup> will allow the PN much needed flexibility and an increased participation in the CMCP. Supply of the following, could additionally improve Pakistan Navy's potential to combat maritime terrorism in its area of responsibility:

- **UAV's:** Maritime Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly becoming part of navies worldwide. To vigilantly monitor its treacherous coast, Pakistan must have well equipped UAVs. These platforms should be mission specific and appropriately configured to meet local environs. MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance, 8-10 hours) UAVs designed for functions in littorals *i.e.* in and among islands looking at terror camps<sup>94</sup> along the coast and creeks, may prove to be an ideal asset. Infra red sensors like SAFIRE III, (already in use onboard PN surveillance aircraft and helicopters) and other Electro Optics gear onboard will facilitate better night surveillance. Ideally speaking, the UAVs should also have monitoring facilities, both on ground as well as onboard ships, to improve situational awareness.

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<sup>90</sup> In recent years PN has added to its inventory a locally constructed Khalid class Agosta 90-B submarine, two fast-attack craft fitted with Chinese C-802 missiles and small assault boats. One of the four recently contracted F-22 P Chinese frigates is also intended to be built at the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW). See also, *Naval Forces*, special issue 2007, vol. XXVII, and *Proceedings*, May 2007, 40.

<sup>91</sup> See also "Maritime Conflicts in the 21st Century," *Naval Forces*, November 2007, 21.

<sup>92</sup> PN has contracted for four F-22P frigates from China, all of which are planned to be in service by 2013.

<sup>93</sup> Over 3000 tons, like the USN Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates.

<sup>94</sup> "Maritime Surveillance UAV's – Shaping Up for Naval Roles," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 42. issue 24, June 15, 2005, 50.

- **Helicopters:** Helicopters are essential to beef up counter-terror efforts in creeks and other parts of the coast. Outfitted with infra red sensors and armed with machine guns and rockets (use of missiles against saboteurs and drug peddlers would constitute an overkill and may not be a cost-effective option for such non-military targets) for deployment against fleeing or highly mobile targets, these platforms can provide a good backup support to water borne effort.

Additionally, Night Vision Devices (NVDs) for the crew and pilot (with duly configured cockpit lighting), and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) can make a vast difference, both in surveillance as well as identification. However, it may also be noted that for most part of the year, the Makran coast registers a humid and sultry weather that could result in reduced performance of FLIR and consequently, much lesser ranges during surveillance operations.

To allow closer ground operations, as and when needed, provision of Automatic Flight Control System onboard helos remains an indispensable requirement. Pakistan Navy could also consider installing such devices onboard Z-9 (Dauphin) helos, being acquired as part of the Chinese F-22P frigate programme. However, to protect these platforms from ground fire, strong armour plating and other protection measures will have to be employed.

- **Hovercraft/Flat Bottom Craft:** Pakistan's extensive coastal area and vulnerabilities demand constant supervision and well-equipped craft, other than that currently available. Addition of high speed Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) for reconnaissance and combat patrolling in creeks and other parts of the coastal areas, can improve counter-terror capability. However, such vessels may become easy targets for terrorists skilled in using Rocket Propelled Guns (RPGs).
- **Miscellaneous:** The Pakistan Navy must have an adequate stock of NVDs, Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) and portable HF/VHF radio systems,<sup>95</sup> which are currently either short or not available at all. Availability of a UAV monitoring and control station would facilitate real time engagement of dynamic and time sensitive targets, as and when needed.

### Maritime Security Agency (MSA)

In addition to the Pakistan Navy, the Maritime Security Agency is responsible for regulating and protecting maritime interests within Pakistan's Exclusive

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<sup>95</sup> Bush Administration has informed US Congress it intends selling Harris HF/VHF radio equipment worth US \$ 160 million to Pakistan to help improve latter's security and facilitate updated intelligence between patrols and higher headquarters, *Dawn* (Lahore), December 21, 2006.

Zone. Included in its core tasks is prevention of drug trafficking and human smuggling.<sup>96</sup>

MSA has one ex US Gearing Class Destroyer, 4 corvettes of Chinese origin, 3 Chinese fast patrol boats and 3 Defender aircrafts of UK origin. While 1960s vintage destroyer has outlived its utility, Chinese origin corvettes are the mainstay of MSA operations. But these corvettes can only operate in moderate sea conditions. A sea state beyond, seriously impairs the operational performance of these craft.

Suitable platforms equipped with modern sensors and capable of operating in heavy seas are an essential need of MSA. The agency's Defender aircraft also lacks night surveillance capability, which can improve if fitted with FLIR. Likewise, addition of some more helos could add to the Agency's boarding operations.

### **Maritime Intelligence Sharing Mechanism in Pakistan**

A fitting mechanism for intelligence gathering, collating and coordinating efforts between various agencies to counter terrorism at sea, does not exist in Pakistan. In the conduct of operations, each agency in Pakistan acts independently, either on a tip off or else employing a random search and interception method. There is an urgent need to institutionalise maritime intelligence sharing and coordination to ensure effective synergetic response to illicit activities, both along and off the Makran coast.

### **Domain Awareness**

Drug cartels and human traffickers have links in regional countries, particularly the Gulf States. These countries have their own set ups to counter illegal sea commerce. Comprehensive intelligence sharing between Pakistan, regional countries and Task Force 150 can provide effective domain awareness in the North Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf.<sup>97</sup> This would mutually aid the region and the international community in preserving and protecting sea trade in the area.

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<sup>96</sup> Rear Admiral Asif Sandilla, Director General Maritime Security Agency, Talk at the Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore, January 10, 2007.

<sup>97</sup> To enhance regional maritime domain awareness, a system called Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (VRMTC), and supported by the US Department of Transportation via Internet based Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) was proposed for the Gulf countries in the Middle East Regional Sea Power Symposium dovetailed with ISS XVIII. The system intends to cover the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Pakistan can examine the proposal to reinforce security of the maritime traffic within its own area.

## Conclusion

Pakistan's maritime expanse and politically unstable situation in the province of Balochistan remains unusually tempting for terror acts and the conduct of illegitimate sea commerce. The conditions in bordering Afghanistan and alleged Taliban strongholds in and around Quetta call for a first rate vigil to respond to possible challenges in the North Arabian Sea and the Makran coast. Despite critical platform shortages and allied facilities, both PN and MSA continue to perform remarkably well in deterring maritime terrorism. Yet, increasing vulnerabilities and threats in the area, as well as operational commitments, continue to stretch Pakistan Navy and sea policing agencies to the furthest limits. Instead of recklessly lambasting and blaming Pakistan for diverting Coalition Support Funds elsewhere,<sup>98</sup> the media in US may examine Pakistan's unstinting contribution in the ongoing war over the past six years and its enduring suffering as a result.

The global maritime security today underpins the economic security of all nations. As a coalition partner, the United States must extend all possible assistance to Pakistan including provision of suitably equipped platforms and personnel training that would enable a major non-NATO ally to effectively ward off maritime terrorism. This is essential for legitimate commerce to prevail in a crucially important region. Preserving order in the North Arabian Sea and the Makran coast is as much an imperative for Pakistan as it is for the world. ■

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<sup>98</sup> "NYT Accuses Pakistan of Diverting Terrorism Funds," *Dawn* (Lahore), December 25, 2007. The New York Times report alleges that much of \$5 billion Pakistan received from the US under Coalition Support Fund to fight terrorists was diverted to buy weapons to counter India, *New York Times*, December 24, 2007.

## PAKISTAN'S TRADE AND DIPLOMACY TOWARD CENTRAL ASIA: A CASE STUDY OF UZBEKISTAN DURING 1991-2007

Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik\*

### Abstract:

*Although Pakistan has a long cherished desire to cultivate strong trading and economic ties with Central Asian countries, there are inherent problems such as the long Soviet legacy, the Afghan War, lack of a direct road link, and the Taliban, Jibad, and terrorism factor. Nevertheless, prospects of trade and economic relations seem bright. Pakistan could be a transit route for Central Asian countries, linking them up to the Arabian Sea via the Gwadar Deep Sea Port in Pakistan's Balochistan province. Second, the Karakorum Highway, linking Pakistan with China, could be realigned to include these countries. This would help revive the ancient Grand Silk Route trade. Third, strategically located Pakistan could be an energy transit route between Central and South Asia. Furthermore, the chronic power shortage in Pakistan could be augmented from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As a whole, Pakistan's trade with all Central Asian countries including Uzbekistan has been quite negligible since the establishment of their relations in 1991. Unfortunately, possibilities have not been translated into reality as yet. Therefore, concrete policy actions are broadly needed by all concerned countries to boost their trading and economic relations.*

### Introduction

**P**akistan has a long cherished desire to cultivate strong trading, economic and cultural ties with six Central Asian countries namely; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Unfortunately, Pakistan does not have any direct land link with any of Central Asian countries. But, Pakistan has the potential to emerge as transit and energy corridor for the landlocked Central Asian countries by

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linking them up to the Arabian Sea via the Gwadar Deep Sea Port. The realignment of the Karakorum Highway, linking Pakistan with China, would revive the ancient Silk Route that connects Central Asia, Pakistan and China. Besides these vital transportation links, there is a possibility of linking Turkmenistan through a gas pipeline project with Pakistan onward to India and China, in addition to buying electricity from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to meet the chronic power shortage in Pakistan. These are extremely promising prospects but they have not been translated into action for the past 17 years or so. It is evident from the fact that Pakistan's trade with Central Asia has remained quite marginal. Concrete steps such as building transportation and energy corridors could boost trade and economic relations between Pakistan and Central Asia and also Eurasian region at large. In the long run, Russia, China, Afghanistan and India will find improved diplomatic and trade relations between Pakistan and Central Asia beneficial to their vital commercial and geo-political interests. This would also increase the interests of the leading economies of South East Asia, Japan and South Korea. Central Asia then can benefit from East Asian economic miracle, increased trade and investment.

This paper analyses Pakistan's economic relations with the Republic of Uzbekistan since its independence in 1991 through 2007 to see how bilateral trade benefited the two countries and the region at large. An analysis of bilateral trade, factors hampering trade, and investment possibilities would be discussed. Regional organisations also play important role in bringing countries together for common actions. In this sense, Pakistan-Uzbekistan economic relations will also be analysed in view of their participation in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Based on trade and economic analysis, an attempt will also be made to offer policy guidelines to decision-makers to overcome difficulties surrounding the Pakistan-Uzbekistan economic relations in order to convert this relationship into a dynamic relationship in the years to come.

### **The Origin of Contention**

Two factors have largely overshadowed the development of friendly ties between Pakistan and Uzbekistan: (I) the Cold War, and (II) the Taliban episode in Afghanistan. Cold War held up the development of the possibility of the promotion of ties between Pakistan and Central Asia that was a part of the former Soviet Union. When Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947, Central Asian republics long had become part and parcel of the USSR. Therefore, an impendent contact had remained impossible between Pakistan and Central Asian states. Furthermore, Pakistan, being a strong ally of the United States and the West, was considered an adversary, particularly during the Afghan War (1979-88), to the Soviet interests in Central Asia. After the Soviet break up in 1991, Pakistan and Uzbekistan established diplomatic

relations in 1992. Unfortunately, the Taliban regime (1996-2001) in Afghanistan, apparently backed by Pakistan, continued as a source of tension between Pakistan and Uzbekistan as their interests perpetually clashed with each other during this period. Tashkent's authorities claimed that Islamabad did not do enough to fight suspected terrorists, including remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a major threat to Uzbekistan's integrity, in remote regions of Pakistan in collaboration with similar fundamentalist groups. A large number of fighters from the IMU, including Tahir Yuldosh, were believed to have settled in Pakistan's tribal region of Waziristan after the downfall of the Taliban. Pakistan has repeatedly assured Uzbekistan of its resolve to fight against terrorist groups based inside Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> In fact, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have been facing terrorism, extremism, and fundamentalism and there is a need that they should jointly work to overcome this menace. Uzbek Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov, raised the question of terrorism with the Pakistan leadership during his visit to Islamabad in November 1998.<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif underscored the paramount importance of the countries bordering Afghanistan to concert their efforts to promote the Afghan peace process. Therefore, he urged the need that the menace of terrorism should be tackled by all the six countries bordering Afghanistan during a talk with Kamilov, who met with Sharif again at Islamabad on June 5, 1999.<sup>3</sup> Being members of the Six Plus Two Group, Pakistan and Uzbekistan have involved in the peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem. There had been frequent ministerial-level visits in the recent times with a focus on resolving the same issue. Therefore, it can be safely pointed out that the former Soviet and the Taliban factor had severe implications for the growth of independent relations between Pakistan and Uzbekistan.

### **Diplomatic Beginning**

With the removal of two above mentioned irritants to some extent, diplomatic relations have got all the necessary impetus to grow. As a whole, both countries have been enjoying cordial bilateral diplomatic relations since the independence of Uzbekistan in 1991 from the Soviet Union's break-up. Pakistan was among those first 23 Islamic countries, which sent a delegation to Uzbekistan in December 1991, led by Foreign Minister, Sardar Asif Ali. Formal diplomatic relationship was established in the following year in May 1992. Pakistan established its embassy at Tashkent in June same year. Another significant point was that high-level diplomatic exchanges between the two

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<sup>1</sup> Report by the Associated Press of Pakistan, January 13, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Radio Free Europe, *Newsline*, vol. 2, no. 228, 98-11-30, <http://www.rferl/1998/98-11-30.rferl.html>.

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.uzland.info/news/06\\_05\\_99.htm#CBL](http://www.uzland.info/news/06_05_99.htm#CBL).



countries were made within months after the establishment of diplomatic relations. For instance, Prime Minister Sharif undertook a visit to Uzbekistan in June 1992, the first-ever visit to Uzbekistan by a Pakistani leader. The other significant aspect of this visit was that it was made within ten months after Uzbekistan gained independence from the former Soviet Union in August 1991. This visit was followed by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's two visits to Uzbekistan that were undertaken in May 1994 and again in May 1995. President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari visited Uzbekistan in October 1996.

Later, visits were exchanged between President General Pervez Musharraf and Uzbek President Islam Ghaniyov Karimov on March 5-7, 2005 and May 2-4, 2006, respectively. President Karimov's visit to Pakistan was the first visit by a top Uzbek leader after his country gained independence. Business, trade, small and medium-size enterprises, and agriculture were the subject of as many as nine agreements signed during this visit as well as issues of security and counter-terrorism were also discussed between the two leaders.<sup>4</sup> In order to cooperate in security matters, both leaders signed an agreement to combat terrorism. There have been extensive exchanges at the foreign ministers level between the two countries.

Following the first-ever Pakistan's Parliamentary Delegation's visit to Uzbekistan in January 2007, under the leadership of Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Pakistan-Uzbekistan Friendship Society was formed to enhance mutual parliamentary and cultural ties.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz undertook his first-ever official visit to Tashkent on March 13-15, 2007. The primary purpose of Aziz's visit to Tashkent was the promotion of bilateral trade and investment between the two countries with a focus on gas, oil and electricity sector. Federal Ministers and a large number of leading businessmen were also included in the delegation.<sup>6</sup> Besides Tashkent, Prime Minister Aziz also visited the ancient cities of Samarkand and Bukhara. While welcoming Prime Minister Aziz, Uzbek President Karimov said: "We see your visit as a sign of developing cooperation between Uzbekistan and Pakistan."<sup>7</sup> In response, Prime Minister Aziz noted with satisfaction: "I am sure that the cooperation between our two countries, based on mutual trust and respect, will continue to grow."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> "About a visit of H. E. Mr Islam Karimov," *Liberty International* (Islamabad), May 2006; "Uzbek-Pakistan Relations," *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Senator Talha Mahmood was nominated as President of the Society.

<sup>6</sup> It included: Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, Ejazul Haq, Federal Communication Minister, Shamim Siddique, Inter-Provincial Coordination Minister, Salim Saifullah Khan, Textile Industry Minister, Mushtaq Ali Cheema, Water & Power Minister, Liaqat Ali Jatoi, and State Commerce Minister, Hamid Yar Hiraj.

<sup>7</sup> *Uzbekistan Today* (Tashkent), March 16, 2007.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

During the visit, both countries signed four Memoranda of Understandings (MoUs). The most important MOU was related to transportation and transit facilities, ensuring Pakistan as a corridor for energy, gas, and trade. Uzbekistan is rich in energy resources. Since 1996, it has been an exporter of energy. The country is world's eighth largest producer of gas with 66.2 TCF reserves capacity in the Amudarya Basin and Burabek area. Besides a major oil producer, Uzbekistan generates its electricity from gas-fired units and it is an exporter of electricity. The energy sector continues to keep expanding in Uzbekistan. Realising these energy potentials of Uzbekistan, Pakistan can enter into various promising joint ventures with that country in the field of oil, gas and electricity to ensure energy security for energy-deficit Pakistan.

The second MOU was signed between the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and the Uzbek Chamber of Commerce. The educational and academic research MOU was signed between the International Islamic University, Islamabad with the Uzbek Islamic Institute. The fourth MOU was related to the signing of the Treaty in Legal & Criminal matters between the two countries to combat terrorist and criminal activities. Both countries can be natural partners in combating terrorism. *Madaris* (Islamic Seminaries) could play a pivotal role in bringing both the people of Pakistan and Uzbekistan closer. *Madaris* should be transformed into centres of excellence, similar to the good old days when such *Madaris* produced a large number of eminent scholars<sup>9</sup> and connected the people of the Indian Sub-continent with the people of Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara. No *Jibadi* (Holy War) culture ever existed in such *Madaris* in the past until the West created a *Jibadi* culture to fight Soviet Communism in Afghanistan during 1979-88, whose spill-over effects have created terrorism facing the world today.

Both Pakistan and Uzbekistan have already taken encouraging steps over the past couple of years to expand the orbit of economic relations. Air link between Lahore and Tashkent, for instance, has been restored from July 2006. This has also increased the number of visitors between the two countries. For instance, the number of visitors from Pakistan accounted merely 100 in 2006, whereas in the first three months of 2007, it increased to 1200. Majestic architectural monuments of Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva and Farghana Valley could attract a large number of foreign tourists to Uzbekistan. Both Pakistan and Uzbekistan are parts of the ancient Silk Route. Moreover, the opening up of a branch of the National Bank of Pakistan at

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<sup>9</sup> Such as Muhammad Al-Khorazmi (780-863 AD), Ahmad Al-Farghoni (798-861 AD), Imam Abu Mansur Al-Matouridi (872-950 AD), Abu Nasr Muhammad Al-Farabi (872-950 AD), Abu Rehan Muhammad Ibne Ahmad Al-Beruni (973-1051 AD), Abu Ali Ibne-Sina (980-1037 AD), Burhkhoniddin Al-Marghiloni (1118-1197 AD), Mirza Ulugbaig (1394-1449 AD), Alisher Navoi (1441-1501 AD), and Kamaliddin Bekhzod (1455-1535 AD).

Tashkent in the near future, discussed during Aziz's visit to Tashkent, would facilitate mutual trade and investment.

Russia also sees the development of diplomatic and economic relations between Pakistan and Uzbekistan somewhat in a positive manner. Hindered by geography and cultural dissimilarities, India cannot play down the growing importance of Pakistan's relations with Uzbekistan. Pakistan's potential as trade and energy corridor for the landlocked Uzbekistan and access to the Persian Gulf through the Deep Sea Gwadar Port, is a natural advantage for Pakistan in the future. In other words, the growing importance of the Gwadar Port would counter any Indian manoeuvring in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Central Asia against Pakistan. Therefore, the foundation of solid diplomatic, political and economic relations between Pakistan and Uzbekistan has already been laid down and it is sure to strengthen in the future.

### **The Frail Regionalism**

Apart from historical, ethnic, cultural and Islamic bonds, regional cooperation also fosters cooperation between Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Both countries are members of the ECO that includes six Central Asian Republics, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Pakistan has also got an Observer status along with India, Iran, and Mongolia in the SCO, where Uzbekistan is an active member. Besides Uzbekistan, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are its members. Under the changing circumstances, it is believed that "Pakistan's Observer status in the SCO should turn into a full-fledged membership". Prime Minister Aziz made this point while talking to President Karimov at Tashkent. SCO intends to combat militancy, separatism, terrorism, and to foster energy and economic cooperation. Pakistan participated at the Shanghai SCO moot in June 2006 with the highest profile as President Musharraf represented Pakistan in the Summit. For some reasons, Pakistan could not attain the status of full membership at that time. For Pakistan, SCO is still not becoming a flourishing stand. Notwithstanding, Pakistan's participation was lowered down at the SCO Bishkek Summit held in August 2007, while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, continued their participation at the highest level. Iran was not admitted as a member at this stage too; nor were Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Pakistan and India. The latter is also keeping a low profile at the SCO. Pakistan might be carefully watching India's attitude toward SCO. Pakistan's participation at the SCO Bishkek moot, however, led the critics to portray that organisation's clout for Pakistan had shrunk. The participation of Pakistan at the Foreign Minister level gave a signal of Pakistan being disinterested in the organisation for the time being. Earlier meetings were attended either at the Prime Minister or the Presidential level. Apparently this departure has been

impelled by the internal situation and pressing engagements of the leaders at home.

#### *Trading Constraints with SCO*

In terms of Pakistan's economic relationships such as trade, investment and mutual economic cooperation, the region of SCO has not emerged as a vital area for such interactions. For instance, as far Pakistan's bilateral trade with SCO is concerned, Pakistan's total trade with this bloc was recorded US\$ 6.055 billion in 2006 that made SCO's share of Pakistan's exports as 6 per cent and imports 14.5 per cent for the same period. Moreover, major chunk of this bilateral trade was destined for China and this increase was the result of Pakistan's Vision East Asia that aims at increased trade and commercial linkages with the countries of East Asia rather than SCO's overtures. Out of 14.5 per cent of Pakistan's imports from SCO, China got the lion's share of 13.5, while the remaining one per cent belonged to other five SCO countries. Similarly, out of 6 per cent export share of SCO, China's share of Pakistan's exports to the SCO region was as high as 5.3 percent, while the remaining five members of SCO's share was recorded as low as 0.7 percent. If China was excluded, Pakistan's total two-way trade with SCO stood around US\$ 474.9 million in absolute terms that further made SCO's share of Pakistan's exports as low as 2 percent and imports 0.3 percent. Moreover, intra-regional trade between SCO members is also quite negligible as well as the level of economic coordination and cooperation is at the lowest ebb among SCO member countries.

**Table-1**  
**Pakistan's Trade with SCO Countries in 2006**

China	US\$ 5.580	Billion
Russia	US\$ 430.9	Million
Kazakhstan	US\$ 13.5	Million
Kyrgyzstan	US\$ 2.5	Million
Tajikistan	US\$ 11.0	Million
Uzbekistan	US\$ 17.0	Million
<b>Total:</b>	<b>US\$ 6.055</b>	<b>Billion</b>

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*, 2007.

Pakistan's trade analysis with SCO suggests that the bloc is not vital for Pakistan's trade particularly if its bilateral trade with China was excluded knowing that Sino-Pakistan ties have remained vital even without the consideration of SCO. In addition to this, it can be concluded that SCO does

not seem to be a trading bloc yet, but it might emerge as a potential trading bloc in the future. However, present level of economic complementarities among SCO members does not permit the bloc toward the achievement of a trading status. For Pakistan's trade point of view, SCO is not more than a myth.

Moreover, SCO seems to be more inclined toward security, defence, and strategic issues rather than economic integration. It has great potential to emerge as a military, defense, security and strategic bloc countervailing Western hegemony and US dominance in the vast Euro-Asian region. Russian cooperation or its eventual integration with Asia makes a significant departure in its foreign policy behaviour in several centuries. There might be a strong feeling of realisation about the emerging strength of Asian economies with the rise of China, ASEAN, South Korea, and above all, Japan. Nevertheless, SCO's success would largely depend on how much strategic understanding has been built and achieved between China and Russia. Other members would be either revolving around China or Russia for support and guidance.

The entry of Pakistan into SCO should not be taken as a simple affair of goodwill. Pakistan should critically evaluate its choices and opportunities as well as concerns while becoming a member of SCO.<sup>10</sup> Pakistan is located at the crucial strategic crossroad of Asia that makes it (Pakistan) a vital energy corridor and trade transit route for the future economic needs of China, Afghanistan, and Central Asian states that are longing for access to the Arabian Sea for long. At the same time, Pakistan has been pursuing Vision East Asia that aims at strengthening its ties with Japan, China, ASEAN, Oceania, and the South Pacific. Pakistan has to see whether or not SCO converts into an anti-Western bulwark. In case, SCO adopts an anti-Western posture, Pakistan's Vision East Asia could become a failure as Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand would be resisting any such move. Pakistan has more vital economic ties such as trade and investment in the region of East Asia than the Euro-Asian SCO region.

### **Prospects of Bilateral Trade**

Economic interdependency and regionalism are two important dimensions that can foster economic integration among the nations in the fast changing global economic environment. Unfortunately, economic interdependency is also non-existent between Pakistan and Central Asia. Regionalism, under the ten-member ECO, also does not work in terms of economic relations although it has promoted political understandings and diplomatic linkages since the independence of Central Asian states in the early 1990s. ECO has inherent problems. Its all three founder members have been engaged in their

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<sup>10</sup> Ahmad Rashid Malik, "SCO: Choices for Pakistan," *Nation* (Islamabad) June 16, 2006.


own respective regions. For instance, Pakistan is more inclined toward the SAARC and ASEAN. Iran is engaged in the Middle East. Turkey is trying to get into the European Union. Naturally, all these six Central Asian states are bound to suffer. Interestingly, all Central Asian states still heavily depend on Russia for trade and other economic activities under the framework provided by the former Soviet Union for over 70 years. The situation has not changed much even after their independence from the USSR.

Therefore, Pakistan's trade with Uzbekistan should be seen in the overall context of Pakistan's trade with Central Asia. Trading contacts between Pakistan and Central Asia are not up to any satisfactory mark over the past 17 years or so. Trade volume between Pakistan and Central Asian states is somewhat at a standstill for the last 7 years since 2000. Pakistan's total exports with these countries recorded around US\$ 23 million in 2006 compared to US\$ 28 million in 2000, with Kazakhstan taking the large chunk of exports of Pakistan. As far as Pakistan's imports are concerned, there occurred a constant increase in Pakistan's imports from these countries, i.e., from US\$ 6 million in 2000 to US\$ 40 million in 2006 with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan taking the large chunk of these imports. This situation is there for the last couple of years. It should be reiterated that real potential in trade between Pakistan and Central Asian states has not been properly exploited yet.

The ongoing trade between Pakistan and Uzbekistan is also rather marginal. At the same time, Pakistan's exports and imports from Uzbekistan are also inconsistent and a constant flow of increase has not been maintained for a variety of reasons. Pak-Uzbek economic relationship is hostage to the entire geographical setting in the region. The present regional and global politics affects them too. In spite of their utmost desire to promote trade, they were hampered by past legacy and the ongoing geo-political controversy in the region. Pakistan's export policy and the way Pakistan is handling war on terror in the region without understanding its economic interests and implications, are also discouraging both Pakistan and Uzbekistan to promote their trade and economic ties.

As far Pakistan's trade volume with Uzbekistan is concerned, Pakistan's trade with Uzbekistan during the last 14 years from 1993 to 2007, tells a revealing story at some point but a discouraging tale at the other. Soon after Uzbekistan's independence, Pakistan's exports to that country perpetually increased from US\$ 14 million in 1993 to US\$ 18 million in 1994. In the next couple of years, i.e., 1995 and 1996, Pakistan's exports increased to US\$ 35 million to as high as US\$ 45 million respectively. There was a slight decrease in 1997 when Pakistan's exports slightly declined to US\$ 39 million. After 1999, there occurred slump in Pakistan's exports to Uzbekistan, i.e., US\$ 11 million in 1999 to merely US\$ 2 million in 2006 (see also Figure below).

**Figure-1**  
**Pakistan's Exports to Uzbekistan during 1991-2006**




Source IMF: *Direction of Trade Statistics* (various years). Data for 2007 is for the first Quarter (January-March)

Pakistan's imports from Uzbekistan remained quite negligible, i.e., just US\$ 1 million during 1993-1997 except in 1995 when they increased to US\$ 3 million. Nevertheless, in 1998, Pakistan's imports from Uzbekistan reached up to US\$ 23 million. Again, next year, there was a phenomenal increase in Uzbekistan's exports to Pakistan in 1999, when they jumped to as high as US\$ 68 million. Unfortunately, after that period, Uzbekistan's exports to Pakistan continuously declined to US\$ 6 million in 2000 to US\$ 5 million in 2001 to US\$ 4 million in 2002 and just US\$ 1 million in 2003. Some modest increase has been witnessing now as Uzbekistan's exports are recovering to US\$ 14 million in 2006 but this was not a desired level. However, within the context of Central Asia, share of Uzbekistan of Pakistan's imports from the region becomes as high as 36 per cent, which was same as that of Turkmenistan (see also Figure below).

**Figure-2**  
**Pakistan's Imports from Uzbekistan during 1991-2006**

(US\$ Million)



Source: Ibid. Data for 2007 is for the first Quarter (January-March).

Trade in commodity would show that both countries' trade was highly complementary. As far trade commodities were concerned, Pakistan's exports to Uzbekistan contained of citrus fruits, pharmaceutical goods and plastic-ware. Pakistan's imports from Uzbekistan included mechanical equipment, cotton fibre and silk. Uzbekistan could export passenger and cargo aircraft, chemical products and agricultural machinery to Pakistan. This depends on how Pakistan diversifies its imports.

Other than geo-strategic reasons, as explained above, there are a number of reasons for inconsistent and marginal trade flow between Pakistan and Uzbekistan. These include following:

- Pakistani importers buy Uzbek cotton through a third party, i.e., Iran. The cost of Uzbek cotton exported to Pakistan thus becomes expensive.
- Lack of direct land route is another obstacle.
- Moreover, air links of Pakistan that were established in the early 1990s with a couple of Central Asian states such as linking Islamabad with Almaty, no longer exist due to low traffic. There have been discussions to revive these air routes, but no work has been done yet except the revival of the Lahore-Tashkent air link in July 2006.



*Investment Prospects*

With regard to investment, there are Pakistani business firms working in Uzbekistan. Although Pakistani businessmen face a severe competition in Uzbek investment sector because Russians, Chinese, South Koreans, Singaporeans, Malaysians and Indians have largely been dominating country's investment sector. Uzbek Government encourages a healthy competition and there are unlimited opportunities in various sectors including mineral development, light industry such as pharmaceutical, leather and food, which could be an attractive source for the prospective Pakistani investors. Above all, the overall goodwill of the people of Uzbekistan toward Pakistan would be an asset in translating mutual economic ties into solid and everlasting realities between the two countries. The expansion of the Karakorum Highway to Uzbekistan would facilitate bilateral trade. Gwadar Port has a great potential to push Pak-Uzbek bilateral trade in the coming years. Nevertheless, prospects of economic cooperation between Pakistan and Uzbekistan depend on the situation in neighbouring Afghanistan, which has been in turmoil since 1979. "We would like to see a stable, peaceful Afghanistan as it is the conduit for transport, energy, and trade between Pakistan and Uzbekistan", Prime Minister Aziz remarked at Tashkent.

**Policy Options**

After critically evaluating Pakistan's economic relations with Uzbekistan, the following eight recommendations could be drawn to foster economic ties between the two countries:

- I. The turmoil in neighbouring Afghanistan has severe economic implications for Pakistan-Uzbekistan bilateral relations. Their bilateral economic relations thus have been overshadowed by the political and security situation in Afghanistan. The Afghan irritant must be resolved if any bilateral cooperation was ensured between Pakistan and Uzbekistan in the near future.
- II. The realignment of the Karakorum Highway linking Pakistan with China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan should be done on priority basis.
- III. The Gwadar Deep Sea Port could be a starting point in enhancing economic ties between Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Therefore, follow up operational system of Gwadar Port linking all Central Asian countries is essential to all sorts of economic and commercial cooperation between Pakistan and Central Asia. Gwadar Port is not yet operationalised and road network is still a long way off.
- IV. Number of trade delegations and exhibitions must be increased to promote trade and commerce between the two countries. As

- Uzbekistan is the largest country in Central Asia in terms of population, enhancing trade with Uzbekistan would mean introducing Pakistani goods to other Central Asian countries.
- V. Pakistan's buying of electricity from Uzbekistan should be given a priority in order to diversify Pakistan's ever-growing demand of electricity.
  - VI. Cooperation in oil and gas must be explored.
  - VII. An action-oriented policy with regard to trade and commerce and institutional linkages is urgently required to boost trade between Pakistan and Uzbekistan, which would also ultimately promote Pakistan's trade with other Central Asian countries.
  - VIII. Recalling that Central Asian Sufi saints and *Madaris* at Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva have profound impact for the spread of Islam in South Asia, spiritual, educational and scientific linkages must be revived with an emphasis on modern needs of Islam. There must be joint efforts by Pakistan and Uzbekistan to reform *Madaris* education, besides collaborating in scientific research and educational programmes.

### **Conclusion**

A number of conclusions can be drawn out of this analysis. First, *Taliban, Jihad* and terrorism factors still disturb the fabric of bilateral economic relations between Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Second, the "New Great Game of Central Asia" has not taken any concrete shape as yet. For Pakistan, the "New Great Game of Central Asia" means developing trade, transportation, and energy corridors between Pakistan and the Central Asian states, promotion of ECO, and increasing economic stakes in SCO. Third, United States, China, India, and Russia are also leading players in this "New Great Game of Central Asia" and in one or the other way some of these players are also playing down Pakistan's interests as a transit route and energy corridor between Pakistan and Central Asia. This must be taken into account seriously. Finally, Pakistan being energy-deficit should make concrete efforts to utilise energy resources of Central Asia for development. ■