

## Book Reviews

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### AMBASSADOR OF HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY: JINNAH'S EARLY POLITICS

Ian Bryant Wells,

(Delhi: Permanent Black), 2005

Pages 269, Price Rs. 595.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah created in 1947 a separate homeland, Pakistan, for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. But his earlier politics was based on Hindu-Muslim unity, as he was essentially a liberal constitutionalist. The book under review is a critical study of Jinnah's early politics during 1910-34, which is based on the PhD thesis of Ian Bryant Wells, completed at the Flinders University of South Australia, Adelaide.

Wells rejects the "Two-Jinnahs" approach: from an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity to a communalist in 1940. He argues that this approach is an over-simplification of 'the trajectory of a complex and evolving political thinker and strategist.' He considers Jinnah a professional politician of the liberal mould who was committed to working 'within the system' and the primary change in him came in terms of 'strategies he employed to achieve his goals rather than in the goals themselves.'

As far as the events of post-World War I were concerned, namely Rowlatt Act, Dyarchy, and self-government, Jinnah advocated the constitutional rights of the people of India. However, Jinnah did not support Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation movement. Jinnah could have gained political advantage by supporting the *Khilafat* cause that aimed at the restoration of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey. While Gandhi took full advantage by supporting the *Khilafat cause* – a religious movement – Jinnah opposed religion being brought into politics. Nevertheless, he influenced the British Government to soften its stand towards the Turks.

Wells convincingly argues that Jinnah's secularism and his desire for Hindu-Muslim unity was fully shown in his attempts to bring Congress and Muslim League together onto a common political platform in 1916 and afterwards. Although he was the president of the Muslim League in 1916, he was an Indian nationalist at the same time and his 'major political vehicle' was the Indian National Congress. During 1918-19, Jinnah was on the 'crest of a wave and a powerful force' in Indian politics. But in 1920, he was "heckled from the Congress stage and labeled a political impostor".

What were the reasons for the disappearance of Jinnah from the pinnacle of nationalist politics in 1918 to political obscurity in 1921? This was the period of rise of Gandhi. Wells does not agree that Jinnah's fall was precipitated by Gandhi's emergence to the Indian political leadership; he is of the opinion that it was due to the demise of liberal constitutionalists such as

Gokhale, Mehta, and Naoroji in the preceding years in which Jinnah lost his supporters. This may be partly correct but the author has ignored the fact that Gandhi introduced religious factor in politics while Jinnah not only avoided but strongly opposed the use of religion in politics.

Jinnah, however, remained committed to his goal of Hindu-Muslim unity but the growing reactionary Hindu politics in the Congress led him to become more concerned with minority rights, as he supported separate electorate for the protection of the rights of Muslim minority. The author maintains that even after the Nehru Report in 1928, 'Jinnah still saw Hindu-Muslim unity as a byword for *Swaraj* [independence] and he retained his faith in constitutional method as the way it could be achieved'. The author concludes that Jinnah's rejection of the Nehru Report was intended to seek the unity of Muslim community. He convincingly maintains that 'Jinnah still saw himself as a nationalist and continued to harbour a dream to unite the Hindu-Muslim community to strive for a common political goal' (p.183). He, however, could not make a clear distinction between the reasons for the rejection of the Nehru Report by Jinnah and the formulation of Jinnah's Fourteen Points in 1929. In fact, the reason for the rejection of the Nehru Report was non-acceptance of almost all reservations proposed by Jinnah, while it is correct that his Fourteen Points were intended to reunite Muslims, because his boycott of the Simon Commission had divided the League, and to broaden support amongst Muslims before they could negotiate for a Hindu-Muslim accord.

Wells also refutes the verdict that Jinnah's politics was based on elitism rather than mass politics. He argues that as a member of the Imperial Legislative Council, Jinnah demanded introduction of compulsory primary education for Indians, a change in Indian Civil Service recruitment policy to facilitate Indian candidates to compete with their English counterparts and the Indianisation of the armed forces. All these steps could have facilitated the advent of mass politics and politicization of the masses through education. But, earlier, he had also shown his capability to come to the streets to motivate and lead the masses when he protested against the Government of Bombay in 1918 to demonstrate the grassroots support of the nationalist forces among the people.

Wells is of the opinion that during the early 1930s, Jinnah worked for making Round Table Conference a success. As the Conference ended in failure, he decided to stay in London because he realized that there was no room for him in the Indian nationalist politics dominated by Gandhi's so-called religious fervour. Wells, however, disagrees with the general perception that Jinnah spent this period in silent 'political exile' in London. Although away from Indian political scene, he remained 'heavily involved in attempts to end the non-cooperation campaign and return Indian nationalist politics to constitutional methods'.

The growing influence of Hindu communalists in the Congress convinced Jinnah that protection for the Muslim community was needed. Wells opines that Jinnah was a pragmatic rather than an idealist, while in a Muslim camp, he was still an Indian nationalist who was committed to a united India. The hardening of communalism and the emergence of extra-constitutional methods transformed Jinnah's thinking. Left with no option, he ended up with a conviction that compromise with majority community was no longer possible.

Wells claims that some of the proposals formulated by Jinnah during 1910-34 have gone unnoticed but they were largely confined to forging unity between the Hindus and Muslims. In short, the study is an impressive account based on some primary sources that are not found elsewhere. It is a valuable contribution to historical research and is especially useful for those interested in South Asian politics. ■

**Dr Noor ul Haq**

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**TERRORISM AND THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

William M. Carpenter & David G. Wiencrk (Editors), M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York 10504, 2005, Price \$ 84.95.

The advent of global terrorism has robbed human beings of their peace of mind. In particular, it has caused increasing threats to America's vital interest. In order to meet this challenge the U.S. and its allies have taken upon themselves to alter their priorities, methods and commitments. Notwithstanding its deep-rooted differences with Russia and China, the U.S. has decided to cooperate with them as also with China on the issue of fundamentalist terrorism. It has also decided to deal with "rogue" states such as North Korea, which according to U.S. has the capability and probably the will to make "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMD), available to other unstable forces.

The volume under review: "Terrorism and the New Security Environment," primarily deals with the War on Terrorism and its impact on Asia. In the introductory chapter, the book outlines the new security environment brought about by the events of September 11, and brings together insights and expertise of the contributors. These contributors comprise a diverse group of international security analysts and Asian affairs experts from government, academia and the private sector. These scholars have brought a significant experience as well as a variety of perspective to the book.

The power and influence of the United States has no doubt grown in relation to other states, but, this unipolar power structure has created new dangers for the United States as it is now the principal target of many hostile elements. Nations that have seen their power diminished are seen looking for new ways to challenge the US supremacy and keep the United States off balance.

To counter impending threat to its national sovereignty, the U.S. and its allies have waged a relentless “War on Terrorism”, which is likely to last for many years.

This war is being conducted in many locales, including throughout Central, South and South East Asia. The US homeland, in all probability, will remain vulnerable to follow-on terrorist attacks. In Asia, the new security complexities, raised by the events of September 11, add further to pre-existing instabilities. As such, the conflict potential in the region tends to remain high, spanning a full spectrum of low to high intensity threats.

Chapters included in this book analyse factors and political security conditions that prevail throughout the region on a country-to-country basis. Each chapter contains a “Terrorism Threat and Response” section and describes the extents to which 9/11 has had an impact on that country’s interest. It also takes into account the extent, to which, any particular country is engaged with the United States and others in the region in the “War on Terrorism” North Korea, however, clearly stands out as a nation outside this anti-terror frame work.

The profiles of the twenty three individual states, included in this volume, describe the country’s framework for assessing political-security issues. These profiles also contain a risk assessment that highlights the key internal and external security problems facing the country. These profiles also review the role of the armed forces, military force structure and defence policy issues. Out of these twenty three profiles, we will first discuss Pakistan and this will be followed by India. Space constraints do not permit to discuss each profile independently.

While evaluating Pakistan’s security outlook, it is important to understand that Pakistan’s idea centred around the Vision of a Muslim homeland in South Asia. This idea has been and continues to be essentially a contested one: In Pakistan, the issue is the degree of communalism and emphasis on religion. For “moderates”, the goal is the establishment of a stable and democratic nation state, one that is Muslim, but that does not take an expansive view of religious role in nationhood.

In this expression, Pakistani nationalism is indistinguishable from others in the region. For “Islamists”, however, the goal has been the extension of Islamic law and customs to many, if not most spheres of Pakistani life, including the Constitution, legal system, and civil society. Viewed in this perspective, Pakistan’s essentially contested identity needs to become a matter

of consensus before the country's future path is properly streamlined. President Musharraf has committed himself to establishing in Pakistan a moderate Islamic State. His policy reversals of 2001 and 2002 have set him and his supporters on a perilous course. His rewards, however, thus far have included international recognition and support for his military regime.

The author believes that the U.S. "patronage" notwithstanding, Pakistan is set in a dangerous region. India's hegemonic intents, the Kashmir dispute, turmoil in the Western Pashtun majority regions and domestic radicalism continue to preoccupy Pakistan's security planners. However, if President Musharraf and his supporters remain alive to problems facing their country and succeed in finding their solution, they can succeed in enjoying the confidence of their country men. In addition, on the foreign policy scenario, if Pakistan succeeds in finding accommodation with India and makes effective use of renewed alliance with the United States to bolster their international standing, Pakistan may draw rich dividends as a result of its dynamic internal and external policies.

And now a parting note on India's engagement on the terrorism issue. In this context, it may be mentioned here that India's engagement on the terrorism issue has primarily focussed on the United Nations, given its ability to influence Pakistan, New Delhi has sought to use the terrorism issue as part of its diplomacy more generally. However, India's wider diplomacy continues beat on the terrorism drum to rally support for pressure on Pakistan. ■

**Ghulam Sarwar**

### **PRIVATIZING THE STATE**

By Beatrice Hibou.

London: Hurst & Company 2004. Pages 261.

The proposed privatization of Japan's postal service led Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to dissolve the lower house of the Japanese Diet on 8 August 2005 as his party did not get required support for the bill intended for the privatization of the state's postal enterprise. This raises one serious question: should profitable or highly strategic state enterprises be sold out to private companies? Seemingly, the popular reply in Japan – the champion of free trade and privatization, - was 'no' at least democratically. At the same time, in a similar situation in Pakistan, state enterprise, Pakistan Telephone Corporation Ltd (PTCL), was privatized. In Pakistan's case, privatization did not take place with the consent of the National Assembly unlike in Japan. In the latter case, the following assumption took place: economically weaker state is relatively more prone to external pressure for the privatization of state enterprises as a result of weak democratic credentials.

Therefore, economically weaker state with fragile democratic values should not opt privatization of public enterprises under the prevailing global circumstances, until it comes out of woods and establishes a lasting democracy. Failure to do so encourages the private actors to exert unnecessary pressure on the state, government, officials, or state-actors to meet the demand of their private dividends and their real interests. In the wake of such kind of privatization, will state survive as an independent economic and political sovereign entity in the post-privatization period with neo-'have-nots' exploited by the private enterprisers?

Ten essays contributed by various writers published in Beatrice Hibou's edited work, *Privatizing the State*, (first published in French by Jonathan Derrick in 1999), critically look at the discourse of privatization and globalization in the context of inter-public and private relation. Hibou, a Researcher at the Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Paris, highlights the dichotomy that exists between the ideology of the state and the ruling elite in matters of privatization. The authors are of view that 'it is difficult to analyze the privatization of state enterprises in purely economic terms' (p.47). They maintain that 'privatization is much more than the simple transfer of ownership, the alteration of the rules of management, the injection of new capital of a different sort, or the advent of new qualifications and modern technology', (p.47).

In this discourse, the book challenges privatization. It is a process of minimizing of state sovereignty, power, and structure. Privatization is a stake in power relations. Public enterprises have become essential tools of exploitation in the name of 'privatization' and 'market economy'. When societies are corrupt, states are undemocratic, or semi-democratic, or prone to foreign influence, or have other weaknesses, strategic, security or foreign policy complexities, privatization could only bring in immense obscurities to the state in its power structure after public enterprises were sold out. Where democracies are relatively stable or least corrupt and more publicly accountable, say for example, the United States, Western Europe, or Japan, privatization could yield some better results. In this context, it seems that neo-liberal economic reforms are yet another failure too.

Contributors to the book have described a multiplicity idea of the issue of privatization. These include: historical origins of privatization, its role in present day state formation, power and sovereignty of weaker states in the face of privatization, international context, and political implications for states in transition and change to democracies. The study is centered on the failure of the so-called neo-liberal reforms. Authors argue that privatization is supposed to bring about the retreat of the state. Hibou's own assessment on privatization, market economy, globalization, and on the state is quite revealing.

Authors cite the intricacies of privatization in Poland, Russia, Indonesia, and China, which makes this study fairly worthy of note. Privatization in Poland, a former Communist state, and China, a living Communist state, is quite interesting as deregulation may not come up with an answer to corruption in the former state, and privatization could raise unanswerable issues with regard to the vanguard of socialism in the latter state. Having seen the collapse of Communist states, Mao tse-Tung's socialists are pursuing privatization for their own power survival to disengage the state from the economic sphere (p.93) and to hold on to power. China is, both economically and politically, in a state of transition. Market openness is synonymous with the pluralization of politics. Is China pursuing that too? Has gap between the state and the society been lessening in that country? Is there any power sharing? These questions are yet to be answered by the 'Chinese liberals' who have already dragged the economy into the liberal and market sphere to attract foreign capital and to boost exports. Many experts in America fear that Chinese market economy with complete lack of democracy, makes a 'short-term victory' (p.169) for China. The socialist state is piercingly divided into 'public' and 'private' (p.171) – an idea that is absolutely alien to its basic ideology of socialism.

Similarly, Russia also represents an interesting case of 'market economy'. The image of the Russian economy has not improved yet; it has been rather further tarnished after the collapse of the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Phrases such as 'semi-criminal state capitalism', 'crony capitalism', 'racket economy' or 'Mafioso state' perfectly illustrate notorious observations attached to Russia's post-Soviet economy (p.183). According to Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, one of the contributors to the book, 'the instigators of the privatization process have often repeated that the creation of a class of small property owners would act as a heaven for democracy' (p.183). The subsequent power game and privatization of state property, ownership, redistribution of control over the means of production in the former Soviet state created huge mess and initiated a state-led wide-spread corruption in the name of 'market economy' and 'privatization'. Thanks to Western capitalism: Russian underground economy became 'market economy' that was further legitimized in the name of 'privatization'.

In short, privatization in developing countries and politically transitional democracies has been emerging as a catchy slogan to attract foreign capital in exchange of public entities since the early 1990s. This trend is mainly the result of collapse of communism or states' desire to attract foreign capital or to put assets into order but, at the same time, privatization is not necessarily the only solution to the state-controlled economy. Scholars of political and development economy, global financial experts, policymakers, and others can learn several lessons out of this study with a focus on Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia and also more generally to create, at least, a policy



framework for a 'better economy' if not the so-called 'market economy' for the state instead of heavy reliance on crude privatization and risky market forces.■

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### **GLOBALIZATION: TAME IT OR SCRAP IT?**

By Greg Buckman

(New York: Zed Books Ltd) 2004, Pages 229.

The book *Globalization: Tame it or Scrap It*, by Greg Buckman is published by Zed Books. Zed Books are publishing a series of books on important issues relating to problems confronting humanity. The purpose of these books is to create awareness and help committed people to work in different fields of social work; and at the same time to make information easily available to the public. The publications also aim at maximizing the relevance and availability of the books published in the series and to "help stimulate new thinking and social action in the opening years of the new century." Martin Khor, Head of Third World Network (TWN), has appreciated the initiatives of Zed Books as helpful for highlighting the problems faced by the developing world.

The author has been working on issues concerning globalization, forestry and energy. In early 1980's, he worked with the environmentalists to save the Franklin River in Tasmania, Australia. He was also the former national finance manager for the Wilderness Society of Australia. With a strong background in the field of globalization and its impact, he has provided cogent arguments, especially the thesis that globalization is resistible. In this regard, he has provided an in-depth analysis of different strands in anti-globalization movement. Instead of only criticizing globalization, he has provided concrete arguments for reforms. It is a very useful and comprehensive book on the subject.

The author argues that economic globalization has never been an inevitable part of human life and according to him, it is resistible. The book can be divided into two parts. The first part provides an overview of how globalization came about while the second part discusses different schools of thought in the anti-globalization movement.

In the opinion of the writer, there are two important strands/ schools of thought in the anti-globalization movement - Fair Trade School and Localization School of thought. The Fair Trade school proponents basically argue for reforms in the system, especially reforms in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). On the other hand, the Localization proponents advocate abolition of these organizations and demand outright reversal of

globalization as a phenomenon. He details the weaknesses of each school of thought and highlights their points of convergence and divergence.

The writer has ably taken into account the apprehensions about anti-globalization movement, which is faced with confusion and differences among its different schools of thought. He also points out that on different policy issues the anti-globalization proponents have no clear stance and do not provide clear alternatives. Besides, he argues that if the anti-globalization movement has to succeed it has to formulate a common policy on different policy issues. According to the writer, if one agrees with the Localization School stance regarding trade, then it should provide an alternative to trade or what amount of trade should be allowed? If one agrees with the Fair Trade School of thought that extensive trade would alleviate poverty, the author counsels this school to consider the environmental costs of extensive transit trade. He does not support the argument that increase in trade would generate income that would alleviate poverty. On the other hand, he says that this increase in trade is mostly between the developed countries and therefore it does not benefit the poor. Substantiating his argument, the author further refers to the reduction of Official Development Aid (ODA) to 0.33 percent by developed nations to the developing world.

The writer believes that these anti-globalization movements should formulate a common policy because the aim is to curtail the fallout of globalization and to provide substantial alternatives. He recommends that anti-globalization movements can coordinate with the media as well as with political parties to make its message heard.

Last, but not the least, he opines that the protests at Seattle or Cancun do remind the people that something is wrong with globalization but do not tell the public how to rectify the wrong. Hence there is a need to increase awareness about globalization amongst the masses so that they should work for the betterment of humanity.■

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### **CHINA-INDIA ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT BUILDING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE**

Swaran Singh

New Delhi: French Research Institutes in India, 2005

Pages. 205.

China and India are giant states and neighbours. During the last six decades, their mutual relations have witnessed upheavals owing to their complex security issues particularly their undemarcated boundary dispute. Soon after

their independence, China and India established friendly relations, which were termed as *Hindi Chini bhai bhai*. However, the Sino-Indian War of 1962, created a deep cleavage and put them in hostility which lasted for about two decades. For the last two decades, their relations have started improving. This trend started with the advent of Deng Xiaoping in China in the late 1970s. This rapprochement was struck by their common desire for economic cooperation for their mutual benefits, though China was keener in this regard. Swaran Singh in his recent book entitled *China-India Economic Engagement Building Mutual Confidence*, examines the role of economic factor in normalizing Sino-Indian relations. The author is a well-known Indian Sinologist. His earlier work *China-South Asia: Issues, Equations and Politics*, (2004) was widely reviewed by scholars. He has written extensively on China and South Asia as well as on Indian foreign policy, which received wide publicity in prestigious journals. The present book is a CSH Occasional Paper, which is published by French Research Institute in India. It consists of six chapters followed by Sino-Indian chronology of major events and a detailed bibliography.

The post-Mao leadership in China introduced drastic reforms in internal and external spheres. These reforms aimed at China's rapid economic development. In author's opinion, China could not have achieved present economic growth, had it not toned down its ideological zeal, opened it up to the other world particularly the West to have an access to their sophisticated technology, and maintaining good relations with the countries around its periphery. India also witnessed several reforms introduced by the different governments. Though the nature of those reforms is different from that of China, yet both countries are throwing open their economies and markets to rest of the world. According to the author, the reforms have started benefiting each other's economy. Discussion relating to this theme is given in Chapter I.

Chapter II, traces the trade links between the two peoples. According to Singh, these links go back to ancient times. The establishment of Silk Route provided the base of China-Indian economic ties, which have now entered into modern times. The trade between China and India was interrupted for the first time following the first Opium War (1840-2). But when the rival European countries started accessing to China, Britain revived its trade contact with China, by involving its adjacent colony—India. According to the author, the onslaught of British colonialism also had its good impact on China. It revolutionized the trade links, caused set back to old feudal system in China.

In their post-liberation period, both China and India adopted different economic and trade pattern. India adopted open trade policy with private sector increasingly independent. On the other hand, China opted for the policy of autarky and 'self-reliance' with State's monopoly on all domestic and foreign trade. Furthermore, China's split with the Soviet Union and Cultural Revolutions culminated in casting deep shadows on Chinese economy.

China and India signed their famous trade-cum political agreement in 1954, which also incorporated *Pancheela*. This provided various facilities to two-way trade. Their colonial legacy played an important role in determining their relationships. Both sides also used this legacy for their internal situations as well. In author's opinion the Foreign Direct Investment in the two countries would also facilitate the two-way trade.

Chapter III deals with the bilateral trade, which is the main segment of this book. Over the years, the bilateral trade between the two countries has tremendously improved. Sino-Indian mutual trade improved from US\$ 0.2 billion in 1990, to US\$ 5 billion in 2002. Again it rose from US\$ 7.6 billion in 2003 to US\$ 13 billion in 2004. It is only India in the South Asian region, which enjoys trade balance with China, rest of the countries have trade deficit. In author's opinion, the burgeoning mutual trade has created profound impact on their political security issues. It would not be wrong to state that political issues are becoming subservient to their economic ties.

Sino-Indian border trade is another hallmark of their burgeoning relationships. China recognized Sikkim as part of Indian territory. This decision has enhanced trade at Nathu La pass in Sikkim. In addition to this, trade through Lipulekh in Utranchal and Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh is also on the rise. Furthermore, China and India have taken certain measures to improve their border trade. However, the poor infrastructure particularly on Indian side remains the chief problem in their border trade. The author has discussed pros and cons of the Sino-Indian border trade in Part IV of the book.

Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought depicting the future of China-India relations. One could term them as natural competitors. While the others may argue that their policies would be complementary to each other, given their present rapprochement. This discussion is presented in Chapter V of the book.

In author's view, Sino-Indian economic ties have started to complement, if not lead to determine the nature of their political relations. China and India have started coordination on several forums: Russia-China-India Triangle; China's support for India for a permanent seat in the UN SC. However, the latest developments do not match with the author's assessment. India, by signing nuclear deal with the US in July 2005, has diluted the prospects of the Sino-Russo-Indo triangle. While on Indian pursuits for the UNSC seat, China has not taken any stance favourable to India. Beijing's position on this issue is still ambiguous. There is another lacuna in this study. The author has only touched the theme of World Trade Organization (WTO). The implementation of WTO would have definite impact on Sino-Indian economic ties, but it would have been better, had the author given particular attention to this issue as well. It is also true that some scepticism still continues to affect China-India economic ties. However the author rightly states that

Sino-Indian relations should not be observed from the prism of their old hostility. Their growing economic ties have promising impact on their political security relations. The future prospects have been discussed in Chapter VI.

The book is a solid contribution based on assiduous research of the author. Singh uses both primary and secondary sources in addition to frequent tables and graphs to embellish his studies. The effort has been made at an appropriate time when discussions in academic circles with regard to the role of economic interdependence for conflict resolutions is going on. Main argument of the author can be applied to certain other cases studies like Sino-US relations, Sino-Japan relations and Across-strait relations where economic engagement has been operating as a Confidence Building Measure. ■

**Ghulam Ali**

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