

9/11 and the Changing Paradigm of Conflict Resolution

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Two different perceptions continue to shape the thinking and approach determining global politics in the post September 11, 2001, period. For a while, it seemed that the massive destruction caused by the suicide bombers in New York and Washington on September 11 would result into a large-scale retaliation by the United States (US) against the “invisible enemy.” But the subsequent developments taking place after such tragic attacks exposed the contradictions in American foreign policy, particularly those pertaining to the issue of terrorism. The Bush administration did venture into its war against terrorism by ousting the Taliban regime from Afghanistan and launching a sustained campaign against the Al-Qaida terrorist network, but instead of dealing with the causes, which promote terrorism, it focussed on eliminating some individuals and groups from the scene.

First, the 9/11 developments and the subsequent US led war against terrorism changed the global complexion of power because for the first time after the end of the Second World War, Washington decided to use all available resources at its disposal to protect American lives and interests. With the support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU) and other like-minded countries, the US made it clear that the evil of terrorism would be met with full force. Hence, “the coalition against terrorism is remarkable not only because of large number of countries involved from all around the world, but also the apparent recognition to the fact that the fight against terrorism will be a prolonged one. That one can see the involvement of diplomatic pressure and financial sanctions, as well as military force against the specified enemy targets. Never in world history have so many countries combined together against a common threat in this manner.”¹ Yet, it is a matter

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¹ Paul Dibb, “The future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?” *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington D.C) Vol. 25, No.2, Spring 2002, pp. 131-32. According to him, the war against terrorism will be

of debate that to what extent is America following an even handed policy in combating terrorism unleashed by individuals, groups and states and how is it reacting to the state sponsored terrorism in different parts of the world. President George W. Bush's assertion about America's first war of the 21st century, and his subsequent reference to the "Axis of Evil" during his State of the Union address in January 2002 indicated a shift in the US approach on dealing with the post-9/11 developments.

During the bi-polar system, it was quite evident that the power competition was between the Western/capitalist World led by the US and the Communist/socialist Bloc headed by the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the bi-polar system and the Soviet Bloc in 1990-91, the world saw the emergence of a strange coalition of non-conformist forces, composed of individuals and groups who tried to get their share of power but were unable to do so because of their incompatibility with the dominant global forces led by the US. The events of 9/11 proved the hypothesis that it would be dangerous to give the US-led international system a free hand and, unlike the situation during the inter-war period, a non-conformist approach in today's world is primarily held by the non-state actors, primarily those belonging to the Muslim extremist groups. America's policy of unilateralism, as perceived in the post-9/11 scenario, is another source of chagrin among the non-conformist people. Second, the arrogance and ignorance pursued by Washington in dealing with critical issues, particularly the one related to the new phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, proved the fragility of American-dominated world order. The events of 9/11 cannot be de-linked from unjust and imprudent handling of the Oslo Accords by Israel and the failure of Washington to restrain its strategic ally from constantly refusing to adhere to the fundamental principles of the peace process. If the phenomenon of terrorism has challenged the American way of life and the Western dominated global power system, the underlying reasons for the prevailing insecurity and instability can be found in the contradictory policies pursued by those who have been shaping the paradigms of global order since 1990 but are unwilling to establish a just and fair international system.

The nature of global conflicts at various levels also needs to be examined in the light of post 9/11 developments, because one can see the emergence of new conflicts and the complication of old ones.

unprecedented as it spread across a wide range of countries, not only in the Middle East. It will require patience and close coordination.

If old conflicts, particularly those in the Middle East and South Asia are still unresolved, the new conflicts, which have emerged in the last few years, are also related to the failure of the international community to play an effective role in this regard.

This paper will argue the linkage between 9/11 developments and the paradigms of conflict and conflict resolution with a focus on South Asia by examining the following questions:

- a. To what extent have the post 9/11 developments influenced the process of conflicts and conflict resolution?
- b. How have the non-conformist state and non-state actors influenced the nature and shape of conflicts?
- c. Why are the conformist state actors unable to deal with new conflicts emerging after 9/11, particularly on the issue of terrorism, and how can the world be saved from future waves of terrorism?
- d. How have the post 9/11 developments affected Indo-Pak conflicts and to what extent has the international community played a role in preventing the outbreak of hostilities between the two warring neighbours?

9/11 and the Process of Conflict Resolution

There cannot be two opinions about serious instability and crisis, which erupted in the world after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11. But one needs to venture into an in depth study of how such attacks changed the nature and shape of conflicts at various levels. Or whether they brought about any change at all. Two things need to be taken into account as far as the linkage between 9/11 and the nature and shape of conflicts and conflict resolution is concerned. First, some of the traditional conflicts, which since the outbreak of the Cold War, have adversely affected global peace and security and should have been resolved in the post-Cold War era, are still far from settlement. On the contrary, the Palestine and Kashmir conflicts, which are the two major flash points in the world today, have been overshadowed by the events taking place after September 11. Second, a new type of conflict has emerged after 9/11, which is related to terrorism. Stretched over different types, such as religious, sectarian and ethnic terrorism tends to dominate the prevailing paradigm of conflicts in the world today. Unlike territorial, political, economic and ethnic conflicts, terrorism has a capacity to cause widespread destruction without the direct involvement of any state actor. On this account, the single most important implication of

the post 9/11 events is the emergence of terrorism as a major destabilizing factor in the prevailing world order.

The South Asian countries decided to join the US-led war against terrorism because of their own interests. For instance, India was prompt in offering its support for a global coalition, expecting that such a configuration of nations would have natural implications for improving the security situation in South Asia. Pakistan decided to join the US-led war against terrorism against Al-Qaida and the Taliban because of predictable economic incentives, the need to save its strategic assets, escaping from the American threat that failing to join them would take Pakistan to the stone age, and salvaging its Kashmir policy from total destruction. Nepal joined the alliance hoping that it would end up in flushing out the Maoist insurgency from the country. Sri Lanka hoped that it would be able to garner more support for its fight against Tamil militancy.² On this account, more than a commitment against eliminating terrorism, those who joined the US led campaign against terrorism had in mind the accomplishment of their own variety of interests. This approach is also shared by an Indian security analyst, who argues that:

9/11 also reinforces the centrality of the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship in South Asia. The global war on terror has admittedly had differential impact on the various states of South Asia. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the new emerging international norm against terrorism has had an extremely positive impact. Although undefeated on the ground (and at sea) by the Sri Lankan forces, the LTTE seems nevertheless to have recognized that with the change in the international context its days as a terrorist (as opposed to guerrilla) force are numbered. In Nepal, on the other hand, the increase in terrorist violence by the Maoists does not seem to have been affected in any tangible way by 9/11 and its aftermath. It is yet uncertain whether substantial US military assistance to Nepal is likely, and whether it will prove decisive should it be forthcoming. It is also worth noting that the differential impact of 9/11 on Nepal and Sri Lanka, an issue of some importance, has been subordinated in salience to the India-Pakistan military brinkmanship.³

² Lok Raj Baral, "Post-September 11 developments and their implications for South Asia: A view from Kathmandu," a paper presented at a three-day conference organized by the Regional Center for Strategic Studies on, "Post-September 11 developments and their implications for South Asia," at Nagorkot, Nepal from June 16-18, 2002 and published in Dipankar Banerjee, Gert W. Kueck (eds.) *South Asia and the War on Terrorism Analyzing the Implications of September 11* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), pp. 101-115.

³ Varun Sahni, "Fractured, Frightened and Frustrated: South Asia after 11 September," paper presented at a three-day conference organized by the Regional

The question which emanates from the debate on terrorism as a major implication of conflicts is: why has no coherent strategy been formulated by the international community to effectively deal with terrorism and how can those conflicts which encourage terrorism be managed and resolved? Unlike other conflicts, terrorism is an amalgamation of different conflicts, particularly those which are related to the socio-economic conditions of people and the denial of justice by the powerful to the weak. Given the complexities of terrorism and its identification as an implication of conflict, it has been difficult to figure out techniques, which could deal with its resolution. If the suicide bombers in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel are involved in terrorist acts, such a situation has been the outcome of the failure of the peace process and the refusal of Israel to comply with the Oslo Accords. Any terrorist act, whether it takes place in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Palestine, Israel, Russia, India or Pakistan, leads to the intensification of conflict and violence.

What has happened after 9/11 is the identification of terrorism as “The Issue” destabilizing the world order.⁴ If this is true, then not only the US but numerous other countries are facing the menace of terrorism, whether state sponsored or carried out by some individuals or groups. The real source of terrorism, as a major implication of conflict, is again the grievances of those people who are unable to seek justice through normal procedures. When all their efforts to seek justice ended in vain, they resorted to various violent methods, thereby leading to major instability in the world order. Even before the destruction of the World Trade Center by the suicide bombers on September 11, hundreds of terrorist acts had taken place in different parts of the world, but the colossal loss of lives in just two incidents at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon shattered the myth of America’s power and compelled the US to retaliate by launching a war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Such a policy was formulated despite the fact that the terrorists who hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were not Afghans but of Middle Eastern origin. From the US point of view, those states harbouring terrorists were also to be taken to task. For that matter, the Taliban regime, which provided support and bases to the Saudi born multi-millionaire Osama Bin Laden in carrying out terrorist activities against the US, had to be

Centre for Strategic Studies on, “Post-September 11 developments and their implications for South Asia,” at Nagorkot, Nepal. op. cit., pp. 85-100.

⁴ “The global war on terrorism: The first 100 days,” handout published by The Coalition Information Centre, Islamabad, pp. 3-4.

removed. When the Taliban regime refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the US, the coalition-led attack was launched against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.

The phenomenon of suicide bombers and the killing of innocent people even for a just cause, have been widely condemned. But those who take pride in giving their lives against injustices and tyranny forget the fact that, by targeting civilians, they not only strengthen the hands of hard line state actors but also discredit their cause before the international community.

Some of the arguments which are given to justify linkages between 9/11 and the emergence of terrorism as a major implication of conflicts and a de-stabilizing factor in global order, are as follows:

- a. America's war against terrorism is a myth, which only aims to curb those conflicts which tend to expose the double standards of the Western world. That terrorism is an effect of unresolved conflicts, which could not get the priority of the international community, thus encouraging disgruntled elements to express their anger by various terrorist acts.
- b. Terrorism after 9/11 is responsible for delaying the resolution of the Palestine and Kashmir conflicts because no one can sympathize with acts of violence against innocent people. Suicide attacks against civilians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and killing of innocent people in Kashmir, caused serious damage to the liberation struggle in these two areas.
- c. As long as terrorism, whether state-sponsored or carried by individuals or groups, is not analysed by the global powers as the dominant paradigm of the present world order, it will not be possible to successfully implement a methodology for the management and resolutions of conflicts. The events of 9/11 have given an opportunity to strive for fair and just resolution of conflicts so that all such elements who tend to justify violent methods for the accomplishment of their objectives are exposed and denied the conduct of various terrorist methods.
- d. As far as South Asia is concerned, the 9/11 events further worsened the security environment of the region. After the collapse of the Agra summit in July 2001, Indo-Pak relations were back to square one, with each side blaming the other for wrecking the opportunity available at Agra for a peaceful resolution of their conflicts. But after 9/11, Indo-Pak conflicts took a new turn when New Delhi offered full support to America's war against terrorism and tried its level best to

establish a linkage between Pakistan's support to the Muslim insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and the terrorist elements in Afghanistan. However, having failed to stop Pakistan from joining the US-led coalition against terrorism, India ventured on other measures like propagating against the *Jihadi* culture in Pakistan and deploying hundreds of thousands of troops along its Western borders. According to a Nepali scholar:

The September event didn't create conditions for changing the status of relations of the two antagonistic actors – India and Pakistan. On the contrary, only a forced handshake between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan was witnessed during the SAARC summit held in Kathmandu. Instead of improving relations in the post-September scenario, the two leaders even could not meet at the retreat, a usual SAARC phenomenon arranged for the Heads of State and Government during the summit. This standoff was more transparent at the Almaty Summit where President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee even failed to handshake. Though the post-9/11 developments have shown an unprecedented engagement of the US in regional affairs that have restrained the two sides for not precipitating the crisis, relations continue to be strained between India and Pakistan. Given the burgeoning relations between the US, the European countries and Russia, with China not playing the role of a fixer, the future security scenario of the region may move towards the positive direction.⁵

As far as the “handshake” between President Musharraf and Prime Vajpayee on the occasion of 11th SAARC summit in Katmandu is concerned, it was something unprecedented. “Musharraf walked over to Indian Prime Minister thrusting his hand into his. To the applause of the crowd, Musharraf said, “he was extending a hand of genuine, sincere friendship. Let us together commence a journey of peace, harmony and progress in South Asia.” Vajpayee smiled and held Musharraf's hand as he rose in his chair. Vajpayee said, “he was glad Musharraf extended his hand of friendship to me. Now President

⁵ Ibid., He further says that, “the global level anti-terrorism campaign launched by the US and its allies has shown that South Asia as a region has drawn the attention of the US that considers the region as a flash point for triggering off wars and hence the hectic persuasive activities being conducted by the US. However, other major powers like France, China, Russia and Japan are less panicky on the South Asian developments. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair, trying to play second fiddle to the US President, George W. Bush, was visibly indulged in shuttle diplomacy impressing on India and Pakistan not to take a reckless plunge by escalating tensions along the border. Later, hard hit by his detractors at home, he seemed to have retracted from his active diplomacy. Although other major powers continue to stand together on the issue of combating international terrorism, their joint efforts for reducing Indo-Pakistan tension are not forthcoming.

Musharraf must follow this gesture by not permitting any activity in Pakistan or any territory in its control today that allows terrorists to perpetrate mindless violence in India. I say this because of our past experience. I went to Lahore with a hand of friendship. We were rewarded by aggression in Kargil and the hijacking of an India Airlines aircraft from Katmandu. I invited President Musharraf to Agra. We were rewarded with a terrorist attack on Jammu and Kashmir assembly and in the parliament of India.”⁶ But there was no follow-up to the historic handshake and Musharraf’s gesture was not reciprocated by India.

In other South Asian countries also, the issue of terrorism became a major factor in violent conflicts, like the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka and the Maoist movement in Nepal. The US-led war against terror gave substantial leverage to the Nepali and Sri Lankan governments to take on various militant groups, curb insurgency and prove to the outside world that both the Maoists and the Tamil Tigers were terrorists. In Bangladesh, extremist Islamic groups were blamed for having links with the Al-Qaida network, and the country, despite its democratic credentials and a moderate Islamic society, is identified as a potential hub of Islamic extremists. In all these cases, American support to weed out so-called terrorist elements was requested but no proper strategy was formulated to deal with the causes of violence and insurgency. Most important, after 9/11, the state actors in South Asia and outside tried to deal with conflicts according to their own standards, and with a feeling that they did not need to take into account the interests and feelings of insurgency or autonomous movements.

Conformist and Non-Conformist Actors

Conflicts take place when non-conformist elements challenge the state of conformism and attempt to change the status quo. If one tries to understand why the battle between conformist and non-conformist elements results in systematic disorder, two things come into the picture. First, after the end of the Cold War, at the superpower level, the void which resulted from that situation encouraged extremist elements to play their role. Various ethnic and religious extremist groups, from the former Yugoslavia to Chechnya, Palestine and Kashmir, began to assert their position, thus causing a great threat to the territorial status quo in these areas. These groups were against the prevailing order and came in direct conflict with the West,

⁶ “Indo-Pak conflict back in focus,” *Daily Star* (Dhaka), January 7, 2002.

particularly the US. The events of 9/11 were a direct result of the frustration and anger expressed by these non-conformist groups. One can identify these groups with terrorism but, in its essence, their main purpose has been to show their resentment against the US-dominated world order and fight for their rights. Does it mean that non-conformist groups without any state backing can destabilize the entire world, or has there been a great deal of exaggeration about their strength?

Washington feels that with the support of its coalition members in NATO, it can effectively deal with these non-conformist groups, but at the same time, it is not ready to minimize their importance. One individual like Osama Bin Laden has been depicted as the most dangerous person on earth, capable of creating havoc and terror. The non-conformist approach of Osama Bin Laden and his drive against American policies, regardless of his past affiliation with the CIA during the Afghan War, tend to unite conformist forces in the post-September 11 period. It is a strange situation because never before in modern history has one person caused so much insecurity and panic among powerful states.

Some of the reasons given by the non-conformist elements to justify their acts of violence are:

- a. The present international system is unjust and unfair because it doesn't protect the interests of the weak. After the end of the Cold War, the unipolar world has resulted into more exploitation from the US-backed states and America has failed to restrain those elements who have tried to suppress freedom movements.
- b. Since Washington has not listened to the grievances of non-conformist groups, particularly those related to Israel's suppression of the rights of Palestinians, they have no option but to resort to violent methods against all such forces who symbolize American power. Such an approach led to the attack on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, American military installations in Saudi Arabia and the destruction of the World Trade Center.

Contrary to the arguments of non-conformist elements, conformist forces hold the view that those trying to undermine the global order are resorting to terrorist methods. The list of non-conformist groups is growing day by day because of dissatisfaction arising from the policies of the dominant power actors. But the conformists argue that if the non-conformist elements are against

American policies then it does not mean that they should undertake terrorist activities and target innocent lives.

As long as terrorism is the weapon used by the non-conformists, they cannot have any moral ground to justify their cause. It seems the battle between conformists and non-conformists will continue unless one or the other party relents. Unfortunately, those who are non-conformists to the policies of the West, particularly the US, have been identified as terrorists. This may not be true because not all the critics of American policies believe in the inadvertent use of force, but the impression given by the world media is different. After 9/11, the images of non-conformists tend to depict a different impression about those who resent and oppose US policies.

Dealing With the New Wave of Terrorism

The failure of conformist elements to neutralize non-conformist terrorist elements has been counter-productive, because day by day, one can hear more and more reports about the spread of violence under the cover of terrorist acts launched by various individuals and groups. With the complicated situation emanating from terrorism at the state and non-state levels, it is difficult to understand why the issue of terrorism has been misunderstood and how a better understanding could be created to find out the factors which promote the rise in violence.

The new wave of terrorism has two important dimensions. First, the failure of the world order emanating after the end of the Cold War at the superpower level in 1991 to justly deal with issues. The vacuum left as a result of the Soviet disintegration raised a number of questions about stability and order in the New World. The US emerged as the most significant world power after the Soviet collapse, but failed to provide a direction and play a leadership role to resolve pending conflicts. As a result, those elements which were dissatisfied with the norms of the post-Cold War era decided to express their resentment by resorting to various violent means, particularly against the US and the West. The US called that wave of violence 'terrorism,' while others described it in terms of movements for national emancipation. Second, the marginalization of the United Nations (UN) and other international institutions and their inability to provide leadership and justice to those who had suffered from a deliberate policy of aggression and exploitation, also encouraged forces who had no option but to take the law into their own hands. While the mystery about the event of 9/11 is still unresolved, the blame for committing that shameful act has been put on few

individuals and organizations. Suddenly, the world began to learn about the Al-Qaida network and the role of Osama Bin Laden in masterminding various terrorist acts, including the one which took place on September 11, 2001. When international institutions were bypassed while combating terrorism, and one country, with the support of some like-minded states, decided to wage a war against terrorism, the success and credibility of such an approach was doubted by those who disagreed with Washington's approach to deal with the issue of terrorism. It was questioned that why was the UN, which should have played a leadership role in combating terrorism, not given that responsibility in the first place?

Fighting against the new wave of terrorism would require the just resolution of conflicts. Till the time the powerful states, particularly America, fail to understand the need to address issues of a critical nature – particularly those in the Middle East, Kashmir and Afghanistan – the issue of terrorism would remain unresolved. If those controlling the instruments of global power attempt to deal with conflicts according to their own standards, the world will plunge even further into an endless state of violence and terror. But this perception is not shared by a Western author who says that:

Some believe that political solutions must be given priority over military solutions for the global campaign against terrorism to be successful. The only thing that can undercut bin Laden's brand of global terrorism is a sustained political effort to address the issues that have fuelled extremism. The problem is that this approach to the immediate demands of decision-making is unrealistic, particularly when the United States has suffered such a devastating terrorist attack on its homeland. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be resolved in the longer term. Asking the United States to desist from military action and concentrate on the long-term and well-nigh impossible task of solving the underlying grievances in the Middle East is not a practical course in the shorter term. It leads to the entirely unacceptable view of moral equivalence between what bin Laden did and the defects that may or may not exist in US Middle East policy.⁷

Another major issue in dealing with the challenge of terrorism is its religious dimension. Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as the only superpower, much has been said about the rise of Muslim fundamentalism and the linkage between various Islamic extremist groups and terrorism. The events of 9/11 were also debated in such terms without taking into account the basic fact that those terrorist groups who claim that they are fighting for a

⁷ Paul Dibb, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-37.

religious cause are, in fact, violating the basic norms of their religion. There is no justification for suicide bombers in Islam and those Muslims who target innocent people through such acts, in fact do a great disservice to their religion. Therefore, a great deal of misunderstanding and obscurity exists in the West about the issues which create bitterness among the Muslims and the acts of a handful of terrorists who are discrediting their religion. After 9/11, the conflict between Islamic extremist groups and the West, particularly the US, has reached a new phase in which the former is trying to depict various emancipation movements as terrorist organizations while the latter has failed to seek a peaceful and proper way to get their rights.

9/11 and Indo-Pak Conflicts

The implications of 9/11 have been far and wide but, as argued, “both India and Pakistan are winners in this new situation in a way that before would have been inconceivable. Sanctions applied against Pakistan and India because of their nuclear weapons’ programme have been lifted. But the question is, can the United States use its new found leverage with India and Pakistan to broker a resolution to their dangerous military confrontation in Kashmir?”⁸ The terrorist attacks which took place in New York and Washington also had a direct impact on the troubled relations between India and Pakistan because of New Delhi’s attempt to exploit the situation and seek Washington’s help in declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. Therefore:

...perhaps the greatest concern for Pakistan in post 9/11 has been the manner in which India has reacted to developments in the region. As Pakistan saw it, India attempted to try and use the War on Terrorism as an opportunity to draw Kashmir into the terrorist ambit. When it failed to do so in the early months, it viewed with concern the growing US-Pakistan military cooperation, especially when the attack on occupied Jammu and Kashmir failed to get a US condemnation of the Kashmir freedom struggle.⁹

Before 9/11, Indo-Pak relations were overshadowed as a result of the failure of the Agra summit, but, still, the channels of dialogue between the two countries remained open. Ironically, for Pakistan,

⁸ Ibid., p. 138.

⁹ Shireen M. Mazari, “Regional Security Issues and Concerns – A view from Pakistan,” a paper presented at a three-day conference organized by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies on, “Post-September 11 Developments and their Implications for South Asia,” at Nagorkot, Nepal from June 16-18, 2002 and published in Dipankar Banerjee and Gert W. Kueck (eds.) *South Asia and the War on Terrorism: Analyzing the Implications of September 11* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2002), pp. 71-84

the manner in which India reacted to the terrorist acts of 9/11 was contrary to basic norms of decency. Without even being asked, New Delhi offered all assistance to the US in its war against terrorism, particularly against the Taliban and the Al-Qaida network. It also tried to implicate Pakistan in the 9/11 terrorist acts by arguing that by supporting the Taliban regime, the Pakistani state and various non-governmental extremist religious organizations were, in fact, encouraging such groups to strike at American people and interests. It was a matter of great surprise for the analysts of international affairs that India became so desperate to hurt Pakistan that it did not even hesitate to exploit the events of 9/11. Such an approach, pursued by the right wing Hindu fundamentalist regime under Prime Minister Vajpayee, was counter-productive, because the outcome was the escalation of Indo-Pak tension. However, according to a Pakistani writer:

India's apparent irritation at Pakistan's new strategic position is pleasing to many in Islamabad. This is again short sighted. It is surprising that 54 years of relations with India has not enabled Pakistanis to realize that Indian leadership, unlike their own, is not emotional. Indian leaders are carefully calculating, with a five to ten years policy direction in mind. India is orchestrating its campaign against terrorism in Kashmir, where the recent bomb blast outside the Legislative Assembly provided opportunities to the Vajpayee government to mobilize US support against "Pakistan sponsored" terrorism. Once the United States has achieved its objectives in Afghanistan (and Pakistan has received payment for services rendered) it may well resume its long-term strategy in South Asia, and strengthen its military relations with India.¹⁰

Like the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who followed the policy of liquidating the Palestinians by calling them terrorists, the Indian Government also tried to take advantage of the situation and blamed Pakistan for supporting terrorist elements in Jammu and Kashmir. The turning point was on December 13, when the Indian Parliament came under a terrorist attack, resulting into prompt charges by New Delhi that Pakistan was involved in that act. India put pressure on the US to ask Pakistan to take stern action against various *Jihadi* groups involved in what it called terrorist activities in Kashmir and other parts of India. After the end of his week long visit to the US in February 2002, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf said that, "groups like *Lashkar* and *Jaish* have assumed as the agents of *Jihad* in many countries and had become active participants in

¹⁰ Rizwan Zeb, "War Against Terror: Lessons for Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* (Villanova) Vol. XXV, No. 3 (Spring 2002), p. 71.

international politics. It is because of this reason that Pakistan is being accused of promoting terrorism all over the world. Such organizations were banned in our national interest. After my January 12 speech they (India) should have withdrawn from our borders themselves. They did not. They have political reasons too.”¹¹

It seems that the Kashmir dispute, which is a major source of tension between India and Pakistan, also assumed a different dimension after 9/11 because of two reasons. First, New Delhi did its best after September 11 to prove that the Kashmiri liberation struggle was in fact sponsored by the terrorist network in Pakistan and the international community, particularly the US, should do something to take action against Islamabad. India’s objective in following such a policy was to discredit the Kashmiri freedom movement and declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Second, Pakistan responded to Indian allegations by initiating measures to launch a crackdown on terrorist elements, particularly those having connections with Taliban and Al-Qaida. President Musharraf’s speech of January 12, 2002 in which he announced stern measures to stop what India calls “cross border terrorism,” also indicated a change in Islamabad’s approach on supporting the Kashmiri freedom struggle. However, such measures did not result in de-escalation of Indo-Pak tension because India refused to reciprocate and revoke certain unilateral measures which it had taken against Pakistan after December 13, like banning Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) flights flying over India, suspending rail and road links, recalling its High Commissioner from Islamabad and deploying more than half a million troops along its Western borders.

Following the intense American pressure, the Musharraf regime was compelled to stop the support which it was rendering to some militant Kashmiri organizations, but it reiterated its pledge to sustain moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri movement for emancipation. After the May 14 terrorist attack at an army camp in Jammu and the killing of around 30 people, India intensified its campaign against Pakistan and threatened severe action if Islamabad continued “cross border terrorism.” As remarked by an Indian writer, “Musharraf should have realized by now that the September 11 carnage in New York and Washington has changed international opinion on terrorism. Violence has ceased to be a solution to any problem because it has become much too terrible and destructive.”¹²

¹¹ “Lashkar, Jaish become agents of Jihad: Musharraf,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), February 17, 2002.

¹² Kuldip Nayar, “Will Musharraf take the leap?” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), January 13, 2002.

It was only after the diplomatic and political intervention of the international community that the Indo-Pak war was averted. Still, the two countries are far from resuming a dialogue. India has made it clear that unless Pakistan hands over 20 alleged terrorists and takes concrete measures to stop cross border terrorism, it cannot resume the normalization process. On the other hand, Islamabad has urged the international community to force India to de-escalate tension along its borders and resume talks for the resolution of outstanding conflicts.

9/11 and Hope of Conflict Management

A totally different perception related to the implications of 9/11 on the Indo-Pak conflict holds that, as a result of the American war against terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, Washington, in no way wants the escalation of Islamabad-New Delhi tensions. For that purpose, right from December 13, when a terrorist attack took place at the Indian Parliament, till May 14, when another terrorist attack struck at an army camp in Jammu, the US tried its best to de-escalate the situation by sending high emissaries, ranging from Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld to the Secretary of State Colin Powell, to New Delhi and Islamabad. "While American led efforts have clearly averted any immediate threat of war, it is also obvious that the US is now an established major player in the sub-continent."¹³ As pointed out by a US security analyst, "the US today has more influence and leverage in the subcontinent than perhaps at any time previously. Less, positive, the US is confronted with the management of India-Pakistan tensions that detract from broader objectives."¹⁴ Similarly, according to a Bangladeshi security expert:

Since 9/11 there are indications that the US has quietly encouraged cooperation even though, because of the strained relations between India and Pakistan, the SAARC process has slowed down considerably. The US through its South Asian Regional Initiative (SARI) program is actively promoting regional cooperation in energy sector. The US would also welcome the establishment of a free trade area in the region and the development of infrastructure on a regional basis. Peace and stability in South Asia has become a matter of paramount importance to the US because of Afghanistan, because of the threat of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan

¹³ Shishir Gupta, "Code of Conduct," *India Today* (New Delhi), June 17, 2002, p. 32.

¹⁴ Satu P. Limaye, "United States Security Policy Toward the Subcontinent After 9/11," a paper presented at a three-day conference organized by the Regional Center for Strategic Studies on, "Post-September 11 Developments and their Implications for South Asia," at Nagorkot, Nepal, op. cit.

and because of the warming of relations with India and a host of other reasons.¹⁵

From a pragmatic point of view, it is not in the interest of the US and its allies involved in the war against terrorism to see the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan because such a situation will badly hurt their campaign against terrorism, particularly against the remnants of Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. During the height of Indo-Pak tension at the end of May, the Pakistan government had indicated that it could not commit its forces on the Western front because of heightened tension on the Eastern front. Pakistan's involvement in war with India would have meant a serious setback to the US-led war against terrorism. In order to pre-empt such an eventuality, the US did its utmost by appealing to India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in their conflict over Kashmir. On this account, "Musharraf was clever enough to understand that the US would not want a sub-continental war that would derail its Afghan campaign. Any diversion of Pakistani forces in a war with India would only endanger the security of the US strategy in Afghanistan."¹⁶ It does not mean that American policy after 9/11 will help resolve Indo-Pak conflicts, because history shows that no outside pressure or mediation since 1971 has helped in compelling the two countries to take steps for the resolution of the conflict unless there is willingness on their part.

On July 28, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, during his visit to India and Pakistan, clearly called for restraint by the two countries and the resumption of the process of dialogue. After meeting Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, he hoped that, "the recent reduction in tensions and preliminary de-escalatory steps would bring the rivals to the bargaining table." Substantiating his optimism, he said that, "I think the possibility of dialogue in the near future is something that can be achieved."¹⁷ Talking to *Reuters* in Sigonella, Italy, on July 27, Powell said that, "ultimately we have to get to dialogue or else we will just be stuck on the plateau which would not serve our interests. We don't want to be back where we

¹⁵ Farooq Sobhan, "Impact of 9/11 on Bangladesh," a paper presented at a three-day conference organized by the Regional Center for Strategic Studies on, "Post-September 11 Developments and their Implications for South Asia," at Nagorkot, Nepal from June 16-18, 2002.

¹⁶ Hasan Zaidi, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place," *India Today* (New Delhi), January 14, 2002, pp. 32-33. Also see Ashok Malik and Anil Padmanabhan, "Conflicting interests," *India Today*, June 3, 2002, pp. 40-41.

¹⁷ "Powell hopeful of Indo-Pak dialogue in near future," *The Independent* (Dhaka), July 29, 2002.

were few months ago.”¹⁸ Basically, the gist of Powell’s urge for dialogue between India and Pakistan centres around Kashmir and during his visit to India and Pakistan, he categorically called Kashmir as a conflict impeding the process of normalization between the two South Asian rivals. In early January 2002, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited India and Pakistan to reduce tension and ease the military standoff between them. The US and Britain expressed deep concern at the war moves and urged India to show restraint while pushing Pakistan into crackdown on militant outfits.¹⁹ International pressure on India and Pakistan to see reason and restrain from further deteriorating the security situation along the borders increased when the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chinese President Jiang Ziamen held separate talks with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee on the occasion of the Almaty Conference held in June 2002. What has happened after 9/11 is that, because of the external involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan for their war against terrorism, it is in the interest of major powers to de-escalate Indo-Pak tension and help the process of conflict management. Nevertheless, Lok Raj Baral gives an optimistic note on the American role in South Asia after 9/11 when he argues that:

The US role in South Asia is more active than ever before and is expected that the escalation of tension between India and Pakistan would not turn into a full-scale war. The dramatic decision taken by India towards de-escalation of tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations following the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage’s visit to India and Pakistan in June 2002, has not only demonstrated the increased American influence in the region but has also underplayed the regional initiative, if there were any, for disengaging the two belligerents. Developments taking in South Asia have further put pressure on the US and other powers not to be ambivalent or selective on the issue of terrorism. The entente between Russia and US is also likely to restrain both belligerents.²⁰

The assumption of Pakistan that, because of the US led war against terrorism, the Kashmir dispute will be resolved, is again wishful thinking. While at the international level there is some concern about the plight of the Kashmiris, there is certainly no evidence to prove that there is a tilt in favour of Pakistan. On the contrary, India, after September 11, succeeded in drawing world attention to the acts of violence in Jammu and Kashmir and linked it

¹⁸ “Powell pledges to push for talks on Kashmir,” *The Independent* (Dhaka), July 28, 2002.

¹⁹ “Blair arrives in Pakistan on peace mission,” *The Daily Star* (Dhaka), January 8, 2002.

²⁰ Lok Raj Baral, *op.cit.*

to the acts of terror unleashed by some Pakistan-based Islamic extremist groups. The Indian assertion about cross-border terrorism became so intense that Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf, in his speech of January 12, 2002, was forced to take stern measures against terrorist groups operating inside Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan has tried to exploit the US/Western war against terrorism in Afghanistan for putting their pressure on India to de-escalate tension along the borders and resume the process of dialogue for the resolution of pending issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. But New Delhi is trying to sidetrack from any international influence to initiate dialogue with Pakistan for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. On these grounds, one can argue that both India and Pakistan, for totally different reasons and interests, have tried to take advantage of the 9/11 events but neither side has tried to cool down the temperature and initiate the process of dialogue. Pakistan has asked India to de-escalate tension along the borders by withdrawing forces from its Western front but India has linked it to the handover of 20 suspected terrorists and stopping, what New Delhi says, is cross border terrorism. As a result, there is a stalemate in Indo-Pak relations and the international community has only succeeded in preventing a predictable showdown but has not been able to bring the two countries to the negotiating table. As far as the impact of 9/11 on the issue of conflict management between India and Pakistan is concerned, there is not much headway because of the rigid positions taken by the two countries. But certainly, the international intervention has been able to put some pressure on New Delhi and Islamabad to avail the opportunity and resume the process of dialogue on resolving pending issues.

Conclusion

As the US-led war against terrorism continues, the nature and shape of conflicts, particularly in South Asia, would also be influenced, but with the accomplishment of American objectives from that war, fundamental changes in the regional security paradigm are possible. Till the time the US and the coalition forces are involved in tracking down and combating the Al-Qaida and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan, Washington will have a paramount interest in preventing any overt showdown between the two neighbours, India and Pakistan. Be that as it may, it should be the South Asian leaders who should be concerned about their region and seriously work out a strategy to resolve unsettled issues.

Three important realities have questioned the overall approach of South Asian governments to deal with alarming issues, particularly those concerning human security and the implications of various conflicts. First, the marginalization of South Asia in global affairs, particularly in economy, technology, politics and sports. Because of the focus of South Asian governing elites on squandering energies and resources on non-issues, the region is far behind in the area of human development. The events of 9/11 tend to reinforce the truth that the people of South Asia, because of their ignorance and powerlessness, are unable to force their leaders to follow an approach which is more rational and concerns the welfare and development of the majority. As South Asia continues to sink in to a sea of poverty and underdevelopment, the gap between it and other developed regions has risen significantly. Second, on major issues which required a better sense of understanding and consensus among the South Asian countries, particularly between India and Pakistan, the reality is totally different. During the Cold War days, India and Pakistan followed different paths. When the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan, again the two countries were at odds and refused to formulate a consensus on that issue. When Iraq attacked and occupied Kuwait in August 1990, resulting in the exodus of hundreds and thousands of South Asians from the two countries, New Delhi and Islamabad failed to take a joint stand to deal with that problem. Finally, the events of 9/11 again exposed bitter hostility between India and Pakistan as the two countries, while supporting the US-led war against terrorism, embarked on the escalation of their conflict over Kashmir. A new phase of the Indo-Pak cold war began after September 11, resulting in the mobilization of around 1 million troops along the borders, and the suspension of air, road and train links.

Third, the civil societies of South Asia, particularly of India and Pakistan, are incapable of restraining their governments from sustaining the politics of confrontation. Taking advantage of the meek and docile nature of opinion leaders, power circles in New Delhi and Islamabad do not feel the need to seriously unleash the process of conflict management or resolution. Most important, their vital interests are not related to the security of their people but to their own privileges and benefits. Had a consensual approach been followed by the civil society groups of South Asia on issues deepening the security predicament of the region, it would have been possible to prevent another cold war between India and Pakistan after the events of September 11.

Nevertheless, the task of conflict resolution in South Asia cannot be accomplished without indigenous efforts backed by clear strategies and dynamic leadership. Extra-regional facilitation can help, but the initiative in this regard must come from the leaders of South Asia. Particularly after September 11, 2001, it has become a great necessity for South Asia to resolve conflicts through a process of negotiations rather than by involving extra-regional players. ■

A Comparative Study of Manifestos of Major Pakistani Political Parties in Election – 2002

Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan*

According to *Chambers 20th Century Dictionary*, manifesto means “a public written declaration of the intentions, opinions, or motives of a sovereign or of a leader, party or body.”¹ The *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* defines manifesto as “written statement in which a group of people, especially a political party explain their beliefs and say what they will do if they win an election.”²

From the above definitions it can be inferred that a manifesto does not merely consist of programmes and policies that a political party, group or leader plans to pursue after elections, that it also contains as its integral part the ideology, outlook and worldview of that party, group or leader on whose behalf the manifesto is issued. As it is apparent from the definition, a manifesto is issued on the eve of elections, primarily with a view to attracting the largest possible number of voters. For this reason, those issues that agitate the minds of the people are accorded special place in the manifesto. Special care is taken to highlight the problems that the people face and solutions are suggested that appeal to them. Since a manifesto reflects the ideology, beliefs, opinions, motives and intentions of a political party or a leader, then in a multi-party system, the manifestos of different political parties are bound to contain areas of convergence as well as divergence of views of the contesting parties on similar problems. In this paper, an attempt has been made to compare the manifestos of three major political parties (alliances), who contested Pakistan’s general elections held on October 10, 2002. The objective of this study is to highlight the similarities and dissimilarities of views as stated in the October 10 election manifestos of Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) PML(Q), Pakistan People’s Party-Parliamentarians (PPP-P) and Muttehdha Majlis-e-Amal³ (MMA) on

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¹ *Chambers 20th Century Dictionary*, New Edition, 1986, p. 765.

² *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary*, Sixth Edition, 2000, p. 813.

³ Muttehdha Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) is alliance of six religious parties namely;

major internal and external problems of Pakistan. The reason behind the selection of these political parties for this exercise is that PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA were the top three scorers in the elections. Out of 272 contested seats of the National Assembly, PPP-P bagged 63 seats and secured 7,361,423 of the total number of votes cast. The tallies of PML(Q) and MMA are 80 and 45 seats with a total number of 6,898,587 and 3,181,483 votes, respectively. Taken together, these three political parties captured 188 out of 272 (more than 69 per cent) contested seats of the National Assembly. During the elections, all the three political parties articulated with full force and power of conviction their respective views on important policy issues confronting Pakistan on the domestic and foreign fronts. These political parties, especially MMA claimed that they achieved spectacular success in the elections on the basis of their programmes as outlined in their manifestos.

A comparative study of the manifestos of these three parties, therefore, will also be useful for the purpose of understanding the emerging trends in the October 10 elections and consequent alignment of political forces on important national issues.

Background of the October Elections – 2002

The Parliamentary Elections of October 10, 2002 were held by the military government of President General Pervez Musharraf under the instructions contained in the Supreme Court of Pakistan's decision in Zafar Ali Shah Vs Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) Case, May 2000, popularly known as Zafar Ali Shah Case. In its decision, the apex court had validated the assumption of power by the COAS on October 12, 1999, made the Proclamation of Emergency issued on October 14, 1999 and the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) No. 1 of 1999 under the doctrine of necessity, and instructed the Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf to hold elections and transfer power to the elected civilian representatives of people within three years i.e., before October 12, 2002. On July 10, 2002, it was announced that the elections for the Senate, National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies would be held on October 10, 2002. Before the announcement of the election date, the military

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- a. Jamaat-i-Islami (JI);
 - b. Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman group, JUI(F);
 - c. Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam, Maulana Samiul Haq group, JUI(S);
 - d. Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis (JAH);
 - e. Tehreek-e-Jafria (TJ);
 - f. Jamiat Ulma-e-Pakistan, Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani group, JUP(N).

government had announced a number of political reforms by amending, changing or making addition to various articles/clauses of the 1973 Constitution. The package under which these reforms/constitutional amendments were announced is known as Legal Framework Order (LFO). The LFO was issued by the Chief Executive on August 22, 2002, for “smooth and orderly transition” and, “in pursuance of the Proclamation of Emergency of the fourteenth day of October, 1999, read with the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) No. 1 of 1999, and in pursuance of the powers vested in him by and under the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, dated the 12th May, 2000.”⁴

The LFO contained 29 constitutional amendments, changes or additions to the 1973 Constitution. Some of these amendments were directly relevant to the elective bodies, mode of elections, conduct of elections and political parties. For example, under LFO:

- a. The number of seats in the National Assembly was raised from 217 to 342, including 10 seats reserved for the non-Muslims.
- b. The number of seats reserved for women in the National Assembly was to be 60.
- c. Members to the seats reserved for women, which were allocated to a province were to be elected through proportional representation system of political parties’ list of candidates on the basis of total number of general seats secured by each political party from the province concerned in the National Assembly.
- d. By an amendment in Article 58, a new Clause (b) was added, under which the President got the power to dissolve the National Assembly, if a situation had arisen in which the Government of the Federation could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate was necessary.
- e. With addition of a new clause in Article 63, no person could contest elections for the legislative bodies if he/she was convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction on a charge of corrupt practice, moral turpitude or misuse of power or authority under any law for the time being in force; or for being absconder or defaulter on government loans or utility bills, in excess of Rs. 10,000.00.

⁴ *Legal Framework Order, 2002.*

- f. The number of seats in the Provincial Assemblies was also increased in the following order:

Province	General	Women	Non-Muslims	Total
Balochistan	51	11	3	65
NWFP	99	22	3	124
Punjab	297	66	8	371
Sind	130	29	9	168
TOTAL	577	128	23	728

- g. By inserting a new Article (152 A), National Security Council (NSC) was set up.
- h. The intra-party elections were made essential for a political party to take part in elections.

In addition to these reforms and constitutional amendments, two other decisions with far reaching impact on the October elections were taken. They were the lowering of voting age to 18 years and the restoration of joint electorate. The original 1973 Constitution contained the provisions of holding elections on the basis of joint electorate and allowing the adult population of Pakistan with minimum age of 18 years the right to vote in the elections. But General Zia-ul-Haque (1977-88) substituted them with separate electorate and 21 years as the voting age. The system of electorate from separate to joint, was changed on the persistent and unanimous demand of the minorities; whereas, the voting age was lowered with a view to broadening the base of participatory democracy in Pakistan. As a result, the size of electorate increased considerably.

According to the election schedule announced on July 10, the submission of nomination papers of the candidates was to start from August 20; whereas, the final list of the candidates whose papers were accepted, was to be announced on September 17. As such, political parties were given only 22 days for electioneering, although ban on political activities was lifted on September 1.

129 political parties, including PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA, applied to the Election Commission (EC) of Pakistan for permission to take part in October 10 elections. The EC scrutinized the documents i.e., constitution, certificate of intra-party polls and other information furnished by these parties, under The Political Parties

Order 2002. After scrutiny, the EC declared 71 political parties eligible to contest the October 10 elections. PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA were among these 71 political parties.

On August 21, the EC announced a Code of Conduct for political parties to follow during the election campaign that was to start from September 1, 2002. The Code of Conduct contained 21 restrictions on the political parties. According to these restrictions, no political party was allowed to propagate any opinion, or act in any manner, prejudicial to the ideology, sovereignty, integrity and security of Pakistan, or the morality or the maintenance of public order, or the integrity or the independence of judiciary of Pakistan, or defame or bring into ridicule the judiciary or armed forces of Pakistan; as provided under Article 63 of the Constitution. The candidates were also forbidden to launch attacks on the private lives of their rivals during the election campaign. The candidates were not allowed to resort to corrupt practices like the bribing of voters, intimidation of voters or canvassing within 400 yards of the polling station and holding public meetings 48 hours before the time fixed for the close of polls. Processions were allowed but only on the condition that the candidates or political parties shall decide beforehand the time and place of the starting of the procession, the route to be followed, and the time and place at which the procession will terminate.

On August 27, the Federal Government announced the lifting of the ban on political parties from September 1, 2002. But announcing the decision, the government overruled the code of conduct issued earlier by the EC maintaining restrictions on rallies and processions. According to the new code of conduct, election rallies and processions on roads, streets, railway stations, etc., were disallowed as a part of the political activity.⁵ The new order also spelt out a number of conditions regarding the public meetings to be held by the political parties during the election campaign. According to the conditions announced by the government, political meetings were only to be organized at places or areas specified by the district or provincial governments “in order to prevent public inconvenience and to maintain normal public life.” The announcement of the government further said that the district and provincial governments in consultation with the political party concerned, would decide well

⁵ *Dawn* (Karachi), August 28, 2002.

in advance the time, place and other details of the meetings, and normally no deviation in the agreed programme should be allowed.⁶

Election Campaign and Major Issues

For 272 general seats of the National Assembly, PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA fielded 197, 232 and 183 candidates respectively. With the lifting of the ban on political activities from September 1, 2002, the contesting parties and candidates started their full-fledged election campaign within the parameters set by the government for restricted and controlled electioneering. All the three parties held public meetings in major cities like Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Quetta. In these big public meetings, and at rallies held at other places, the political parties presented their programmes of action as outlined in their manifestos and expressed their opinions on important issues and problems being faced by the people. MMA held a big public meeting in Karachi on September 8. Speaking at the meeting a central leader of MMA and Ameer, Jamaat Islami (JI), Qazi Hussain Ahmad said that if voted to power, MMA would enforce Islamic system in Pakistan and implement the recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) on the Islamisation of existing laws in the country. He also said that MMA would fight against secular forces and that it provided an alternative leadership in the country.⁷ In order to mobilize the people in its favour, the MMA adopted an innovative tactic of Train March from Rawalpindi to Karachi. The first Train March of MMA was organized on August 28 from Rawalpindi in which almost all the central leaders of MMA participated. Speaking on the occasion, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, Chairman MMA and President of Jamiatul Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani), declared that the religious parties grouped into MMA would strive for the elimination of culture of injustice and tyranny, reducing unemployment, enforcing *shariat* and ending lawlessness.⁸ The second phase of MMA Train March was organized at Lahore Railway Station on September 7. But the police foiled it as the government, under the new code of conduct issued on August 28, had banned the political activities at railway stations. The police also arrested all the central leaders and a dozen of workers belonging to MMA, but they were released after a few hours. When the train reached Multan, a large crowd of charged workers

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *The News* (Lahore), September 9, 2002.

⁸ *Dawn* (Karachi), August 29, 2002.

received the leaders of MMA. The police arrested 35 persons at Multan Railway Station and resorted to baton charge at Okara, Khanewal and Bahawalpur.⁹ Though MMA held public meetings and organized rallies in different cities of Punjab and Sindh, its main focus was on NWFP and Balochistan. In their speeches at different places in these two provinces, the leaders of MMA denounced the policies of the US and Britain on Afghanistan and Indian atrocities in Kashmir. They also made it clear that they did not want Pakistan to come under the influence of the Western Powers. "MMA," said Maulana Samiul Haque, while speaking at an election rally at Attock, "was opposed to the influence of Bush, Blair and Bajpayee (BBB) on Islamabad." He further said that those who were opposing MMA and did not want it to come to power, were, in fact working for BBB's influence on Islamabad.¹⁰

Like MMA, PML(Q) and PPP-P also held public meetings and election rallies within the constraints of the limits imposed by the government under the new code of conduct. Due to the restrictions imposed by the government, the election campaign remained lacklustre and, in the opinion of some analysts, even without any major issue. "The traditional election frenzy experienced in the previous elections is conspicuous by its absence," wrote Pakistan's leading daily, *Dawn*, while commenting on the state of electioneering for October 10 polls.¹¹ The situation did not undergo any significant change even with the approach of polling date. "The election campaign," reported *The Frontier Post* from Kohat, only a week before polling day, "has yet to gain momentum," and observed, "unlike last elections, polls this time have failed to generate enthusiasm among the masses."¹² One reason given for the lacklustre nature of the election campaign was the absence of the top leadership of the two mainstream political parties from the country, namely Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif) [PML(N)] and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, President of PML(N), whose government was removed by COAS, General Pervez Musharraf on October 12, 1999, was living in exile in Saudi Arabia. Benazir Bhutto was also living outside the country in self-imposed exile. In their absence, the second rank leadership took command of their parties. But this leadership failed to mobilize their vote bank effectively.

⁹ *The News* (Lahore), September 8, 2002.

¹⁰ *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), October 6, 2002.

¹¹ *Dawn* (Karachi), August 25, 2002.

¹² *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), October 3, 2002.

However, electioneering did pick up to some extent as the political parties completed the process of finalizing the lists of their candidates and seat adjustment arrangements amongst each other. Despite the fact that campaign for the October 10 elections remained at a low key and free from big controversies, there were a number of issues and demands raised by the leadership of PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA, while addressing public meetings and election rallies. We will discuss these issues and demands of these three political parties while analysing and comparing their respective manifestos. It will enable us to make a comparison in a broader perspective. While comparing the manifestos of PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA, we will first focus on those issues and demands over which there is similarity of views among these political parties.

Law and Order, Security and Rule of Law

All the three parties have recognized in their manifestos the need to ensure security to every citizen particularly weak sections of the society to maintain the rule of law and to improve the law and order situation in the country, which has markedly deteriorated over the last few decades. For this purpose, PML(Q) pledged in its manifesto:

- a. The rule of law shall be upheld at all costs throughout the country.
- b. The state functionaries shall protect the weak against the powerful.
- c. Police reforms shall be carried out to make the police service an efficient and citizen friendly institution.
- d. In order to reduce delay, judicial procedure shall be modernized and simplified wherever possible.
- e. Legal aid schemes shall be set up for the needy, especially for orphans, women and other less privileged sections of the society.
- f. The role of *Punchayat* shall be strengthened at district, tehsil and village levels.¹³

MMA, in its 15-point Manifesto promised to “ensure uniform and quick justice to every citizen, from the president to an ordinary layman.”¹⁴ The leaders of MMA elaborated their concept of justice, social peace and rule of law in their speeches during the election campaign. While addressing a public meeting in Karachi on

¹³ *PML(Q) Manifesto*, (Islamabad, Central Secretariat, Pakistan Muslim League, August, 2002), p. 9

¹⁴ *MMA Manifesto*, <<http://209.47.225.24/palest/eng/mma/manifesto>>

September 8, 2002, MMA Chief Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani declared that MMA, after being voted to power, would turn the country into a “cradle of peace,” free from Klashinkov culture. Another central leader of MMA, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, who is also Ameer Jamaat Islami (JI), declared at the same meeting that MMA had not given any negative programme; instead it had come up with a positive programme based on Islamic *shariat* in the form of its manifesto. He demanded the enforcement of recommendations of Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), which covered all aspects of life, including judiciary and police administration.¹⁵

PPP-P in its manifesto, promised to give Pakistan and the region, “peace within and peace without” with honour and dignity. This implied that PPP-P recognized a link between security inside the country and external security i.e., security in the region. For this purpose, the manifesto contained an outline of party’s stand on Kashmir and relations with the neighbours, especially India. According to the manifesto, “the PPP-P, without prejudice to the UN Security Council resolutions, supports open and safe borders at the Line of Control (LOC) to socially unite the Kashmiri people. It notes that India and China have a border dispute and yet enjoy tension free relations. It seeks to reduce tension with India through peaceful negotiations to outstanding disputes and issues.”¹⁶In the manifesto, PPP-P underlined the importance of the rule of law by describing it as “the basis of civilized society.” In order to protect the rule of law on permanent basis, the party proposed the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The purpose of this body, as given in the manifesto, is “to acknowledge victims of political injustice who fell prey to state sponsored perversion of justice to meet the end of an unholy agenda to destroy trust in public representatives and promote militarism of society.”¹⁷

¹⁵ *Dawn*, (Karachi), September 9, 2002.

¹⁶ *PPP-P Manifesto 2002*, <<http://www.ppp.org.pk/manifesto/2002.html>>

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Economic Development, Eradication of Poverty and Welfare of the People

Like the problem of law and order and the importance of providing security to the people, the three political parties were also well aware of the need for reviving the economy, especially industrial production and working towards the reduction of poverty level in the country. In this regard, MMA promised to “ensure provision of bread, clothes, shelter, education, jobs and marriage expenses to all citizens.” The MMA had its own perception of an economic system. In its election manifesto, it said that MMA would strive to “create an independent, just and humane economic system where citizens would be provided opportunities for *halal* jobs, business and investment.” The MMA also pledged to “abolish all chronic and new feudal system with forfeiture of illegal wealth and its distribution among the poor.” It also promised to provide land to the peasants and farmers for their livelihood and guarantee reasonable price to their produce.”¹⁸

In its detailed manifesto, PML(Q) gave a prominent place to its views on economic policy. In the economic field, the manifesto of PML(Q) laid more emphasis on “revival of the industry through better management and improving investment climate.” The manifesto recognized that deteriorating law and order situation was one of the reasons for the slow growth of the economy. In its manifesto, therefore, it announced its “commitment to revive the economic functions” through a programme of restructuring of the government, streamlining of the tax collection system and by improving the law and order situation.¹⁹ PPP-P promised to increase labour wages and ensure the implementation of ILO laws, providing relief to the middle classes and improving the lot of agricultural workers. Regarding poverty, PPP-P made a pledge to eradicate it by ensuring that the social sector budget was increased. “It is by investing in our young people that we can build a progressive and prosperous society,” said the manifesto of the PPP-P.²⁰

Education, Employment and Social Development

In their manifestos, all the three political parties recognized the importance of education as an absolutely necessary condition for social and economic development. Declaring that education was a key to the empowerment of the people, the manifesto of PPP-P

¹⁸ MMA Manifesto, op. cit.

¹⁹ PML(Q) Manifesto, op.cit.

²⁰ PPP-P Manifesto, op.cit., p.4.

promised that “text books to government primary schools would be provided free of cost; while a means test will make students eligible to additional government support.” The manifesto also promised that the libraries would be promoted and vocational centres, on the pattern of Computer Literacy Programme, would be enhanced. “PPP-P,” said the manifesto of the Party, “commits itself to its sons and daughters an education that enables a brighter future than that of their parents so that they can hold their heads high in the comity of nations.”²¹

The manifesto of PML(Q) said that, “education shall become the top priority of the government, which shall aim to raise the educational standards to levels that compare favourably with the countries of middle level income.” The manifesto of PML(Q) promised 100 per cent literacy by 2012 and 100 per cent school age going attendance at primary level. It had also been promised in the manifesto that all students up to matriculation level would be provided free education. Scholarships shall be provided to outstanding students at different levels of education. The manifesto also promised to take all necessary steps for the improvement of higher education.²²

The manifesto of MMA also pledged to, “ensure compulsory and free of charge education till matriculation and provide opportunities to meritorious students and scholars for advanced research.”²³

Form of Government, Constitution and Political System

Though not specially mentioned in their manifestos, all the three parties were, of course, committed to the existing (federal parliamentary) form of government. None of the parties expressed their desire to replace the present political system of Pakistan based on the 1973 Constitution. “Pakistan,” says the manifesto of PML(Q), “was envisioned as a modern, democratic, welfare (state) based on Islamic principles and values. Its polity is based on the principles of federation with a parliamentary system of government.” In the manifesto of the PML(Q) various measures were promised to strengthen the democratic, parliamentary and federal character of Pakistan’s political system, which included; (1) doing away with legislation by Presidential Ordinances; (2) making the functioning of parliamentary committees more efficient; (3) making all major policy

²¹ Ibid., p. 4.

²² PML(Q) Manifesto, op. cit., pp. 19-21.

²³ MMA Manifesto, op. cit.

decisions on the floor of the parliament; (4) introduction of appropriate legislation for funding of political parties by companies, societies, public bodies or individuals; and (5) transfer of more funds from the federation to the provinces through the National Finance Commission.²⁴

By recognizing the need for strengthening provincial autonomy, the manifesto of MMA also accepted the federal and parliamentary character of the political system of Pakistan. In their speeches at different public meetings and election rallies, all the central leaders of MMA made clear their commitment to democracy, federal-parliamentary form of government and upholding the 1973 Constitution. "We all agree," said Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Vice Chairman of MMA, "that Constitution (1973) is an undisputed document, which should not be distorted by arbitrary amendments; and Parliament was supreme body, which should not be dwarfed by a supra-constitutional body like National Security Council."²⁵ Similar views were expressed by the leader of PPP-P, Mr. Amin Fahim on the supremacy of Parliament and inviolability of the Constitution. "PPP-P," he said in a statement, "would not compromise on the principles of parliamentary supremacy and inviolability of the Constitution while forming the government." Another senior leader of PPP-P, Mr. Raza Rabbani, while echoing the views of Mr. Amin Fahim, said, "We will move ahead with MMA for the restoration of 1973 Constitution and rejection of LFO."²⁶

Thus, so far as the form of government, constitution, character of political system and nature of Pakistan's polity was concerned; there was unanimity of views among PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA. The three parties were also committed to carrying out their political activities within the framework of Westminster type of parliamentary form of government, which recognizes the parliament as supreme body. The three parties also supported the 1973 Constitution as a consensus constitution.

The comparison of the manifestos of the three political parties also revealed that there was similarity of views among them on the nature of internal problems faced by Pakistan. In this regard, all the three parties attached top priority to the problem of restoring peace, harmony and law and order. The three parties were convinced that an improvement in the law and order situation held the key to the revival of the economy, and the increase investment. The three parties also

²⁴ *PML Manifesto*, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

²⁵ *Dawn* (Karachi), December 13, 2002.

²⁶ *The News* (Lahore), November 1, 2002.

recognized growing poverty as a serious problem and came forward with a number of suggestions for its eradication. There was also an agreement among these three political parties that education was a necessary condition for the achievement of goals of national development. The three parties favoured an open and free-market economy, although in its manifesto, the MMA emphasized the “humane” nature of the economic system. Similarly, PPP-P and PML(Q) emphasized the protection of the rights of workers and peasants.

It was also clear, from a comparison of the manifestos of the three political parties, that they believed in and supported the fundamental human rights, including the right to life, liberty, property and honour. All the three political parties supported democracy, political pluralism, the right to vote for every adult man and woman and a directly elected supreme parliament. In one of his recent statements, Maulana Fazalur Rehman, the Chief of JUI(F) and Secretary General of MMA said that MMA would work for the strengthening of democracy in Pakistan and would not support any move that was aimed at derailing the democratic process in the country. He also said that MMA did not believe in the policy of confrontation. Removing the apprehensions regarding the future programme of MMA, he categorically stated that there would be no attempt to impose “Islamic system” against the wishes of the people. What MMA wanted, he said, was that the recommendations of CII should be implemented. So far as Islamic system was concerned, he made it clear that it would be imposed only when there was a suitable environment.²⁷ These views on the political system of Pakistan hardly conflicted with the views held by PML(Q) and PPP-P on the nature of Pakistan’s polity.

Differences

There were certain policy issues over which these political parties had adopted sharply contrasting postures. We shall now identify those issues and compare the respective stands of PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA. While doing so, we shall put these issues in perspective, so that there is a better understanding of the party line projected in the manifestos of these political parties. The issues being identified cover the internal as well as external politics of Pakistan, and are the result of most recent developments, both on the domestic and global fronts.

²⁷ *Jang* (Lahore), November 27, 2002.

Foreign Policy, War Against Terrorism, Jihad and Kashmir

In its manifesto, MMA pledged to “get the country and people rid of influence of imperialistic forces and their local agents.” It also promised “to extend moral, political and diplomatic help and support to all suppressed (people) with particular emphasis on Kashmiris, Palestinians, Afghans and Chechnians.” These two statements reflected the oft-repeated and well-known position of MMA opposing Pakistan’s decision to join the US and international community in a global coalition against terrorism represented by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. MMA strongly denounced the presence of US forces in Pakistan and grant of permission to the US for the use of Pakistan’s ground facilities and air space for bombing over Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 incidents. After the ouster of Taliban from power last year, the US shifted its war against the Taliban from Afghanistan to the border regions of the country along Pakistan’s tribal areas. The US forces, in close cooperation with Pakistani forces had carried out raids to nab the fleeing elements of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These actions were strongly resented by the tribal people and MMA lent whole-hearted support to them.

Four of the six parties grouped into MMA, namely JI, JUI(F), JUI(S) and JAH, have been very closely associated with the Afghanistan problem, both during the Soviet occupation and after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country. In the war of resistance waged by the people of Afghanistan against the invading Soviet forces, JI played an active role by allowing its trained activists to join the Afghan *jihad* (holy war) and facilitating the distribution of large-scale international humanitarian assistance to millions of Afghan refugees who had taken shelter in Pakistan. JUI(F) and JUI(S) were also involved in this process, but JI played a dominant role due to its special relationship with the government of late General Zia-ul-Haque and some of the Afghan *mujahideen* groups, like Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmatyar, who was at that time the blue-eyed boy of the US. Since Pakistan and an overwhelming number of the world’s nations, especially the US and Western countries, fully supported the Afghan war of resistance against the Soviet Union, the open and active involvement of Pakistan’s political parties, like JI, was not only endorsed by the government of Pakistan, but was actively encouraged. This involvement continued even after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989 and Pakistani based Afghan

mujahdeen groups received all kinds of help in their bid to capture power in Kabul. During this period, the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan virtually ceased to exist, making it easy for men and material to move across the border between the two countries. Pakistan's tribal areas lying close to its borders with Afghanistan, served as base areas for the *mujahideen* who first struggled against the Soviet invaders and then fought a bitter civil war among themselves to establish their hegemony in Afghanistan. Under the Taliban, these ties, mostly based on ethnic affinities, were reinforced.

When the Americans launched their air attacks against the Taliban in October 2001, there was, quite understandably, a strong reaction in the tribal areas against the American action. Thousands of volunteers crossed into Afghanistan from the tribal areas of Pakistan to take part in what they perceived was a *jihad* against the US and its allies i.e., the forces of the Northern Alliance. The anger against the American military action in Afghanistan turned into a strong protest against the government of President General Pervez Musharraf, who had agreed to provide the Americans logistical assistance in carrying out air attacks on Taliban positions in Afghanistan. The people of Pakistan's tribal areas have directly been affected by America's war against the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda of Osama bin Laden. This resentment of the local people was strongly articulated by JI, JUI(F) and JUI(S) in the form of, firstly, protest movement, and then, into election slogans. The protest movement and agitation launched immediately after the start of American bombing against Afghanistan on October 8, 2001 was aimed at forcing the Musharraf regime to change its pro-US policy. But it failed to achieve its objective, as the agitation did not receive an encouraging response from Punjab and Sindh. But anti-US and anti-Musharraf slogans and programmes outlined in the manifesto of MMA received dividends in the form of election gains that surpassed even the wildest dreams of the religious zealots.

MMA based its election campaign on the issue of American bombing on Afghanistan and pursuit of Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements in the tribal areas of Pakistan. As a senior leader of MMA, Hafiz Hussain Ahmad, remarked at the beginning of the election campaign, "The alliance will be pushing election campaign on the basis of the realities and developments of 9/11 and post-September devastating reaction shown by the West in the region."²⁸ Qazi

²⁸ *Dawn* (Karachi), September 5, 2002.

Hussain Ahmad launched his election campaign from Chakdara, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), with a blistering attack on the US and its policies in the region. “The United States,” said Qazi Hussain Ahmad, while addressing an election rally, “wants to avenge the tribesmen in the name of operation against so called Al-Qaeda and reach Pakistan’s sensitive installations.” He criticized President General Pervez Musharraf for “extending support to allied forces,” and said that the “Americans and allied forces had launched a crusade against Muslims in the name of so called war on terror and operations against Al-Qaeda.”²⁹ A candidate of MMA in NA-40 (North Waziristan Agency) urged the electorate to resist the US policies in the region. “At present,” he said, “the US has focused attention on the tribal areas just for meeting her nefarious designs, which could effect the independence and autonomous status of the tribesmen.”³⁰ At a big public rally organized by MMA in Rawalpindi (Liaquat Bagh) on September 23, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani said, “the Americans have killed thousands of innocent Afghans with the help and assistance of Pakistan and now they were turning towards Pakistan.”³¹

There is no doubt that MMA contested October 10 elections by raising the issue of American bombing on Afghanistan and operations against Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas. This was a fact that the top leadership of MMA openly admitted. In their speeches during the election campaign, the leaders of MMA made it clear that if voted to power, they would change the pro-US Afghan policy of the Musharraf government.” “We will withdraw this support (to the US on Afghanistan),” said Qazi Hussain Ahmad in a statement during the election campaign.³²

Both PML(Q) and PPP-P differed with MMA over the Afghan policy set by the military government of President and Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf. While discussing the foreign policy of the country in its manifesto, the PML(Q) suggested to have normal and friendly relations with Afghanistan under the rule of Hamid Karzai. The PML(Q) made no comment on the ongoing war against terrorism in its manifesto and instead of condemning American operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, the manifesto of PML(Q) supported “all efforts for reconciliation and

²⁹ *The News* (Lahore), September 17, 2002.

³⁰ *The Nation* (Rawalpindi), September 29, 2002.

³¹ *The Nation* (Rawalpindi), September 23, 2002.

³² *Dawn* (Karachi), September 28, 2002.

reconstruction in Afghanistan.”³³ Unlike MMA, the PML(Q), supported President Pervez Musharraf and his policies, including constitutional changes. Speaking in the Meet the Press Programme in Lahore on September 15, 2002, Chaudhary Pervez Elahi, of PML(Q) said that his party would vote for President Musharraf to ensure his stay for five years, if needed. “His policies,” he said, “are good. The country is deriving benefit from him. Now we are heading towards true democracy. So we will vote for him,” Chaudhary Pervez Elahi said categorically. Strongly defending the constitutional changes and amendments introduced by President Musharraf under LFO, he said that any system without checks and balances was liable to fail and falter. However, he favoured a strong parliament, which should, in his view, focus on legislation.³⁴ In its manifesto, PML(Q) supported the Devolution Plan introduced by the military government and promised to strengthen the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) “to carry out its duties without any hindrance.”³⁵

PPP-P rejected some of the constitutional amendments under LFO, but, at the same time, supported certain changes and political reforms of the military government, like expansion of women representation in the legislative bodies, reducing the voting age to 18 years and restoration of joint electorate for the minorities. The position of the Party on these issues was duly reflected in the manifesto. “PPP-P,” says its manifesto, “supports constitutional terms for district governments.” “The District Governments,” the manifesto further says, “should be independent of the Federal Authority and have an access to an appropriate and independent fiscal base within the parameters of provincial autonomy.”³⁶ PPP-P strongly differed with MMA over the issue of the war against terrorism and Pakistan’s decision to ally itself with the US in operations against Al-Qaeda. “PPP-P,” “says its Manifesto,” opposes terrorism and will continue the policy of present (Musharraf) regime to ally itself against the forces of terrorism.” Further elaborating party’s position on the issue of terrorism, the manifesto says, “The war against terror focuses attention on the danger of the rogue elements accessing nuclear systems of countries with inadequate Command and Control systems. The Nuclear Command and Control systems as well as nuclear safety

³³ *PML(Q) Manifesto*, op. cit.

³⁴ *The Nation* (Rawalpindi), September 16, 2002.

³⁵ *PML(Q) Manifesto*, op. cit., p.11.

³⁶ *PPP-P Manifesto*, op. cit., p. 8.

measures will be ensured by the PPP-P government to allay fears about the safeguards of the nuclear assets.”³⁷

As a component party of Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD), PPP-P maintained that the 1973 Constitution should be restored in its original form. In this regard, a joint declaration was issued in Islamabad on September 5, on launching the election campaign from one platform with a focus on the restoration of 1973 Constitution. According to the ARD Chief, Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, the election campaign of the alliance would specially target the military government (of President Musharraf) and his policies.³⁸ Speaking at an election rally in Quetta, on September 28, President PPP-P Makhdoom Amin Fahim accused the military government of usurping the rights of the people and said that if his party were voted to power, it would restore their rights.³⁹

Governance, Corruption and Women Rights

All the three parties have discussed and stated their respective views on the above issues i.e. governance, corruption and women rights, in their election manifestos. Despite the fact that these parties acknowledged the need to raise the status of women; wanted that the political power and authority should be used in a judicious, transparent and fair manner, and according to the principles of good governance; and that the polity of Pakistan should be free from the curse of corruption. They tended to view these issues in their own perspectives, which, basically, are similar but, on interpretation, betray serious differences of opinion. For example, MMA, in its manifesto, pledged, “to protect rights of women guaranteed by Islam and restoration of their honour and prestige.”⁴⁰ Explaining the MMA position on the rights of women, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, told a Women Convention in Peshawar on October 20 that if it came to power, the MMA would abolish co-education and establish women universities in the country.⁴¹ MMA also expressed its reservations on the increase in women seats in the National Assembly and four provincial assemblies. But in its manifesto, PML(Q) committed itself to encouraging the women “to take part in elections for the National Assembly, Provincial Assemblies and Local Government

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³⁸ *Dawn* (Karachi), September 5, 2002.

³⁹ *The Nation* (Rawalpindi), September 29, 2002.

⁴⁰ *MMA Manifesto*, op. cit.

⁴¹ *The News*, Lahore, October 21, 2002.

Institutions.” The PML(Q) also advocated the involvement of women as workers in the industrial, agricultural and cooperative sectors; and a review of all discriminatory laws against women. The manifesto also recommended that in case of government or state land allotment, ownership should be in the name of husband and wife.⁴² PPP-P, in its manifesto, pledged to protect the rights and promote the interests of women along with the rights and interests of minorities and children. In PPP-P’s view, the women, minorities and children constituted ‘disadvantaged groups’ who “have suffered a series of punishments, laws, public humiliation and gang rape, while the state watched helplessly.” The Party promised to “undo laws that are discriminatory against minorities, women and children.” In the manifesto, the Party also pledged to “promote universal female literacy and protection of the child to honour our women and our future generations.” The PPP-P also declared that it would encourage non-government organizations (NGOs) as watchdogs for the empowerment of women and minorities.⁴³

All the three parties promised good governance in their manifestos. But their perceptions of good governance varied. MMA based its concept of good governance on “fear of God and affection to the Prophet (PBUH).” It also regarded the development of a “God fearing, helping and brave police system,” as a necessary element of good governance. MMA’s programme of liberating the entire society “within ten years to enable every one to know one’s rights and responsibilities,”⁴⁴ is also an integral part of its perception of good governance.

PML(Q) believed that de-politicisation of bureaucracy was essential for the strengthening of the state institutions. In its manifesto, the PML(Q) pledged an austerity programme proposing reduction in the unnecessary government expenditure and restructuring of the government to make it effective, efficient and responsive to the needs of the citizens. The other measures suggested by PML(Q) in its manifesto for good governance were: devolution and decentralization of powers and authority; elimination of corrupt practices, strengthening of NAB and streamlining of the provincial anti-corruption department. The manifesto also pledged to withdraw all discretionary powers of the government functionaries.⁴⁵

⁴² *PML(Q) Manifesto*, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

⁴³ *PPP-P Manifesto*, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

⁴⁴ *MMA Manifesto*, op. cit.

⁴⁵ *PML(Q) Manifesto*, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

PPP-P, in its manifesto, supported “an independent and impartial anti-corruption office to investigate every citizen of Pakistan, irrespective of the office that he or she holds.”⁴⁶ This body, according to the manifesto of PPP-P, it “would conduct itself according to the universal principles of due process rather than become the handmaiden of hostile regimes against political opponents.”⁴⁷

Conclusion

A comparison of the manifestos of PML(Q), PPP-P and MMA revealed that there were a number of areas, like parliamentary democracy, federalism, independence of judiciary, rule of law, eradication of poverty and education where there was a total consensus among these parties. They were committed to preserve the parliamentary and federal character of the constitution and supported the parameters of provincial autonomy as provided under the 1973 Constitution. All of them supported democracy, political pluralism and the right of universal adult franchise for the people of Pakistan. The three parties advanced similar programmes for raising the standard of education, ending unemployment and working for the welfare of the people. The parties also recognized law and order situation as a serious problem and made similar recommendations to improve it. The manifestos of the three parties contained solemn pledges for ending unemployment and lawlessness. These parties also favoured the creation of a peaceful environment for attracting foreign investment. All the three political parties declared in the manifestos their strong resolve to root out corruption, malpractices, favouritism and culture of violence from the society. The three parties also promised good governance, rule of law and strong state institutions if voted to power.

But the manifestos of the three parties offered sharp dissimilarities of views and conflicting approaches to some of the important national problems. These issues fall in the realm of foreign as well as domestic policies of the previous government. Moreover, the dissimilarities are multi-dimensional, e.g. PML (Q) and PPP-P have similarity of views on Pakistan’s policy of alliance with the US on the issue of terrorism; but differ on Kashmir policy. In this regard, the views of PML(Q) and those of MMA coincide on relations with

⁴⁶ *PPP-P Manifesto*, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

India. PPP-P has come out openly in favour of “good neighbourly” relations with India. The PPP-P is in agreement with PML(Q) on the issue of fighting against terrorism in cooperation with the US and international community. There is another issue on which the PPP-P and PML(Q) see eye to eye with each other; but have a serious difference with MMA. This issue relates to the increase in the seats of women in the legislative bodies, like the National Assembly and four provincial assemblies. The MMA has strongly opposed the increase of seats for women in the assemblies, while PPP-P has welcomed this step taken by the previous military government. MMA’s position on the issue of joint electorate is different from that of PPP-P and PML(Q). The religious parties grouped into MMA have traditionally been strong opponents of joint electorate. It was largely to appease the religious right in Pakistan that late General Zia-ul-Haque introduced separate electorate under 8th Amendment in 1985. When the previous military government restored joint electorate, it was very strongly opposed by JI and other religious parties. But PPP-P and PML(Q) have similar positions on the issue of joint electorate.

But MMA and PPP-P have similar stand on the question of LFO. Both hold that the amendments in the constitution could be made only through the method prescribed under the constitution. In their manifestos, these two political parties have expressed their strong beliefs in the supremacy of the parliament and inviolability of the constitution. However, MMA and PPP-P differ on the question of electorate and reservation of ten minority seats in the National Assembly. MMA, in its manifesto, has pledged to enforce *Shariat* and establish Islamic system in the country in all walks of life. For this purpose, it aims at bringing about radical changes in the social and economic system of Pakistan. This includes interest free banking system and establishment of separate educational institutions for the females. Both PML(Q) and PPP-P are committed to basing Pakistan’s economic, political and social system on Islamic principles, but are not ready to barter away the sovereignty of the parliament in legislation.

The manifestos of PPP-P, PML (Q) and MMA, on the one hand, reflect the ideology and political philosophy on which these parties are founded; on the other hand, the manifestos contain the responses to specific issues emanating from certain developments and events preceding the elections. These events and developments are interruption of democratic political process by the military take-over on October 12, 1999, the 9/11 incident, American war against terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s alliance with the US in war

against terrorism, anti-terrorism operations in Pakistan's tribal areas and the package of constitutional changes and amendments announced by President General Pervez Musharraf under LFO before the elections. The three political parties have responded differently to these developments. But despite this divergence of views on these issues, all the three political parties accept the 1973 Constitution with its basic structures i.e., federal-parliamentary democracy, independence of judiciary, Islamic provisions and fundamental human rights, as a valid framework for political operations. ■

Annex - A**The Manifesto of PML-Q****Main Points**

1. A number of political reforms to strengthen participatory democracy would be introduced.
2. The process of accountability in all public services shall be institutionalised, particularly for the elected representatives.
3. Role of opposition in the parliament shall have full institutional protection, as is the case in all parliamentary systems.
4. The Rule of Law shall be upheld in all parts of the country.
5. Police reforms shall be carried out to make police service efficient, citizens friendly institution rather than as an oppressive body.
6. The office of Ombudsman shall be strengthened to keep a check on the working of all ministries and departments at the centre and provincial levels.
7. All discretionary powers would be withdrawn. Government decisions must conform to laid down rules and regulations.
8. Bureaucracy shall be de-politicised by ensuring security of tenure and acceptance of responsibility with greater accountability. State institutions shall be made more responsive to the needs of the people and less susceptible to political abuse.
9. The NAB shall be strengthened to carry out its duty without any hindrance.
10. Size of the entourage of President and Prime Minister shall be curtailed for foreign tours.
11. Ministers and officials who are entitled to use official cars shall be allowed only one car.

12. Every agricultural district of the country shall be evaluated and a ten-year plan of development shall be devised keeping in view its land, water, technical, capital and human resources.
13. State land shall be sold at reasonable prices to those actual tillers.
14. To promote industrialization and make it competitive, credit allocation and other financial facilities shall be provided.
15. All banks and other financial institutions shall be reformed and their performance monitored so that the malpractices of the past are arrested.
16. Pakistan Muslim League shall try to bring a long term perspective in the economic transformation of the country through a number of measures, like up gradation of infrastructure, better quality management, modernization of sea-ports, incentives for local and foreign investors, raise in exports, higher agricultural growth, dynamic energy policy, balanced budget and national environmental strategy.
17. Literacy level would be increased by increasing allocation for education.
18. Government shall promote an on line educational resource (a grid) in coordination with Telecommunication Industry, which will be an important means of encouraging and promoting computer literacy.
19. Work towards the establishment of a just and fair international political order based on the UN Charter and principles of peaceful co-existence. To give highest priority to strengthening the capability of our armed forces, to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan and to contribute to the promotion of peace and security in the region.
20. To work for the peaceful settlement of all outstanding disputes, which are impeding normal relations with India without compromising Pakistan's historic commitment to the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the related UN resolutions.

Annex - B**The Manifesto of PPP-P****Main Points**

1. Election guidelines would be provided to restore to the public, the sanctity of the ballot.
2. Pakistan and the region will be given “peace within and peace without” with dignity and honour.
3. To promote religious tolerance on the principle that the religious beliefs of the individual citizens have little to do with the business of the state.
4. To promote values of freedom, fundamental rights and economic empowerment of the people with checks and balances that end concentration of power.
5. To oppose terrorism.
6. Pledges to eradicate poverty by ensuring that the social sector budget is increased.
7. The people of Pakistan will be liberated from the shackles of poverty, debt and servitude.
8. To support middle class purchases a Pay As You Earn Scheme (Credit Purchases) will be adopted in Government Corporations and other salaried institutions.
9. To make education a top priority.
10. To establish Youth Force/*Khadim-e-Danish*.
11. To provide incentives for software as well as hardware development.

12. To improve government health centres and hospitals and to establish Old Peoples Homes as well as Homes for Poor Children to aid and assist families that find such issues challenging.
13. To ensure the Rule of Law.
14. To lift the lid on state sponsored injustice and establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to acknowledge political victims.
15. To provide easy dispensation of justice by increasing the number of courts and abolishing special courts.
16. To examine the establishment of Constitutional Court in consultation with Pakistan Human Rights Commission.
17. To support technocrat and women seats on closed party system.
18. Election of Senate members by the members of Provincial Assemblies through open single transferable vote.
19. To protect the rights of women, minorities and children.
20. To oppose terrorism and continue the policy of the present regime to ally itself against the forces of terror.
21. To seek to reduce tension with India through peaceful negotiations to all outstanding disputes.

<<http://www.ppp.org.pk/manifesto/2002.html>>

Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) Manifesto

Main Points

1. To revive fear of God, affection to the Prophet (PBUH) and service to people with particular emphasis on government officials and cabinet members.
2. To make Pakistan a true Islamic welfare state to ensure justice to people and eradicate corruption whatsoever.
3. To ensure provision of bread, clothes, shelter, education, jobs and marriage expenses to all citizens.
4. To protect basic human rights (life, property and honour) of citizens.
5. To create an independent, just and humane economic system where citizens will be provided opportunities for *halal* jobs, business and investments.
6. To ensure uniform and quick justice to every citizen, from the president to an ordinary person.
7. To develop a God fearing, helping, brave and protecting police system.
8. To get the entire society literate within ten years to enable everyone to know one's rights and responsibilities.
9. To ensure compulsory and free of charge education till matriculation and provide opportunities to meritorious students and scholars for advanced research.
10. To protect rights of women guaranteed by Islam and restoration of their honour and prestige.
11. To abolish all chronic and new feudal system with forfeiture of illegal wealth and its distribution among poor.

12. To provide lands to peasants and formers for their livelihood and guarantee reasonable prices to their produce.
13. To protect provincial autonomy and district governments, taking care of backward areas and classes and taking special steps to get them at par with developed areas.
14. To get the country and people rid of influence of imperialistic forces and their local agents.
15. To extend moral, political and diplomatic help and support to all suppressed with particular emphasis on Kashmiris, Palestinians, Afghans and Chechnians

<<http://209.47225.1234/palest/eng/mma/manifesto/>>

Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives of Human Development in the Muslim World

Muhammad Ahsan*

This paper is an attempt to analyse the notion of ‘human development’ in its historical and contemporary perspectives. This notion was presented by the late Mahbub ul Haq at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990. It is based on the assumption that income does not constitute the entirety of a person’s life in society and, therefore, per capita income alone is not enough to measure human progress. The outcome of the discussion reflects that in contrast to the common belief that it is a new and innovative approach to improve the quality of human life, in reality, this is neither a new concept nor is the approach to tackle the development process a unique one. The only uniqueness of this concept is that it has been reinvented after more than fourteen centuries. The statistical analysis of the state of the contemporary Muslim World with regard to human development reflects that overall human development ranks of both high and low-income Muslim countries are significantly lower as compared to respective Non-Muslim countries. The same is also true for various components of human development, e.g., education, human security, human deprivation and human capital. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, this situation is a serious challenge for Muslim countries and demands urgent measures to overcome the problem of human under-development.

The UNDP first *Human Development Report 1990* was the brainchild of the late Mahbub ul Haq.¹ Today, more than a

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¹ Mahbub ul Haq, *Human Development in South Asia 1997* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997). Mahbub ul Haq (1934-98) first introduced this concept

decade after the publication, this conceptual framework has gained a special place at global level, exerting enormous influence on decision-makers, researchers, academicians and ordinary citizens. Amartya Sen² also contributed to the development of this framework. He underlined the fact that achieving a better life has more to do with nurturing and expanding human potentialities and capabilities than constantly promoting consumption of more goods and services.³ This paper analyses the situation of human development in the Muslim World in the historical and contemporary perspectives of human development. The statistical analysis of the contemporary state of human development of the Muslim World is based mainly on UNDP's recent reports where an effort is made to present a comparative picture of high and low-income Muslim and Non-Muslim countries. Here, this division of countries which is based on religion is not aimed at establishing two blocs of the world on the basis of faith; rather it attempts to highlight the widespread human under-development across the Muslim World, which is an important cause of global insecurity and instability. The discussion highlights the fact that human development is possible, and not merely an illusion – the prospects for human development lie in adopting various measures in specific areas. Therefore, concrete efforts are required in this regard to bring about positive change.

The Concept of Human Development

Before proceeding to further analysis, it is important to discuss the concept of human development briefly. Although it can be argued that in its *World Development Report 1980*, the World Bank was the first institution to use the term 'human development'⁴, the concept was adopted by the UNDP in 1990 when it published its first global

in 1980 when he was working for the World Bank (1970-82). Later, during his work for UNDP (1989-95), he took the initiative to publish the first *Human Development Report 1990*. In 1995, he established Human Development Centre in Islamabad (Pakistan) and published its first report on South Asia, *Human Development in South Asia 1997*.

² The Nobel Laureate in Economics in 1998.

³ Amartya Sen, *Inequalities Re-examined* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992). See also Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1999) and Sen, *Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason* (Cambridge: Trinity College, 1999).

⁴ The World Bank, *World Development Report 1980* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 32.

report based on this concept.⁵ The report argued that: ‘Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect.’⁶ While highlighting the link between economic growth and human development, UNDP emphasised that ‘if the distribution of income is unequal and if social expenditures are low (Pakistan and Nigeria) or distributed unevenly (Brazil), human development may not improve much, despite rapid GNP growth.’⁷ The *Human Development Report 1995*, supports this concept as follows:

The concept of human development is much broader than the conventional theories of economic development. Economic growth models deal with expanding GNP rather than enhancing the quality of human lives. Human resources development treats human beings primarily as an input in the production process – a means rather than an end. Welfare approaches look at human beings as beneficiaries and not as agents of change in the development process. The basic-need approach focuses on providing material goods and services to deprived population groups rather than on enlarging human choices in all fields.

Human development, by contrast, brings together the production and distribution of commodities and the expansion and use of human capabilities. Encompassing these earlier concerns, human development goes beyond them. It analyses all issues in society – whether economic growth, trade, employment, political freedom or cultural values – from the perspective of people. It thus focuses on enlarging human choices – and it applies equally to developing and industrial countries.⁸

The recent *Human Development Report 2001* argues that: ‘Human Development is about much more than the rise or fall of national incomes. It is about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests. People are the real wealth of nations. Development is thus about expanding the choices people

⁵ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 11-12.

have to lead lives that they value. And it is thus about much more than economic growth, which is only a means – if a very important one – of enlarging people’s choices. Fundamental to enlarging these choices is building human capabilities – the range of things that people can do or be in life. The most basic capabilities for human development are to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in community life. Without these, many choices are simply not available, and many opportunities in life remain inaccessible.’⁹

It is noteworthy that since 1990, when the first human development report was published by the UNDP, human development has been measured in terms of Human Development Index (HDI). The invention of the HDI is based on various efforts made in the past.¹⁰ ‘The HDI is a composite of three ingredients: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth. Knowledge is measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-third weight) and mean years of schooling (one-third weight). Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capita adjusted for the local cost of living (purchasing power parity, or PPP).’¹¹ ‘The HDI measures only the average national achievement, not how well it is distributed in a country.’¹²

⁹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 9.

¹⁰ The problems of using per capita income as a measure of development are a matter of common knowledge among academicians and thus social indicators are considered as an additional or alternative measure of development. The use of these indicators (e.g., life expectancy at birth, literacy rate, primary and secondary enrolment ratio, per capita consumption of protein, per capita energy consumption and average number of persons per room, etc.) related to the quality of life was highlighted by Adelman and Morris in 1967, and then the United Nations in 1970. Later, in 1979, another scholar, Morris D. Morris computed the ‘Physical Quality of Life Index’ which was composed of three indicators, i.e., life expectancy at age ‘one,’ infant mortality and the literacy rate. These attempts to measure social development provided a foundation for the discovery of future HDI. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Society, Politics and Economic Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); UNRISD, *Contents and Measures of Socio-economic Development* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute on Social Development, 1970); (Morris D. Morris, *Measuring the Conditions of the World’s Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index* (London: Cass, 1979)

¹¹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 91.

¹² UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 13.

Choudhury¹³ challenges the comprehension of the HDI by emphasising that it (HDI) lacks the concept of social welfare and thus it presents only a partial picture. He stressed the point of institutional change and in his opinion, rather than HDI, a Social Well-being Index (SWI) should be constructed. He argued that the stock market situation was an actual reflection of socio-economic stability in a country. Thus, as much as the stock market is stable, there will be more investment and social well-being. A careful consideration of HDI and SWI indicates that, SWI is not able to present an accurate picture of human development because here the real emphasis is on economic growth. Haq argues that economic growth is not an end but merely a means to development because this growth does not necessarily translate into human development. It is particularly true for various Muslim countries (e.g., Pakistan) where in spite of reasonable economic growth in the past few decades, its benefits have been hijacked by politically influential and wealthy people. Therefore the gap between the different social classes has widened.¹⁴ Thus, it can safely be said that HDI is a useful tool for understanding and ordering the level of human development of different countries. It has a stronger impact on readers' minds and attracts attention more powerfully than simply a long list of social indicators.

Islamic Approach to Human Development

In the present discussion it is important to briefly discuss the Islamic approach to human development and its relevance to the UNDP's approach. The Arabic word Islam simply means 'submission', and derives from a word '*Silm*' meaning 'peace.'¹⁵ According to Muslim belief, 'Islam is a complete code of life.'¹⁶ 'This is because there is no aspect of life, such as religion, economy, politics, education and health, etc., for which Islam does not provide guidance.'¹⁷ The 'Quran is the primary source of knowledge for Muslims.'¹⁸ 'One of the basic

¹³ Masudul Alam Choudhury, *Studies in Islamic Social Science* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 152-153.

¹⁴ Mahbub ul Haq, *Human Development in South Asia 1997* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. iii.

¹⁵ Islamic Text Society, *Understanding Islam and Muslims* (Cambridge: Islamic Text Society, 1989), p. 3.

¹⁶ Ghulam Sarwar, *Islam: Belief and Teachings* (London: The Muslim Educational Trust, 1994), p. 173.

¹⁷ Yahya Oyewole Imam, 'Islamic Health Care Services in the Contemporary World,' *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXXIX-4, (1995), pp. 234-44.

¹⁸ Abdus Samad, *Iqbal's Concept of State* (Niigata-ken: International University of Japan, 1992), p. 335.

and the most important characteristics regarding the social economy and the economic system upon which the Quran repeatedly lays stress is that all means and resources through which human beings earn their livelihood are Divinely created.¹⁹

In the Islamic system, human development is a purposeful activity aiming at: (i) economic development with its fair distribution of benefits, (ii) fair distribution should bring positive change in society, and, (iii) both these activities should enhance spiritual satisfaction of human beings.²⁰ Interestingly, this approach is similar as well as different from the UNDP's concept of human development. Its first two points are similar to the UNDP's approach, however, differences appears in the case of the third point. In UNDP's approach, the component of spiritual development and satisfaction is left open and optional. In Islamic philosophy, the human being is a God made creature with its two main components, body and soul. Therefore, human development is required in both these aspects. With reference to the above mentioned first two points with regard to human development, Islam particularly emphasises on: (i) social justice, fair distribution and utilisation of resources, (ii) education for all, (iii) economic development, (iv) income and employment promotion, and, (v) in the overall context, improving the physical quality of life.²¹ A brief comparison of these two approaches of human development is presented in the following Table, which highlights that the Islamic approach to human development would be incomplete without incorporating the component of spiritual development.

Table-1
UNDP's and Islamic Approach to Human Development

UNDP's Approach	Islamic Approach
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main emphasis on primary components of human development - Basic education; - Longer healthy life, and; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on education including secular and religious education, as well as acquisition of knowledge and skills in the field of science and

¹⁹ Khurshid Ahmad, (ed.) *Studies in Islamic Economics* (Jeddah: International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, 1976), pp. 3-18.

²⁰ M. A. Mannan, *Economic Development and Social Peace in Islam* (London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd., 1989), pp. 17-18.

²¹ Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, et. al. (1989), *An Agenda for Islamic Economic Reforms* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1989), pp. 79.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Higher level of income. • Secondary components are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political freedom; - Human rights, and; - Self-respect. 	<p>technology.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancement of opportunities for income generation and health services. • Emphasis on human security to ensure social justice at national and international level and religio-political freedom.
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Source.²²

Human Development of Early and Medieval Muslims²³

In Islamic teachings there is much emphasis on human development, and early Islamic history demonstrates its practicability. The first Muslim state was created on the map of the world in 622, when the Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH) migrated from Makkah to Madinah. ‘This migration [*Hijrah*] later became the starting point for the Muslim Lunar calendar’.²⁴ After His (Prophet) migration, He observed that in contrast to Makkah’s economy, where the trade was a dominant feature, the economy of Madinah was primarily agricultural based. In that new environment, He laid the foundations of a state in which agriculture played a prime role. His ten-year rule over Madinah was a period of economic stability and human development. Under these prevailing circumstances with respect to human development, in His state administration system, four points were of key importance, i.e., i) organisation, ii) education and research, iii) land consolidation and utilisation, and, iv) cooperation and self-help. After arriving in Madinah, his first step was to conduct a population census in the city. This census established the percentage of labour-force, which was in work. It also indicated the number of people who could read and write as opposed to those who were illiterate. The census showed that the total figure of the Muslim male labour-force was 1600. He

²² UNDP, 1990, 1994, 1995; Islamic Text Society op.cit.; Sarwar op.cit.; Imam op.cit.; Samad op.cit.; Ahmad op.cit.; Mannan op.cit.; Naqvi *et.al.*, op.cit.

²³ The discussion in this section is mainly based on various publications of this author (e.g., Muhammad Ahsan, ‘Human Development Strategies and the Muslim World: A Multi-dimensional Approach,’ *National Development and Security*, Vol. VII-3, 1999, pp. 1-24; ‘The Twenty-first Century and the Muslim World: State of Human Development with Particular Reference to Education,’ *Muslim Education Quarterly*, Vol. 16-3, 1999, pp. 54-93; and *Muslim Heritage and the 21st Century* (London: Taha Publishers, 2002).

²⁴ Shaykh Fadhlalla Haeri, *The Elements of Islam* (Dorset: Element Books Ltd., 1993), p. 14.

organised and developed these peoples into an efficient human capital.

In this newly created state, which was based on religion, Muslim and Non-Muslims enjoyed their full human rights and self-respect. It is appropriate to mention here that this innovative style of human administration was organised at four levels: (i) *Niqabat*, (ii) *Erafat*, (iii) *Nizarat*, and, (iv) *Amalat*. *Niqabat*, which was the lowest administrative unit of the state, consisted of eight families among whom one of the head of the families was its administrator. *Erafat* consisted of 12 *Niqabats* and its head was called *Areef* who was elected from local people and approved by the government. In addition to administrative matters, he was responsible for local branch of *Bait-ul-Mal*.²⁵ *Nizarat* was an intermediary administrative unit between *Erafat* and *Amalat*. Each *Nizarat* consisted of 24 *Erafats*. Many *Nizarafats* constituted of one *Amalat* which was similar to the provincial level of the government. The size of *Amalat* depended upon the local socio-economic situation and regional population. The chief executive of *Amalat* was called *Amel* who was directly appointed by the central government. Although, the *Amel* was not the elected head of the region, the appointment was made after the consultation of the people and social heads. It needs to be emphasised here that this system was based on the need and nature of those people and therefore, during the Prophetic (PBUH) short period of government, it was established on sound footings and remained unchanged for centuries to come.

It may be noted here that with reference to Prophet's (PBUH) teachings and political administration, similarities can be traced in His approach to human development and the UNDP's approach. Particularly with regard to the development of human capital, he placed enormous emphasis on education and training. The first message, which He received from God, was to read and learn. Therefore, He organised a national education system and established its five sub-departments for: (i) teaching of different languages, (ii) accountancy and business administration, (iii) industrial education and training, (iv) agricultural education and research, and, (iv) defence and strategic studies. This system was based on four types of classes: (i) daily, (ii) weekly, (iii) seasonal, and, (iv) distance learning. In this educational set-up, there was more emphasis on practical aspects and agricultural research, which was an important need of the time for the purpose of human capital formation. Often

²⁵ Bait ul Mal is the Central Bank.

these programmes were multi and inter-disciplinary in nature, where in addition to the teachers and trainers, the participants of the courses were also used to make presentations and share their experiences.

Due to the particular nature of the agro-tribal community of the Madni Muslim state, two simultaneous approaches, i.e., land consolidation and creation of cooperatives, were adopted for income generation and employment promotion. Unlike today when every one knows the importance of land consolidation, centuries ago the situation was entirely different and people were ignorant of this concept and practice. Immediately after His migration to Madinah, the Prophet (PBUH) organised the scattered cultivated land and gardens, and developed the available human capital to enhance per capita productivity. It is widely believed that the cooperative movement is a modern invention and that it was initiated by a group of 28 people in Rochdale UK in 1844.²⁶ However, in reality this movement was started in Madinah 1222 years before the 'Rochdale Pioneers.' These efforts provided strong foundations for the overall development of the quality of life.

The strategies of human development initiated by the Prophet (PBUH) continued in the years to come. Numerous voluminous books have been written and massive research has been conducted on the development of knowledge and, science and technology in the early and medieval Islamic periods.²⁷ However, due to the limited space available, here the discussion is confined only to a few lines. It is noteworthy that during the period of Caliph Umar, Umro bin al-Aas (*Amel* of Egypt) prepared a feasibility report and maps to connect the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea by a canal. Their plan and objective was similar to the present Suez Canal. The report was presented to the Caliph but after detailed consideration and discussions the project was not approved due to national and international security reasons.²⁸ Although the Suez Canal was not built during that time, this deficiency was fulfilled by constructing numerous other canals. In fact, for this purpose, there was a huge department of civil engineering called *Nizarat-al-Nafia*. This

²⁶ Later these people became famous as the 'Rochdale Pioneers' (M.M. Bashir Kausar and M.A. Khan, *Cooperative Theory and Practice* (Faisalabad: University of Agriculture, 1980), pp. 15-17.

²⁷ Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present* (London: Macmillan, 1968). See also Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study* (London: World of Islam Festival Publishing Co. Ltd., 1976)

²⁸ During that period, there was a danger of attacks from Romans as they had a stronger Navy compared to Caliphate.

department was employing an army of workers and in the province of Egypt alone, nearly 120,000 workers and civil engineers were engaged in digging new canals. One of the masterpieces of this department was a newly constructed Canal of *Ameer ul Mo'meneen*, which linked the River Nile to the Red Sea. This almost 110 Km long canal was constructed mainly for shipping purposes and was completed within six months. It may be mentioned here that the medieval age of Islamic history is particularly famous due to its human development based on prosperity and advancement in the fields of science and technology. This development was only possible due to innovative steps and solid foundations laid by earlier Muslims. They opened their doors to the rest of the world and unlike present day restrictions on the transfer of technology, trade embargo and sanctions, they were pleased to spread their knowledge and skill to other nations.

The Contemporary Muslim World

At the dawn of the 21st century, out of 207 countries and territories of the world²⁹, 57 countries are the members of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and are considered Islamic countries or the Muslim World.³⁰ According to the UN estimates, out of the total 6.13 billion population of the world, the Muslim World constitutes 21.4 per cent.³¹ Similarly, out of the 103 million Km² of geographic area

²⁹ The World Bank, *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)

³⁰ The member states of OIC are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei-Darussalam, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote d' Ivory, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen (Organisation of Islamic Conference, 2002).

³¹ United Nations Fund for Population Activities (June 2, 2002), *Demographic, Social and Economic Indicators: The States of World Population 2001*, <<http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2001/english/indicators/indicators2.html>>

For the simplicity of analysis in this paper, the total population of Muslim countries is considered as the Muslim World while the total population of Non-Muslim countries is taken as the Non-Muslim World. It is estimated that out of the total global population, the proportion of Muslim population is 22.30 per cent (Ian Castello-Cortes et. al., *World Reference Atlas* (London: Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 1999); New Internationalist Publications Ltd., *The World Guide* (Oxford: New Internationalist Publications Ltd., 2000); The Economist Intelligence Unit

that covers the world, the Muslim World covers 30.51 million Km².³² The global map indicates that the Muslim World stretches from North West Africa (Morocco) to South East Asia (Indonesia). It ranges from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. It is further estimated that the Muslim World produces more than three-quarters of the world's rubber and jute, two-third of its oil, two-third of all palm oil, over two-third of its spices, and half of the tin and phosphate. In addition to having a vast number of gas reserves, they also produce a large quantity of the world's cotton, tea, coffee, wool uranium, manganese, cobalt and many other commodities and minerals.³³ Unfortunately, in spite of these obvious advantages, human under-development is dominant throughout the Muslim World. With reference to the context, it would be useful to look at a broader comparative picture of the Muslim and the Non-Muslim worlds. Table 2 indicates that with regard to the basic indicators, the Muslim World lags far behind the Non-Muslim World.

Table-2
Basic Indicators about the Muslim and the Non-Muslim Worlds

Item	Muslim World		Non-Muslim World	
	High Income Countries	Low Income Countries	High Income Countries	Low Income Countries
Population living below international poverty line	..	33.8	..	27.6
Per capita GDP (US\$)	8,612	613	26,180	2,512
GDP growth rate (per cent)	-0.7	-0.2	2.6	1.5
Literacy rate (per cent)	77	59	98	79
Life expectancy (years)	72	58	79	64
Population growth rate (per cent)	2.1	2.2	0.5	1.4

(various country reports), 2001; Naeem Dar (ed.), *Muslim Directory* (London: Blackmore Press, 2001); CIA, *World Fact Book*, 2001), <www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook>

³² The World Bank, *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also Castell-Cortes et. al. (1999); New International Publications Ltd. (2000).

³³ Ahmed Nawaz, *Global Production and Trade* (New Delhi: Swanz and Co., 2001), pp. 35-54.

Population without safe water (per cent)	19	36	6	28
No. of doctors per 100,000 persons	123	82	273	115

Source: The World Bank, 2000; UNDP, 2001.

Note:³⁴

Today the Muslim World, as a whole faces a number of challenges as evidenced by the serious problems that beset individual Muslim countries. Mahbub ul Haq rightly pointed out that: ‘The development ranks of Islamic countries are generally lower than per capita ranks, showing that their income has not been fully translated into the lives of their people. The overall HDI for 49 Islamic countries is only 0.393, placing the Islamic World in the low human development category.’³⁵ According to the *Human Development Report 2001*, 44 Muslim countries had a lower value of HDI than that of the world average.³⁶ Moreover, in similar income groups, several Muslim countries were far behind their Non-Muslim counterparts in terms of human development. In the following Table, two examples are quoted in this regard. The data indicates that within the group of high-income countries with similar income, the HDI world ranking places UAE in 45th position as against New Zealand, which enjoys the 19th position. Similarly, in low-income countries, Guinea occupies 150th position in comparison to Viet Nam which is ranked 101st. The literacy rates in New Zealand and Viet Nam were 99 and 93 per cent as compared to UAE and Guinea where the figures were only 75 and 35 per cent, respectively. This situation reflects that in addition to other factors, the mismanagement of resources in Muslim countries is an important cause for their human under-development.

³⁴ The division of high and low-income countries is based on the *World Development Report 2000/2001* which mainly focuses on poverty issues. In this division, high and upper-middle income countries are considered as ‘high income countries’ (GNP per capita US\$ 2,996 or above), while lower-middle and lower income countries are categorised as ‘low-income countries’ (GNP per capita US\$ 2,995 or less). According to this classification out of 57 Muslim countries only 11 (i.e., Bahrain, Brunei, Gabon, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) are considered as high-income while the rest are deemed to be low-income Muslim countries.

³⁵ Mahbub ul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 105.

³⁶ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 141-144.

Table-3
Comparison of the Muslim and the Non-Muslim Countries
with Similar Income but Different Levels of Human Development

Country	HDI Ranking	GDP per Capita (US\$)	Life Expectancy (years)	Literacy Rate (per cent)
High-income				
• New Zealand	19	19,104	77.4	99.0
• UAE	45	18,162	75.1	75.1
Low-income				
• Viet Nam	101	1,860	67.8	93.1
• Guinea	150	1,934	47.1	35.0

Source: UNDP, 2001.

Regarding the above discussion, a simple question arises – what will the state of human development in the Muslim World be like in the twenty-first century? Unfortunately, an analysis of global statistics does not present an encouraging picture. With reference to the context, it is important to mention here that a recent analysis of Mohammadi and Ahsan revealed that during the 1990s, on an overall basis (i.e., all low-income countries of the world), Non-Muslim countries received more aid as compared to Muslim countries.³⁷ Moreover, during this period, the growth rate of aid to Muslim countries was nearly ‘-1’ in contrast to Non-Muslim countries where the respective figure was ‘2’. This was in spite of the fact that there was more poverty and debt burden, and less foreign investment in Muslim countries. Although, it can be argued that during the 1990s, various Muslim countries have made some progress with regard to human development, in the contemporary age of globalisation and competition, this progress is proving to be insufficient. It is worth noting that according to recent estimates of the UNDP, out of all 57 Muslim countries, 34 have fallen in the HDI world ranking. Furthermore, although some of the high-income Non-Muslim countries have also fallen in world ranking, they still remain among the top countries of the global HDI. The average growth of HDI for the Muslim World as a whole was -29.2 as against 3.0 percent of high-income Non-Muslim countries.³⁸

³⁷ Ali Mohammadi and Muhammad Ahsan, *Globalisation or Recolonisation? The Muslim World in the 21st Century* (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 2002), pp. 37-56.

³⁸ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1999* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also UNDP (2000) and UNDP (2001).

‘Education for All’ in the Muslim World: A Reality or Just a Slogan?

Education is at the heart of humanistic development. The goals of future-oriented education are defined by the development process as the collective vision of society. Education as knowledge is one of the creative elements in the formation of that collective vision and is also one of the important means for realising the agenda of human ascent from the shadows out. It has a catalytic role in each element as well as the human development process as a whole.³⁹ In Islamic literature, there is an enormous emphasis on the acquisition of knowledge. The first verse of the Quran was a command to the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) to read, learn and understand (Quran, 96: 1-4). According to Quranic teachings, Allah gave man the ability to observe, think and to write with the pen so that he could circulate knowledge broadly and preserve his cultural heritage for coming generations. In the Quran, knowledge and education are highly emphasised and it praises learned people, encourages original thinking and human development. Unfortunately, in the contemporary world these teachings are widely neglected and thus are limited only to the extent of ‘theory’. In the practical sense, the Muslim World is far behind in this field. It is noteworthy that these religious teachings are also supported by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, which considers education as a basic human right.⁴⁰ Similarly, the ‘World Conference on Education for All’ (jointly sponsored by UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP and the World Bank) held in 1990 at Jomtien (Thailand), adopted the ‘World Declaration on Education for All’.⁴¹ It called on all countries to provide basic education to all their citizens by the end of the twentieth century. According to its Article One (*Meeting Basic Learning Needs*) – Section One:

Every person – child, youth and adult – shall be able to benefit from educational opportunities designed to meet their basic learning needs.

³⁹ Raja Roy Singh, *Education for the Twenty-First Century: Asia Pacific Perspectives* (Bangkok: UNESCO Principal Regional Office, 1991), p. 24.

⁴⁰ Julia Häusermann, *A Human Rights Approach to Development* (London: Rights and Humanity, 1998). See also Kevin Watkins, *Education Now: Break the Cycle of Poverty* (Oxford: Oxfam, 1999).

⁴¹ UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP, and The World Bank World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs (World Conference on Education for All, 5-9 March 1990, Jomtien, Thailand), (New York and Bangkok: UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP and The World Bank, 1990).

These needs comprise both essential learning tools (such as literacy, oral expression, numeracy and problem solving) and the basic learning contents (such as knowledge, skills, values and attitudes) required by human beings to be able to survive, to develop their full capacities, to live and work in dignity, to participate fully in development, to improve the quality of their lives, to make informed decisions and to continue learning (UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP and World Bank, 1990:3).⁴²

In April 2000, 188 countries (including all Muslim countries) joined 'The World Education Forum' in Dakar. The Dakar Conference was held to review progress after the 'World Conference on Education for All' (1990) and to reaffirm their commitment to basic education. The World Education Forum was important in the context that here: (i) a commitment for free and compulsory education was made,⁴³ (ii) governments were particularly requested to develop new or strengthen existing educational plans, and, (iii) developed countries acknowledged that several developing countries lack economic resources required to achieve the objective of 'education for all.'⁴⁴ In fact, in several Muslim countries the situation of education sector is quite discouraging. For instance in Pakistan (the only nuclear power in the Muslim World), government statistics for the year 2001 indicate that the country's literacy rate was only 49 per cent (male 61.3 per cent and female 36.8 per cent).⁴⁵ This literacy rate varies in the country across the provinces and rural and urban areas.⁴⁶ It is quite discouraging that after more than half a century of independence, this country is still among the countries of the world, which have the lowest literacy rates.⁴⁷ Similarly, Table: 4, which indicates a cross-country comparison of high and low-income Muslim and Non-Muslim Worlds also reflects a discouraging picture. As is discussed above, here too, it is obvious from the figures that in spite of having the same level of per capita income, in the context of human development, Qatar and Mauritania are far behind Spain and Mongolia in the respective categories. The literacy rates of both these Muslim countries are also far lower than their Non-Muslim

⁴² Ibid., p.3.

⁴³ Earlier the World Conference on Education for All (1990) did not produce a commitment to free and compulsory education.

⁴⁴ Thus it established a principle of ensured international financing.

⁴⁵ Government of Pakistan, (July 15, 2001), *Economic Survey 2000-2001* <<http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/main.html>>

⁴⁶ Anita Ghulam Ali, 'Back to the Writing Board,' *Zameen: A Magazine for the Non-resident Pakistanis* (1998), pp. 82-87.

⁴⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 157-160.

counterparts. This situation clearly demands more investment in education. However, the proportionate public expenditure on education, both in Qatar and Mauritania are lower than Spain and Mongolia, respectively. This situation raises concern about how Muslim countries can make significant progress in the field of human development in the contemporary globalised world.

Table-4
Comparison of Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries
with Similar Income but Different Levels of Human Development,
Adult Literacy Rate and Expenditure on Education

Country	HDI Ranking	GDP per Capita	Adult Literacy Rate	Public Expenditure on Education (Percentage of GNP)
High-income				
• Spain	21	18,079	97.6	5.0
• Qatar	48	18,789	80.8	3.4
Low-income				
• Mongolia	116	1,711	62.3	5.7
• Mauritania	139	1,609	41.6	5.1

Source: Same as Table: 3.

Human (In) Security

Human security is an important component of human development. There are varying views about human security and in recent years it has been considered that the borders of this notion are stretched beyond the defence of a country's geographic boundaries. In Bhagavan's view 'human security means ensuring that people's basic needs are met, which at least, is about access to secure and adequate livelihoods and income.'⁴⁸ In 1994, the UNDP argued that: 'For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a country's border. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these

⁴⁸ M. R. Bhagavan, 'Knowledge and Research in a Radically Changed World,' in SIDA, *Development Cooperation in the 21st Century* (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 1997), pp. 9-16.

are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world'.⁴⁹ In the same report, the UNDP further argued that: 'The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them – with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms.' A careful consideration of these definitions reflects that Bhagavan's emphasis is on the basic needs approach and his definition fails to encircle a broader concept of human development.⁵⁰ The salient points of the UNDP's approach are:

- a. Human security is a universal concern (both for the developed and the developing worlds).
- b. When the security of people in any part of the world is challenged, it also affects the security of people in other parts.
- c. Human security is people-centred as it is concerned with the daily lives of the masses.
- d. It also means, security from hunger, disease, repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.
- e. Human security is not a substitute of the broader concept of human development rather a precondition for it. In addition, there is a strong relationship between human security and human development. Progress in one area will promote opportunities in the other.

It is worth mentioning that the UNDP's approach to human security is broader and more comprehensive as compared to Bhagavan's definition.⁵¹ This view is also supported by Buzan.⁵² For him, state security is not necessarily enhanced by the decline of external military threats. Indeed, the reduced ability of the state to fulfil the needs of its citizens is also a potential threat to national and international security. However, it may be mentioned here that in its

⁴⁹ UNDP *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁵⁰ ILO, *Employment Growth and Basic Needs* (Geneva: ILO, 1976). See also Gustavo Esteva, 'Development,' in Wolfgang Sachs (ed.) *The Development Dictionary* (London: Zed Books, 1992).

⁵¹ Lester R. Brown, *Redefining National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1977), pp. 5-8. See also David A. Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security,' *Review of International Studies* (1997), Vol. 23-1, pp. 5-26.

⁵² Barry Buzan, 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 67-3 (1991), pp. 431-451.

report of 1994, while providing the definition of human security, UNDP did not give due importance to the conventional aspect of security, i.e., the armed or external threats to the existence of a state. Whether these threats are local, regional or global – they may be beyond the control of a single nation state. The current wave of global violence, the US led war on terrorism (which is widely considered controversial across the Muslim World), the instability in the Middle East and the South Asian regions are the facts which currently strengthen the arguments that both, internal and external securities are important components of the overall notion of human security which is the prerequisite for human development. For this reason, the internal or external threat to the security of a country pushes for ever higher military spending which may seriously harm efforts to achieve a higher level of human development. This is particularly true after the 11th September (2001) when the changed global environment has threatened the human security of several countries in the world in general and the Muslim countries in particular.⁵³

Table: 5 presents two sets of cross-country (high and low-income) comparisons. The Middle East and South Asia, are both the most troubled and volatile regions of the world. Israel and the UAE can be categorised as high-income and high-human development countries as compared to Nepal and Pakistan, which are at the low end of income and human development. The figures indicate that Israel, in spite of its extremely high military expenditures as

⁵³ The military threat to national security is one of many that governments have to address. Ayoob argues that: 'The term [security] as it has been traditionally used in international relations literature is based on two major assumptions: one that threats to a state's security principally arise from outside its borders, and two, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually need a military response if the security of the target state is to be preserved.' In the views of Baldwin and Wolfers, the definition of security can be established through the specification of two factors. The first factor is to be specified is a referent object – the actor(s) whose security is under discussion. It can be a nation state, society, ethnic or religious group or even an international system. Secondly, it is necessary to specify the values to be protected, such as political autonomy, territorial integrity, or continuity of state identity. However, in the age of globalisation and global terrorism, it may not be possible to draw a specific line between 'local,' 'national' and 'international' factors. In the words of Ex-President Clinton: 'There is no longer a division between what is foreign and what is domestic – the world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crises, the world arms race – they have all become global in nature and reach' (Muhammad Ayoob, 'International Security and the Third World,' in W.C. Olson (ed.), *Theory and Practice of International Relations* (Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1994), pp. 224-41.

compared to UAE, has well managed the utilisation of its financial capital and spends far higher proportionate amount on its health and education sectors. The respective figures for UAE are much lower and thus present a discouraging picture. The outcome of this situation is that life expectancy and adult literacy are considerably higher in the former as compared to the latter.⁵⁴ In the South Asian region, Nepal and Pakistan are almost at the same level of human development and face threats to their national security.⁵⁵ However, similar to Israel, Nepal's proportionate spending on education and health are significantly higher than Pakistan's. This situation reflects that Non-Muslim countries are able to manage their financial resources in an efficient way as compared to their Muslim counterparts.

Table-5
Human Security – Cross-country Comparison of Low and High-Income Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries

Country/Region	HDI Ranking	Public Expenditure on Education (Percentage of GNP)	Public Expenditure on Health (Percentage of GDP)	Military Expenditure (Percentage of GDP)
High-income (Middle East)	22	7.6	6.0	8.1
• Israel	45	1.7	0.8	3.2
• UAE				
Low-income (South Asia)	129	3.2	1.3	0.9
• Nepal	127	2.7	0.9	4.4
• Pakistan				

Source: Same as Table: 3.

With reference to the context, it is important to briefly discuss the Islamic approach to human security, which is an important component of *Shariah* (Islamic law). In Islam, human security is considered a preliminary step to for achieving the objective of human development. Here the main emphasis is on the elimination of human poverty, which is also called human deprivation. The recent shift from the World Bank-IMF backed 'structural adjustment programmes' and then 'enhanced structural adjustment facility' to the current 'poverty reduction and growth facility,' and 'poverty

⁵⁴ Figures of life expectancy at birth and adult literacy for Israel and the UAE

were, 78.3, 97.6, and, 74.8 and 75.1, respectively (UNDP, 2001, pp. 141)

⁵⁵ Kashmir is the real dispute between India and Pakistan while Maoist rebel attacks are a major threat to Nepal's security.

reduction support credit' based on country specific 'poverty reduction strategy papers,' also highlights the importance of the elimination of poverty.⁵⁶ The Islamic approach to human security differs from the 'basic need approach' as in the former the anti-poverty programme is based on human security while in the latter, the main emphasis is on the fulfilment of the basic needs of humankind.⁵⁷ In Islamic philosophy, human security is a derivation of Quranic teachings where enormous emphasis is laid on social justice. It (Quran) says: 'In their (wealthy people) wealth, the needy and deprived have due share' (15:19). It 'points to the need for a system in which economic power is justly distributed, wherein an individual's consumption level may not necessarily be proportional to his capacity to earn. The difference between these two magnitudes – viz. individual's earning capacity and his level of consumption – has to be made up by a social security programme.'⁵⁸

According to Muslim belief everything is created by Allah and the human being is a very special creature in the universe. In Islam, Muslims are bound to total submission to Allah and this submission is the only way to their future security. The concept of *Jihad* is an important pillar of the Islamic approach to human security. In the words of Kolocotronis: '*Jihad* is a struggle governed by rules and regulations – in it there is no room for terrorism. Muslims who have a clear understanding of the original teachings of Islamic *Jihad* know the true nature of the struggle.'⁵⁹ This view is also supported by Boisard.⁶⁰ A twentieth-century famous Muslim scholar Maududi writes: '*Jihad* means struggle to the utmost of one's capacity.'⁶¹ Jameelah agrees with Maududi and stresses the point that this is a struggle to establish righteousness and vanquish evils.⁶² She

⁵⁶ The World Bank, *Report on Adjustment Lending: Policies of Recovery of Growth* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1990). See also *IMF and the World Bank Invite Public Participation in Review of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme*, News Brief No. 0107, <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2001/nb0107.htm>>

⁵⁷ Abraham H. Maslow, *Eupsychian Management: A Journal* (Homewood: Irwin-Dorsey, 1965)

⁵⁸ Naqvi., op.cit., p. 16.

⁵⁹ Jamilah Kolocotronis, *Islamic Jihad: An Historical Perspective* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications 1990), p. vii.

⁶⁰ Marcel A. Boisard, *Jihad: A Commitment to Universal Peace* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1979), pp. 23-42.

⁶¹ S. Abul A'la Maududi, *Towards Understanding Islam* (Beirut: The Holy Quran Publishing House, 1980), p. 140.

⁶² Maryam Jameelah, *A Manifesto of the Islamic Movement* (Lahore: Muhammad Yousf Khan, 1979), p. 41.

uses the concept of inner struggle. The late spiritual leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution has also expressed similar views and suggested that in reality, inner *Jihad* is the supreme *Jihad* which is a 'ceaseless war that man is called upon to wage against his inner-self'.⁶³ This discussion reflects that in its broader spectrum, the *Jihad* is a continuous struggle for the establishment and the promotion of righteousness and elimination of evils such as human underdevelopment, human insecurity, illiteracy, hunger and human deprivation etc.⁶⁴ If such a struggle is made in a systematic way and within its prescribed boundaries, it can be an important source for the promotion of human security which ultimately will strengthen the whole process of human development.

In contrast to the above facts, in the present day, *Jihad* is generally considered a controversial and sensitive issue and is commonly understood in the context of 'holy war' or terrorism. The terms *Madrassas* and *Mujahideen* are also considered closely associated with *Jihad*. *Madrassas* are religious educational institutions and the *Mujahideen* are usually graduates of these institutions who voluntarily wage *Jihad*. However, all graduates from *Madrassas* are not *Mujahideen*. Like other mainstream schools, *Madrassas* play an important role in improving the literacy situation and fulfilling peoples' spiritual needs by the dissemination of religious knowledge. In the words of Nayyar: 'In a society that has persistently neglected the education of its children, and where investment of time and labour in schools does not go very far in fulfilling the needs of livelihood, *Madrassas* have rapidly emerged as a parallel, but non-equivalent system of education.'⁶⁵ It is worth mentioning that it is quite common in the Muslim World for people to seek refuge in religion when faced with human underdevelopment, human insecurity, human deprivation and mass illiteracy. The same is also true of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in which the financial crises of the 1990s were further aggravated by the

⁶³ Ruhullah al-Musavi al- Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution* (edited and translated by Hamid Algar), (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 14.

⁶⁴ This struggle is nothing to do with terrorism, violence and religious extremism. In the contemporary age, misconceptions about *Jihad* arise both, because of 'miss-utilising' the real concept of *Jihad* by various Muslim extremists as well as because of the high propaganda against Islam in the powerful global media. Such propaganda started particularly after the demise of Communism as it is widely considered that now Islam is the only enemy of Capitalism.

⁶⁵ A. H. Nayyar, "Madrasah Education Frozen in Time," in Pervez Hoodbhoy (ed.), *Education and the State: Fifty Years of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 215-250.

demise of the Soviet Union and resultantly the changed behaviour of major global players towards this country.⁶⁶ The prolonged civil war in Afghanistan and the rise of tension between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue were other major causes of attraction to *Madrassas* and *Jihad*. Some *Madrassas* became centres for religious extremism and promoted a narrow and self-styled brand of *Jihad* and sectarianism among their students. This situation has created a threat to human security.

Human Deprivation

As against income poverty in which only income is considered as a parameter for judging the level of poverty, human poverty is described as human deprivation by the UNDP. Human deprivation is composed of 'the percentage of people expected to die before the age of 40, the percentage of adults who are illiterate, and the overall economic provisioning in terms of the percentage of people without access to health services and safe water, and the percentage of underweight children below five.'⁶⁷ This definition is also supported by the World Bank and according to the *World Development Report 2000/2001*: 'Poverty is pronounced deprivation in well-being. But what precisely is deprivation? The voice of poor people bear eloquent testimony to its meaning. To be poor is to be hungry, to lack shelter and clothing, to be sick and not cared for, to be illiterate and not schooled. But for poor people, living in poverty is more than this. Poor people are particularly vulnerable to adverse events outside their control. They are often treated badly by the institutions of state and society and excluded from voice and power in those institutions.'⁶⁸ A similar view has also been expressed by McNamara.⁶⁹ A careful consideration of the concept of human deprivation reflects that it is mainly concerned with basic social indicators while the social sector development of a country is a part of the overall process of human development.⁷⁰ In this context, human deprivation and human

⁶⁶ These crises were the product of the worsening economic situation in the country caused by high debt servicing, US discriminate country specific sanctions, IMF and the World Bank conditionalities, internal and regional instability.

⁶⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1997* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 14.

⁶⁸ The World Bank, *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 15.

⁶⁹ Former president of the World Bank.

⁷⁰ In Pakistan, during early 1990s, Social Action Programme was started to uplift the situation of social sector of the country.

insecurity are closely associated with each other and have strong connections with mass-illiteracy and income poverty. The under-development in these sectors generates a vicious circle, which keeps the cycle of human under-development in rotation.

In the following Table, where two Muslim and two Non-Muslim countries are selected for comparison from high and low-income categories, the cross-country comparison highlights some important points. With respect to HDI ranking, both Venezuela in the high-income category and Nicaragua in the low-income category, are slightly lower than their Muslim counterparts, i.e., Malaysia and Egypt. Similarly, both these Muslim countries also enjoy a considerably higher level of per capita GDP as compared to their respective Non-Muslim counterparts. Furthermore, figures show that the proportion of population below the poverty line (income poverty) is also nearly half in Malaysia and Egypt as compared to Venezuela and Nicaragua, respectively. However, the dark side of the picture is that this betterment is not translated into the elimination of human deprivation. Statistics show that Malaysia was on 13th position in the global ranking of 'human deprivation index' as compared to Venezuela where the figure was only 8. A similar situation can be seen in the case of Egypt and Nicaragua. This is the reason why the percentage value of HDI was significantly higher in both Muslim countries as compared to their counterparts. This situation also reflects inefficient utilisation of resources, which is why Muslim countries are facing serious problems of human deprivation.

Table-6
Human Deprivation – Cross-country Comparison of Low and High-Income Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries

Country	HDI Ranking	GDP per capita (US\$)	HDI (HDI-1)		Population below national [income] poverty line (per cent)
			Ranking	Value (per cent)	
High-income Countries					
• Venezuela	61	5,495	8	8.6	31.3
• Malaysia	56	8,209	13	10.9	15.5
Low-income Countries					
• Nicaragua	106	2,279	39	23.3	50.3
• Egypt	105	3,420	50	31.7	22.9

Source: Same as Table: 3.

Human Capital

There are various types of capital: physical capital, financial capital, social capital, and human capital to name a few. Physical capital includes all physical facilities, infrastructure, fixtures and tools available for a specific cause while the concept of financial capital is associated with the stock and supply of money. The analogy between the notions of physical capital and human capital can be considered the tools and the training, which enhance the productivity of an individual.⁷¹ The concept of social capital refers to the features of social organisations such as networks, norms and the trust that facilitates cooperation among various individuals for the purpose of mutual benefits. In this context, social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital.⁷² In this section, only human capital is briefly discussed in the context of the overall human development process.

One important point in the economics of human development is the creation of ‘the idea that the concept of physical capital as embodied in tools, machines and other productive equipment can be extended to include human capital as well.’⁷³ Schultz applied the notion of human capital to the economics of education, particularly to an explanation of the increase in productivity of human resources.⁷⁴ He also explained the relationship between human capital and economic growth. In a similar context, Gary Becker focused on mathematical and statistical economics of human capital.⁷⁵ Woodhall agrees with Becker and Schultz by saying: ‘The concept of human

⁷¹ Robert D. Putnam, ‘The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life,’ *American Prospect* (1993) Vol. 13, pp.35-42. See also Omar Khayyam Sheikh, *Towards Universalising Primary Education in Pakistan* (Islamabad: Modern Book Depot, 1987)

⁷² Louis Putterman, ‘Social Capital and Development Capacity: The Example of Rural Tanzania,’ *Development Policy Review* (1995) Vol. 13, pp. 5-22.

⁷³ James S. Coleman ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,’ *American Journal of Sociology* (1998) Vol. 94, Supplement, pp. S95-S120.

⁷⁴ Theodore W. Schultz, ‘Capital Formation by Education,’ *Journal of Political Economy* (1960) Vol. 68, pp. 571-83. See also Theodore W. Schultz, ‘Investment in Human Capital,’ *The American Economic Review* (1961) Vol. LI-1, pp. 1-17.

⁷⁵ Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker incorporated investment, health, migration, income and wage, productivity and economic growth in the theory of human capital. However, their main emphasis is on education. Their work in this field is more elaborated, comprehensive and analytical as compared to their predecessors (Schultz, 1960), 571-83, 1961:1-17, 1963:10; Gary S. Becker, *Human Capital* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964).

capital refers to the fact that human beings invest in themselves by means of education, training, or other activities, which raise their future income by increasing their lifetime earnings.⁷⁶ It is important that the element of investment and return is the main focus of this concept. Since the 1960s, substantial changes have taken place in the global economy, therefore, this factor has made the concept of human capital – technical knowledge which considers human beings as an input into the production process.⁷⁷ However, in spite of this limitation, the notion is widely used in academic and government circles. A comprehensive definition of human capital is given in a recent report of the Government of Pakistan (2001) which states: ‘Human capital development which is the product of education and improvement in health and nutrition, is both a part of and a means of achieving this goal. Human capital is critical in raising the living standards of the poor.’⁷⁸

Here, it would be appropriate to look at the situation of human capital formation in Muslim and Non-Muslim countries. In the following Table, four countries are selected for comparison in high and low-income categories. Each of the two countries in the respective category are almost at the same level of human development. Although, the notion of human capital is much broader in scope, here, due to limited space available, only education, health and communication are taken into account. On the basis of the figures presented in Table: 7, it can be argued that these Muslim countries were spending a reasonable amount on education and the number of physicians were also quite encouraging in Kyrgyzstan. However, the actual problem rests with the low level of expenditure on health. In contrast, both, Bulgaria and South Africa were spending considerably higher amounts on health as compared to their respective Muslim counterparts. It is common knowledge that Muslim countries are far behind in the fields of communication and technology. The following figures also present the same picture. Therefore, in the case of the number of telephone lines and television sets, both, Malaysia and

⁷⁶ Maureen Woodhall, ‘Human Capital Concepts,’ In Martin Carnoy (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of Economics of Education* (New York: Elsevier Science Inc. Ltd., 1995), p. 24.

⁷⁷ M. Carnoy, ‘Economics of Education, Then and Now,’ in Martin Carnoy (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of Economics of Education* (New York: Elsevier Science Inc. Ltd., 1995), p. 1.

⁷⁸ Government of Pakistan (July 15, 2001), *Economic Survey 2000-2001*, <<http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/main.html>>

Kyrgyzstan are lagging behind as compared to their respective counterparts.

Table-7
Human Capital – Cross-country Comparison of Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries with respect to Education, Health and Communication

Country	HDI ranking	Public expenditure on education (% of GNP)	Health		Communication	
			Public expenditure (% of GDP)	Physicians per 100,000 people	Phone lines per 1,000 people	TV per 1,000 people
High-income						
• Bulgaria	57	3.2	3.8	345	329	366
• Malaysia	56	4.9	1.4	66	198	166
Low-income						
• South Africa	94	7.6	3.3	56	115	125
• Kyrgyzstan	92	5.3	2.9	301	76	44

Source: Same as Table: 3.

Review and Reflections

Development theorising is a complex and problematical exercise, and in this context, this short piece of research has discussed only a few dimensions of the broader concept of human development with reference to the contemporary situation of the Muslim World.⁷⁹ The *Human Development Report 2001* argues that ‘the course of human development is never steady. The changing world always brings new challenges, and the past decade has seen serious setbacks and reversals’ (UNDP, 2001:13).⁸⁰ Thus, it can safely be said that any specific and restricted episode of theorising with respect to the dynamics of a complex and changing situation within the unstable Muslim World, is in fact, a discrete and fragmented exercise particularly in terms of the relationships between theory and the actual situation.

The discussion made in the paper highlights that the Muslim World’s performance in the human development sector has been poor as compared to the Non-Muslim World. In the words of Abu-Sulayman, an eminent Muslim scholar: ‘Internally weak, relatively backward, frustrated, conflict ridden, suffering from internal tensions, and often controlled and abused by foreign powers, the Muslim World is in a state of crises. For Muslims, all modern history is a

⁷⁹ P. W. Preston, *Development Theory: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 3-4.

⁸⁰ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 13.

tragedy. At the earlier time, during the sweeping revolution of Islam, Muslims were the custodian of civilisation and both the centre and master of the civilised world. But at present, the Muslim polity is neither master nor partner, and both Muslims and Islam are often regarded in the world politics as little more than problematic. In Muslim countries it is customary to blame external powers and imperialism for all manner of ills. Although this habit may point up many of the grievances and obstacles Muslims face, it cannot explain the internal cause of the ill.⁸¹ Abu-Sulayman is right in his argument as the outcome of the above analysis also reflects the poor state of human development in the Muslim World. Whether it is an overall picture of human development, or these are its various components, e.g., education, human security, elimination of human deprivation or the formation of human capital, Muslim countries are much behind Non-Muslim countries.

This situation demands urgent measures for improvement. To overcome the problem of human under-development, the Muslim World needs to adopt a multi-prong strategy. Particularly, it needs: (i) more allocation of financial resources, (ii) optimum use of available resources, (iii) improvement in the educational situation, (iv) strengthening activities for human security, (v) elimination of human deprivation, and, (vi) development of human capital. In this context, how more financial resources can be acquired and be utilised efficiently, is an important question. One of the most important options is that in the contemporary global situation, Muslim countries should strengthen the OIC and under this umbrella, they should jointly consider their security issues. Therefore, an Islamic Security Council may be established within the framework of the OIC. The establishment and effective role of this Council, on the one hand will ease the work of the UN and improve its image⁸² and on the other, it will be supportive in resolving conflicts and instability within the Muslim World. As a first step, major Muslim countries should join together to cut their defence budget starting from one per cent per annum to at least 10 per cent in a decade. This reduction would save

⁸¹ Abdul Hamid A. Abu Sulayman, *Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Dimensions for Methodology and Thought* (Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1994), p. 1.

⁸² A large number of people in the developing world particularly in Muslim countries are not satisfied with the role of the UN, mainly due to US and Western dominance. Under the circumstances it can be hoped that the establishment of an Islamic Security Council would be helpful in creating stability in global affairs and would divert resources from defence to human development.

billions of dollars out of which half can be allocated for the proposed Council. This amount would be enough to maintain a joint Islamic Defence Force. The remaining half of the financial resources should be pooled in an Islamic Human Development Fund. At the initial stage, this money should be utilised to establish a network of infrastructure and start various human development projects in deprived communities in Muslim countries.

Furthermore, in the present age of information technology, a hold on the world's leading financial institutions and control of global media are two key elements in playing a leading role in global affairs. Unfortunately, Muslim countries are far behind in both areas. This situation demands the strengthening of the activities of the Islamic Development Bank and the establishment of a strong Islamic news agency. These measures would not only be helpful in improving the human development situation in the Muslim World but will also create an environment of mutual trust and confidence which would be supportive in global peace and prosperity. It may be noted here, that these measures are not beyond practicability. The Muslim World has an added advantage of common religion, a common cultural heritage and a common history. Drawing strength from its rich traditions, it has the potential to set an example to the rest of the world as is done by the European Union. ■

Nuclearisation of South Asia and Its Impact on The Gulf

Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri*

The nuclearisation of South Asia in May 1998 created a feeling of euphoria in India and Pakistan. Domestically, and especially in the Muslim world, Pakistan was able to attain the unique distinction of being the first Islamic country to go nuclear and seventh nation of the world nation to join the coveted nuclear club. The general public felt that Pakistan's decision to openly demonstrate its nuclear capability was urgently needed in view of India's deep-rooted animosity and the tests it had conducted earlier.

However, within a year or so sober realities started sinking in and the pros and cons of nuclearisation began to be earnestly debated, both internally and externally. A deteriorating economy, the Kargil Crises of July-August 1999 and Pakistan's growing alienation in the comity of nations were some of the events that ignited this debate.

The Gulf region, proximate to Pakistan, immediately felt the impact of the nuclearisation of South Asia. Both South Asia and the Gulf region are interdependent geographical entities, with erstwhile connections that go back to British colonial rule. Although the British had decided to leave their colonial possessions east of Suez by 1967, the region was part of the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), which later led to the military pact of the Cold War days, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Pakistan formed part of this defence arrangement, which was initially named the Baghdad Pact. After Iraq decided to opt out following the anti-royalist revolution in 1961, it was renamed CENTO.

The South Asia and Gulf regions are "penetrated sub-systems" in the US-dominated world system. During the Cold War, their alignments with the superpowers were strong. This was epitomized in the "twin pillars" policy of the US in supporting both Iran and Saudi Arabia as "anchors of stability" in the volatile Arab Middle East.

Although the Gulf region faces its own security dilemmas, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia in the late 1990s has sent tremors of fresh disquiet in their region. This is understandable

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due to proximity and bondage that exists between the two regions. For instance Pakistan's closest Arab neighbour Oman, a member of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), borders the Pakistani province of Baluchistan where Pakistani nuclear tests were conducted in May 1998. These counter-tests were carried out in reaction to India's detonations conducted only a few weeks earlier.

Dynamics of Nuclear and Missile Proliferation

Generally, the world community has not been appreciative of the nuclearisation of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Anti-nuclear sentiment against South Asia was rife, sponsored and spewed mostly from Israel, the US, the European Union (EU) and Japan. Islamic Pakistan, which was also closely associated with then Taliban-dominated Afghanistan, came under greater scrutiny and even under limited US sanctions. India, a bigger country with a semblance of democracy, however chaotic and faltering it might have been, was nonetheless perceived as potentially enormous market for the West. Therefore, its admission into the nuclear club did not raise too many eyebrows; in fact its entry was seen in a more benign light than that of Islamic Pakistan.

As a result of this gate crashing into the nuclear club by the two South Asian rivals, the US-sponsored non-nuclear proliferation regime received a big setback. Now, the consequent horizontal spread of nuclear weapons was seen as a new challenge. It was thought that this could provide impetus to some nuclear aspirants, such as Iran and Iraq, and even to Libya, Syria or North Korea, to go the same way for their perceived "national security."

After all, becoming a nuclear power is considered a "currency of power" and prestige for which the developed nations have themselves set a trend. In fact, nuclear proliferation reveals a peculiar dynamic and a pattern of its own. For instance, after the ex-Soviet Union detonated its nuclear device, the domino effect led China to acquire the same capability. This, in turn, led India to detonate the so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in May 1974, which was euphemistically named "Smiling Buddha," and to further develop its nuclear programme. Later, after nearly a quarter of a century, India carried out full-fledged nuclear blasts in May 1998. As an action-reaction syndrome, Pakistan followed suit. Although the latter's nuclear programme had picked up momentum after 1974, it was, in a way, forced to go nuclear in May 1998 in response to India.

Iraq is contiguous to Pakistan's eastern neighbour Iran, with whom it fought an eight-year war in the 1980s. Iran and Iraq have

allegedly been building weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) for quite some time. Their historical animosities, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), their increased isolation in the US-led world system and the impulse for regional rivalry in the Gulf, may propel them in the long term, to acquire WMDs on the grounds of national security.

More importantly, their population, size, messianic ideologies, and nuclear and technical expertise, together with the linkages with some major nuclear powers give them added incentives to join the nuclear club. "If Pakistan could do it why can't we," was mentioned with some degree of pride by some of these countries' diplomats.

Unfortunately, US plans to establish nuclear missile defence (NMD) will potentially have a deleterious chain-effect on the security perceptions of China, India and Pakistan. The US is following a "go-alone" policy and its advocacy of the NPT and the CTBT seem hypothetical in light of its massive defence build-up *a la* Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), commonly known as the Star Wars Programme.¹⁵⁰

This not only evokes the concerns of Russia, China and other major powers, but also conveys a wrong message to other regional powers such as India and Israel. In other words, despite all the pious talk about arms control and disarmament by the US and other big powers, the possession of nuclear weapons is a *sine qua non* and a currency of power and prestige.

Countries that are presently facing the ire of the major powers and have been isolated by the world community are all infused with radical ideologies (North Korea, Iran and Iraq). Thus they may be eager to acquire these weapons in order to regain their national self-esteem which has been badly wounded as a result of the attitude and behaviour of the superpowers and the unjust world system.

Iran has unresolved differences with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa in the Gulf.¹⁵¹ Iraq's unrepentant aggression [Iraq has recently apologised to Kuwait] against its immediate, small but wealthy neighbour, Kuwait in 1999, and earlier, Iran, could hardly be considered Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the region.

¹⁵⁰ Many writings have appeared on the subject. See e.g., a critical view, editorial, "Star wars revisited, *The News* (Islamabad), May 4, 2001, p. 7. For a sympathetic view, read "Bush nuclear start," Editorial Review, *The New York Times*, May 5, 2001, p. 27.

¹⁵¹ "Regional Military Involvement: A Case Study of Iran Under the Shah," *Pakistan Horizon*, Quarterly, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, Vol., XXXVII, No. 4 (Fourth Quarter 1984), pp. 32-45.

Technological diffusion has become a global phenomenon. As a substitute for the rapidly depleting resources of fossil fuels, many nations are turning to nuclear energy. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there are nearly 438 nuclear power stations in operation around the world supplying almost 16 per cent of the world's electricity.¹⁵² Out of this total, the European countries have 150 reactors; North America 118; Middle East and Asia 94; and nearly 31 nuclear power plants are under construction.¹⁵³ Some anti-status quo states, given their drive for domination and pre-eminent status in the world, may not hesitate to circumvent obstacles and acquire crude nuclear weapon technology for blackmailing their neighbours or even the major powers.

After all despite all odds, Pakistan has been able to attain nuclear-weapons status. According to Shahram Chubin, an Iranian scholar on strategic matters, Iran is pursuing a full range of nuclear and missile weapons programme while Iraq is pursuing nuclear, chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons programmes. Iran's nuclear programme is both indigenous and covert through acquisition of fissile material from such countries as Russia, North Korea and China.¹⁵⁴

While some analysts are sceptical about the US about over-dramatising threats from the "rogue states," others do not discount the possibility that if Iran and Iraq basically remained hostile to the US and Western interests for the next 10 to 15 years, they could constitute major potential threats to the Gulf region. For instance, Steven Simon, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, defends the US NMD programme against the potential threats. Yet he suggests some delay in its deployment after assessing the technical viability and impact on other states. Apart from five official nuclear powers, he adds, there is a "real and growing" threat from nearly 25 countries that either have or are trying to acquire ballistic missiles.¹⁵⁵

Iran's national security strategy is manifold. First, as a regional power it desires to increase its influence and presence in the Gulf

¹⁵² *The News* (Islamabad), May 4, 2001, p. 25.

¹⁵³ France tops in dependence upon nuclear energy (76.3 per cent), followed by Lithuania (73.3 per cent), South Korea (40.7 per cent), Sweden (39 per cent) and Switzerland (38.2 per cent). *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Shahram Chubin, "Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Persian Gulf Case," *Occasional Paper*, No. 33, March 1997 (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Centre, March 1997), p. 5.

¹⁵⁵ "US fears of threat from rogue states questioned," *The News*, May 3, 2001, p. 9.

region, the Middle East and the Muslim world at large; second, it wants to deter its unfriendly neighbour and rival, Iraq; thirdly, it desires to curtail US influence in the region; and fourthly, it needs to sort out border or island disputes with Abu Dhabi. Knowing fully well that it cannot match the US military presence and clout in the region, it wants to rely on asymmetric means to challenge the US. Its regional ambitions are rationalised on the plea of its “vulnerabilities” as an “isolated state” in the world system that is subjected to sanctions. Therefore, it wants to enhance its conventional and missile capability by getting assistance from countries that are willing to sell technology, viz., Russia, North Korea and China.¹⁵⁶

As an illustration, Iran displayed the testing of the 1,300-km medium range Shahab-3 in July and September 2000 to reflect its intentions of power projection. It has acknowledged the development of Shahab-4 (later categorised as space launch vehicle) and plans are afoot for Shahab-5, an IRBM or special launch vehicle. It can also deploy a limited number of these MRBMs in an operational mode in any perceived crisis. Its ambitions are set on acquiring ICBMs in the next 15 years or so. Besides, it has reportedly purchased land, sea and air-launched short-range cruise missiles from China – many of these deployed as anti-ship weapons in or near the Gulf.

There are some concerns that it could export some weapon-related technology to other countries such as Syria or Libya. However, any future Iranian defence posture will depend upon economic, demographic and ideological factors. Its spending on defence was, for example, \$6 billion for the financial year 2000 and some experts predict that it will remain at 3 per cent of GDP for the next few years.¹⁵⁷

External Linkages

All GCC countries maintain external military linkages. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar have defence relationship with the US and Britain, whereas Syria, Iran and Iraq have security linkages with Russia and China. In fact, Russia, whose arms exports total up to \$4 billion a year, is currently the fourth biggest arms exporter in the world. This is after the US \$ 26bn, Britain \$ 10bn and France \$ 6.6bn.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ *Proliferation: Threats and Responses*, January 2001 (Department of Defence Document, Washington, DC), p. 34.

¹⁵⁷ “Arms sales to Iran, China vital to Russia: Expert,” *The News*, April 20, 2001, p. 5.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* China and India account for 80 per cent of Russia’s exports.

In the opinion of General Boris Kuzyk, head of industrial group nuclear programme and concepts, Russia, in the near future, could emerge as the second largest exporter of weapons.¹⁵⁹

There is a fine line between nuclear development for peaceful purposes and graduation into a nuclear weapons programme. After all, India detonated its nuclear device in May 1974 as PNE. Britain and France had previously supported the Iraqi nuclear programme. In addition, there is some evidence of North Korea having entered the arms market as a missile supplier in the region.¹⁶⁰ The ripple effect is worrisome to the security of the Gulf countries and this may step up the arms race in the region.

Spill-over of Indo-Pakistan Tensions in the Gulf

As if the internal tensions from within the Gulf, accruing from some powerful neighbours were not enough, the continued rivalry between India and Pakistan compounds the security scenario. Not only dark shadows cast on the smaller countries (Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives), but also towards the west, i.e., the neighbouring Gulf region.

The ten-month military stand off between India and Pakistan (2001-2002) was viewed quite seriously by most of the Gulf countries for its dangerous implications. Simmering tension over the Kashmir dispute puts undue pressures and politically embarrasses many Gulf regimes. The reason is that they are reluctant to take sides openly in a dispute between the two South Asian arch-rivals (India and Pakistan), with whom they enjoy reasonably lucrative economic and political ties.

According to an Indian diplomat-turned scholar, while the world's energy consumption is growing around one per cent annually, India's demands could well grow by 8 per cent in the near future.¹⁶¹ Crude oil imports to India rose from 27.35 million tonnes in 1994-95 to around 53.5 million tonnes in 2000.¹⁶² If this trend continues, he argues, India will be importing nearly 80 per cent of its

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ On Korea's missile programme see Ian Anthony, "Responses to Proliferation: The Korean Ballistic Missile Programme," *SIPRI YEARBOOK*, 2000 (Stockholm: International Peace Research Institute), (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 647-664.

¹⁶¹ See G. Parthasarathy, former Indian ambassador to Pakistan, "Diplomacy In Contemporary World: Need to Guarantee Energy Security," *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), November 9, 2000.

¹⁶² Ibid.

crude oil within a decade and over two-third of these imports come from the Gulf region.

In the event of a conventional Indo-Pak war on Kashmir, and subsequent escalation into a nuclear exchange, the impact on the Gulf region is going to be concussive. Large guest workers of Indian and Pakistani origin are residing in these countries. If tensions escalate, these residents will not be able to keep themselves immune from violent and jingoistic national sentiments, degenerating into law and order problems for the Gulf governments. These will be clearly non-conducive to their national harmony, which has been their strong point so far.

Nuclear threats and counter-threats (made by political and military leadership of India and Pakistan since the 1998 nuclear tests) are fraught with acute dangers. That not only engenders fear and uncertainty in South Asia but also sends shock waves to the Gulf neighbourhood. The intemperate and flippant nuclear statements made by some leaders in both countries reverse confidence building and, at the same time; take an economic toll, insofar as they scare away trade, business and investment.

Saudi Arabia, a GCC member and a close friend of Pakistan, e.g., finds itself vulnerable on many counts. It has a long coastline, a large territory to defend, lack of open sea naval bases, a narrow seaboard and a concentration of oil terminals in the east.¹⁶³ The UAE also faces more or less similar problems. If perchance, the security situation deteriorates in South Asia, erupted hostilities could affect the free passage of oil and trade in the region as well.

Prudently enough, the Gulf leadership has so far been able to maintain a balance of good relations with both India and Pakistan and their traditional western partners. Yet any major escalation of tensions in South Asia or in their neighbourhood in the event of any US attack on Iraq, could pose painful dilemmas for them.

Indo-Israel Nexus

The political fallout of nuclearisation in South Asia has brought India and Israel closer than ever before. Although India had recognised Israel in 1948, for a variety of reasons, it had refrained from

¹⁶³ On Saudi Arabia's maritime problems and some suggestions, see Brigadier Mohammad Mahboob Qadir, "Implications of Lack of Open Sea Naval Base on Saudi Arabia's National Security," *Pakistan Defence Review*, A Professional Magazine of Pakistan Army on Defence and Security, GHQ, Rawalpindi, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Winter 1999), pp. 129-137.

establishing diplomatic links with that country.¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, in the 1960s, defence and economic collaboration between the two countries existed in a clandestine fashion. It gained momentum after 1992 when India formally established diplomatic links with Israel.¹⁶⁵ India's burgeoning ambitions to attain a global power status and its partnership with Russia, China and Israel pose potential threats to the Arab world and the Gulf region. Presently, the Indian navy may not be posing an immediate or major challenge in the Gulf. Nevertheless, given its aspirations of becoming a "blue water" navy and expanding its reach from Aden to Malacca Straits in the Indian Ocean as an Asia-Pacific power, India could, at some stage, come into conflict with the US, Britain, other western powers or even China in the region.¹⁶⁶

Currently, however, this possibility seems remote and may take many years to materialise. More crucial is the fact that India and Israel are collaborating in nuclear technology, weapon up-gradation programmes, surveillance and sharing of intelligence and counter-insurgency techniques. President Ezer Weizaman of Israel while visiting India in late December 1996 told the then Indian prime minister Deve Gowda that defence could be one field where "India will be happy hunting ground for us."¹⁶⁷

This Indo-Israel nexus and the pros and cons of procurement of different defence systems are occasionally reported in the Indian media. Meaningful military interaction with frequent visits by different defence contingents from both sides¹⁶⁸ has evoked security concerns amongst the neighbours of Israel and the Muslim world at large.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ For details on this relationship see Maqsd U. Nuri, "The Indo-Israel Nexus," *Regional Studies*, A Quarterly Journal of Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Vol. XII, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 3-56.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁶⁶ On India's aspirations and limitations till the late 1980s see Maqsd U. Nuri, "Indian Navy in the 1980s," *Regional Studies*, Quarterly, Islamabad, Vol., VII, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 67-89.

¹⁶⁷ "India's Diplomatic Moves for Military Build-Up," *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, Vol. XIX, No. 12, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, December 2000, p. 30.

¹⁶⁸ For example, by the end of April 2001, India's Naval Chief Admiral Sushil Kumar visited Israel (and later France) for procurement of Israeli Barak anti-ship missiles to be fitted on its only aircraft carrier, INS Viraat. See "Indian navy chief leaves for Israel, France," *The News*, April 30, 2001, p. 12.

¹⁶⁹ Manoj Jhoshi, "Egyptians dismayed at Indo-Israeli Ties," *The Times of India* (New Delhi), March 21, 2001.

Concerns over the Indo-Israeli military collusion and possible pre-emptive surgical strikes against Pakistani nuclear installations surface whenever there is a spike in India-Pakistan tensions. This was especially so at the time of the 1999 Kargil Crisis and then during the recent military stand-off from December 2001 – June 2002.

Often, this Indo-Israel security collaboration, which admittedly has limitations of its own, is sometimes overplayed in Pakistan. The Indians assert that defence collaboration is only a part of other forms of co-operation.¹⁷⁰

Regardless of this, if any nuclear strike against Pakistani nuclear installations becomes a reality, the nuclear fallout will not only adversely affect Pakistan and India but also contaminate the adjoining areas, including the Gulf. Furthermore, it will jeopardise shipping and cause nuclear pollution in the coastal regions.

In addition, any transportation and disposal of nuclear waste in the seabed or underground or radiological contamination resulting from further nuclear tests will be an ecological hazard for the adjoining region. In the absence of foolproof nuclear safety mechanisms and given the earthquake-prone nature of South Asia, storage of nuclear hardware and weaponry poses potential dangers.

The above scenario of attack on nuclear facilities may seem improbable given the stringent security and control measures adopted by the Pakistan government. Yet it is not entirely impossible, given the fact that Pakistan is the only Muslim country having acquired nuclear weapons, an anathema to Israel and India. After all, Israel had conducted surgical strikes at the Iraqi nuclear installation under construction at Osirak in 1984.

A minority view is emerging that advises Pakistan to make a pragmatic shift in its foreign policy. According to Amber Kalyal, if countries such as India (with a sizeable Muslim population), Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Tunisia and some other Arab nations could forge contacts with Israel and have developed limited economic intercourse, Pakistan, too, should do so, without compromising on the Palestinian issue.¹⁷¹

Some Israelis do not perceive the Pakistani nuclear programme as a direct threat, as they do, for instance, the incipient nuclear

¹⁷⁰ Farah Naaz, "Indo-Israel Cooperation: Agriculture, Trade and Culture," *Strategic Analysis*, Monthly Journal of IDSA, New Delhi, Vol. XXIII, No. 6 (September 1999), pp. 895-908.

¹⁷¹ This view is reflected in Amber J. Kalyal, "Changing Nature for Indo-Israeli Relations," *Strategic Studies*, A Quarterly Journal of The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Vol. XX, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), p. 104.

programmes of Iraq and Iran. The Indian connections with Iraq and, now, Iran, stir anxiety of many regional countries. As an illustration, Iraq was among those West Asian countries with which India had always very good relations; the economic ties, including oil exports, were substantial. Moreover, Iraq has a secular Baathist Party in power, which had then distanced itself from the OIC and was not supportive of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.¹⁷²

Also, it needs to be pointed out that during the 1991 Gulf War, India's role was rather ambiguous, amoral and generally went against world opinion.¹⁷³ Previously in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and then in Iraq-Kuwait War (1991-92), Iraq twice let down its neighbours, the OIC, Arab League and the non-aligned community of nations by committing military aggression against its immediate neighbours.

While talking to some Indian journalists, the visiting Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Salaem al-Sabah complained that India had acted "hurriedly" in closing down its embassy after the Iraqi occupation. "India did not support Kuwait. We had expected you to support us," he said. "Pakistan's position was very clear." He added, "we are grateful to it that it supported us."¹⁷⁴ However, Indo-Kuwait relations soon regained their warmth after India extended some help in the economic rehabilitation of their war-shattered economy.

Strategically and economically, Iran has lately started getting closer to India. The motivations may be mostly economic and geo-strategic but they do raise concerns for some GCC Arab members and Pakistan. While India reassures its neighbours that its Iran policy is not directed against any other country, it is the extended neighbourhood policy in tandem with Iran's military ambitions that pose long-term concerns for the Gulf region.

There is no gainsaying that India, as a regional and aspiring global power, has still not been able to win the goodwill and trust of its smaller neighbours in South Asia. On many occasions, it has hardly hesitated to act as a regional hegemon and relied on its size and military muscle. It wanted to be a peace broker in Afghanistan, but ironically, was also one of those countries that did not openly criticise the December 1979 Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan.

¹⁷² *The Hindu* (Madras), November 1, 1991.

¹⁷³ For details on India's reactions to the 1991 Gulf War consult Maqsood U. Nuri, "India and the Gulf Crisis," *BISS Journal*, Bangladesh Institute of International Studies, Dhaka, Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 1-50.

¹⁷⁴ *The Hindu*, op cit.

Presently, a constellation of factors has brought diverse actors together: India, Iran, Russia and China and the CARs. All of these are generally supportive of the Northern Alliance government in Afghanistan and were earlier relieved to see the ouster of the Taliban regime. They all acquiesced in extending all possible military and economic aid to the US in its war against the Taliban-dominated Afghanistan.

South Asia: Beyond Being Nuclear

While nuclearisation in South Asia has created its own dynamics and vulnerabilities, the ten-month long military stalemate between India and Pakistan has opened new windows of opportunities for the leadership in both countries. But both countries have to look out, open the window, and make bold paradigm shifts. This means evaluating their weaknesses and strengths and arriving at critical decisions of war and peace with imagination and foresight.

The nuclear factor in South Asia can be transmuted into a factor of stability and maturity and greater urge for co-operation. Conversely, if proper lessons are not learnt, it may well result into a recipe for horrific self-destruction.

India and Pakistan have to make efforts to tread a path of maturity that should be the hallmark of nuclear powers. No wonder, South Asia is seen as a nuclear flash point and abiding cause for concern.

Nuclearisation of South Asia is a *fait accompli*. The technology cannot be unlearned and the weapons cannot go into mothballs. However, the dire need is to face the post-nuclear transition in a bold and imaginative way as other nuclear powers had done.

The Cold War may have ended in parts of the globe but its hot and gusty winds are still blowing across South Asia. Religious hatred, historical memories, the lingering Kashmir dispute and the recent acquisition of nuclear weapons, all make a lethal brew. It is, therefore, urgent for both India and Pakistan to enter into serious dialogue, abjure the use of force in Kashmir, formulate and clarify nuclear doctrines and faithfully implement the already agreed military and non-military CBMs.

Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons on both sides have provided some degree of deterrence and induced restraint and caution, but this factor cannot be overplayed. That we have been able to ward off nuclear conflagrations is no cause for smug complacency. The nuclear arsenals cannot substitute for problems created by poverty, disease and misery of the region, which constitutes nearly one-fifth of

mankind. Gross underdevelopment and extreme impoverishment has turned the region into a virtual poverty bowl, despite being endowed with excellent human material and resources. Ironically, the level of insecurity has increased despite the attainment of nuclear status by both the countries.

Nuclear weapons cannot halt or even slow down the conventional arms race. Neither is nuclear technology cost-effective as continuous research in sophistication, up-gradation, testing, development of infrastructure and training of scientific work force is required to keep pace with rapid changes. While they may act as deterrent, conventional military build-up will continue apace due to the pull and push factors of internal and external forces. Besides, new forms of unconventional threats such as rampant terrorism have underscored the need for a special kind of defence methodologies, training and weaponry.

According to a US Congressional Report, Pakistan and some other countries, despite their nuclear programmes, are amongst the top ten conventional arms purchasers in the world. They are Saudi Arabia \$66.1bn, Taiwan \$20.6bn, Egypt \$9.7bn, South Korea \$8.8bn, United Arab Emirates \$7.8bn, Israel \$7.2bn, Iran \$4.7bn, China 5.95bn and Pakistan \$4.4bn.¹⁷⁵

In the last few years, seminars and academic fora have endlessly debated the implications of nuclearisation in South Asia. Specifically, fears about any breakout of nuclear war through accident, panic or the independent decision of a zealous commander occasionally crop up. Fragility and non-reliability of deterrence is highlighted because of the volatile political situation in South Asia.

It is moreover contended that the situation in South Asia is much different from what prevailed in Europe, where territorial disputes have been resolved. However, the threat of pre-emptive strike by Pakistan or India in crises situation lurks on the horizon. This is notwithstanding the fact that India has pledged a No-First-Use nuclear doctrine whereas Pakistan has strenuously maintained that it will not subscribe to that, and may be forced to use nuclear weapons if there is a dire threat to its territorial integrity.

In the post-nuclear phase, there is a lack of doctrinal clarity and a spate of jingoistic statements have emanated from both sides from political as well as military leaders. This has led to natural apprehensions. As a result, Pakistan had to expound the “nuclear

¹⁷⁵ US Congressional Report, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations: 1992-1999” as cited in Amir Mateen, “Pakistan among top ten arms purchasers,” *The News*, April 24, 2001, p. 12.

restraint regime” and instituted a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) to allay any domestic and foreign fears about misuse of nuclear weapons through accident, malfunction, wilful use or default. Following the troops withdrawal starting from September 2002, India’s hawkish Deputy Premier Mr. L. K. Advani, in December 2002 belligerently challenged Pakistan to a “fourth war.”

Kenneth Waltz’s thesis of greater number of nuclear powers in the world contributing to stability and ‘the more the merrier’ concept is now becoming suspect. This thesis could have grave implications in this semi-anarchic world order of today, where more fingers will be on nuclear triggers and where many issues for conflict remain.

Waltz was probably relying too much on the ‘rational actor model’ – a theoretical construct, which may not be applicable in the South Asian or in many Third World settings.

With the diffusion of scientific know how and the availability of technology, globalisation and movement of people across borders, there are probabilities (though no certainties) that nuclear devices could pass into unauthorised hands. Some highly motivated and organised terrorist groups could, either by stealth, or business transactions, acquire these deadly devices. After all, many disgruntled and radical/fundamentalist groups exist in East and West adhering to millenarian/utopian ideologies. These individuals/groups are not in control of any territory, are not tightly organised or highly funded and are difficult to detect.¹⁷⁶

While nuclear weapons do purportedly confer recognition and international status, presently, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan are perceived as “states of concern” in the international system. In fact, the first two are part the Bush designated “axis of evil.” Consequently, all are facing varying degrees of international opprobrium although, Pakistan since 9/11 has come out of that isolation and is considered an ally of the US in fight against international terrorism. The Gulf countries, surrounded by the regions, now armed with nuclear weapons, are quite concerned.

¹⁷⁶ Substantial literature exists on this aspect see e.g., “The New face of Terrorism?,” *Strategic Survey*, 1998-99 (London: IISS, 2000), pp. 61-70; see also Jessica Stern’s study, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” *Foreign Affairs*, bi-monthly, Washington, DC, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November-December 2000), pp. 115-125 and her book, *The Ultimate Terrorist* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999).

Iraq and Iran: Impact on The Gulf

Presently, the US and some neighbouring states view Iraq and Iran's military and nuclear plans with concern. In the world of realpolitik, cooperation and conflict tends to move along parallel tracks. A lot will depend on the future policies of Iran and Iraq in the Gulf region, as they remain anti-status quo powers. For instance, if the UN nuclear inspectors reports of December 2002 confirm that Iraq is not manufacturing nuclear or other WMD, the US could be restrained from undertaking military invasion of Iraq. As of now, the US military strike seems apparently inevitable to affect a regime change. It is speculated that the magnitude of Iraq's post-Saddam reconstruction will require massive funding from the West and its wealthy Arab neighbours, which may not be easily forthcoming. Decades of sanctions against Iraq in the last ten years or so have exacted a heavy toll on Iraqi society.

While there is no love lost between Iraq and its Gulf neighbours on account of the formers previous aggressive behaviour, latter may not welcome any dramatic change in Iraq that might severely destabilise the region.

For one thing, an overthrown or assassinated Saddam Hussain may develop a martyr's image of his own and draw immense sympathy from the Arab masses. Secondly, the ire of the people against US military policies in Afghanistan or military repression in Palestine may then be directed against their very own pro-Western rulers, leading to likely pro-Islamic/radical regimes. Third, a stream of refugees from Iraq into the neighbouring Arab countries may be difficult to contain. Disruption in sea trade, low oil prices, risky capital investment, reluctance of donors to invest, and unpredictable response from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and oil rich Sheikdoms may be additional problems.

Since the mid-1990s, Iran is slowly opening up to the West and its Arab neighbours, especially after President Khatami's ascent into power in May 1997. His visits to Saudi Arabia are positive trends. Some observers opine that the West needs to prop up Iran as a counter to Iraq. Iran's dialogue with the GCC, building of some bridges of understanding with Iraq (e.g. release of Iranian POWs and muting of criticism), and the signing of Iranian-Saudi security treaties on drugs, and terrorism surveillance, are all purportedly moderating trends in its foreign policy.

The recent visit of Indian Prime Minister to Iran after nearly 25 years shows some convergence in their economic and security

outlook.¹⁷⁷ Whether this posture of mellowing down is because Iran needs some breathing space by opening up to the West and eastern Asia or to overcome its isolation and regain its energy security remains to be seen.¹⁷⁸ The previous ideological thrust of Iranian foreign policy is no longer operative through export of the Iranian revolution, as in the 1980s. The new policy, according to an observer “is now overwhelmingly framed in classical terms of regional-power assertiveness, rather than ideology.”¹⁷⁹ All the same, its military and nuclear programme,¹⁸⁰ that began started under the late Shah of Iran, is by now institutionalised and moving ahead.¹⁸¹

Normally states with a history of religious or ideological thrusts in foreign policy do not easily shed away their ideological baggage. Iran, for one, cannot easily break away from the Islamic revolution; religion provided distractions from the economic woes of daily life and the conservatives are too entrenched to let liberal trends take over easily in society.¹⁸² Iraq has had a history of bloody internal strife; its Baathist ideology is basically anti-status quo, and is secular and radical for many conservative Arab states.

¹⁷⁷ Smita Gupta, “India and Iran join hands against terrorism,” *The Times of India* (New Delhi), April 11, 2001; PTI Report, “Iran wants India to fight US meddling,” *The Statesman* (Delhi), April 13, 2001; P. Sharma, “Atal downplays Iran bonhomie threat to Pak,” *The Telegraph* (Calcutta), April 14, 2001; Smita Gupta, “Threat of terrorism brings India, Iran closer,” *The Times of India*, April 15, 2001.

¹⁷⁸ The scepticism is reflected in Ladan Bouroumand et. al., “Is Iran democratizing?, Voices from Within,” *Journal of Democracy*, Monthly, Washington DC., October 2000, Vol. II, No. 4, pp.139-146; S. K. Vishwanath, “Iran: Testing Times for Freedom,” *Indian Ocean Digest*, Centre for Area Studies, Osmania University, Hyderabad, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January-June 1999), pp. 17-19. A more sympathetic view is, however, given by T. V. Gopala Chari, “Iran’s New Revolution,” *Indian Ocean Digest*, Centre for Area Studies, Osmania University, Hyderabad, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January-June 2000), pp. 76-82.

¹⁷⁹ “Iran: Crisis and Consensus,” *Strategic Survey 1999/2002* (London: IISS, May 2000), p. 182.

¹⁸⁰ A detailed background and description of the Iranian armament and nuclear programme is analysed in M. H. Nuri, “The Iranian Armed Forces – Major Defence and Nuclear Programmes,” pp. 41-66 in *Iran As a Regional Military Power: 1970-78* (MA Thesis), submitted to the Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, September 1979.

¹⁸¹ For a detailed account and description of the Iranian armament and ballistic programme see Stuart. D. Goldman et. al., “Russian Missile Technology and Nuclear Reactor Transfers to Iran, *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service), July 29, 1998.

¹⁸² Iffat H. Malik, “Role of Islam in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Foreign Policies,” *Strategic Studies*, Quarterly, Islamabad, Vol. XX, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), p. 139.

For now, global interests of the US provide adequate security guarantees to GCC states. On the basis of present trends, its presence will remain there in the foreseeable future. Pending any new regional security mechanism, the GCC will have to rely on a mix of regional self-reliance and extra-regional support. In the meantime, they will also have to expedite the establishment of healthy civil societies and diversified economies.

In the Middle East, the failure of the Oslo peace process and the rise of the *Intifada*, following the rupture in the Arab-Israeli peace process and the consequent repression unleashed by Israel, has raised the political temperature in the region. The Iranian and Syrian-backed Hezbollah and Hamas are confronting Israeli security forces. This creates further problems for the GCC countries. It provides not only greater political space to certain militant groups in some radical states e.g. Syria, Iraq and Iran, but also within the wider Arab and Muslim world, including the GCC group of countries.

In this context, it is notable to mention that in the two-day Tehran meeting of April 27, 2001, nearly 32 Muslim states and religious parties participated. In this meeting strident condemnation of Israel was carried out. From the Iranian perspective, the meeting carried a strong yet subtle subtext. First, that it was Iran that represents Muslim interests not only in the Middle East but also in the entire Islamic World. And secondly, it alone echoes the sentiments of the common Muslim and Arab masses as against their rulers, who are pro-West and lack firmness in condemnation of US and Israel.¹⁸³

In fact, Iran and Iraq's policy of exploiting emotional support from the Muslim masses is ostensibly aimed at undermining the ruling Arab leadership of some conservative states in the eyes of their own public. At the same time, the rhetoric is meant to gain further domestic legitimacy.

¹⁸³ *The News*, April 27, 2001.

Pakistan and Gulf Security

Pakistan shares historical, cultural and ideological linkages with the GCC countries and the Arab world at large. A sizeable Pakistani expatriate population works and resides in neighbouring GCC countries, especially Oman, whose armed forces also comprise the Baluch people.

In April 2001, Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman paid a four-day visit to Pakistan, the first after 1974. During his visit, both countries signed various bilateral agreements to boost trade, business and joint investment.¹⁸⁴ Pakistanis in the GCC countries are employed in skilled and semi-skilled labour force. However, as of today, their military links with the smaller GCC states are not as extensive as they were in, for instance, in the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁸⁵

First, Pakistanis were mostly in advisory capacity and were stationed in many Middle Eastern countries for protection of vital defence and security installations because of political reliability and professionalism. Furthermore, Pakistan followed a strict policy of non-interference in inter-Arab disputes. Besides, unlike Cuban in Africa, who had a militant ideology of socialist revolution, Pakistani forces supported the status quo and provided ballast to the incumbent governments. Another difference was that in the case of Cuba, it was sometimes claimed that their presence in Africa was at the behest of a patron superpower, the former Soviet Union, which supplied them military arms and equipment. Contrarily, the Pakistanis were mostly on their own, although their presence and role was bolstered by the US and other Western nations. Most importantly, Pakistan's presence in host countries, whether in the Gulf or elsewhere in the Middle East, was premised on the principle that in case of war between two Arab nations, Pakistani troops would not take sides.

Today, Pakistan is bedevilled with a weak economy and multifarious internal and external challenges. It had exaggerated and somewhat unrealistic expectations that after going nuclear, its Arab friends would bail it out of economic difficulties. Its ongoing economic travails make it inward looking and prevent it from following an assertive foreign policy. This situation was to a great

¹⁸⁴ On 22 April a joint agreement worth Rs. 105 billion was signed between the two countries. See, "Omanese minister invites Pak trade team," *The News on Sunday*, April 22, 2001, p. 20. See also, "Oman to invest \$50 million in Pakistan," *The News*, April 24, 2001, p. 12. It is worth mentioning that India has maintained very close economic relations with Oman.

¹⁸⁵ In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the UAE had extensive military links with Pakistan, Egypt and some other Muslim countries.

extent reversed after the events of 9/11 as Pakistan became a “frontline state” in the US-led war against international terrorism. There was even some talk of “extended deterrence” through providing a nuclear umbrella to Gulf friends. Realistically speaking, this is not feasible under existing regional and international circumstances.

First, since the early 1990s, there is already a sizable and effective US and Western presence in the region to cater to Gulf security. Currently, some of the GCC countries do not see direct and immediate threats emanating from Israel (although it is a permanent threat to the Muslim World) as they do from Iraq and Iran, two anti status quo powers allegedly harbouring plans for domination of the Gulf. Any intrusion by Pakistan will cause anxiety to Iran and Iraq and thus aggravate the security concerns of GCC states.

Secondly, Pakistani armed forces, despite handing over power to a civilian government will share power and remain involved at home with the onerous task of overseeing the running of the government.

Thirdly, Pakistan’s quest for the so-called ‘strategic depth’¹⁸⁶ – by having a friendly and peaceful Afghanistan and Central Asia – has not materialised, particularly with the ouster of Taliban and the induction of the Northern Alliance dominant transitional government. Moreover, the civil war lingers on in Afghanistan. With Iran, Pakistan’s relations are on the mend and coming out of the strains imposed by support to opposing groups in Afghanistan, rivalry over Central Asian trade routes and sectarian killings by some terrorist groups in Pakistan.

Finally, the GCC countries are gradually reducing their dependence on outside powers and are trying to become more self-reliant. Already, there are major strains in Saudi-US relations, caused by the humiliating treatment of Saudi nationals in the US after the events of 9/11. Saudis are now realising the need for diversifying their intake of guest workers from other countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Central Asia and some East Asian countries.

Yet Pakistan’s linkages with the GCC are still cordial and strong. Geographically, Pakistan is at the geographical tri-junction of

¹⁸⁶ The concept was rather utopian and was expressed by hardliners such as General (Retired) Aslam Beg and Lieutenant General (Retired) Hameed Gul as a panacea for Pakistan’s security vis-a-vis India. According to them, this could be achieved by engineering political changes in neighbouring Afghanistan and the newly independent Central Asia republics.

South, South-West and Central Asia that gives it a unique geopolitical advantage. Given Pakistan's military strength, it can provide, some psychological assurances to Arab countries by securing their strategic rear against Israel. Its army can be utilised at some nodal points after mutual agreements with Arab friends. This will be for the protection of critical economic and military assets. Besides, it could help in assisting Gulf countries with peaceful nuclear programmes, power generation, health, agriculture, mining, irrigation canals, roads and tunnels.

However, it may be pointed out that this option, which was feasible a few years ago, is becoming increasingly unlikely in view of the Bush administration's suspicions of even peaceful collaboration in the nuclear field.

In the quest for peace in South Asia, the GCC member states could play a more pro-active role by economically pressurizing/inducing India and Pakistan to initiate a serious search for peaceful settlement of issues and normalisation of relations. It could use its economic lever to induce healthy changes in the mindsets of the two neighbours whose hostility has reached almost morbid levels. For the Gulf region has nearly 35 per cent of the world reserves of oil and an equivalent percentage of gas reserves. Projected new discoveries could make this figure rise up to nearly 50 per cent.¹⁸⁷ This makes both India and Pakistan heavily dependent upon them.

Conclusion and some Reflections

Today, geo-economics is the new buzzword that is superseding geo-strategy. Ultimate security, strength and viability of nations depend upon human resource development. In other words, it means building of civic societies and attaining economic vibrancy and internal cohesion through a fair and just system. The meltdown of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, despite its mammoth security structure (conventional and nuclear) is a vivid reminder that mere military hardware and panoply of arms cannot ensure security and survival of nation states, be they great or small.

For durable peace in South Asia, nations have no alternative but to forsake the path of belligerence and move towards normalisation. This is easier said than done, as it demands political will, ingenuity and statesmanship. After all, there are many examples of nations that

¹⁸⁷ Syed Rashid Husain, "Gas Discoveries: Gulf may face challenge," *Dawn*, November 20, 2002, p. 9.

were once historical foes, eventually discarding the “baggage of history” and normalising relations. Notable examples are North and South Korea, North and South Yemen, East and West Germany, China and Russia, and China and India.

India has as much a stake as Pakistan in the well being and prosperity of the Gulf region. South Asia has a significant number of expatriate workers who live and work there and contribute to the economies of their host states. There is great scope for businesses and markets.

Both US and India have a vested interest in promoting stability in the region but certain divergences on matters such as Indo-Israel, Indo-Iraq, and Indo-Iran links may cause problems in their collaboration.

Pakistani security managers should see the early January 2001 visit of India’s former Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, to Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman in a positive light.¹⁸⁸ Pakistan should know that Indo-Arab commercial and trade links existed even in undivided India.

In addition, given the sizeable resident Indian population in these countries, any renewed contacts with India need not cause any erosion of the traditional and time-tested Pakistan-Saudi or Pakistan-UAE friendship. In fact, globalisation, marketisation and the modern art of diplomacy mean diversifying of contacts with as many nations as possible and partaking in a “win-win” rather than a “zero-sum” game.

Through a web of relationships and networking, the Saudis and other Gulf kingdoms could help restrain India’s hegemonic impulses and exercise moderating influence over its policy with immediate neighbours like Pakistan.

Likewise, the Indian prime minister’s 4-day visit to Iran in mid-April 2002 should be seen in the same light. The Iran-Saudi Security Agreement¹⁸⁹ on April 15, 2001 bears positive connotations and tends to release tensions in the region. It is a positive CBM and needs to be backed up with further steps of similar nature.

Every sovereign nation has a right to enter into interaction with another state if it deems it to be in its national interest. Emotionalism based on religion and ideology, cannot be a substitute for pragmatic interests that nations have always pursued for their well being and

¹⁸⁸ “Singh in Saudi Arabia,” *The News*, January 21, 2001, p. 6.

¹⁸⁹ “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Security Agreement is on April 15”,
<<http://www.arabicnews.com/ansup/Daily/day/010402/2001040217.html>>
(December 10, 2001)

security. This has become more pronounced after the end of the Cold War.

The GCC leadership will have to master the art of balancing the interests of competitive actors in the region. While their own security needs are fulfilled through strategic partnership with the US and Britain, it is important that they should have broad-based security arrangements with other European powers, including Japan and East Asian countries.

With the installation of a democratic government under Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Pakistan's economy will hopefully improve and if that happens, Pakistan could again become involved in defence and other economic partnership with the Gulf as before.

To sum up, while the nuclearisation of South Asia may not pose immediate threats to the Gulf region, the continued Indo-Pak tensions make the Gulf states uneasy. This is because nuclearisation has, in many ways, drastically altered the security picture of South Asia as well as the adjacent Gulf region by adding new complications to the security calculus. The GCC countries are now sandwiched between a hostile and nuclear Israel on its east and a nuclearised and tense South Asia on its west.

In addition, crossing the "nuclear Rubicon" by South Asians (India and Pakistan) could induce nuclear nationalism in neighbouring states. In other words, it could whet the political aspirations of certain anti-status quo powers in the Gulf region who may now see the acquisition of WMD and missile systems not only as a guarantee of security but also as a sign of national prestige.

The nuclear rivalry and policies of one-upmanship by India and Pakistan accentuate the existing state of tensions for the GCC countries. The clash of identities between the Arab states and Iran, national rivalries on inter-state border conflicts – are inherited from colonial times and this meshes with internal political problems.

The wealth, progress and prosperity of the Gulf countries makes them vulnerable; their relatively small sizes and internal weaknesses, could pose a security risk for them as it excites the envy of some less fortunate neighbours with predatory instincts. Hence, with the discovery of oil in the 20th century, the zone has become "one of the most turbulent and politically unstable areas in the world."¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ *The Asian Recorder*, May 14-20, 1973, p. 11384.

South Asia has compounded its security through stockpiling of nuclear weapons and missiles in spite of abysmal poverty.¹⁹¹

According to a notable observer, India is not immune from disintegrative trends in the next decade or so because of its myriad problems, that include grinding poverty. Currently, it faces nearly sixteen ongoing separatist movements, the threat of nuclear theft, terrorism and the growing militarism of the fundamentalist BJP ruling party.¹⁹²

The above scenario may seem alarmist but other South Asian and neighbouring Gulf countries cannot afford to be blasé about the undercurrents developing in India.

Therefore, it is imperative that the GCC states in concert with India and Pakistan should candidly discuss their security concerns and defence dilemmas. Perhaps, it is high time that the GCC, with its leadership and economic clout, should bring to bear some healthy pressures on both India and Pakistan to moderate their rigid stances and help them settle their differences. The GCC countries need to emphasize on “human security” rather than military security.

Needless to say, a politically and economically stable South Asia is in everybody’s interest, including the Gulf region. Likewise, a stable Persian Gulf is reciprocally a source of strength and stability for South Asia. Since the two regions are inextricably linked through common bonds of culture and geography, the security and well being of one will directly impinge upon the other. ■

¹⁹¹ Amera Saeed, “Poverty in South Asia: Predicament and Prospects,” *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad (August-September 2000), p. 113.

¹⁹² Shireen Mazari, “South Asia in 2010,” *The News*, May 3, 2002, p. 6.

Pakistan-India Military Standoff: A Nuclear Dimension

Dr. Zulfqar Khan*

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (US) instantaneously changed the political landscape of the world. In a dramatically changed situation, Washington immediately restored its traditional relationship with Pakistan, much to India's annoyance.¹ At the same time, it also deepened its strategic relationship with India.² The Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) elite, including the Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee himself, had wished to portray India and the South Asian region as an area of great strategic significance to the US in the war against terrorism.³ This volatile situation primarily had motivated both the nuclear rival states to woo the US in a bid to coerce and intimidate the "rival suitor" – to achieve their respective diplomatic and strategic objectives.⁴

Prior to September 11, the Indian Government already had cordial and close relations with the US, and in spite of the sanctions imposed after the May 1998 nuclear tests, it still benefited from Washington's leaning toward New Delhi, which was highlighted by President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000.⁵ On the other hand, the Indian leadership and analysts, including the former Premier, I. K. Gujral, had always undermined Pakistan's nuclear capability, before Pakistan proved the Indian "doubters wrong."⁶ About these developments Harald Muller writes:

Since May 1998, the events in South Asia have changed the parameters of world politics, and in particular those of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, fundamentally. They are as significant as the fall of the Berlin Wall nine years ago. Unfortunately, they point us in the opposite direction: away from cooperation, arms control and disarmament, towards confrontation, arms racing and, eventually nuclear war.... It is essential to see the trigger to the events in the

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¹ Matin Woollacot, 'Kashmir and Terrorism aren't the Problem, it's the Bomb,' *The Guardian*, May 24, 2002.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ See Pervez Hoodbhoy's article in the *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 2002.

fundamentally changed character of the present Indian government – a precarious coalition headed by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). These nuclear weapons are not for security, status or prestige in the first place, as is all too often assumed. They are instruments for political power, for dominating the subcontinent and achieving equality with China. They are instruments for increasing the tensions with Pakistan, so that the more radical elements within the BJP can enhance their influence within their party and in India at large.⁷

As Muller has pointed out, the fundamentalist Hindu party, the BJP, had used the nuclear weapons capability to establish Indian hegemony on the subcontinent and to attain a strategic parity with China, a *de jure* nuclear weapon state. More significantly, in the first phase, it had deliberately accentuated its confrontational policy with Pakistan with a view to achieving its strategic objectives. In the second phase, it had embarked on a collision course with China and Pakistan, in order to resurrect the BJP's Hindutva credentials on the Indian domestic political scene. Thirdly, India had demonised the Pakistani and Chinese nuclear programmes with aim of justifying its nuclear tests against the prevalent international customs.

According to BJP's ideologue, Jaswant Singh:

India, in exercise of its supreme national interests, has acted in a timely fashion to correct an imbalance and fill a potentially dangerous vacuum.... A more powerful India will help balance and connect the oil-rich Gulf region and the rapidly industrialising countries of Southeast Asia.... India could not accept a flawed non-proliferation regime as the international norm when all realities conclusively demanded the contrary.⁸

Subsequently, the BJP skilfully employed India's nuclear weapons programme to boost its national ego and credentials, and exploited it as the dominant security discourse vis-à-vis Pakistan.⁹ This amply reflects India's obvious disregard for the security of the other South Asian states.¹⁰ Furthermore, New Delhi also planned to resurrect itself as a balancing state stretching from the Persian Gulf to

⁷ Harald Muller, 'The Death of Arms Control?,' *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No. 29, August/September 1998, p. 2.

⁸ Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid,' *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 77, No. 5, September/October 1998, pp. 48-89.

⁹ Haider K. Nizamani, 'South Asian Nukes and Dilemmas of International Nonproliferation Regimes,' *Working Paper No. 33*, December 2000, of the Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, p. 5.

¹⁰ For details see Shaun Gregory, 'A Formidable Challenge: Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia,' *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 54, 2001, The Acronym Institute.

the Far East, as demonstrated in the above-cited statement of Jaswant Singh. In such a problematical environment, it was imperative for Pakistan to establish a robust nuclear deterrent to protect its “sovereignty and territorial integrity against external threats,” and to strengthen its “ability to resist Indian efforts to dominate the region.”¹¹ Because, in 1998, the BJP government was, in any case, bent upon crossing the nuclear threshold, notwithstanding the strategic environment and, in return, provoked Pakistan to test its nuclear weapons. India construed this, in retrospect, as a rationale for its decision for nuclear testing.¹²

The Kargil War in 1999 had accorded India an alibi to announce its Draft Nuclear Doctrine, which had envisaged everything the superpowers possessed during the heydays of the Cold War. Soon after the Kargil conflict, the hawks in India developed a risky misperception that they could manage a limited war with Pakistan without it escalating into an all-out war – and without each side resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Besides, the Indian nuclear doctrine also vividly envisages an “assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time.” In addition, it calls for “space based and other assets” for its early warning and delivery systems.¹³ This Indian decision is

¹¹ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James T. Wirtz (eds.), *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 333.

¹² Matin Woollacot, op. cit. Justifying India’s decision to test nuclear weapons, K. Subrahmanyam writes, “The negative security assurances given by nuclear weapon states, on a careful analysis, raise serious cause for concern for India. For instance the US security assurance, which is almost the same as that given by the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, states: ‘The US reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons except in case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a state towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a non nuclear weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.’ India is not a party to the NPT and even carried out a nuclear test in 1974. Therefore, none of the so-called security assurances would cover India.” See K. Subrahmanyam, ‘India and the International Nuclear Order,’ in D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (eds.), *Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2002), pp. 67-68.

¹³ Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman, and Frank von Hippel, ‘Nuclear Role Models’, *The Washington Post*, August 6, 2002. According to George Perkovich, India’s nuclear doctrine document was perhaps “meant to say that a state aligned with nuclear weapon powers in aggression against India would not be spared, but the omission suggested that the document was vetted less for its international

expected to start a nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia, which would obviously aggravate the launch-on-warning posture in the subcontinent. The launch-on-warning travel time for a missile from the US to the then Soviet Union (present day Russia) was 30 minutes, while in the South Asian environment, it takes around 10 minutes for a missile to travel from one country to another.¹⁴ Adaptation of the US and Russian nuclear posture by India and Pakistan would be more dangerous. “Once elements of South Asia’s nuclear arsenal begin to be permanently deployed on high alert, US-Russian experience shows, bureaucratic and political forces will come into play, resisting any attempt to roll back a hair-trigger posture.”¹⁵ The nuclear posture becomes even more volatile and hazardous if it is combined with brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy, which India had initiated to bully Pakistan to accept a settlement of the Kashmir problem on its conditions. The Indian leadership had orchestrated brinkmanship against Pakistan after the terrorist attack on its Parliament on December 13, 2001. The succeeding paragraphs would recapitulate the entire gamut of India’s dicey strategy, which was *prima facie* premeditated to intimidate and pressurize Pakistan to acknowledge New Delhi’s hegemony.

Indian Strategic Thinking

The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.¹⁶

The above cited passage of the much-publicised Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, although apparently contains a ‘no first-use’ assurance against the use of nuclear weapons against the Non-Nuclear Weapon

security effect than for its domestic impact.” He further elaborated that, “The draft nuclear doctrine did not designate states that were deemed targets of India’s deterrent – such as Pakistan and China...” See George Perkovich, ‘What Makes The Indian Bomb Tick?’, in D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (eds.), *Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2002), p. 52.

¹⁴ Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman, and Frank von Hippel, op. cit.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Rodney W. Jones, ‘Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview,’ *Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office*, Final Report, October 1, 2001, p. 51.

States (NNWS) but it is clearly linked with the sustainability of deterrence. Most significantly, it is only valid against those states that are NNWS, and are not aligned with the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). Therefore, India's nuclear doctrine does not hold true vis-à-vis Pakistan ('no first-use' guarantee), which is also a NWS. In addition, the culmination point of India and Pakistan's strategic concept, rationally speaking, should adhere to the concept of sustainability of nuclear deterrence. The paragraph 3.2 of the Nuclear Doctrine, it also "envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time," which generates misperceptions regarding India's actual motives. Besides, they neither possess the economic and technological resources nor the infrastructure to establish an effective defence against the nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.¹⁷ This would obviously increase the chances of accidental use, or the outbreak of nuclear war on the subcontinent. According to Michael Krepon, President of the Henry L. Stimson Centre, "This is a region that tends towards misreading, tends towards surprises, tends towards misperceptions."¹⁸ In particular, the absence of a dialogue process between India and Pakistan has made the escalating tension potentially more perilous and prone to miscalculation than the US-Soviet Union crisis over the Cuban missile issue in 1962. Unfortunately, the Indian leadership had further aggravated the tension by issuing threatening statements against Pakistan. For instance, Defence Minister George Fernandes claimed that India "could take a strike, survive, and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished." Indian Defence Secretary Yogendra Narain, in an interview to the Indian magazine, *Outlook*, advocated surgical strikes against Pakistan, and said, "We must be prepared for total mutual destruction."¹⁹ Above all, Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee, during his visit to the Line of Control (LoC) in the Indian Held Kashmir in May 2002, urged India to be ready for sacrifices for a "decisive fight" against Pakistan.²⁰ On the other hand, Pakistan vowed to use full force in retaliation to an Indian attack. While, India accused Pakistan

¹⁷ For more details see, John E. Pike et. al., 'Defending Against the Bomb,' in Stephen I. Schwartz (et. al., eds.), *Atomic Audit*, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), pp. 269-270.

¹⁸ Cited in, Paul Richter and Thomas H. Maugh II, 'One Step Away from Nuclear War,' *Los Angeles Times*, June 2, 2002.

¹⁹ Pervez Hoodbhoy, op. cit.

²⁰ *The Indian Express*, May 22, 2002.

of cross-border terrorism in the Indian Held Kashmir.²¹ This approach reflected a dangerous Indian misperception and mindset regarding the use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan. It would be appropriate to recapitulate this mindset, especially after the Kargil War.

The Post-Kargil Discourse

In the aftermath of the Kargil War, the entire security paradigm between the two *de facto* NWS had changed. By January 2000, India had evolved a doctrine of a limited conventional conflict under the nuclear environment of South Asia. Fernandes, outlining this hypothesis, (in January 2000), claimed that there was a provision between a low-intensity and a high-intensity conventional conflict where a limited conventional war was possible. He said that:

Nuclear weapons did not make war obsolete; they simply imposed another dimension the way warfare was conducted...Pakistan...had convinced itself for decades, that under the nuclear umbrella it would be able to take Kashmir without India being able to punish it in return.... There was perception that the overt nuclear status had ensured that covert war could continue...while India would be deterred by the nuclear factor.

...obviously they [Pakistan] have not absorbed the real meaning of nuclearisation: that it can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war...that 30-years ago [in 1969] two nuclear-armed neighbouring countries – China and the Soviet Union – had fought a bitter war across their borders. So the issue was not that war had been made obsolete by nuclear weapons, and that covert war by proxy was the only option, but that conventional war remained feasible, though with definite limitations, if escalation across the nuclear threshold was to be avoided.²²

Fernandes had referred to the Sino-Russian conflict to rationalise his projected concept of a limited war between India and Pakistan. But the fact remains that the Sino-Russian clashes of 1969 were of a low-intensity, and had never conflagrated into an open conflict. Therefore, it is difficult to use the Sino-Russian hostilities model to project a limited conventional war concept for South Asia, which India apparently intended to undertake against Pakistan in the

²¹ BBC,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid2001000/2001727.stm>
(May 22, 2002).

²² Inaugural address by the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes at Gulmohar, Habitat Centre, New Delhi, 'The Challenges of Limited War: Parameters and Options,' National Seminar organized by the *IDS*A, January 5, 2000.

future.²³ In the Indian viewpoint, in some cases, it could intentionally escalate a war with Pakistan in order to test the latter's nuclear resolve, and the alleged nuclear bluff over Kashmir.²⁴ However, it would be irrational to equate the Kargil combat with a limited conventional war. Kargil conflict was a geographically limited operation, which was contained to that region due to the prevalence of nuclear deterrence between the two countries.²⁵ Therefore, this Indian policy can rightly be termed a bluff and huff strategy, which is primarily based on the precarious nuclear fault line of South Asia.²⁶

In spite of inherent dangers in such a defective strategy, the Indian leadership, including its military commanders, are still advocating the concept of a limited war, which, in their perception, would not lead to an all-out, or a general war.²⁷ This indicates that the Kargil conflict is expected to influence the war strategies of both India and Pakistan. Both states have evolved divergent perceptions and misperceptions about war strategies and each other's concepts of limited conventional wars. Therefore, in case of an escalation of a limited, or a high-intensity conflict, between India and Pakistan, it would enhance the prospects of gross miscalculation and the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent.²⁸

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ *The Hindu*, January 5, 2000.

²⁵ Ashley J. Tellis et. al., 'Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis,' *RAND*, 2001, p. 56.

²⁶ Raja Menon, 'War Against Terrorism,' *Times of India*, October 6, 2001.

²⁷ Closing address by Gen. V. P. Malik, COAS, at a National Seminar on 'The Challenge of Limited War: Parameters and Options,' cited by Manoj Joshi, 'The Kargil War: The Fourth Round,' in Kanti Bajpai (et. al., eds.), *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy* ((New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Private Ltd, 2001), p. 57. In September 2002, at a seminar on 'Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia,' Gen. Malik had disclosed that the Indian forces were mobilised for war along the entire front during the Kargil conflict, see Vishal Thapar, 'Pak Nukes in US Custody,' *Hindustan Times*, September 29, 2002.

²⁸ India's misperception is eloquently explained by its Finance Minister Jaswant Singh, who while speaking in Washington at the annual International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings on September 28, 2002 had said that pre-emption was an integral part of deterrence. He further remarked that every country had a right to pre-emptive strikes as an intrinsic element of its right to self-defence, and it was not the prerogative of any one state. See Jaswant Singh's statement in, 'Every Country has Right to Pre-emptive Action: Jaswant Singh,' <<http://www.indiaexpress.com/news/world/20020930-1.html>> (September 30, 2002)

The Post-September 11, 2001 Situation

As argued in the preceding pages, the Indian leadership had developed a serious misperception that the Kargil conflict had shown that they could fight a limited conventional battle with Pakistan without its escalation into an all-out war. The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, and Washington's initiation of a war against terrorism and Islamic militancy, proved a catalyst that exasperated tensions between Pakistan and India. India planned to capitalise from the emerging worldwide focus against terrorism, which accorded New Delhi an opportunity to portray Pakistan as a state sponsoring *Jihad* and terrorism.²⁹ Most significantly, the US campaign against terrorism, the UNSC Resolution 1373 of September 2001 on terrorism, had made no distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters, thereby providing India a rationale to launch a coercive diplomacy with a view to compelling Pakistan to settle the Kashmir dispute on its conditions.

Immediately after September 11, India speedily joined the US-led campaign against terrorism with a view to motivating Washington to declare Pakistan a terrorist state due to the latter's support to the Taliban regime, and to the Kashmiri elements.³⁰ However, Pakistan's unequivocal support – including logistical and intelligence assistance – against global terrorism; its abandonment of the Taliban regime in Kabul (after the latter's intransigent attitude towards Islamabad's mediation to defuse controversy over Laden's extradition to the US), the Bush Administration's priority to remove the Taliban government; politico-economic stabilisation of Pakistan in an effort to prevent latter's nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of militants in India's perspective, had *prima facie* prevented US from declaring Pakistan a terrorist state.³¹

Simultaneously, India also calibrated a strategy of intentional escalation of tension with Pakistan in the wake of terrorist attacks – one outside the Srinagar State Assembly's building on October 1, and the other one on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. In

²⁹ Brahma Chellaney, 'Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia,' *International Security*, Vol. 26, NO. 3, Winter 2001/2002, pp. 94-116.

³⁰ Gaurav Kampani, 'Placing the Indo-Pakistani Standoff in Perspective,' Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, March 2002, pp. 7-8.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8. Also see Dan Balz, Bob Woodward, and Jeff Himmelman, 'Afghan Campaign Blueprint Emerges: Part 3: September 13,' *Washington Post*, January 29, 2002, p. A01; Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, 'Combating Terrorism: It Starts Today – Part 6: September 16-17,' *Washington Post*, February 1, 2002, p. A01.

spite of Pakistan's outright condemnation of these terrorist attacks, the Vajpayee government threatened Pakistan with a limited war.³² According to US government experts, India's conventional and strategic forces advantage over Pakistan had not only enhanced the unpredictability factor in the subsequent military standoff, but had also increased the probability of a war. Because, Vajpayee had announced to punish Pakistan³³, for the crime it did not commit. The post-13th December India's calibrated strategy against Pakistan, and its cavalier approach toward a limited war concept, had multi-dimensional facets, which are discussed in the succeeding passages.

India's Calibrated Strategy

India's grand escalatory strategy against Pakistan was primarily premised on the parameters which the *Indian Defence Review*, a government sponsored publication, has comprehensively summarised:

India needs to respond with a strategy that unleashes total war...primarily on four counts: First, even if Musharraf temporarily turns coat under international pressure, he cannot afford to dismount the Jihadi Tiger that he himself created.... Second, if Pakistan does not focus on its "Balkanise India" campaign, it will wither away as a nation state.... Third, Pakistan is almost a rentier state like Afghanistan. Therefore, it is willing to act as a frontline mercenary nation for any international actor.... Fourth, in Pakistan, the military-intelligence-mosque combine shares synonymous strategic vision...to ultimately carve out two super-Islamic states. One to run from Islamabad to almost Moscow across Central Asia. The other in East Asia...

To bring to an end Islamabad's export of terrorism as part and parcel of its foreign policy, New Delhi should evolve a geo-political strategy that supports and sustains military action with clarity.

Our intelligence apparatus is one of the most under-utilised instruments of state.... The intelligence agencies should be tasked to conduct operations inside Pakistan, so as to escalate burgeoning internal dissension.... Over a period of time, this one instrument, if effectively operated with sufficient funds, can ensure that the law and order situation continues to deteriorate, thereby deterring foreign investment, and a widening of the unbridgeable sectarian divide that would strengthen the demand for an independent Shia state, and encourage non-Punjabi communities like the Sindhis to move

³² *Times of India* (Mumbai), December 19, 2001, and *The Hindu* (Chennai), December 20, 2001.

³³ Bradley Graham and Thomas E. Ricks, 'Military Disparity Adds to Uncertainty; Analysts Say India's Advantage Contributes to Escalatory Situation,' *The Washington Post*, June 1, 2002.

towards independence.... Even now it's not too late to implement – if Pakistan fragments into five parts, at least three to four sub-nationalities would align with us. That would lower the threat perception on the Western front by sixty per cent.

In Kargil we erred by fighting on a single front...Indian military offensive should be bold, swift and innovative taking the war to the enemy instead waiting to receive him.

Since both are nuclear powers, the remote possibility of nukes being exchanged exists.³⁴

India's escalatory policy, as enunciated in the above-cited quotation, was designed to:

- a. Portray Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism and fomenting the *Jihadi* culture virtually against the entire world, with a view to creating two hypothetical super-Islamic states.
- b. That Pakistan's inherent weaknesses as a nation-state compelled it to pursue a policy to balkanise India.

Therefore, India's grand strategy was projected to achieve the following objectives:

- a. Exploit and escalate Pakistan's internal dissension with a view to creating internal anarchy and preventing foreign investments; and to balkanise Pakistan.
- b. Formulate an aggressive strategy to fight a conventional war on Pakistan's territory.

As argued that the Indian leadership had developed a dangerous strategic psychosis that a limited conventional war, that too on the Pakistani territory, was feasible. And that Pakistan's alleged threat to use weapons was purely huff and bluff. Such an erroneous strategy, misperception and irrational behaviour, was used as an "art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence", as Schelling has described it,³⁵ by India after the 13th December incident to achieve its political objectives against Pakistan. Narrowly perceived strategies, especially in the event of "crisis instability," as per the theory of deterrence, each side would tend to strike first, with a view to restricting the damage to minimum. Therefore, in such a volatile situation, a surprise attack could lead to an outbreak of war, which otherwise none desired.³⁶ For instance, during the 1986-87

³⁴ 'From The Editor – Pakistan: The Next Battlefield,' *Indian Defence Review*, Vol. 17 (2), April-June 2002, pp. 7-10.

³⁵ Cited in, David Holloway, 'Nuclear History and the Nuclear Future,' a seminar paper at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) on March 20-21, 2001, p. 7.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

‘Brasstacks’ crisis, which was not a military exercise, but was a “plan to build up a situation for a fourth war with Pakistan.” And disturbingly, the Indian premier was not aware about “these plans of war.”³⁷ According to George Perkovich, the Indian policymakers had considered the option of attacking Pakistan’s nuclear installations in January 1987 to remove the threat of Pakistan’s nuclear counter-attack on India.³⁸ But since the Kargil conflict, a perception has evolved that even the nuclear-armed states can fight a conventional war, which obviously has a propensity to start crises, or a limited war between India and Pakistan in the future. “This will increase the dangers of both a preventive and pre-emptive strike if war is considered inevitable, as well as the danger of a deliberate, but limited use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield,” writes Sagan.³⁹

Mobilisation of Forces

Soon after an attack on the Parliament, which Pakistan had condemned in the strongest possible terms, India ordered the mobilisation of its armed forces, shifted its air assets along the LoC and borders with Pakistan, and moved its naval ships to the Arabian Sea, closer to Pakistan. And, India’s Home Minister, L. K. Advani, on December 19, 2001, *demarche* Pakistan to:

- a. Strike against the alleged militant Islamic organisations and groups allegedly undertaking Jihad in India.
- b. Cessation of support to cross-border terrorism into the Indian-controlled Kashmir.
- c. Hand over 20 individuals accused of terrorism in India.⁴⁰

According to the Indian leadership’s perspective, they can start a major or a limited conventional war against Pakistan, without triggering the use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, they planned surgical strikes across the LoC into the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir on the justification of combating terrorism, and to destroy the alleged terrorist camps. Obviously, this Indian design was expected to evoke a Pakistani response, which could have ranged

³⁷ Lt. Gen. P. N. Hoon, the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Army, cited in, Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,’ a seminar paper at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) on March 20-21, 2001, pp. 9-10.

³⁸ George Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 280.

³⁹ Scott D. Sagan, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴⁰ *Times of India*, December 20, 2001, and Pravin Sawhney, ‘Conventional Parity with Pakistan,’ *The Pioneer*, June 29, 2002,

<<http://www.dailypioneer.com/secon3.asp?cat=\opd3&d=OPED>>

from a proportionate reaction to escalation into a full-fledged nuclear conflict. India's miscalculated strategy was expected to have disastrous ramifications, not only for India and Pakistan, but also for the security of the entire world.⁴¹ Other factors responsible for the initiation of Indian brinkmanship were:

- a. That, it had largely stemmed from domestic political considerations, and not necessarily from a threat to India's security from the alleged Pakistan-based Kashmiri militants.
- b. The Vajpayee government was under pressure to bring a victory for the BJP in order to exploit its laurels in the State Assemblies election in February 2001, including Kashmir in October 2002. Therefore, it was expected that India would neither de-escalate the tension nor demobilise its forces, at least until the Kashmir polls.⁴²
- c. To portray Pakistan as a "Rouge State," on account of terrorism, and to subsequently use it as a rationale – and as a moral high ground, to fight militancy by whatever means India deemed appropriate.⁴³
- d. To manoeuvre a link between the terrorists involved in the attacks on the World Trade Centre, and the Kashmiri militants and the Al-Qaeda elements.⁴⁴
- e. To secure a permanent settlement of the Kashmir dispute on New Delhi's terms, and to establish its hegemony on the subcontinent.

Nuclear Rhetoric and International Reaction

In the second phase, parallel to diplomatic measures – reduction of diplomatic staff in each other's country and India's withdrawal of its High Commissioner from Islamabad, the Indian leadership had stepped-up a nuclear war rhetoric. Vajpayee claimed that India was ready for a nuclear war with Pakistan, while, President Musharraf retorted that India had also earlier doubted Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability before the overt nuclearisation in May 1998. Musharraf further maintained that Islamabad was compelled to test nuclear weapons, and reiterated that as Pakistan was not bluffing

⁴¹ Gregory Copley and Christopher Kondaki, 'Looking at the Ramifications, The New Indian Brinkmanship,' *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, 1, 2002, p. 4.

⁴² Interview of Defence Minister George Fernandes cited in, Pravin Sawhney, op. cit.

⁴³ Gregory Copley and Christopher Kondaki, op. cit., p. 5.

⁴⁴ Brahma Chellaney, op. cit., p. 98.

in 1998, and again in May 2002 “we were compelled to show that we do not bluff.”⁴⁵ With the start of nuclear rhetoric, the Indian policymakers planned to utilise a new form of bilateral nuclear diplomacy. Secondly, New Delhi intended to employ this new version of diplomacy to engage the US and other major powers to settle South Asia’s “most neuralgic dispute” – Kashmir. India’s leading defence analyst, C. Raja Mohan, writes:

Until recently, it was Pakistan which sought to manipulate the risks of a nuclear confrontation for political objectives. But it is New Delhi today that is subtly using the threat of nuclear war to get the international community to pressure Pakistan...⁴⁶

A senior Western diplomat based in New Delhi, thus commented on the Indo-Pakistani nuclear rhetoric:

Was the huge...military pressure solely designed to scare the pants off the international community and pressure Pakistan or were the Indians really prepared to use it? As a last resort, they probably were prepared to use it, but the saner figures in the government wanted to avoid war...⁴⁷

Besides, the Western leaders also expressed grave concern regarding the escalating tensions between the two countries. The US Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, in an interview to the BBC said, “The international community was frightened to death that we were on the verge of nuclear war.”⁴⁸ This amply demonstrates an inherent danger in a situation leading to a tit-for-tat type of action-and-reaction. And if both sides had consistently kept on responding to heightening tension, then the risk of losing control over the situation and the escalation ladder was high.⁴⁹ India had deliberately started the policy of nuclear brinkmanship in order to intimidate and coerce Pakistan to accept its hegemony in the region. But the situation has its own inbuilt mechanisms and dynamics, which keep on unfolding with each event. And the most significant aspect of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent is ambiguity, and to determine the threshold or the trigger, of a nuclear response of India and Pakistan.⁵⁰ As discussed in the opening paragraphs of this article, India’s Nuclear Doctrine is an ambiguous document. Moreover, the

⁴⁵ Celia W. Dugger, ‘India-Pakistani Tensions Subside, But Nuclear Fear is Far From Over: News Analysis,’ *The New York Times*, June 20, 2002.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Bradley Graham and Thomas E. Ricks, op. cit.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

post-13th December events had further diluted the credibility of its 'no first use' clause due to threats of a nuclear war enunciated by the Indian policymakers, the start of coercive diplomacy, and India's persistent refusal to hold a dialogue with Pakistan.⁵¹ A serious *impasse* between the *de facto* NWS had evoked international mediation efforts to defuse rising tensions in the region.

The US, the EU (European Union), and the other world leaders, including the UN Secretary General, had undertaken shuttle/telephonic diplomacy between New Delhi and Islamabad to facilitate the diffusion of tension. India had also stepped up diplomatic efforts, and wrote separate letters to the US, Russia, and the UK (United Kingdom), explaining the motives behind India's stepped up military build-up along the borders with Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan also sent special emissaries to the major capitals of the world outlining its viewpoint about India's dangerous brinkmanship against Islamabad. The SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation) and the CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia) summits in January and June 2002 respectively, also could not defuse tension between India and Pakistan.⁵² During the SAARC and the CICA conferences, Musharraf had categorically condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and offered a dialogue to India for peace and stability in the region.⁵³ On the other hand, Vajpayee reiterated that a dialogue would be considered by India only when the "cross-border terrorism" had ended.⁵⁴ In spite of President Musharraf's commitment at the SAARC and the CICA conferences, address to the Pakistani nation on January 12, March 23, May 27, and to the religious scholars and intellectuals on January 18, to fight against the menace of terrorism, and to end what India termed as "cross-border terrorism;" India continued with its policy of threat and war rhetoric against Pakistan.⁵⁵ India expressed apprehension about Pakistan's sincerity to end the "cross-border terrorism," and termed

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² K. Subrahmanya, 'Vajpayee Sets Terms for De-escalation,' *The Deccan Herald*, June 5, 2002.

⁵³ 'Documents,' President Musharraf's speech at the 11th SAARC Summit, Kathmandu, Nepal, January 5, 2002, *IPRI JOURNAL*, Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 82-84.

⁵⁴ Ibid. pp. 85-87, and K. Subrahmanyam, op. cit.

⁵⁵ 'Documents,' *IPRI JOURNAL*, Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 2002, op. cit., pp. 82-84, 97-105, 106-113, 142-144, and 150-152.

Musharraf's speech of May 27 as unacceptable and dangerous.⁵⁶ India's External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, on May 28, remarked that Pakistan was the "epicentre of international terrorism" and rejected Musharraf's assurances of ending infiltration across the LoC.⁵⁷

Since President Musharraf's address to the Pakistani nation on May 27, 2002, Pakistan consistently maintained that it had taken a position not to allow anybody across the LoC. He reiterated that, "Why doesn't India arrest infiltrators when they cross over? The onus on what is going on in Indian Kashmir cannot be laid on Pakistan."⁵⁸ Pakistan also ruled out the jointing patrolling proposal of India, and argued that in a situation where there are more than a million troop deployed on the LoC, "there is not sufficient confidence in each other to start joint patrolling."⁵⁹ Whereas India constantly accused Pakistan of cross-border terrorism, and to disrupt the scheduled elections in the Indian Kashmir (in September/October) even during Armitage's visit to India on August 23, 2002. Interestingly, the Kashmiri leaders had called for a boycott of Indian-backed polls. They claimed that the past elections in Kashmir were also rigged in favour of the pro-India political parties, and called for the implementation of the UNSC resolutions on Kashmir.⁶⁰ Incidentally, India had earlier rejected Colin Powell's proposal during his visit to India in July 2002, to allow foreign observers to monitor the polls, and instead continued the war rhetoric and described the military standoff as a state of war.⁶¹

An aggressive Indian discourse was expected to last until the elections in Indian Held Kashmir.⁶² India's fixed policy was intended to secure US support to accept its version of the Kashmir dispute, which it could not achieve. Secondly, it also indicates New Delhi's frustration that the international community had accepted that Pakistan has ended infiltration across the LoC.⁶³ On the other hand, Pakistan continuously offered a dialogue option to India. But India

⁵⁶ Atul Aneja, 'Our Options are Open, Says Jaswant Singh,' *The Hindu*, May 29, 2002.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Pakistan's Deputy Foreign Minister, Inamul Haq's comments on August 22, 2002 during the SAARC Foreign Ministers Conference in Kathmandu, *The News* (Islamabad), August 23, 2002.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ *Dawn* (Islamabad), August 24, 2002.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Editorial, *The News* (Islamabad), August 24, 2002.

continuously refused to engage in peace diplomacy, and continued pursuing its policy of coercive diplomacy, which had not shown any signs of success.⁶⁴ “India’s strategy of putting pressure on Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism in Kashmir has clearly failed,” writes P. R. Chari, an Indian defence analyst. He further commented that, “India has made itself a hostage to fortune. It cannot de-escalate its military build-up without completely losing face.”⁶⁵ A retired Indian Army general, Ashok Mehta, also writes that, “Indian generals are telling the politicians that they cannot remain fully mobilised indefinitely.”⁶⁶ Hence, India refused demobilisation of its forces until New Delhi could independently verify the fact that Pakistan had reduced support for “cross-border terrorism.”⁶⁷

The Role of Coercive Diplomacy and Future Implications

The initiation of India’s coercive diplomacy has further destabilised the region, and has disrupted the entire concept of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and India. India’s defence analysts, including the External Affairs Ministry officials, claimed that the coercive diplomacy has succeeded.⁶⁸ Soon after the escalation of military tension in December 2001, the Indian writers began articulating an official Indian version that Pakistan was using the nuclear threat to coerce India, and urged the government to “call this bluff.”⁶⁹ Interestingly, Henry L. Stimson Center in the US, in a study, has indicated that India was confident that its potentially dangerous policy options would not prompt a nuclear catastrophe.⁷⁰ According to this study, both the countries had divergent perceptions about the stand-off:

- a. India claimed that the brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy had succeeded in convincing the US to pressurise Pakistan to end the infiltration.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ghayoor Ahmed, ‘War Clouds on the Horizon,’ *Dawn*, May 22, 2002, <<http://www.dawn.com/2002/05/22/op.htm>>

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ ‘India Wants Action, Says Advani,’ *The Times of India* (Mumbai), February 16, 2002.

⁶⁸ Prominent amongst the Indian defence analysts included K. Subrahmanyam; see Pravin Sawhney, op. cit.

⁶⁹ Nusrat Javed, ‘Fearing Next Round of Pak-India Standoff,’ *The News* (Islamabad), July 30, 2002.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

- b. Pakistan had drawn entirely different viewpoint that the combination of conventional and nuclear deterrence had gone in its favour. They also termed the standoff as an “Indian bluff, tough talk, and brinkmanship without a will to fight.”⁷¹

Therefore, the emerging dangerous misperception between the two nuclear-armed neighbours points toward a terrible direction. “Success that quickly sour for both parties,” writes the Stimson experts, “combined with a belief by both that they would do well in the next round, sets the stage for the next crisis.”⁷² In addition, both countries believed that the US has more influence on the other side. India held the opinion that if the US were to exert its pressure on Pakistan, then the latter would end the infiltration on a permanent basis. On the other hand, Pakistan held the view that unless the US gave its tacit consent, the Indian attack could not materialise. Hence, any future crisis between the two would have a short “fuse.”⁷³ Therefore, US ability to manage the future crisis would be limited, and India and Pakistan’s propensity to engage in brinkmanship would lead to more posturing. This would require more US involvement through a ‘facilitation strategy’ with a view to averting a catastrophe.⁷⁴ According to Shekhar Gupta, Editor of *The Indian Express*, and Arundhati Roy, a peace activist, who, while addressing a seminar in Islamabad on August 15, 2002, urged India and Pakistan to start a dialogue for the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Kashmir.⁷⁵ Gupta emphasised a need to shift the entire paradigm where people of both the countries could start interacting with each other at various levels in order to remove the bilateral “misconceptions.”⁷⁶ Thus, in the absence of a dialogue process, if India and Pakistan continued their respective policies, then the prospects of peace and stability in the region would be bleak. And both India and Pakistan would carry on shifting the onus of responsibility on to each other.⁷⁷

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Faraz Hashmi, ‘Indian Writer Blames Governments for Fuelling Hatred,’ *Dawn* (Islamabad), August 16, 2002.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ For instance on August 25, 2002, India’s External Affairs Minister Yahswant Sinha, threatened to take further steps against Pakistan. He stated that, “and what we have done so far does not constitute the totality of steps that one can take short of going to war.... There is no evidence as of now that Pakistan has delivered on its commitments. Infiltration from across the LoC may have

Nuclear Deterrence

As elucidated in the preceding pages, the existing level of misconceptions between the two countries would have shorter “fuse” in future crises. Since December 2001, India and Pakistan had kept up the pace of their nuclear rhetoric. India continued its nuclear brinkmanship and constantly reiterated that all options, including military strikes against Pakistan, were open.⁷⁸ There were varieties of factors responsible for the initiation of India’s military brinkmanship. First, India perceived that the US would not allow a limited conventional conflict to escalate into an all-out war in a bid to protect its strategic goals in Afghanistan. Secondly, the BJP government thought that Pakistan would not dare start a war with India due to fears that the US might launch an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations with a view to averting the risks of a nuclear conflict. Thirdly, India’s growing strategic partnership accorded it a confidence that the diplomatic effects of a limited conventional conflict with Pakistan could be contained.⁷⁹ But the US and the EU shuttle diplomacy has indicated that the Bush Administration took President Musharraf’s restructuring programme for the Pakistani state quite seriously, and perceived that a moderate Pakistani state, on the lines of Turkey, was the prime foreign policy objective of Washington.⁸⁰ Besides, India also did not possess a sufficient conventional military edge to launch a conventional war against Pakistan.⁸¹ Pakistan’s strategy of offensive defence, nuclear and conventional deterrence, and determination to resist the perceived Indian “hegemonic attitude,” were the other factors that had restrained India from initiating a limited conflict.⁸² Subsequently, Pakistan endeavoured to reinforce its conventional deterrence concept, and to give a strong message to India, had test fired a series of nuclear-capable missiles just before Musharraf’s address to the

declined but it is still taking place. Unless Pakistan delivers on its commitment we cannot start a dialogue with it.” See Jawed Haqvi, ‘India Threatens to Take Further Steps,’ *Dawn* (Islamabad), August 26, 2002.

⁷⁸ ‘Pakistan Must Respond to Global Call to End Terrorism,’ *The Hindu* (Chennai), March 25, 2002.

⁷⁹ Gaurav Kampani, op. cit., p. 17.

⁸⁰ For details see, US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s testimony before the US Senate, ‘Testimony at Budget Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,’ US Department of State, February 5, 2002, <<http://www.state.gov>>

⁸¹ Gaurav Kampani, op. cit., pp.18-19.

⁸² Sridhar Krishnaswam, ‘We Can Take Offensive Into Indian Territory: Musharraf,’ *The Hindu*, May 27, 2002,

<<http://www.hinduonnet.com/stories/200202052704300100.htm>>

nation on May 27, 2002. In his speech, he reiterated to the need to end the “cross-border” infiltration. But at the same time, he expressed the determination to fight in the enemy’s territory if war was “thrust” on Pakistan.⁸³

Theoretically speaking, in an unstable strategic environment, the chances of sustaining losses in a limited war are fewer. Therefore, the likelihood of a nuclear war, even by a “rational opponent,” is there.⁸⁴ According to this concept:

...limited war requires limits – i.e., mutual recognition of restraints. These tacit agreements, arrived at through partial or haphazard negotiations, require terms that are qualitatively distinguishable from the alternatives and cannot simply be a matter of degree. For example, in the Korean War the 38th parallel was a powerful focus for a stalemate...the explicit statements and the tactical moves of nations constitute strategic signals. Adversaries watch and interpret each other’s behaviour, each aware that his own actions are being interpreted and each acting with a consciousness of the expectations he creates.

An adversary who might be tempted to initiate a limited war must therefore proceed cautiously. In a stable strategic context, however, nuclear war means mutual annihilation; and, therefore, adventurous nations can instigate limited wars with less fear of all-out retaliation.⁸⁵

The leaders of the two countries have consistently traded threats and counter-threats with a view to achieving their respective political objectives. Therefore, the chances of containing a limited conventional conflict within required “limits,” as argued in the preceding quotation, were quite bleak. The element of agreement on a certain focal point – like the 38th parallel during the Korean War, for example – was absent. Above all, the emanating “tactical” and “strategic signals” from New Delhi and Islamabad were also likely to be misinterpreted by both sides. Furthermore, India’s start of nuclear brinkmanship, instead of proceeding “cautiously,” had further destabilised the environment. Otherwise India and Pakistan, who had fought three wars over the last fifty years, had not fought a major war since the enunciation of nuclear deterrence.⁸⁶ Thus, the international

⁸³ ‘Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-capable Missile,’ *Sify News*, May 25, 2002, <<http://headlines.sify.com/895news1.html>> ‘Musharraf Says War Would Be Fought in India,’ *The Yahoo News*, <<http://uk.news.yahoo.com/020529/80/czyfy.htm1>>

⁸⁴ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 16.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

community had appropriately expressed genuine fears that the simmering tension between India and Pakistan had the potential to escalate into a nuclear war.⁸⁷ In the nuclear deterrence paradigm, the fear of retaliation by a nuclear-armed adversary is a potent and central factor for the successful perpetuation of deterrence.⁸⁸ In the subcontinent, the situation had deteriorated due to mobilisation of troops by India to “maximize strategic goals and objectives” vis-à-vis Pakistan.⁸⁹ This policy of India was *prima facie* formulated without taking into consideration a series of consequences, which it was expected to exert in the event of a limited war.⁹⁰ Therefore, the “fog of war” is likely to generate miscalculation, “bureaucratic momentum,” and chaos in any future crises.⁹¹

One thing is quite clear that different models, or perceptions, about the viability of a conventional war and the risk of a nuclear holocaust were expected to produce different explanations and perspectives in India and Pakistan. Hence, the chances of misperception were much greater between India and Pakistan than the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. “Different conceptual lenses lead...to different judgements about what is relevant and important,” which can enhance the prospects of miscalculations.⁹² For instance, India’s leading analyst, Pravin Sawhney, quoting K. Subrahmanyam, writes that it was never the policy of New Delhi to go to war with Pakistan. Rather, it was merely meant for coercive diplomacy.⁹³ But at the same time Sawhney writes that in January and June 2002, the Indian Army was fully prepared to attack across the LoC. He claimed that even Premier Vajpayee had “confirmed” this fact. Sawhney cited four schools of thought with a view to determining the reasons that had prevented a war. The first was that nuclear weapons had prevented war. The second was that the mobilisation of troops by India was designed to induce the US-led coalition against terrorism to include cross-border terrorism on its agenda. The third contended that a limited war against a nuclear-armed Pakistan could not have assisted India in achieving its military and political objectives. The fourth school of thought argued that

⁸⁷ Ewen MacAskill, ‘Fear of Nuclear War Over,’ *The Guardian Unlimited*, May 22, 2002.

⁸⁸ Scott D. Sagan, op. cit., p. 14.

⁸⁹ Graham T. Allison, op. cit., p. 32.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 33.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 17.

⁹² Ibid., p. 251.

⁹³ Pravin Sawhney, op. cit.

Pakistan's conventional deterrence had restrained India from starting a war.⁹⁴ The divergent perceptions and schools of thought coupled with the mode and availability of information and estimates, which usually reflect "organizational goals and routines" meant for the rational actor's calculation, are invariably "chancy" that could lead nations "irrationally" into a nuclear conflict.⁹⁵ This fact is also substantiated by the history of the Cold War where the organisational processes had produced inadvertent military crises.⁹⁶ Therefore, it is absolutely imperative for the peace and stability of the region that the US calibrates its policy to induce India and Pakistan to hold a dialogue on Kashmir with a view to finding a solution of this dispute, and to encourage confidence building and arms control measures between them.⁹⁷

Conventional and Strategic Forces

There is a marked disparity between the conventional forces of both India and Pakistan. For example, in 2001, India's defence budget had increased by 3.2 per cent to Rs. 732 billion, from Rs. 709 billion in 2000. Since 1998, it had increased by nearly 70 per cent, which amounted to 3.1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000. On the other hand, Pakistan's defence budget in 2000 was Rs. 190 billion and, in 2001, its defence spending had been frozen at Rs. 157 billion.⁹⁸ The active strength of India and Pakistan's armed forces was: 1,263,000 (excluding 535,000 reservists), and 620,000 (excluding 513,000 reservists) respectively.⁹⁹ See Figure-1 for the comparative strength of their armed forces.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Graham T. Allison, op. cit., pp. 253, 259-260. For instance, during the Cold War, US had spent \$937.2 billion in order to establish defence against the nuclear bomb. But, despite this massive expenditure to erect strategic defences, it was unable to protect its population and other economic and military assets from the Soviet missiles. For more detail see, John E. Pike et. al., op. cit., pp. 269-270.

⁹⁶ Scott D. Sagan, op. cit., p. 15.

⁹⁷ Sumit Ganguly, 'Behind India's Bomb: The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence,' Review Essay on a book by Ashley J. Tellis *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2001, p. 141.

⁹⁸ *The Military Balance 2001-2002* (London: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 155 and 157.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 162, 167.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 162-164, 167-168.

Figure-1

<i>Country</i>	<i>Army</i>	<i>Air Force</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Paramilitary</i>
India	1,100,000	110,000	53,000	1,089,700
Pakistan	550,000	45,000	25,000	288,000

As reflected in Figure-2, asymmetry between India and Pakistan's military equipments is also quite extensive.¹⁰¹

Figure-2

<i>Equipment</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>
<u>Army</u>		
Tanks	3504	2300
<u>Navy</u>		
Submarines	16	10
A. Carriers	1	Nil
Destroyers	8	
Frigates	11	8
Mine Countermeasures	18	3
Amphibious	7	Nil
Support/Miscellaneous	32	9
Corvettes	24	5
Patrol & Coastal	39	9
Combatants		
Aircraft	7 squadrons	2 squadrons
Helicopters	8 squadrons	3 squadrons
<u>Air Force</u>		
Combat Aircrafts	738	353

Moreover, the difference in both countries' strategic forces is also disproportionate. However, different sources have given conflicting figures about India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities. Nuclear arsenals of both countries are reproduced in Figure-3.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Michael Richardson, 'Fears Spread That Other Asian Nations Will Seek Nuclear Arms,' *The International Herald Tribune*, June 6, 2002; Luke Harding and Rory McCarthy, 'Why Nuclear Conflict is a Real Threat,' *The Guardian Unlimited*, May 23, 2002; 'If There's Nuke War, India Would Suffer More,' *Sify News*, May 25, 2002, <<http://headlines.sify.com/902news5.htm1>> Thom Shanker, '12

Figure-3

<i>Source</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>
Janes's Information Group	150-200	150
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	25-40	15-20
Institute for Science and International Security, Washington.	65	40
Policy Architects International, Washington.	Over 100	About 40
Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems	50-150	25-50
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists	70-120	12-18

Disparity in conventional and strategic forces, geographical proximity, and the absence of C⁴I² (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information and Intelligence) and, above all, the existing state of misperception and mistrust between India and Pakistan, has further accentuated the “fog of war.” Although officially, the Indian and Pakistani leaders have consistently reiterated that a nuclear war is “unthinkable,” “unlikely,” and “insanity.”¹⁰³ Although, both sides are showing cognisance that there are nuclear hazards, therefore, they have to be cautious. Probably the Indian leadership, in a bid to prove to Pakistan that they are not afraid of war, had started a policy of escalation of tension. According to some experts, the deterrence perception did not go down well in India. During the crisis, the Indian leadership, including its defence minister, had stated that Pakistan would not respond to

Million Could Die at Once in an India-Pakistan Nuclear War,’ *The New York Times*, May 27, 2002; Rodney W. Jones, ‘Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview,’ *Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office*, Final Report, October 1, 2001, pp. 3 and 7; Scott Baldauf and Howard LaFranchi, ‘Why Pakistan Might Turn to Nukes,’ *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 4, 2002; and Paul Richter and Thomas H. Maugh II, ‘One Step Away From Nuclear War,’ *Los Angeles Times*, June 2, 2002, <<http://www.latimes.com/1a-000038902jun02.story>> According to Luke Harding and Rory McCarthy, Pakistan’s plutonium reactor at Khushab, could produce five nuclear bombs a year. While, it’s indigenous missile weapons systems is one of “world’s most sophisticated and formidable,” claims an official of the Pakistan Institute for Air Defence Studies. See Luke Harding and Rory McCarthy, op. cit.

¹⁰³ Scott Baldauf and Howard LaFranchi, op. cit.

India's conventional attack with nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁴ Interestingly, Lee Butler, the former head of the US Strategic Command, commenting about the nuclear deterrence concept remarked that, "No thanks to deterrence, but only by the grace of God" and the US and the Soviet Union survived their crises during the Cold War.¹⁰⁵ Hence, an initiation of brinkmanship and the ensuing rhetoric between India and Pakistan, has demonstrated that several conventional-warfare scenarios could lead South Asia to a nuclear holocaust:

- a. A naval blockade of Pakistan, which could put its economic survival in jeopardy.
- b. India's initiation of air strikes on the strategic Pakistan-China link – the Karakoram Highway.
- c. Further escalation of "cross-border terrorism" and militancy in the Indian-controlled Kashmir.¹⁰⁶

"The likelihood of a high-intensity conventional war due to inadvertence or miscalculation would be high in the event India undertook or expanded symbolic military strikes to territories beyond Pakistan-controlled Kashmir," writes Gaurav Kampani, a Senior Research Associate of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.¹⁰⁷ According to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, Washington:

Neither side wants this to come to a nuclear war, but they have spent so much time discounting the chances of it happening that there is little preparation for the scenario where a mistake is made that triggers the other side, or moves in a conventional battle are misread.¹⁰⁸

In such an eventuality, it would be quite difficult to retrieve the situation, or to rectify mishaps.¹⁰⁹

Even a limited use of nuclear weapons against some symbolic targets – both counter-force (military targets) and counter-value (major cities) would entail a massive radioactive fallout, international reprobation, negative implications on non-proliferation efforts, and on peace and security. In the case of use of nuclear weapons on the

¹⁰⁴ Peter Grier, 'A Big Test of Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Arsenals Defuse S. Asia Tensions – So Far,' *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 4, 2002.

¹⁰⁵ Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman, and Frank von Hippel, op. cit.

¹⁰⁶ Scott Baldauf and Howard LaFranchi, op. cit. Also see, Nadeem Iqbal, 'Economic Threat May Push Pakistan to Nukes – Report,' *The Yahoo News*, February 4, 2002.

¹⁰⁷ Gaurav Kampani, op. cit., p. 19.

¹⁰⁸ Scott Baldauf and Howard LaFranchi, op. cit.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

subcontinent, it could kill up to twelve million people and injure around seven million. The humanitarian catastrophe would be so overwhelming that even the entire medical facilities of the Southwest and Middle East, would not be able to cope with the situation.¹¹⁰ According to Arthur Upton, University of Medicine and Dentistry, New Jersey, there would be a high death rate within a five-mile radius of the blast; and in the long-term, there would be an increase in cancer related deaths within 100 miles downwind of the detonation. Besides, the extent of collateral effect would be determined by whether the blast occurs on the ground or in the air. In case of a blast in the air, writes John D. Boice Jr., Vanderbilt University Medical School, “there was no fallout”. But in case the bomb explodes on the ground, radioactive isotopes like strontium and iodine could even reach the stratosphere, and obviously travel long distances.¹¹¹

As far as the negative impact on international security is concerned, there are over fifty states in the Asia/Pacific region that are already working on nuclear and missile programmes. The West, including the US, has a great concern regarding hazardous technologies falling into the hands of terrorist organisations.¹¹² However, the threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors through the so-called state-sponsors, are apparently low. The state-actors – like Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea, who had pursued nuclear programmes at a very high political and economic cost and had invested years of research and development, would not allow their nuclear arsenals to fall in to the hands of non-state actors, knowing fully well that they will be held responsible for such actions.¹¹³ Moreover, non-state actors would require access to massive finances and nuclear-related technologies, weapon components, delivery systems and detonators, skilled personnel willing to work for the terrorist organisations; and processing technologies and measuring equipment, which would be difficult for the non-state actors to manage. Although the acquisition or efforts to acquire these components, particularly related to nuclear weapon designs, by the terrorist organisations, is an indication of threat potential.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Thom Shanker, op. cit. Also see estimates by the *New Scientist*, in, ‘If There’s Nuke War, India Would Suffer More,’ *Sify News*, May 25, 2002, <<http://headlines.sify.com/902news5.htm1>>

¹¹¹ Paul Richter and Thomas H. Maugh II, op. cit.

¹¹² Michael Richardson, op. cit.

¹¹³ Thomas J. Badey, ‘Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-Based Threat Assessment,’ *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2001, p. 44.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-48.

Therefore, all the state-actors should calibrate an effective collective strategy to neutralise this threat potential.¹¹⁵

Analytical Conclusion

The survey of Pakistan and India's military standoff indicates that India's political leadership had shown little responsibility and restraint while initiating a dangerous brinkmanship.¹¹⁶ The Indian officials claim to emulate the US and Soviet Union's mutual restraint paradigm but, during the crisis, it had overlooked the inherent perils and dynamics of a limited war's escalation into a full-scale conflict.¹¹⁷ Since 1947, India and Pakistan's miscalculations and inadequate diplomatic communication had its share in the three full-scale wars, and a number of other crises. The internal and mutual constraints, which had prevented US and Soviet Union from using their nuclear arsenals during the Cold War, are, unfortunately, absent on the subcontinent.¹¹⁸ In such a volatile geopolitical environment, mutual mistrust, and non-communication - absence of a dialogue process, the "fog of war" is expected to further aggravate the situation and bilateral misperceptions.

Thus, it is imperative that both countries take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger in order to diminish, if not completely eliminate, the risk of an accidental use of nuclear weapons in crisis.¹¹⁹ It is more crucial that both sides refrain from treating nuclear bombs as "simply another weapon" system.¹²⁰ Besides, India and Pakistan have a tendency of reacting in a pre-programmed and counter-reaction fashion in an escalatory situation, which makes the crisis

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 43, especially Table 1. According to Stephen Younger, director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, extensive searches in Afghanistan showed Al-Qaeda was interested in nuclear technologies, as well as biological and chemical weapons. See, 'Al-Qaida Weapon Access Worries US,' *The Guardian Unlimited*, July 18, 2002.

¹¹⁶ 'No Excuses for Petulance,' *The International Herald Tribune*, June 5, 2002.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. On the idea of a limited war, a retired general of the Indian Army, V. R. Raghavan, has termed it a folly. "Once war breaks out", writes Raghavan, "The military dynamic of obtaining a favourable outcome takes control. The spiral of politico-military escalation that begins to unfold has a momentum of its own, which even experienced statesmen find difficult to control," cited in Barry Bearak, 'Indian Leader's Threat of War Rattles Pakistan and the US,' *The New York Times*, May 23, 2002.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ 'Urgent Call Made to End the Nuclear Danger,' *Disarmament Diplomacy*, July/August 2002.

¹²⁰ 'Nuclear Bombs no Longer a Deterrent,' June 18, 2002, <www.nci.org>

even more risky.¹²¹ In a crisis, Pakistan being a weaker state vis-à-vis India, should not be expected to exclude all means of deterrence, which would tend to rationalise it with reference to the UN Charter that prohibits the use of force – that India had employed the threat of use of force against Islamabad after the 13th December's incident.¹²² Besides, India's Nuclear Doctrine also did not exclude the possibility of use of nuclear weapons against the NWS, which of course included Pakistan. Neither is, its public opinion averse to the use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan.¹²³ Therefore, both the Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities might be classified as “deterrence stable” but not necessarily as “crisis stable,”¹²⁴ due to the inherent weaknesses in their C⁴I² systems, unpredictable behaviour of their rational actors – as demonstrated in the wake of India's perilous brinkmanship – and divergent misperceptions vis-à-vis each other. Hence, narrowly perceived strategies, especially in the event of “crisis instability,” as per the theory of deterrence, each side would tend to strike first, with a view to confining its damage to the minimum. ■

¹²¹ Bradley Graham and Thomas E. Ricks, op. cit.

¹²² According to Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan has to rely on the “means it possessed to deter Indian aggression” and would not “neutralize” that deterrence by any doctrine of “no-first-use.” See Pakistan's Ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram's statement in the UN on May 29, 2002, ‘We'll Use Nukes Even in Conventional War: Pak,’
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/article/show.asp?art_id=11441382>

¹²³ See David Cartright and Amitabh Matto (eds.), *India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 130. However, over 250 parliamentarians and organizations of India and Pakistan, in January 2002, had urged both countries to end hostilities. They demanded that, “Eliminating the risk of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan is a goal which must take precedence over all other possible political and security goals as it concerns the continued physical survival of both nations;” Beena Sarwar, ‘Over 250 Parliamentarians and Organisations Urge End to Hostilities,’ *The News*, January 15, 2002.

¹²⁴ Kanti Bajpai, ‘Thinking The Unthinkable,’ *Security, Technology and Arms Control News* 2, No. 3, February 1996, p. 2.

Kashmir: Indian Strategic Initiative Since 9/11 and Imperatives for US Policy in the Region

Dr. Moeed Pirzada*

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York laid the foundation for emerging new world order, to which both Pakistan and India reacted in haste. As Pakistan joined the US led coalition against its former ally Taliban regime in Afghanistan, to safeguard its national interests in a radically altered international scenario. A series of apparently inexplicable happenings, both in the Indian controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir and Delhi soon brought South Asia to the brink of a nuclear confrontation.

Kashmir emerged in the centre of this conflict where the separatist militancy suddenly became so explosive that it barged its way into the eye of international media at a time when the media's undivided attention was focused on the war in Afghanistan. Before 9/11, relations between India and Pakistan were far from being warm and cordial but they were not actively hostile either. Since the stalemate at Agra Summit, a relatively placid atmosphere prevailed between the two nuclear neighbours. However, within a few days of the highly symbolic terrorist attacks on Indian Parliament, India had recalled its ambassador from Islamabad, banned its airspace to Pakistani air line, severed all land communications with Pakistan and with its troop mobilization, more than a million men faced each other, eye ball to eye ball, along the disputed borders in Kashmir.¹

As international media discussed scenarios of a possible nuclear melt down in the sub-continent, Indian experts and media commentators predicted – and were in turn quoted by Pakistani

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¹ Sundeep Dikshit, "Strike forces moved closer to the border," *The Hindu*, December 21, 2001. The movement involved troops from central India, along with tanks and bridging equipment as well as other armoured units towards the International Border with Pakistan along Rajasthan and Gujarat. The increase in military traffic to the western border was apparently, according to Indians, in response to Pakistan's deployment of its strike forces - Army Reserves (South) and Army Reserves (North); Pakistan saw it differently. It is, however, important to realize the speed with which forward deployment started to build up.

commentators – that in the event of an Indian attack and thus war between India and Pakistan, US forces based in Pakistan will have to take out Pakistan’s nuclear capability to save the world from a nuclear Armageddon.² International emissaries from US, UK and EU paid a series of high profile visits to Islamabad and Delhi and pressure mounted on Pakistan to make concessions to India.

However, despite Pakistani concessions and promises to restrain the Kashmiri separatists and their Pakistan based supporters, India’s coercive diplomacy continued. Finally elections were held in the Indian controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir on a time schedule, surprisingly parallel to the elections in Pakistan. These elections were widely welcomed by the international community and media and robust international belief was palpable – even before the start of actual exercise – that these will be held free and fair and will help bring out a solution to the disputed state. In certain instances western countries made appeals to Pakistan that she should not interfere to fail the elections giving – in indirect way – credence to the Indian allegations that things do not return to normalcy inside J&K because of the Pakistani influence and interference.

Though reductions in troop deployments took place on both the sides after the elections in Kashmir, but the overall tension between two countries is far from over.

This paper examines the challenges faced by Indian strategic thinking after 9/11, vis-à-vis Pakistan; options available to it and responses offered. A detailed analysis of the sequence of events that appeared at propitious moments to help advance the cause of Indian strategy will be conducted to raise the question: “If there is something more to the nature of terrorism within India and Indian controlled Kashmir that meets the eye?” The response of international community notably US and UK will be also be examined.

Focus will develop on Kashmir, because the apparent aim of the Indian strategy was to win legitimacy for itself in the disputed Himalayan state where it is pitched against Kashmiri separatists for the last 13 years. However, paper will examine Kashmir in the

² This scenario was first raised by Dr. K. Subrahmanyam, a leading Indian strategic thinker (and principal author of the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine) in an oral presentation at the University of California at Berkeley on October 8, 2001. Dr. Subrahmanyam argued that in a future coup, Pakistani’s nuclear assets can fall in the hands of religious fanatics and made it abundantly clear that New Delhi would expect the US to take out Pakistan’s bomb in that case. Since then, it has been used much more loosely in Indian and Pakistani press and discussed on US media.

broader contours of Indian diplomacy which, despite its apparent focus on the disputed Himalayan state, was actually threatened by the prospects of increased good will of international community towards Pakistan. It was seen by New Delhi as disrupting the emerging Indo-US road map; Kashmir being only a part of this strategy – albeit a very important one.

The paper will finally examine the convergence of external and internal imperatives that now drive US strategic alliance with New Delhi. Is there a way Washington can prevent it from becoming a “zero sum game” in South Asia? As US policy attempts to win tacit support for the Indian position that Kashmir is only its internal problem, does it realize the new challenges it creates for the Pakistani state – especially in the wake of Muthidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) gaining prominence in 2002 elections?³ Is there a way US can build a close strategic alliance with India without jeopardizing its long-term interests in this region?

Indo-US Road Map After Kargil

Though the US “tilt” towards India, driven both by the changed geo-strategic perceptions and corporate interests, was becoming obvious throughout the 1990s but it was brought out sharply by the Kargil conflict in the summer of 1999.⁴ From that point onwards, from India’s point of view a clear road map emerged for the future of US-India relations, independent of Pakistan and devoid of any shadows of Kashmir or talk of “Kashmiri self determination.”

By that time, India had more or less managed to overcome negative fallout, resulting from the human rights violations of its “brutal counter insurgency” in Kashmir. With the withdrawal of JKLF from armed resistance against India and the emergence of certain celebrated terrorist acts like the abductions of five western

³ Muthidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a combined electoral alliance of religious parties that swept Pakistan’s north-western and western provinces in the 2002 elections on a campaign of anti-Americanism predicated on aggrieved Pushtun sentiments due to American bombings on Afghanistan.

⁴ See, for instance, detailed discussion of the US perceptions, interests and attitudes towards both India and Pakistan by Bruce Riedel in his paper “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House” submitted in Policy Paper Series 2002 at The Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania. Riedel was special Assistant to the President and senior Director for Near East and South Asia Affairs in the National Security Council at the White House from 1997 to 2001.

<<http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm>>.

tourists by an obscure group Al-Faran in 1995, India had found it increasingly convenient to paint the insurgency in Kashmir as mainly a foreign sponsored terrorism.

The orchestrated domestic and international media campaign on Kargil bolstered by fiercely nationalistic Indian diaspora in major US and European cities and the chain of events inside Pakistan that ultimately resulted into the removal of the government of Nawaz Sharif by Pakistani military. These events led to severe shrinking of political space available to Pakistan in international arena. In this context it will be helpful to appreciate that Nawaz was widely perceived to be supported by the Clinton Administration in his power tussle with a nationalistic military that won't compromise on his "vision for peace" by coming to some sort of accommodation on Kashmir.

Whether Nawaz had any viable vision on Kashmir and whether India was serious in any dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir are besides the scope of this paper. What is important here is to appreciate that Nawaz was seen to be having the good will of Clinton administration against his own military.⁵ And this apparent cleft provided immense happiness to Indian strategists who, for the first time saw a serious disagreement emerging between the civil military establishment in Islamabad and the administration in Washington. The suspension of Pakistan's Commonwealth membership, its difficult economic conditions and overall adverse image helped Indian strategist to believe that short lived parity which Pakistan claimed at the eve of a nuclear South Asia in May 1999, has finally been managed – encapsulated within the new perception: nuclear but failed state and thus more dangerous for regional and international order. South Block visionaries that had spent greater part of their energies throughout 1990's in getting Pakistan declared a "rogue state," sponsoring terrorism naturally felt comfortable that now

⁵ Ibid. A careful reading of Bruce Riedel's account in the above cited policy paper will clearly illustrate the point. This was also a common perception in Pakistani press and quoted in other places, for instance, see Tariq Ali, *Clash of Fundamentalisms*. In chapter 16th of this book, "Plain Tales from Pakistan" he writes, "Yes, it was another coup, but with a difference. This was the first time the army had seized power without the approval of Washington. In October 1999, Nawaz Sharif, with US support, attempted to remove General Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Army. They chose to do so while he was in Sri Lanka on an official trip. The plan backfired." Tariq Ali, *Clash of Fundamentalisms* (London: Verso, 2000), p. 200. These comments are important as Tariq Ali, a die hard Marxist, has been a fierce critic of Pakistani military and in his controversial book, *Can Pakistan Survive?*, he severely criticized Pakistan military.

finally a multi-dimensional strategic relationship with US can emerge without the troubling shadow of Pakistan, clinging to it.

Indian Strategic Response After 9/11

Indian strategic thinkers were quick to assess the impact of terrorist attacks in New York and – with the Pakistani jump into a willing and needy American lap – its possible effects on the region. Increased political space for Pakistan would mean reduced one for India for two reasons: One, Pakistan will find new diplomatic and media support for the cause in Kashmir and Secondly, US will be under pressure to balance its strategic tilt towards India out of deference for its new relationship with Pakistan. There are indications that before 9/11 Indians were expecting US President Mr. Bush to visit India in the first quarter of 2002. And now Indians could clearly see that with operation in Afghanistan and Pakistan's support against Taliban, any such visit of the US president will be delayed for at least a year and if and when it will materialize, it will probably be a usual joint visit to both India and Pakistan – something which Indian strategy saw as a serious setback to the gains made during the last years of Clinton presidency.⁶

A day by day follow up of Indian press in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 brings out that tremendous anxiety through which Indian decision making elite, both within and outside the government, suffered at this critical moment. Cabinet Committee on security met on September 13, to lay out the bare bones of a response strategy and this meeting, among others, was attended by the Foreign Secretary, Ms. Chokila Iyer, and the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis. The consensus that emerged was that it is must for India to develop an active identification with US administration's counter-terrorism drive.⁷ By that time, Prime Minister Vajpayee had already written a letter to the US President Mr. George Bush, saying India is "ready to cooperate in the investigations into this crime and to strengthen our partnership in leading international efforts to ensure that terrorism never succeeds again."⁸

But what will be the contours of that cooperation? There is overwhelming evidence that in the first week following 9/11, Indian political and bureaucratic elite were prepared to go a long way to be

⁶ Chidand Rajghatta, "Jaswant to hard sell India in US," *The Hindu*, October 1, 2001.

⁷ Atul Aneja, "Government discusses fall out of the US attacks on the region," *The Hindu*, September 14, 2001.

⁸ *The Hindu*, September 13, 2001.

part of US led coalition. Given the geographic and thus logistic needs of then potential US operations in Afghanistan, it is somewhat surprising that Indian elite expected to become, in one way or the other, a part of the military operations.⁹ On September 15, in a two hour meeting, chaired by the Prime Minister, the opposition, barring the exception of CPI(M), was united on offering base facilities to the US. However, the leaders were informed that there was no formal request from the US for the use of Indian bases to carry out military strikes in the region.¹⁰

By that time, even the liberal press had openly come out with the argument that India's 'strategic card' is to bank on America's military might to try and silence the guns of Pakistan-sponsored militancy in Kashmir.¹¹ It was thus extremely disconcerting to the Indian elite and middle classes when, around this time, they learnt that they were probably not getting an important role in the US led coalition because Pakistan had asked Americans to keep India and Israel out of this effort. In all probability, it was true, however, US officials took exceptional pains to soothe the Indian sensitivities on this issue.¹²

It was around this time that President Bush called Mr. Vajpayee to assure of the importance US administration attached to India's role in the war against terrorism. However, on September 18, the Indian legislators gave a tough time to PM and External Affairs Minister on the question of Americans pandering to Pakistani sensitivities. And it was second time in less than a week that cabinet was utterly disappointed to learn that the Indian government has not received any formal request of assistance from US. Later, in the evening, the Prime Minister also told reporters that, "no specific

⁹ Atul Aneja, "US may turn to India if Pakistan refuses air bases," *The Hindu*, September 16, 2001. This detailed news report makes an interesting reading in the sense that Indian elite at that time seems to be making lot of emotional investment into the issue of bases to US.

¹⁰ *The Hindu*, September 16, 2001. "Proceed with caution," report by Special Correspondent. In this meeting the CPI (M) said, in a written statement, that it strongly opposed the Government's move to offer logistical facilities and participate in the proposed US military action. "We have reiterated this position clearly again in the meeting." This was the only note of dissent from the whole political spectrum.

¹¹ See for instance editorial of *The Hindu*, September 16, 2001, "Seeking an active role," in which the most liberal of the Indian papers argued that India has to be clear and specific about its objectives in siding with the US led coalition.

¹² *The Hindu*, September 19, 2001, "Reports of Pak. Conditions false," by special correspondent. US Ambassador to India, James Blackwell had to personally convey these assurances to Union Minister Mr. L. K. Advani.

requests” for assistance had been made by the US but dismissed as “hypothetical” another question – whether India was prepared to give “all assistance” as and when the American requests came in.¹³

Indian anxiety was by then clearly palpable across the borders by the Pakistanis. On September 19, Gen. Musharraf, in his famous “lay off” speech said, “They have offered all military facilities to America. They want America on their side. The objective is to get Pakistan declared as a terrorist state and harm our strategic interests and the Kashmir cause.” Though, he did not mention who they were but it was obvious, he was referring to India. In India, on the other hand apprehension was mounting as summed up in *The Hindu’s* editorial of September 18, that “contours of a possible coalition are still far from clear.” And again on September 20, *The Hindu* pointed out that “regardless of tacit American assurance that present tie-up between the US and Pakistan need not destabilize peace and politics elsewhere on the international stage, the plan of forming the nucleus of a globalised alliance against terrorism does not yet seem to have crystallized.”¹⁴

However, the best summing up of India’s apprehensions and interests in the changed scenario was offered to Americans by a prominent academic, Kanti Bajpai, of the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. His views appeared in an op-ed, published in *The Hindu* of September 22 and are of such far reaching significance that they deserve a detailed treatment. Kanti argued that “storm clouds are gathering over India-US relations” because Indian middle classes are worried that US, out of its present needs, has struck a kind of deal with Pakistan, reminiscent of 1950s and 1980s and Indian concerns and anxieties are to Americans dispensable and that, “US has sold India down the Indus.”

Kanti argued that US need to get Pakistan in its “coalition of ‘moderate Islamic influentials’ is understandable” and it may be that benefit of having India in that coalition at this stage are unclear but Washington needs to take a long term view. In the long term, it is the large democratic and developing India that is to US advantage and India due to its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir “has a stake in

¹³ Harish Khare, “Fears over US-Pak. Deal allayed,” *The Hindu*, September 19, 2001. It is also helpful to read *The Hindu’s* editorial of September 19, “An evolving anti-terror agenda.” This discussion, like many others, help to understand the deep-seated anxiety that had started to grip the Indian mind on the issue of being left out from the US led campaign.

¹⁴ *The Hindu*, September 18, 2001. Editorial, “An evolving anti-terror agenda,” and also see editorial of September 20, 2001, “Towards an Anti-terror Alliance.”

the outcome of US policies in the region. India, therefore, matters in a coalition dedicated to managing terrorism problem.”

He then suggested the remedies; it is important to mention a few of them because they have since then seen the light of the day, though perhaps not without a jolt from the Indian administration. (This will come later). First, US should publicly emphasize that it will not make a deal with Pakistan inimical to India's interests. In a rather interesting fashion he pointed out that US ignored India in the first few days and Pakistan successfully created the impression that it has a special relationship with US and a new deal is in the offing. In the same vein, he suggested that US should be seen doing something in cooperation with India. It may not be something big or dramatic but it should be visible enough to the Indian middle classes to reassure them.

Second, “Washington must, at least privately, tell New Delhi that it will go beyond the immediate terrorism problem focused on Afghanistan.” Kanti did not agree with the thesis that US efforts in Afghanistan will automatically help India in controlling and bringing normalcy to Kashmir. He, then identified the fronts where US should move to allay India's concerns.

First of all, it should apply pressures on Pakistan to wind down fundamentalist influences. This means at the very least, redefining the role of *Madrassa* education in Pakistan. In addition, it means rooting out fundamentalist elements in the armed forces. Finally, and most importantly, in the short to medium term, it implies shutting down the militant groups operating in Kashmir. The *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, the *Jaish-e-Mohammed*, and the *Hizbul Mujahideen* are the three most important outfits. Washington should get Islamabad to act hard and fast against these groups and at least disarm them.

The second front that the US should move on, quietly but firmly, is to bring Kashmiri groups round to participating in Kashmir's electoral process. Some Kashmiri factions and sections are interested in contesting the polls. But the APHC has not come out publicly in support of the idea. Washington should use its influence with these groups. Pakistan will oppose Kashmiris voting and participating in the elections. Here is where the US can again be helpful beyond just Afghanistan. Mr. Bush said that it would be a long hard campaign against terrorist violence and that it would require the use of punitive as well as positive incentives, that any strategy would have to combine economic, diplomatic, and political instruments in addition to the military. This would be a vital test case of subtle, strong, and extended engagement with the issue of terrorism.

Kanti also warned that over the long run these groups may sequester in Pakistan or Kashmir and:

If these groups intensify their operations in India or do something spectacular like September 11 against Indian targets, there will be fantastic pressure on New Delhi to retaliate massively. This could lead to a confrontation with Pakistan, the likes of which we have not seen, with nuclear weapons not far away.¹⁵

In hindsight, we now know that ultimately US was forced to take a stock of Indian apprehensions and it ended up asking Pakistan to oblige India on all these demands so neatly illustrated by Kanti on September 22, 2001. This also includes a US position favourable to India on the electoral process in Kashmir. So, can a cynic analyst argue that if US had been persuaded quickly enough then the world would have been spared of the spectre of a possible nuclear melt down in South Asia? Perhaps yes, but then in the third week of September, Americans, though acutely aware of India's importance to their larger world view, did not appreciate the level of Indian desperation and kept on reassuring Indians at various levels, but could not satisfy them. Can one ask the question, "Something dramatic had to happen for Americans to sit up and take notice of Indian concerns?"

On September 25, Indian National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr. Brajesh Mishra, was in Washington, meeting senior Bush administration officials and lawmakers who again assured that India is part of the coalition against terror at many levels and in different ways. However he found US administration obsessed with "get Osama" project and took pains to point out that in spite of all the immediate concerns and objectives, the long-term implications should not be ignored or brushed aside. In particular, Mr. Mishra is said to have drawn attention to the networking of the Al Qaeda as it pertains to the ongoing terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁶

Recording the impressions of his visit and reception, Washington correspondent for Indian paper, *The Hindu* observed, "To say that India is totally out of the loop in the fight against terrorism is exaggerating things. But at least in the short term, the focus here is quite limited as far as the Bush administration is

¹⁵ Kanti Bajpai, "India-US ties after September 11," *The Hindu*, September 22, 2001.

¹⁶ Sridhar Krishnaswami, "Mishra makes his point on terrorism in J & K," *The Hindu*, October 26, 2001.

concerned. Senior officials have made no bones of the fact that the prime attention right now is on Osama bin Laden, his network and training camps.” He also noted, “ Mr. Mishra is here also at a time when there has been a tremendous amount of support and political sympathy for the President of Pakistan, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for his decision to fully align with the US in targeting the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. The political support to Islamabad aside, Washington, along with international financial institutions are putting together a hefty “goodies bag” as well.”¹⁷

The last week of September 2001 is very important to this analysis, as things seem to be moving to a point of convergence, perhaps to their logical end. The American Ambassador to India Mr. James Blackwell, in his first press conference in India and first major public gathering since 9/11 sought to dispel the perception that since the terrorist attacks against America two weeks ago, Pakistan had once again become the main focus of US policy in the subcontinent.

Mr. Blackwell said the relationship between India and the US had been “transformed in many practical ways” since September 11. This would have happened in any case but the attacks against the US had “accelerated” the process. He told press that India and the US were now engaged in cooperation “unthinkable even a month ago.” The envoy pointed to the “intensity, frequency and transparency” of exchanges between the two Governments at the diplomatic, intelligence and military levels. However, on the Indian offer of support to the US military operations against Afghanistan, Mr. Blackwell said that Washington had not made any request so far. When the US made up its mind on the military strategy to be adopted, it could come up with specific requests.¹⁸

A different mood emerged in a parliamentary meeting on September 27 in New Delhi. In a sharp distinction to the earlier sentiments expressed by both the government and opposition benches, government now set at rest speculation on the nature of India’s involvement in the proposed US action in Afghanistan. Addressing the meeting, the Prime Minister, Mr. Vajpayee, made it clear that India had not given any assurance either “directly or indirectly” on the use of its airbases. India’s role was limited to intelligence sharing with the US. “We have given no direct or indirect assurance on making available airbases,” Mr. Vajpayee told the meeting. And while pledging support to the Government, the

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Raja C. Mohan, “Unprecedented Cooperation,” *The Hindu*, September 27, 2001.

opposition sounded a note of caution against deviating from the long-standing policy of non-alignment.¹⁹ This change of mood was remarkably different from the one that prevailed in the same house only 12 days ago on September 15, when, with the only exception of CPI (M), virtually all political opinion supported extending air bases to US for its operations in Afghanistan.

In an equally significant change of tone, the Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Mr. Pramod Mahajan, in a press conference immediately after the two hour long parliamentary meeting, said the Government had made it clear that it was not under any illusion and was not depending on anyone in its fight against terrorism.²⁰ In an apparently unrelated development but nevertheless of significance in hindsight, the newspapers one day earlier, on September 27, carried stories citing unnamed “top security official” that clarified that contrary to earlier reports, militants are not leaving Kashmir but are actually regrouping and are planning major strikes to register their presence on the ground.²¹

Militants Attack Srinagar’s Legislative Assembly

Kanti Bajpai in his above mentioned op-ed had predicted the possibility that militants when flushed out of Afghanistan may sequester in Indian or Pakistani Kashmir and their terrorist activities may force India to react with force against Pakistan. It may be a little ironical that militants struck exactly one week after his prophetic comments. On October 1, an unprecedented militant attack on the Kashmir Assembly left 38 dead and many injured. The Chief Minister, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, and his Ministerial colleagues had, however, left the venue sometime earlier.²² India immediately pointed out the finger on *Jaish-e-Mohammad*, a militant outfit based in Pakistan. An anonymous caller first called to take responsibility of the attack but subsequently the organization formally denied any link or responsibility.

The identity of this anonymous caller was not the only intriguing thing about this militant attack. It also happened at a very crucial juncture in the US led war against Taliban. Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh was in the process of arriving in a

¹⁹ “No promises to U.S: PM,” *The Hindu*, September 28, 2001.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Shujaat Bukhari, “Militants not quitting the Valley,” *The Hindu*, October 27, 2001.

²² Shujaat Bukhari, “Suicide bomber targets J & K Assembly,” *The Hindu*, October 2, 2001.

Washington, busy in the final stages of mounting an attack on Afghanistan and thus relatively disinterested in an Indian “wish list on Kashmir.” Washington correspondent of an Indian paper observed that his “arrival barely caused a ripple.”²³ A week earlier National Security Adviser could not get undivided attention from the administration. But now, with terrorist bombing of Kashmir assembly, situation had dramatically changed. US administration had to sit up, open its eyes and listen to an injured India; a democratic partner that may not have been of any immediate military or logistic support for war effort but could certainly wreck the game by opening up any kind of front on the western borders of Pakistan in Kashmir.

Citing the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, wrote to the US President, Mr. George Bush, bringing to his attention the need to urgently restrain Pakistan from backing international terrorists in Kashmir. “Incidents of this kind raise questions for our security which, as a democratically elected leader of India, I have to address in our supreme national interest.” Pointing to the urgency of holding back Islamabad, he said, “Pakistan must understand that there is a limit to the patience of the people of India.” In the letter, sent hours after the car bomb attack, Mr. Vajpayee said, “I write this with anguish at the most recent terrorist attack in our State of Jammu and Kashmir... A Pakistan-based terrorist organisation, *Jaish-e-Mohammad*, has claimed responsibility for the dastardly act and named the Pakistani national, based in Pakistan, as one of the suicide bombers involved.”²⁴

Though many in the State Department, confronted by the faceless monster of international terrorism, might have wondered on the nature of terrorists, who not only intervened at a most propitious moment to bolster the Indian cause, but also called to leave their exact names and details but this was not the time for such reflections. Within sub-continent, India was furiously demanding, in a war like language, that Pakistan ban *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and *Jaish-e-Muhammad* the two organizations it alleged were freely operating from Pakistan and Pakistan controlled Kashmir.²⁵ And in Washington, an aggrieved and earnest Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, was breathing on their necks.

²³ Rajghatta, Chidand, “Jaswant to hard sell India in US,” *The Hindu*, October 1, 2001.

²⁴ Atul Aneja, “It is time to restrain Pak. PM tells Bush,” *The Hindu*, October 3, 2001

²⁵ “Rein in Lashkar, Jaish too, India tells Pak.,” *The Hindu*, October 2, 2001.

The US President, Mr. George Bush, then personally assured India that the US campaign against terrorism is global and not one-dimensional as seen through the prism of Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda terror network. Mr. Bush conveyed this to the visiting External Affairs and Defence Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, when Mr. Bush not only dropped in at a White House meeting between Mr. Singh and the US National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, but spent 45 minutes of a 75-minute discussion with him. Washington correspondent of Indian paper, *The Hindu*, reported that, “Mr. Bush had good reasons for spending his time at the meeting in spite of his hectic schedule...New Delhi has been quite wary of the growing Washington-Islamabad nexus, especially as it pertains to fighting terrorism.”²⁶

Next day, as Mr. Jaswant Singh stood by the Secretary of State, Mr. Colin Powell declared, “The events that took place in Kashmir yesterday, that terrible terrorist act, that heinous act, that killed innocent civilians and also struck a government facility... It is the kind of terrorism that we are united against.” In a message, Gen. Powell reiterated, “And as the President made it clear... we are going after terrorism in a comprehensive way, not just in the present instance of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, but terrorism as it affects nations around the world, to include the kind of terrorism that affects India.” But Gen. Powell would not comment on any specific allegations that Pakistan was behind the terrorists in Afghanistan or Kashmir.²⁷ It was certainly music to Indian ears but still inability of the administration to condemn Pakistan for the acts was disappointing. Powell’s caution was also shared by Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. It is important to mention here that this was probably the first time that administration openly used the word “Al-Qaeda” in the context of Kashmir. India wanted to hear “Pakistan” instead of “Al-Qaeda,” however, later Indian government and media, often talked of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan as one and the same thing.

This discussion, at this crucial juncture, will remain incomplete if we do not make some brief comments on the “false alarm of hijacking” that took place between the nights of October 3 and October 4. A Boeing 737 of Alliance Airlines, a subsidiary of the Indian Airlines, that took off from Mumbai at night bound for Delhi, was soon declared hijacked by the Civil Aviation authorities.

²⁶ Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Campaign Global: Bush,” *The Hindu*, October 3, 2001.

²⁷ Sridhar Krishnaswami, “J & K too on agenda: Powell,” *The Hindu*, October 4, 2001.

International media treated the news with scepticism raising the question that why India was not more careful in the prevailing circumstances. Pakistan promptly closed its airspace and alleged citing its own intelligence sources of October 2 that this is a plan to implicate Islamabad to intensify the international pressure being created since the Kashmir Assembly bomb attacks.²⁸

The plane had landed at Delhi, and crisis management team met under Union Minister L.K. Advani. Plane was surrounded by NSG commandos and media was watching the story for a live coverage. However, by 4am the civil aviation authorities finally declared that hijacking was a “false alarm” and was caused due to confusion inside the cockpit. Unfortunately the sudden happy resolution left many questions unanswered. To begin with, there was a call to the offices of Alliance Airlines informing of the hijack. And at the height of the crisis, the Civil Aviation Secretary, Mr. A.H. Jung informed the press that there are two hijackers on board who do not speak good English. A visibly embarrassed Vajpayee government ordered a high powered inquiry to investigate the origin of this false alarm but only six days later the 24 year old young man who had received the anonymous call, and was, therefore, a crucial witness to this investigation, was found dead of a heart attack.²⁹

In the following week, British PM Tony Blair visited sub-continent and Mr. Vajpayee, now unfettered to blame Pakistan in front of international cameras, kept on rubbing in his mantra about Pakistani terrorism. In an obvious reference to Pakistan, Mr. Vajpayee said, “we discussed the sinister agenda behind the Srinagar bomb blast. Even while extending our whole-hearted support to the pursuit of the guilty terrorists of September 11, we should not let

²⁸ Bhaduri Nilanjan Jha, “The Hijack that never was” *Times of India*, October 4, 2001. For step by step details see “A blow by blow Account” in *Times of India* of October 4 and details regarding the Pakistani assertions see “Hijack Drama aimed at Discrediting us: Pak.,” *Times of India*, October 4, 2001. A good account is also available in “Alliance Air Plane Hijacked,” by Harish Khare in *The Hindu* of October 4, 2001.

²⁹ Ambreen Ali Shah, “Sudden death of a witness in Hijack Drama,” *The Telegraph* (Calcutta), October 10, 2001. The witness, Shahnawaz Wani, was the supervisor on duty in the Alliance Airlines office in Delhi, who received the anonymous call informing that the plane was hijacked and he had then set into motion the security operation by informing his superiors. With his death, this lead was finished right at its origin.

countries pursue their own terrorist agenda under cover of this action.”³⁰

It is time for us to take stock of the situation. This was second week of October 2001 and by now US Secretary of State, Colin Powell’s visit to the troubled region, i.e. subcontinent, was already announced and US and British bombings to aid Northern Alliance had already begun. Pakistan was too deeply embroiled into this situation and was providing assistance of all sorts to the US led coalition. The main goal of US and British diplomacy – after realizing the extent of Indian desperation – was to placate Indians in such a way that prevents them from creating trouble for their war effort.

Indians, it can be argued, fashioned and waged a successful strategy that helped them to barge their way into a situation by creating nuisance for the US led war effort. Indians knew their importance in the overall US worldview and knew they were taking calculated risks. Though US would not have ignored them in the long term anyway but they were apprehensive, as so clearly illustrated by Kanti Bajpai of JNU, on two major counts: One, Pakistan might develop a sustainable relationship that can put pressure upon them for some sort of dialogue on Kashmir. Second, in relative terms, the new US-Pak relationship may interfere with their already achieved but as yet nascent position in the emerging world order – that to a great extent depends upon Indo-US road map at least at this stage.

In hindsight, we can see that by the end of first week of October, they had successfully completed the first part of their strategy. They caused nuisance and were rewarded for it. And this exercise further helped them to understand and fine tune the pressure they could bring upon Pakistan by threatening to upset the interests of US. By the second week, Pakistan’s President Gen. Musharraf, prodded on by the US and Britain, was talking to Vajpayee assuring him of conducting an inquiry into the whole matter. When Musharraf expressed his desire that the stalled process of dialogue between India and Pakistan should be reinitiated, Vajpayee reminded him that if Pakistani focus would remain on Kashmir then no progress would be made. A patient Musharraf, aware of the fast changing kaleidoscope, politely listened.³¹

In Washington on October 11, Gen. Powell, when asked by CBS-TV whether the US was concerned that India might try to take

³⁰ “Check Countries sponsoring Terrorism; says Vajpayee,” *The Hindu*, October 7, 2001.

³¹ Harish Khare, “Musharraf rings up Vajpayee,” *The Hindu*, October 9, 2001.

advantage of the situation and ignite a conflict while the world is distracted, answered, "I don't think that will be the case. In fact, we have been in touch with both governments and they both realize the volatile nature of this situation and I think both of them understand this is not the time for provocative action, which would cause the situation in the region to become unstable." He further said, "both countries had been very forthcoming in terms of the support in the US-led campaign against terrorism. Pakistan is on the front lines of it, really, because of their proximity to Afghanistan, and President Musharraf has done quite a number of very important things. The Indians have also been very forthcoming with the support that they have given."³² Perhaps what he meant was that Indians are helping by not opening another front in the west of Pakistan, in Kashmir.

In his subsequent visit to Pakistan and India, Powell was treading a careful path. He assured Pakistanis that US takes a long term view on the region and will thus maintain its engagement with Pakistan beyond Afghanistan. In his press conference in Islamabad, he described Kashmir as central to Indo-Pakistan relations and encouraged dialogue between the two countries. "We believe a dialogue on Kashmir is important. We believe maintenance of the Line of Control and the exercise of restraint is also very very important and avoidance of provocative acts which could lead to a conflict of any kind," he said.³³ However, during his follow up trip to India, Ministry of External Affairs promptly rejected that Kashmir is central to the conflict between India and Pakistan and further clarified that India wishes to address Indo-Pak relations only in a "composite manner."³⁴

Militant Attack on Indian Parliament

Though the coercive diplomacy that India set into motion after the "mysterious attacks" on the Indian Parliament on December 13, remained the focus of intense press commentaries but it would only be fair to argue that Indian strategy had developed its basic skeleton, and won a tacit US approval for itself. By the middle of October and the six-month long duel that started two months later was only to accentuate and consolidate its dominant position. Pakistan no doubt, along with US, was at the receiving end of this campaign, but it could also be seen as a clear Indian declaration of "regional assertion" to the world at large. Strategists in south block

³² "India won't ignite the conflict," *The Hindu*, October 12, 2001.

³³ "Resume Dialogue," *The Hindu*, October 16, 2001.

³⁴ "India raises Powell's remarks on Kashmir," *The Hindu*, October 17, 2001.

understand too well the importance of war fought on media to the emerging global consciousness.

The timing of the attack on Indian Parliament is worth examining. The Srinagar bomb blasts took place on October 1, at the very beginning of the US led campaign in Afghanistan. By that time Northern Alliance struggle was well on its way and direct US air attacks were imminent. As we have seen the terrorist attacks in Srinagar brought India, which had hitherto felt ignored, into the centre of the things. From the second week of October onwards, when US and Britain understood Indian dilemma and made public and private efforts to assuage the Indian fears, nothing of any significance, whatsoever, happened in India or Indian controlled Kashmir till the very conclusion of the war in Afghanistan. This was the time when an operation of somewhat unpredictable duration was undertaken in Afghanistan to which Pakistan provided a crucial launching pad. We can safely surmise that US would not have looked kindly on any distraction at this juncture – especially one with doubtful credibility.

Kabul had fallen on November 13,³⁵ however, the struggle continued till Taliban surrendered Kandhar on December 8.³⁶ Hamid Karzai, the head of interim government, arrived in Kabul on October 10, and the struggle against remnants of Taliban was limited to Tora Bora caves. The US administration and media could now conceivably be persuaded to look on issues elsewhere. It was precisely at this time, and not before, that the unknown terrorists decided to attack Indian Parliament buildings in New Delhi on December 13. In terms of timing, terrorists provided a most propitious moment for the Indian government to draw world attention to their concerns regarding Kashmir. Could it be argued that things inside India have faithfully followed a decent and responsible timetable? After all everyone from London to Brussels to Washington was telling New Delhi, from September onwards, that its concerns about Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Kashmir are genuine and will be addressed at an appropriate time. What could have been more appropriate time than the end of war in Afghanistan?

India quickly claimed that “dead attackers” of the Indian Parliament were of Pakistani origin; it arrested their accomplices, and found out Pakistani markings on weapons employed. However, it refused showing the faces of the dead men to the press, twice refused

³⁵ “Northern Alliance Forces enter Kabul,” *The Hindu*, November 14, 2001.

³⁶ “Taliban Surrender Kandhar,” *The Hindu*, December 8, 2001.

Pakistani requests for a joint inquiry and turned down FBI offers for investigations into the crime. Pakistanis condemned the attacks, offered their help and cried “conspiracy” but their arguments, however, reasoned they might have been, were of little consequence. By December 20, Indian strike forces were on move towards the borders.

India recalled its ambassador from Pakistan and terminated its land and road links. It was the first time since 1971 that India took the step of recalling its envoy back from Pakistan. Under tremendous pressure from US and Britain, and less pronounced sources from EU, Pakistan moved in steps and stages to arrest leaders of militant outfits operating in Kashmir and banned their organizations. US took the lead by branding *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and *Jaish-e-Muhammad* as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” and Pakistan followed the suit. Gen. Musharraf in a much awaited televised address to the nation on January 12, announced his decision to ban these militant organizations and invited Vajpayee for talks.

Elections in Indian Controlled Kashmir

Pakistani government’s decision to ban these militant organizations was less of a physical consequence as they were not reliant on government support and hardly maintained bank accounts in their names. Also there is reasonable evidence to suggest that by end 1990s, militancy, barring the sudden inexplicable dramatic events that were helpful to Indian public relations strategy, had ceased to be of any serious consequence to Indian hold in Kashmir. However, Pakistani decisions under US pressure and India’s coercive diplomacy were helpful to India as they sent powerful signals to change the overall context of the Kashmir struggle. It graduated ingloriously from a people’s struggle into a foreign sponsored terrorism against a legitimate government. Kashmiris, pitched against a regional hegemon of the size and power of India, relied upon Pakistani support of sorts to balance the odds. Even the nationalists like Sheikh Abdullah and his followers, that have sought to find, at various stages, an autonomous expression in alliance with the Indian Union have relied upon ‘Pakistani threat’ to further their agenda of extracting political concessions from Delhi.

Pakistani presence on their borders and its vocal support, then ensures a dream pipe of sorts for Kashmiris of all political opinion; it inspires disenfranchised poor masses with the romantic possibility of freedom, however distinct it may be; it offers moderate political forces, who realize the staying power of Indian Union, better chances

of clinching a dialogue with Delhi and ironically it has helped a generation of non-entities like Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad and Farooq Abdullah to sustain a political profile by blackmailing a Delhi – afraid of Kashmiri masses’ romantic attachment with Pakistan.

The spectre of a Pakistan locked in a nut cracker, and being pushed to a corner under India’s coercive diplomacy, perceived as being aided and abetted by a conniving Washington, sent the message to Kashmiris which India so desperately wanted to send; a besieged Pakistan can’t come to their aid. Indian strategy has to talk of ‘Pakistan sponsored terrorism’ as it is a marketable commodity to western audience but in reality it needed to clip that Kashmiri ‘pipe line of hope’ that ‘Pakistan stands at the border.’ Indian strategists correctly concluded that with this ‘hope pipe line’ gone, Kashmiri political elements, across-the-board would clearly see the reality fate has prepared for them.

With the hindsight of the events that have unfolded, it can safely be argued that it was certainly a great victory for the Indian strategy as it set the stage for an election exercise that was given US and EU blessing from the beginning. International media also extended its good will, and APHC was under pressure to remain at least ambivalent, if it could not extend its support. Whether India is prepared or even capable of producing a political formula that can satisfy the aspirations of Kashmiri people, with or without the framework of Indian Union, is a different discussion, beyond the scope of this paper. However, one thing is getting clear that with this success of Indian strategy on the horns of a carefully crafted coercive diplomacy, Indian need, desire and even ability to enter into a meaningful dialogue with either Pakistan or Kashmiris has further declined.

Emerging Imperatives for US Policy

In order to better understand what attitudes US policy makers now take towards Kashmir, we need to appreciate the dynamics that govern Indo-US road map and how they are essentially different from those with Pakistan. US imperative to build a closer relationship with India stems from three closely related but yet distinct factors. One, after the end of Cold War, and with the appreciation of China as a strategic competitor rather than partner, it increasingly sees India as a counterweight to China. Second, with the liberalization of Indian economy, U.S corporations see Indian corporate world as a partner and India as a large potential market. Third, Americans of Indian

origin are now emerging as a potent force that has started to influence domestic US politics in myriad ways.

These imperatives in themselves are not new. India always enjoyed serious consideration in US strategic view of the region and the world. Even in the Cold War days when India either strongly criticized US policies as leader of the non-aligned movement or later as a pro-Soviet state, US remained conscious of India's importance and thus careful in handling India. And even otherwise, India had powerful voices inside US academic world and liberal circles that could instil some balance in its favour. Kissinger comments in his latest book: "Indian leaders....calculated correctly that, based on its democratic institutions and elevated rhetoric, it had enough friends in liberal and intellectual circles within United States to keep American irritation within tolerable bounds."³⁷

However with the end of Cold War and India's need to grow out of the Russian camp, and its opening of economy to foreign companies, the various imperatives driving US policy have finally converged to provide a sort of road map for Indo-US relations. On the contrary, US relations with Pakistan, from the very beginning, developed within a limited bandwidth of government to government interaction. Pakistan never had any friends in academic or liberal circles that shape public opinion and policy within America. US administrations, one after the other, have looked upon Pakistan as a convenient policy tool; may be trusted and loyal but essentially disposable. Though this certainly cannot explain the ups and downs of Pak-US relations in entirety but can help to understand the unstable dynamics that govern it.

Another related factor, but of distinct importance on its own, needs to be understood. Though US after the Gulf War gradually emerged as a kind of de-facto global government and certain scholars have argued that with its control of multilateral institutions and media, it is in fact a new kind of Empire,³⁸ the exercise of power and influence within the American society is if any thing very different from past empires. Much of public debate and policy formation, critical to foreign relations, at the level of Senate and Congress takes

³⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon & Schuster), p. 156.

³⁸ The best assertion of this view comes from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's book, *Empire*, in which they argue that today's empire draws on elements of US constitutionalism, with its tradition of hybrid identities and expanding frontiers.

place in a context that is highly influenced by a topical consciousness inspired by media.³⁹

Pakistan suffers from natural disadvantages in this kind of exercise. It had few friends – if any at all – within the popular media that shapes American consciousness and in turn policy making. Most of its support historically has originated from the old “realist” school of thought or from government agencies like Pentagon or CIA or those former US diplomats that have served in the region and have, therefore, a first hand intimate understanding of issues that confront US policy and affect US long term interests. Such a small pocket of support would have mattered something in an old style British or Soviet empire, where matters of national interests, even at the periphery, were influenced by a coterie of informed opinion. But in a rapidly fluctuating sea of topical public opinion, influenced by powerful lobbies and in turn bearing upon policy decisions, this limited pocket of support amounts to little more than ‘nothing.’

In the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, two factors then easily altered inherently unstable Pak-US relations. One, in wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and emergence of East Europe from under the iron curtain, there was a sudden loss of interest of US policy makers and thus administration into this region in the north of India. Second, the struggle in Afghanistan also influenced the polity within Pakistan, and a society and administration emerged, that was more closely identified with causes in the Middle East. This shift towards the right of religious spectrum in itself would have mattered little if US, in yet another short sighted policy reversal, had not imposed sanctions on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. These sanctions failed to achieve their stated objectives, however, they reduced good will for US in both Pakistani public and government.⁴⁰

³⁹ Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University’s John. F. Kennedy School of Govt., pointed out in a far reaching article in *Foreign Affairs* that, “two thirds of the Republicans elected to Congress in 1994 reportedly did not possess passports and argued that due to decline of interest in foreign affairs the power of special interest groups who take strong focused positions has increased. For a detailed discussion see: Stephen Walt, “Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2000 (Vol. 79, No.2), pp. 65-66.

⁴⁰ The White House Press Briefing on April 11, 1995, immediately after Bhutto-Clinton meeting gives a fairly good idea that State Dept. did realize the negative fallout of Pressler Amendment and its implications for US interests in this region but remained stalled due to the complexity of legislative process. A question arises: The complexity of US procedures may be of relevance to academicians but does it help the people of Pakistan who see repeated US betrayals? Transcript of this briefing is available at

< <http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1995/950412-387114.htm>>

The net effect was a reduced influence for US in this region as a whole and a streak of 'Anti Americanism' never seen before.

It is essentially within this context that US policy towards Pakistan and Kashmir needs to be understood. Indo-US roadmap towards a strategic relationship of wider significance is not necessarily a threat to Pakistan, if both sides take a mature attitude. For Pakistan, it is important to appreciate the combination of imperatives driving US policy and for Americans it is important to prevent it becoming a "zero sum game." During the phase of Indian coercive diplomacy, US policy makers have repeatedly tried to assure Indians that a Pak-US and Indo-US relation should not be looked upon as a "zero sum game." That was when a belligerent India was threatening to disrupt US interests. The test of US maturity now lies in how it will interact with a Pakistan in which religious parties in the shape of MMA have swept western and north-western belts of Pakistan on a mix of aggrieved Pushtun sentiments and Anti-Americanism. And as a consequence, Kashmir also remains a defining issue for large sections of Pakistani populace.

Given the strong imperatives inherent in Indo-US roadmap and the increasing influence of Indian lobby inside US, it is widely feared that US will pressurize Pakistan to accept LOC in Kashmir as a solution; in other words subscribing to the Indian position that Kashmir is an internal issue. The underlying assumption of US policy, as exhibited so far, is that one-sided pressure can be endlessly applied to Pakistani state to nudge it in a desired direction with some economic incentives on the way. This is a dangerous assumption because if this policy continued, it will radicalise Pakistani politics, strengthen the anti-American feelings and threaten the stability of Pakistani state and society by sharpening the wedge between the governing elite and the governed. Formation of non-state actors will then jeopardize US interests in a vital region where it has – despite a deep sense of betrayal – to this day enjoyed tremendous institutional good will.

What possible solution can emerge in Kashmir acceptable to both India and Pakistan is beyond the scope of this paper but to develop a road map towards it, and to prevent regional stress waves, US needs to persuade both states for a dialogue. And it needs to develop a comprehensive relationship with Pakistani state and society at various levels. This relationship needs to grow out of the much-repeated aphorism of Pakistan being "our frontline partner against terrorism" to a platform where Pakistan is perceived as a moderate Muslim country with strong institutional and public links with US.

The best guarantee for that to happen is if Pakistan can develop cultural and business exchanges with US and can make it attractive for US investments. Though US administration cannot certainly persuade corporate America to take an interest in Pakistan, but it can help Pakistan improve its business climate to make itself more attractive. A number of steps are badly needed.

One, US should help improve Pakistan's judicial and court system by helping to develop a comprehensive blue print and providing funds and technical support. Though, Pak-US cooperation to improve law and order situation is emphasized in a narrow sense but it needs to be understood that no lasting solution to this problem can emerge if court procedure and performance is not improved. An assertive and self respecting judiciary that can uphold the spirit of law in a transparent fashion can provide the basis for a mature and realistic relationship for Pak-US relations. The US administration's decision not to bully Pakistan for the extradition of Omar Saeed Sheikh⁴¹ was a mature decision⁴² and in the same vein it may be said that the whisking away of Mir Aimal Kasi in 1998, without the transparent 'due process of law' was damaging to the judicial institution within Pakistan.⁴³

An independent and strong judicial system will contribute in two distinct yet interrelated ways. It will help improve the law and order situation and it can instil business confidence by strengthening

⁴¹ Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh was awarded death penalty by a Pakistani court on July 15, 2002 in the trial related to the abduction and murder of the *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl. *Dawn*, July 16, 2002.

⁴² For details see, "Agreement on Omar's trial in Pakistan," *Dawn*, May 12, 2002. After Pakistan's Interior Minister, Moinuddin Haider visited US in May, it was announced by States Dept. that Pakistani judicial system should go first. It was still not clear if US will like to try him later or will the trial in Pakistan will be considered sufficient.

⁴³ Mir Aimal Kasi, a Pakistani citizen was convicted by a Virginia court of the murder of two CIA employees outside Agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia on January 25, 1993. On June 15, 1997, Kasi was arrested in a remote tribal area inside Pakistan and was flown out of Pakistan without any due process of extradition. It was claimed that his extradition took place under the 1931 treaty concluded between the British Empire and US. However, later his lawyers, provided by the Virginia State, pointed out that his extradition was illegal, as the 1931 treaty did not apply to his case as it stipulated that extradition has to take place in accordance with the law of the land from which prosecution seeks to extradite the defendant. However, in reply, the Supreme Courts of Virginia and US maintained that Kasi was not extradited but was instead 'kidnapped' by the FBI and as such there was no violation of the treaty. Kasi was later executed by lethal injection on November 14, 2002. For details, see "Aimal Kasi to be executed on 14th," *Dawn*, November 6, 2002.

the exercise of contract law and increasing the predictability of business transactions. The row over the Independent Power Producers (IPP's) in late nineties severely damaged the investment climate and confidence needs to be restored if Pakistan has to attract US corporate interest.

Second, with the revival of democracy in Pakistan, US should now move forward to develop a multi-level relationship with Pakistani parliament. The best strategy for Pakistani parliament to acquire greater authority vis-à-vis military and civil bureaucracy will be by consolidating parliamentary procedure and US can provide valuable help to strengthen the committee proceedings. Third, the limited academic exchanges between US and Pakistani think tanks, universities and media need to be expanded. And this should include the programs for US scholars to visit and stay within Pakistani institutions.⁴⁴ This can help create a better understanding of respective positions. It needs to be understood that anti-Americanism in Pakistan did not start from bottom upwards but has travelled down from the elite in government and media that felt betrayed by the American attitudes and sudden reversals of policy e.g. Pressler Amendment.

Finally re-establishing the long abandoned training exchanges between US and Pakistani militaries and joint exercises will go a long way in assuring Pakistanis that far from being sacrificed in a “zero sum game” they are part of US strategic vision for this region. Best hope for a Kashmir solution – satisfactory to both India and Pakistan – now also lies embedded in this kind of arrangement. ■

⁴⁴ This is important because Pakistanis travelling and living in US are common and Pakistani scholars tend to understand US position much better than their American counterparts. Programmes similar to that, usually offered in India, which makes it possible for US scholars to live with universities and think tanks, should be created.

India's Look-East Policy: New Challenges for Pakistan

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal*

India's long cherished dream of acquiring the status of "Big Power" has figured in the South East Asian (SEA) region as an important determinant of her post Cold War foreign policy. On April 9, 2002, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, at the Annual Singapore Lecture 2002, stated, "This region is one of the focal points of India's foreign policy, strategic concerns and economic interests."¹

With a long-term perspective, India wants to reap the benefits of the economic potential of SEA and establish herself as a dominant power in this region. In the 1990s, India signed bilateral and multilateral agreements in the sectors of trade, investment, tourism, defence, science and technology, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the SEA states. Consequently, in December 1995, India became a full dialogue partner of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in July 1996, she succeeded in securing her membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).² The entry into ARF put India at par with the Western nations and China vis-à-vis SEA regional security, and economic and political arrangements.

The expansion of the Indian Navy, establishment of Indian Far Eastern Command (Andaman-Nicobar Islands), and its warming relations with the SEA states proves that she desires to balance China and act as a local leviathan with the collaboration of the United States (US) in SEA. Significantly, nothing has elevated India's strategic profile in SEA more than the new relationship she has built with the US. At the heart of the new security convergence between the US and India is the prospective co-operation in maintaining a stable balance

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¹ "PM's Address at the Annual Singapore Lecture 2002," *Press Information Bureau, Government of India*, April 9, 2002, <<http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreng/lyr2002/rapr2002/09042002/r0904200211.html>>

² The ARF comprises Australia, China, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, the US, the ten ASEAN countries and India.

of power in the Indian Ocean/Pacific regions; to be precise, for countering emerging Chinese power.

The Indo-US strategic partnership would make it easier for India to establish security links with the American allies in Asia and the Pacific, i.e., Australia, South Korea and Japan. These relations would increase India's diplomatic leverage in international politics and provide her an opportunity to accomplish her goals with the support of the international community. At the same time, these developments would present serious diplomatic and economic challenges to Pakistan, in particular, and other South Asian states, in general. For understanding the consequences of India's Look-East policy, one needs to carefully study the seriousness of the Indian leadership in pursuing this policy and response of the SEA states to India's eastward initiatives. Therefore, before examining the challenge posed by India's Look-East policy to Pakistan, a brief review of India's activities in SEA states will be undertaken.

Determinants of India's Look-East Policy

The durability and sustainability of India's Look-East policy depend on the SEA's political, economic and strategic potential in the changing international environment. What are the political, economic and strategic temptations, at present and in the foreseeable future for India in the SEA? The following factors are responsible for India's Look-East policy.

Political Objectives

The demise of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had discarded India's foreign policy framework of non-alignment that matured during the Cold War. But in the post Cold War scenario, the Indian ruling elite has enthusiastically started projecting its desire for a big power status. This desire of India is evident from her demand for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the nuclear and long-range missile tests in the 1990s, and its posture at the international forums.

Issues such as India's failure to establish her political hegemony in South Asia; decline in the role of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in the international politics; fragmentation of the former Soviet Union; emergence of the US as the sole superpower; mustering support for her permanent seat at the UNSC and reforms in the Indian economic policies, by and large guided India's policy makers to search more like-minded friends in the international community, particularly in SEA states. Consequently, India adopted Look-East policy in its foreign policy.

While pursuing her international agenda, India has been receiving support from SEA states. Some of them had supported her move for a permanent seat at the UNSC. For example, in January 2001 during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Hanoi, Vietnamese President Tran De Luong, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and the all-powerful Communist Party president, Le Khai Phieu backed India's stand on Kashmir as well as its effort for a seat at the UNSC.³

Economic Objectives

The Uruguay Round of agreements, multilateral trade negotiations and rising regionalism are the three major developments in the global trading environment in the past decade. These are interrelated in a substantive sense.⁴ These trends in the global economy have motivated states to take greater interest in forming regional groupings that facilitate larger market access. Since July 1991, India has been introducing new reforms in its economic sector. According to P. C. Jogdand, "The much cherished principles of growth with justice, social responsibility and accountability, equity and self-reliance have been rendered obsolete by the new slogans of liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation, efficiency and competitiveness."⁵ Economic reforms initiated by Narasimha Rao-Manmohan Singh had abandoned the Nehruvian model of self-reliant development and accepted the economic globalisation.

At the end of the Cold War, India was not a member of any major trade bloc other than the SAARC. The SAARC has yet to make a significant impact on the regional economic scene or on global trade. The purposelessness of the NAM⁶ in the post Cold War environment and unsatisfactory progress of SAARC motivated India to promote closer bilateral economic ties with the states (especially SEA), other than South Asians.

³ D. Vijayamohan, "My heart beats for the east!," *The Week* (India: January 28, 2001).

⁴ Atul Sarma, Pradeep Kumar Mehta, "ASEAN in the Global Trading Environment," in M. L. Sondhi, K. G. Tyagi, (ed.) *India in the New Asia-Pacific* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2001), p. 204.

⁵ P. G. Jogdand, "Economic Reforms: The Emerging Social and Cultural Trends in India," in M. L. Sondhi, K. G. Tyagi, (eds.), op. cit., p. 220.

⁶ Historically, the NAM (1961) and G-77 (1964) aimed at promoting common interests of developing states through collective action. At a wider level, the economic co-operation among developing states was accepted as one of the instruments of implementing new international economic order during the Sixth UN Special Session in 1974. India has been an active party of these movements.

Among the developing states during the last decade, some of the SEA states have an impressive record in the economic field and India has been promoting stronger economic ties with the SEA states. This would enable her in the longer run to benefit from the dynamism of the larger economic bloc. This might also help India in securing membership to the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), for which it has already submitted an application.⁷

Strategic Objectives

The increase in sea trade, coupled with the increasing dependence of regional countries on it for their economic growth, has naturally focused attention on the security of the sea-lanes which service this trade. Indian naval developments in the Indian Ocean not only affect the Indian Ocean states, but also tend to impact on the Pacific-rim, as some of the Pacific Ocean states have coastlines and interests in the Indian Ocean. For example, Japan and some other Pacific-rim countries are dependent on Indian Ocean trade routes for their oil supplies.

India's strategic concerns in the Indian Ocean are well known. She desires to influence the trade activities in the Indian Ocean by policing the seashores along the Malacca Straits. The linkages with SEA states would be utilised by India to strengthen its military role in the Indian Ocean and increase her influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Indo-US Convergence of Interests

President George W. Bush and his closest advisers (most of whom happen to be remnants of the Cold War days) are on the move to assert their military superiority in the world. Asia is a key area of concentration for President Bush's national security team. According to the *Quadrennial Defence Review* issued in September 2001 by the Pentagon, Asia has replaced Europe as the prime focus of the US defence community. The report states that it is now a critical region that contains a volatile mix of rising and declining powers.⁸ China and North Korea figure prominently in a report on ballistic missile threats to the US issued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in early January 2002.⁹ Bush administration officials, as a group, tend to

⁷ Atul Sarma, Pradeep Kumar Mehta, "ASEAN in the Global Trading Environment," op. cit., pp. 213, 214.

⁸ Andrew Scobell, "Crouching Korea, Hidden China Bush Administration Policy toward Pyongyang and Beijing," *Asian Survey* Vol. XLII, No. 2 (March/April 2002), p. 345.

⁹ Ibid.

advocate strengthening relations with friends and allies of the US in East Asia, and a lesser emphasis on cultivating ties with China.¹⁰

The basic elements of the Americans East Asian strategy are deterring attack on allies and friends; maintaining East Asian bases for global power projection; and preventing spirals of tension among regional actors whose relations are plagued by both historical legacies of mistrust and contemporary sovereignty disputes.¹¹ According to Thomas J. Christen's assessment, "...with certain new equipment and certain strategies, China can pose major problems for American security interests, and especially for Taiwan, without the slightest pretence of catching up with the US by an overall measure of national military power or technology." He added, "I firmly agree with those who are sceptical about China's prospects in significantly closing the gap with the US."¹² Andrew Scobell argued, "It is the enduring fundamental ideological differences they (President Bush's official team) see between Washington and Beijing and growing capabilities of the Chinese military that raise daunting questions in their minds about the future."¹³ Some US observers and many Chinese insist that the real justification for missile defence efforts, both National Missile Defence and Theater Missile Defence, is not Pyongyang but China.

The differences between the US and China on international and regional strategic issues, such as Iraq, Kosovo, the US-Japan strategic alliance, the US and Taiwan military co-operation, US-India military relations and missile defence systems, prove that China would be an equal competitor. When the two countries differ in so many strategic issues, it is imperative for the Americans to adopt a containment policy against China. China's warming relations with the Russian Federation, Central Asian States and Pakistan leaves the US to cultivate its strategic partnership with India, besides its East Asian and Far Eastern allies to contain China, regionally. Simultaneously, India also views China as an enemy. In May 1998, the main reason cited by the Indian Government for carrying out nuclear explosions was a threat to its security from nuclear China. India has realised that it can no longer play "Soviet Card" in the post Cold War environment. With this background, India had endorsed the US missile defence policy. On May 11, 2001, the then Indian

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 345, 346.

¹¹ Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), p. 7.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Andrew Scobell, op. cit., p. 356.

Defence and External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, said after an extended hour-long meeting with the visiting US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, "We are endeavouring to work-out together a totally new security regime which is for the entire globe."¹⁴ The US policy to contain China improved India's role, not only in the US foreign policy but also in East Asia.

India's Eastward Moves

India had formulated her Look-East policy as a definitive innovation about a decade ago, and the logic then was that New Delhi should engage the economically vibrant polities of the ASEAN. The first phase of the Look East policy saw India establishing institutional linkages with the regional organizations. Although New Delhi could not become a member of the larger APEC forum but it joined the ASEAN as a full dialogue partner and a member of its political and security wing, the ARF.¹⁵ In addition, in the first half of the 1990s, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore took initiatives to establish security relationships with India on a reciprocal basis. Defence officials from these countries undertook visits to New Delhi for discussions on security matters.¹⁶

ASEAN

The potential of ASEAN as a collective market and a gateway to the rest of SEA and the Pacific is an important factor in India's Look-East policy. India became a sectoral partner of ASEAN in late 1991 in the core sectors of trade, investment and tourism. She was upgraded as a full dialogue partner from status of a sectoral partner, in the fifth ASEAN summit in Bangkok in December 1995. Since 1991, Indo-ASEAN trade and investment ties have grown rapidly. The investments from ASEAN countries steadily rose to nearly 15 per cent of the total approved investments in India in 1995. In 1997, two-way trade was valued at over \$ 7 billion. According to India investment centre statistics, Indian joint ventures in ASEAN in 1996 were 118 (Indonesia 18, Malaysia 39, Singapore 37, and Thailand 24), with 9 more under implementation.¹⁷

¹⁴ "India discusses new world security regime with US," *The Hindustan Times*, May 11, 2001.

¹⁵ C. Raja Mohan, "Looking East: Phase Two," *The Hindu*, April 11, 2002.

¹⁶ Fazal-ur-Rehman, "India's Evolving Security Relations in South East and East Asia," *Strategic Studies*, Vol. xxi, No. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 17.

¹⁷ C. S. Kuppuswamy, "India's Policy – looking eastward," *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper No. 176., December 27, 2000, < <http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper176.htm>>

On April 9, 2002 PM Vajpayee said, “Reflective of India's interest in intensifying its engagement with ASEAN, we are in the process of jointly developing an India-ASEAN Vision 2020, as a roadmap to our mutually desired objectives.”¹⁸ In a press briefing prior to PM Vajpayee's visit to Singapore and Cambodia, the external affairs spokesperson said, “our intention was to enhance our level of dialogue, our economic interaction and political interaction with each of the ASEAN country and to have a credible and respectable portfolio of activities that were going on.”¹⁹

The first ASEAN-India summit took place in Cambodia on November 5, 2002. In which ASEAN and India committed themselves to jointly contribute to the promotion of peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, and respond positively to the challenges of the dynamic regional and international environment.²⁰

ASEAN+3

In the Manila informal summit of ASEAN in November 99, it was agreed that leaders of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea would meet regularly (every year) and this group was named as ASEAN+3. The Chinese thwarted India's entry into ASEAN+3 in November 2000.

Bangladesh - India - Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC)

On June 6, 1997, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand came together to form an economic association called BIMST-EC linking the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal. BIMST-EC represents the reinforcement of India's relations with two of its South Asian neighbours (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), and of its link with ASEAN (Myanmar and Thailand). This economic grouping aims at promoting rapid economic co-operation between members in key areas like trade, investment, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, transportation and human resources development.²¹

¹⁸ “PM's Address at the Annual Singapor Lecture 2002,” op. cit.

¹⁹ C. S. Kuppaswamy “India's Policy: Looking Eastward – Update No. 2,” *South Asia Analysis Group*, April 29, 2002.

²⁰ Joint statement of the first ASEAN-India Summit (Cambodia, November 5, 2002), <<http://www.dfa-deplu.go.id/world/multilateral/asean/asean-india.htm>>

²¹ Ibid.

Mekong Ganga Cooperation Project

The foreign ministers of the six nations involved in the project at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) at Bangkok in July 2000 announced Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) Project. The six nations involved were India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Except for India, the rest were member nations of ASEAN. The purpose of the MGC is to define regions in the new global economy, while keeping their native identity and character intact. The six countries also undertook to develop transportation networks including the East-West Corridor project and the trans-Asian highway.²² The MGC ministerial level meetings would be held every year in July along with the ASEAN ministerial meetings and post ministerial conferences. After BIMST-EC, this was India's next major co-operative venture in the SEA region.

India's Co-operative Measure with SEA States and Vietnam

Vietnamese Vice President Nygen Thi Binh visited India on March 17, 2002. India and Vietnam have been co-operating in the following areas:

- a. Peaceful use of nuclear energy; India to train 30 Vietnamese scientists.
- b. India will give Rs. 100 million to set up a software and training centre.
- c. Equipment for nuclear science laboratory in South Vietnam.
- d. The Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) to invest Rs. 238 million for oil and gas exploration in Vietnam.
- e. Tatas to supply 300 truck chassis.
- f. India to supply ten locomotives.
- g. Ranbaxy to start new project.

Indonesia

President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia arrived in India on April 1, 2002, on the last leg of a four-nation tour. The main focus of the tour was to strengthen the economic ties between the two nations and, towards this end, she was accompanied by a high-powered 73-member business delegation. India and Indonesia have been co-operating in the following areas:

²² Chandan Irom, "Whatever Happened to India's Look East Policy? The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation,"

<<http://www.manipuronline.com/Features/January2002/mekongganga19.htm>>

- a. Co-operation in defence training; India to provide technical assistance and equipment.
- b. Joint commission to co-ordinate defence activities.
- c. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in science and technology, and agriculture.
- d. A sugar mill in Indonesia.
- e. Offshore oil rigs in India.
- f. Co-operation in oil and gas drilling projects.

Cambodia

PM Vajpayee visited Cambodia from 9-11 April 2002. During this visit, agreements were signed as under:

- a. Co-operation in air services, visa exemptions for certain categories.
- b. Restoration of Ta Prom temple. The restoration work on Ta Prom temple (a part of the Angkor Wat complex) is expected to cost about US \$ 5 million over a period of 10 to 12 years.

Myanmar

On April 6, 2002, India's External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited Myanmar to launch a trilateral highway project linking Thailand and Myanmar with India. The highway from Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand through Bagan in Myanmar is expected to be completed in two years. This will enhance trade, investment and tourism.

There is a proposal for "Trans-Myanmar-Bangladesh Gas Pipeline" over Bangladesh, connecting Myanmar with the Indian States of Tripura and West Bengal. The pipeline is being constructed from the offshore gas field of Myanmar recently formed in the Bay of Bengal off the west coast of Myanmar near Cheduba Islands.

Singapore

PM Vajpayee visited Singapore from 7 to 9 April 2002. During the visit, the two prime ministers discussed strengthening economic ties and agreed to study the possibility of a free trade deal. It was also decided to set up a Joint Study Group to look into the possibilities of establishing an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Singapore and India. A MoU was signed for mutual co-operation between enterprises and economic entities in the telecom sector.

Apprehensions about India's Look-East Policy

While assessing the Indian Look-East policy's impact on Pakistan, it is imperative to be aware of those issues which undermine Pakistan's interest, directly or indirectly. India's warming relations with SEA states pose economic and diplomatic challenges to Pakistan. Of course, its naval build-up in the Indian Ocean is a threat, which has progressively been increasing and continues to affect Pakistan's naval security arrangements. But it would be a serious cause of concern for the SEA states as well, since their economic survival depend equally on the safety and security of the Indian Ocean trade routes and may not favour their control by a hegemonic power. Indian naval exercises with Japan, SEA states and the US in the Indian Ocean pose greater military challenge to the Chinese. Similarly, India's Far Eastern Command has implications for the East Asian states and its indirect threat to their national interest could not go unnoticed. Rationally, these developments do not threaten Pakistan's national security. However, their obvious economic and diplomatic challenges require Pakistan to gear up to face them with a well thought out political strategy. The following are a few important anticipated end results of India's Look-East policy:

- a. India's strategic concerns in the Indian Ocean are well known. The linkages with ASEAN and ARF could be utilised by India to strength its military role in the Indian Ocean thereby increasing her political influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This would negatively influence Pakistan's diplomatic and economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region.
- b. India may be able to put herself at par with the Western nations and China vis-à-vis SEA security arrangements, which would boost her regional and international stature. Consequently, India may try to establish herself as a dominant sea power and institutionalise her hegemony in the region. However, this may not be easily allowed by other major powers such as the US and China, and may be resisted by the regional states. This will impose certain limitations on the Indian game plan.
- c. Being a member of SEA forums, she would be in a position to misguide the SEA states against Pakistan. This may affect Pakistan's position and undermine her interests in the region.

- d. India, as a part of the SEA region's forums, would be in a better position to mobilise support for various political issues in South Asia from the regional states.
- e. India's increasing political influence would gain her SEA states' support for her candidature for permanent membership at the UNSC. Already, some of these states are supporting India on this issue.

Pakistan's Strategy to Face the Challenges

India's permanent antagonism against Pakistan frequently makes Pakistanis assess her moves with suspicion and certain apprehensions, and with some element of threat to national security. India's Look-East policy had been in position for quite sometime and more serious developments have already taken place, without making many stirs in the Pakistan's foreign office. India's policy to develop her economic relationship in SEA seems quite rational and with substantive political gains as well. A relative shift from west to east was inevitable in view of the direct involvement of powerful contenders in this turbulent region. India's Look-East policy does not pose any serious threat to Pakistan's security, not any more than she has already done by her expanding naval power in the Indian Ocean. Yet, the effects generated in the economic and, consequently, in the political fields, could not be favourable to Pakistan's national interests. It requires a comprehensive policy to be evolved and vigorously followed to protect and enhance Pakistan's economic interests in SEA.

Suggested Policy Guidelines for Pakistan

Pakistan's policy should be based on a politico-economic strategy aimed at protecting and promoting her own political and economic interests in SEA. These efforts should not be competitive or obstructive against India. Pakistan may not be able to join the SEA bloc, but under the international laws, she cannot be denied her rights to develop and promote strong bilateral relationships in economic and other fields. Pakistan had good bilateral relations with Indonesia and Malaysia which, over the years have declined. These ties need to be revived and strengthened, which could serve as a good spring board for further expansion. In 2002 two important South East Asian leaders, PM of Thailand and Malaysia visited Pakistan, which was a favourable development.

In South Asia, every state shares its boundaries with India and none shares a common border with any of the other. It gives highly favourable strategic position to India. This exclusive advantage has

also created frictions with India, which have multiplied under India's increasingly arrogant and domineering attitude. Her direct interference in the internal affairs of Nepal and Sri Lanka is constantly viewed with concern. Apprehension and ill-will already exist in the SAARC states against India, which has rendered SAARC ineffective. This is an area that should receive Pakistan's best attention for developing strong bilateral relations in the economic field.

Many South Asian and SEA states are facing energy-related problems. Pakistan may offer to assist them in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Significantly, these states are parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. Their nuclear facilities are under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Therefore, the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful use will not harm Pakistan's policy of non-transfer of nuclear weapons to the other state or states.

In a globalised world, no state could keep the other states out of South Asia. As each of the South Asian nations seeks co-operation with the rest of the world, Pakistan should try to play a facilitator's role in this regard, especially between China and the smaller nations of South Asia.

Taking into account the new global and regional realities, Pakistan should support – politically, morally, diplomatically and, if possible, materially – moves like the Norwegian peace initiative in Sri Lanka, in South Asia and SEA.

In the present international environment, the convergence of strategic interests of New Delhi and Washington is a reality. Pakistan's future course of action with the Americans should take into account this reality. Therefore, it is time that Pakistan should diversify her strategic dependence, gain more freedom of options, and get out of the US-West syndrome.

Pakistan should realistically re-assess her relations with the Muslim world, while giving utmost importance to her national interest. This obsession with the *Ummah* has led nowhere and has only added new difficulties, internally and externally.

India's ultimate objective to emerge as the dominant power in the region from Mekong to the Kabul River would inevitably arouse suspicion and apprehensions amongst the SEA states. India's propaganda and friendly co-operation help in minimising these anxieties but these would continue to persist. Pakistan's effort should be to enhance these fears with a well thought-out diplomatic plan.

Pakistan is a member of SAARC and ECO. Both have yet to make any significant impact on the regional economic ties. Pakistan should be vigilant and look for emerging venues and chalk out a strategy, which should facilitate her entry.

Pakistan has considerable stakes in the security and stability of the Indian Ocean. All rim-land states should have similar concerns. This is an opportunity to work in close co-operation with other regional states, at least to share their concern on Indian ambitions to establish her hegemony over the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan's strategy to frustrate Indian ambitions for permanent seat at the UNSC needs to be reviewed. Instead of trying to block Indian entry, her effort should now focus on filling the new seats with countries who are expected to be more impartial and just, such as Germany and Japan, and a seat to collectively represent the Muslim world.

Pakistan should consider increasing her cultural and academic activities in the SEA states. Indian intellectuals are contributing in to the activities of think-tanks in the SEA states. They are propagating their own national agenda. Pakistan needs to balance it by developing its research and universities linkages with the SEA states and encouraging its intelligentsia to focus on this region.

Conclusion

The political flux after military disengagement of the former Soviet Union from the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia and considerable reduction in the American military presence in the Asia Pacific in the early 1990s provided an opportunity to India to penetrate into SEA affairs. As a consequence, India has developed strong defence and economic links with the region. The Indian Look-East policy's primary objective was economic. But this pan-Asian approach also had a political colouring, which was obvious in the ARF.

Despite India's growing relations in this region; it has not yet become a major determinant of regional security. At the same time one could not ignore the factor that in 1996, India became a member of the ARF. The inclusion of India, the only South Asian power, undoubtedly has a strategic dimension. India's vast economic market potential, nuclear capabilities and conventional military capabilities are prominent in the Asia Pacific calculations. India was also identified as the only country to counter-balance China.

Pakistan's future course of action should take into account the natural economic complementariness and geo-strategic realities.

Instead of merely lobbying against India, it is pertinent that she should establish her own economic, cultural and political relations with the SEA states. Simply relying on the diplomatic course of action is not a pragmatic approach. Thus, Pakistan's South East Asian strategy should be multi-dimensional.

To be precise, Pakistan requires in-depth assessment, re-evaluation of present policy and its replacement with a more effective strategy to face the new challenges. It is emphasised that Pakistan must try to get out of this confrontational and competitive mindset against India and pursue her policy purely in its own national interest, independent of this serious limitation. ■

Indo-Russian Defence Cooperation: Implications for South Asian Region

Ahmed Ijaz Malik*

The continuation of Indo-Russian defence cooperation in the changing strategic milieu of South Asia has raised collective concerns in the region. During the Cold War, the sole foreign policy objective of the USSR was to create a conducive international environment. The purpose was not only to avoid war and maintain its sphere of influence in order to ensure a balance of power, but also to establish mutually beneficial relations between itself and the external world.¹ However, in the current situation, Russia has inducted a new concept of liberalism² into its foreign policy, with the objective of overcoming its economic problems by asserting itself diplomatically, diversifying its pattern of alliances, and forging military coalitions with traditional allies like India.

Russia sees the renewal of these military alliances as a continuation of President Putin's "rose garden" strategy³ of protecting his position and popularity by reaping credit, merited or otherwise, for improving Russia's economic condition. Russia is keen to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and has volunteered to assist the fight against international terrorism.⁴ The cash-starved Russian defence industry depends significantly on foreign buyers. These sales of military hardware are a source of ambivalence in Moscow for two reasons. First, China is the leading market for Russian conventional arms exports although many decision-makers in Moscow still consider Beijing as the primary source of potential aggression against Russian Siberia and the Far East. Second, arms sales generate only an estimated \$3 billion per year, clearly insufficient for maintaining and converting the fast-decaying remains of the Soviet military industrial complex. Russia's defence industry cannot survive on domestic

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¹ Philippe Devilliers, "The USSR in World Politics," in Philippe Devilliers (ed.), *Guerre ou Paix in Nikolai Lebedev* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p. 140.

² O. Bogomolov, "Neo-Liberalism in Russia," *International Affairs*, Vol. 45, Number 2 (1999), p. 69.

³ Thomas M. Nicholas, "Putin's First Two Years," *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 657 (October 2002), p. 308.

⁴ Daniel Triesman, "Russia Renewed?," *Foreign Affairs* (November/ December 2002), p. 58.

procurement that, over the last decade, provided for the purchase of armoured vehicles, aircraft and helicopters.⁵

Indian motives for such a military alliance are global, regional and geo-political. Globally, India would want an eminent status in the region and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC). Regionally, India aspires to be dominant in South Asia and match the military power of China. Geo-politically, India seeks to have a share in the energy resources of the Caspian region⁶ and has a strategic aspiration of United States-Indian joint patrolling in the Indian Ocean.

Russian motives, on the other hand, as conceptualised by certain analysts, include the utilization of military capability for achieving foreign policy objectives. This policy is termed as deliberate procrastination similar to 'wait and see.' Historically, this has been called the Russian patience of dialectical advance.⁷ The order of priorities of the Russian Federation's foreign policy in January 1993 was: The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), arms control and international security, economic reform, the United States, Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, West and South Asia, the Near East, Africa and Latin America. Thus, in the list of ten priorities, India and South Asia ranked seventh, "but this time Russia is aware of the fact that strategic alliance not combined with an economic trade relationship will not last long."⁸

Russia also needs to overcome the crisis of national and political identity. Russia needs strong allies to neutralise the US monopoly in a unipolar world. It is also important for Russia to maintain its image of a true Eurasian power. Russia sees the US as the sole surviving major power in the world and thus feels a need of portraying itself as a powerful country, at least in the Central and South Asian region. The Russian Defence Minister, Marshall Igor D. Sergeyev, clearly and explicitly expressed Russia's aversion to US dominance by saying that a new re-division of the world through the use of force related factors – economic, political and military was

⁵ Alexander Pikayev, "The Business of Russian Cooperation with Iran," *Proliferation Brief*, Vol. 4, No. 6 April 6, 2001.
<http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/ceip/pia04.html>

⁶ K. M. Pari Velan, "Geo-Political Importance of Central Asia to India," <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/274-ifp-parivelan.html>

⁷ Derek Leebaert, "The Stakes of Power," in Derek Leebaert & Timothy Dickinson (eds.), *Soviet Strategy and New Military Thinking* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 4.

⁸ Azhagarasu, "India-Russia Relations: Time to look Out," <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/700/707-ifp-azhagarasu.html>

being enacted. Furthermore, he blamed the US for unilaterally altering international security structures.⁹ Russia's re-alliance with India is also due to certain developments in Central Asia, the Caspian region and Afghanistan. With India having ambitions of dominance in the Caspian region and trying to gain influence in Afghanistan and Russia seeking to regain and consolidate its influence in Afghanistan, the two countries foresee their alignment as being helpful for the achievement of their common goals in the Caspian region. Recently, there has been a greater convergence in the Russian and Indian interests in the region. As India does not have direct borders with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), it has no significant influence in the threat perception of Russia and the CAR.¹⁰ India plans to overcome this lack of influence through its alliance with Russia.

The recent determinants of Russian foreign policy revealed two different schools of thought with divergent opinions regarding the policy towards India and South Asia. One opinion favoured that India should be given priority in Russian policy in South Asia, while at the same time developing good relations with other South Asian countries, including Pakistan. The other school of thought was associated with Andrei Kozyrev of the Russian Foreign Ministry and they did not favour a special relationship with India because they perceive that, by using this option, Russia would be looking at the developments in the region through Indian spectacles. The first view was prevalent among the academic community and the parliamentary circles based on the reality that Russia needed to overcome its economic problems by selling its military products to a country whose military was acquainted with the Russian military technology.¹¹

Pakistan is a country significantly affected by these developments. Moscow appreciates the fact that India and Russia share an understanding on various irritants in South Asia. On the contrary, Pakistan is interested in changing the political map of the region because of its aspiration of seeking a just and peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the UN resolutions. Pakistan also desires a friendly and favourable government in Kabul. Russia is allied to India and has strategic interests in Afghanistan; thus Russia is in one way or another,

⁹ K. M. Pari Velan, "Indo-Russian Relations: Post Pokhran-II," <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/183-ifp-parivelan.htm>

¹⁰ Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking," <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan-6.html>

¹¹ Ibid.

involved in both the issues. Considering the recent events in Kabul after the Loya Jirgah and the establishment of the government of President Karzai, it is apparent that Afghanistan is on the road to political reconstruction and India would want its influence in the new government. However, India, apart from having a small following among the Tajiks, does not have any significant following among the Afghans. Russia, on the other hand, still has influence over some Afghan political factions. The re-emerging Indo-Russian alignment does not only raise security concerns but also affects the domestic politics of the neighbouring and extra-regional countries.

Russia and Pakistan have not enjoyed very cordial relations since the visit of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to the United States (US) instead of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), even though the latter had extended an invitation before the former. That was considered a deliberate disregard for international norms.¹² The relations worsened during the Cold War, with the U2 episode¹³ and the incident where General Zia-ul-Haq was warned by Russian leadership to cut aid and support to the Afghan insurgents or face a new Soviet campaign to goad the disgruntled Baloch minority into breaking away from Pakistan.¹⁴ After the 1971 Treaty of Friendship with India, the Soviet Union acknowledged that, henceforth, its policy in Asia would no longer aim at maintaining the balance between India and Pakistan. India became Moscow's formal ally, and qualified for special attention on that basis.¹⁵ Pakistan was a rival of Russia and India during the Cold War years when it was allied to the United States. Relations between Islamabad and Moscow came under severe strain once again, notably as the Taliban and religious parties in Pakistan began sympathising with the Chechen movement for autonomy.¹⁶

The tempo of Indo-Russian cooperation accelerated after the two countries signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership in

¹² Hafeez Malik, "Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union and Russia," in Hafeez Malik (ed.), *Pakistan Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 322.

¹³ Hamid Hussain, "Tale of a Love Affair that Never Was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations," *Defence Journal*, (June 2002).
<http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/june/loveaffair.htm>

¹⁴ Donald S Zagoria, "Soviet American Rivalry in Asia," in Andrei Korbonski & Francis Fukuyama, (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades* (Lahore: Combine Printers, 1988), p. 266.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.54.

¹⁶ Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, "Russia's mediatory role in South Asia," *Dawn*, June 7, 2002.

October 2001. The strategic partnership included enhanced cooperation in the fields of defence and military-technical cooperation in a long-term perspective, and deepening service-to-service cooperation.¹⁷ India has made its most substantial foreign investment to date in Russia's Sakhalin-1 project, as well as cooperating in atomic energy, space and defence.¹⁸ India is wedded to the idea of maintaining the kind of weaponry its army is trained to use, and seeks to maintain it, overlooking the fact that some of the military hardware is now obsolete.

In the current strategic scenario, Russia could have some motivations other than its 'foreign policy intentions', which are influenced by its military capability.¹⁹ This could be the new idea of 'openness'²⁰ in the Russian foreign policy, where it is extending a network of its alliances to overcome its isolation after the Cold War. This is an entirely different approach from the Cold War era. Russia has accepted the need to alter its security perceptions in accordance with the changed international environment, which is different from the rigid alliance system of the Cold War. This is seen as a 'discovery syndrome'²¹ by certain analysts, where Russia has discovered new avenues in alignments, which were not possible at the time of the Cold War. This new policy can be a motivation for Pakistan to improve its relations with Russia. Admittedly, Pakistan's military bellicosity with India and the prospects of Russian transfer of defence technology to it could impede efforts towards the improvement of Pak-Russian relations.²² Nevertheless, considering the transformation in Russia's foreign policy, Pakistan must avail whatever opportunities come its way to cultivate its ties with one of the most important players in the region.

¹⁷ "Declaration on Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and the Russian Federation," October 3, 2000,

<http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/declaration-3oct2000.html>

¹⁸ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Vajpayee's visit to Russia will be a milestone, says Putin," *The Hindu*, August 28, 2001.

¹⁹ Derek Leebaert, "The Context of Soviet Military Thinking," in Derek Leebaert (ed.), *Soviet Military Thinking* (London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers, 1983), p. 3.

²⁰ O. Bogomolov, op. cit., p.75.

²¹ Sergei Solodovik, "Russia and South Asia," *International Affairs*, January 1993, p. 70.

²² Visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India, October 2-5, 2000,

<http://www.acronym.org.uk/51putin.htm>

Russian-Indian Agreements

President Vladimir Putin, in order to give preference to India, decided to allow India to deal directly with Russian arms manufacturers. Consequently, Rosboronexport, a government owned marketing agency was by-passed, even though it is unlawful to overlook Rosboronexport for defence-related deals. Under the defence protocol signed in June 2000, Russia delivered \$10 billion worth of arms and other military hardware and technologies to India during the 10-year period.²³ The deal concluded on February 15, 2001, includes 310 sophisticated T-90S tanks worth \$700 million.²⁴ The Indian market has provided rich pickings for Russian tank manufacturers.²⁵ In the conventional weapons include 125 mm gun, refleks anti-tank guided missiles system with range of up to 5 km, 7.62 mm machine guns, 12.7 mm air defence machine gun, infra red jammers, laser warning systems and grenade discharge system.²⁶

Aircraft

India purchased a Russian upgrade package developed by the Sukhoi Aircraft Plant in Nizhny Novgorod, the MIG Design Bureau and the former Phazotron radar manufacturer to modernize its fleet of 125 MIG-21 fighters. India has introduced Su-30MK1 (NATO reporting name 'Flanker' multi-role fighter) into service with 20 Squadron in Pune. An additional 24 aircraft will be added by December 2003.²⁷ India is planning to build 140-150 Sukhoi Su-30MK1 strike fighters, under license from Russia, which would cost \$ 3 billion. Other aircraft programmes include upgrades for India's aging Il-38 and Tu-142 maritime-patrol aircraft, an avionics upgrade for Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters and the lease of four Beriev A.50 airborne early-warning aircraft (AWACS) and four Tupolev Tu-22 long-range strike aircraft. A possible upgrade for India's MIG-29 fighters has also been suggested.²⁸ Air Chief Marshal (ACM)

²³ Lt. Gen. R. K. Jasbir Singh (ed.), "Fresh Impetus to Indo-Russian Military Cooperation," *Indian Defence Year Book 2002* (India: Natraj Publishers, 2002), p. 251.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.261-262.

²⁵ Gerard Halford and Gabor Szabo, "Indian Defence Deals Spur Russian Market," *The Russia Journal*, November 2, 2001, <<http://www.russiajournal.com/printer/weekly5367.html>>

²⁶ Lt. Gen. R. K. Jasbir Singh, op cit., p.263.

²⁷ Rahul Bedi, "India Introduces First Su-30 MK-Is into Service," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol.38. No. 16, October 16, 2002, p. 25.

²⁸ Carol R. Saivetz, *Foreign Policy*, in Anthony Jones and David E Powel (eds.), *Soviet Update 1989-92* (Oxford: West View Press), p. 131.

Krishnaswamy opines that Su-30 capability will be “significantly augmented” with the introduction of six IL-78 (Midas) tanker aircrafts that India bought from Uzbekistan and which will be delivered by January 2003.²⁹ The joint development of a “fifth-generation” fighter aircraft, S-37 Berkut (Golden Eagle), is also in the offing and will be manufactured at the Sukhoi Construction Bureau.³⁰ It would be the most ambitious and sophisticated defence project undertaken by the two countries so far. The new aircraft should be ready by 2008 and would replace the SU-30 and MIG-29 fourth-generation jets. It would rival the joint strike force fighter to be built in the US by Lockheed-Martin.³¹ India is also currently negotiating with Britain to purchase as many as 66 Hawk trainer aircraft, and it is exploring options for airborne early-warning and aerial-refuelling aircraft and anti-aircraft systems. A 13.8 percent increase in the defence budget early this year helped pave the way for India's latest weapons procurement spree.³²

During the past 40 years, India purchased \$30 billion worth of armaments from Russia. The Indian Defence Ministry is considering the possibility of purchasing the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier on condition that the Russian side will refurbish it and equip it with carrier-borne MIG-29K fighter planes.³³ In addition, India may reportedly lease up to four Tu-22M Backfire bombers from Russia. The Backfire, which first entered serial production in the early 1970s, is a long-range, low-level penetration bomber designed to carry out conventional or nuclear strikes against surface targets.³⁴ The Tu-22M can be equipped with cruise missile, with some modifications. This development can have great implications for Pakistan, as its present defence capability cannot guarantee a credible defence against cruise missiles.

²⁹ Rahul Bedi, *op. cit.*, p.25.

³⁰ Lt. Gen. R. K. Jasbir Singh, *op.cit.*, p.265.

³¹ Vladimir Radyuhin, “India, Russia to build super-fighter,” *The Hindu*, November 8, 2001.

³² Lt. Gen. R. K. Jasbir Singh, *op. cit.*, p.323.

³³ “Indian Defence Minister to Visit Russia,” *RANSAC Nuclear News*, May 22, 2001, <http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/pub/nuclearnews/05.22.01.html>

³⁴ Wade Boese, “Russian-Indian Summit Firms Up Conventional Arms Deals,” http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_11/russiaindconv.asp

Missile Systems

The Prithivi missile is based on the Russian SA-2 missile technology³⁵, and another version of this missile is being developed and improved for installation on Indian navy surface vessels. The missile called Dhanush, with a reported range of 350 km has already undergone two tests.³⁶ India has purchased a range of systems, including short-range Tunguska missiles for air defense and the mid-range TOR surface-to-air missiles. Recently, India has also negotiated the purchase of the sophisticated long-range S-300 system, which can also be used as an anti-ballistic-missile defense. Indian ships, submarines and aircraft are to be fitted with the Novator 3M-54E Klub cruise missile, a high-speed weapon that can attack ships and ground targets within a range of 300 km. Perhaps the most formidable weapon under joint development is the Brahmos PJ-10 supersonic cruise missile, developed jointly by India and Russian manufacturer NPO Mashino-stroyeniye.

India and Russia tested a jointly developed supersonic cruise missile in the eastern Indian state of Orissa. This missile known as Brahmos PJ-10 has a range of 280 kilometres and can carry a 200-kilogram conventional warhead. The three-tonne, eight-metre long missile can be launched from a variety of platforms, including ships and aircraft. When launched from a ship, the missile can fly at a height of up to 14 kilometres at twice the speed of sound. Brahmos has a sensor on its head that detects the target and can change course and has the capability to strike from a distance of 20 kilometres, if the target changes its path. It can also fly closer to earth or sea surface, but that results in a shortening of its range to 120 kilometres. It can be guided to its target mainly with the help of an on-board computer. “The propulsion system of the missile was provided by the Russians – in clear violation of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category II guidelines – while the Indians contributed in the guidance system, which is claimed by them to be indigenously developed.”³⁷ Besides the Russian navy, the Indian navy is the only one to be equipped with the Klub missiles, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and have land-attack variants.³⁸ In view of the fact that the missile has a motor engine to give high velocity, it would not

³⁵ Naeem Salik, “Missile Issues in South Asia,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002), p. 48.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.48-49.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

have a constant heat signature and could escape being targeted by an interceptor heat-seeking missile.

Ships and Submarines

Foremost among the Indian Navy's purchases is the modified aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. This carrier will cost India Rs. 9,138 crore (Rs. 91.380 billion), 14 per cent of its budget. Though India is buying the ship itself at scrap cost, it is paying around \$600 million for upgrades, as well as 20 MIG-29K naval fighters and six Kamov Ka-31 helicopters for a total of about \$1.5 billion. The MIG-29 K is likely to cost India an additional Rs. 6,000 crore (Rs. 60.00 billion).³⁹ Severnoye Machine-Building Enterprise production association (Sevmash)⁴⁰ is a major shipbuilding complex in Russia and Europe. It builds ships of all classes as well as special marine equipment. Sevmash has already delivered a frigate to India, with a second Project 11356-class ship⁴¹ launched at the Baltiisky Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Another such ship is under construction. India has also bought advanced Russian submarines, including nine 877EKM Kilo-Class submarines. The Naval warship INS Insushastra has been launched. These ships, designed by the Rubin Central Maritime Design Bureau, were built at the Admiralty Shipyard in St. Petersburg and fitted with Novator 3M-54E Klub cruise missiles.⁴²

Russia has agreed to provide 90 R anti-sub missiles to India for its Russian designed 17 Stealth warships, which would be built by India's Mazagon Dock at a cost of \$170 million each by the year 2007.⁴³ The Indian navy plans to induct 877 EKM kilo class submarines built at St. Petersburg, Russia. These are likely to cost Rs. 1,250 crore (12.50 billion). By 2008 the advanced technology vessel, a Rs. 3,750 crore (Rs. 37.50 billion) nuclear submarine jointly developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Atomic Energy Commission, will be in service.⁴⁴

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

Moscow is presently pressuring New Delhi to shun the Western arms bazaars and instead pick up Russian hardware, such as

³⁹ Lt. Gen. R. K. Jasbir Singh, op. cit., p. 326.

⁴⁰ David Pashaev, "Sevmash-Symbol of Russia's industrial power," <http://www.milparade.com/1999/35/026.htm>

⁴¹ "Indian Defence Deals Spur Russian Market," *The Russia Journal*, November 8, 2001, <http://npc.sarov.ru/english/digest/42001/section2p3.html>

⁴² "SSK kilo class (type 877EKM) attack submarines, Russia," <http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/kilo877/>

⁴³ Ibid., p. 326.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.262.

the MIG-AT advanced jet trainer and an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).⁴⁵ The AWACS project, with a Russian platform and Israeli avionics, is in a very advanced stage. These AWACS will have Israeli radar and communication systems, like the Phalcon, mounted on the Russian Ilyushin-76 heavy transport military aircraft, with PS-90A engines.⁴⁶

New Delhi intends to buy at least 30 anti-stealth 2-D 5576-3 radar systems for about \$133 million in the next two years, and produce another 50 under licence for \$167 million. India plans to use the radar systems in about 80 air defence systems based on the 250-km Prithvi surface-to-air missile by 2007. India also plans, by 2010, to use the radar systems in about a dozen systems similar to the 2,500-km Agni surface-to-air missile.⁴⁷

Russian Light-Water Reactors (LWRs)

Russian and Indian officials signed a new contract to begin engineering studies for the construction of two Russian Light Water Reactors (LWRs) in Koodankulam.⁴⁸ Russia has offered India a soft loan of \$ 2.6 billion for building this nuclear power plant in the state of Tamil Nadu. It maintains that the two 1,000-megawatt VVER-1000 reactors, which would be fuelled with low-enriched uranium, would be operated under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and would not, therefore, pose any proliferation threat.

As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Russia is obligated not to sell nuclear materials or technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state that does not have IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities (full-scope safeguards), as required by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a non-signatory of the NPT, only a few facilities in India's large nuclear infrastructure are under IAEA safeguards. Moscow insists that an agreement on nuclear assistance with New Delhi, which is reportedly worth \$2.6 billion and is part of the NSG's 1992 full-scope-safeguards condition for supply, to build the reactors. As the agreement was reached in 1988 therefore, deserved to be implemented in its entirety. Moreover, according "to Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Yevgeny Adamov, to have

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.329.

⁴⁶ Palash Kumar, "Military Allies India, Russia Fail to Sign Wide-Ranging Defence Deal," <http://www.spacedaily.com/news/india-02b.html>

⁴⁷ Lt. Gen. R. K. Jasbir Singh, op. cit., p.253.

⁴⁸ Alex Wagner, "Russia, India Sign Secret Nuclear Energy Accord," *Arms Control Association*, November 2000,

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_11/russindnuc.asp

held-off on the nuclear deal would have looked too much like imposing sanctions, which is not Russia's stand."⁴⁹ Despite foreign pressures and criticism by the US, Russia is continuing its support in nuclear technology to India.

The Cryogenic Deal, GSLV (Geo-Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle)

The Indian designers plan launching at least one satellite a year. The GSLV is a three-stage vehicle. The first stage is a 129 tonne solid propellant core motor with four liquid propellant strap-ons, each with 40 tonne propellant. The second stage is a liquid propulsion system with 37.5 tonnes of propellant. The cryogenic upper stage has 12 tonnes of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.

The US objected to the deal on the ground that it involved the transfer of dual-use technology, which could be used for civil as well as military purposes in spite of the fact that India and Russia had expressed their full commitment not to use the technology for the development of ballistic missiles. It was widely felt that the US pressure on Russia, to shelve the deal, was also partly dictated by the US commercial interests.

Cementing Diplomatic Ties

To facilitate and upgrade future defence cooperation, the two countries agreed to establish an Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation. Along with China, India is already one of Russia's top arms customers, but some Indian officials have expressed concern about Moscow's reliability as a supplier of spare parts, technology, and services. On arms control issues, the two leaders noted in a joint statement that both countries would work toward the "early commencement" of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament and stressed the need for full implementation of arms control treaties, specifically the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.⁵⁰

Implications

The common interpretation of Russian resurgence would be similar to the Cold War interpretation, where the Soviet Union seemed to be moving towards India and Afghanistan with a view to

⁴⁹ "Russia offers advanced radar systems, license tech to India," *Hindustan Times*, November 20, 2001.

⁵⁰ "Russian-Indian Summit Firms Up Conventional Arms Deals," *Arms Control Today*, November 2000,

<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_11/russiaindconv.asp>

countering the presence of the US in Pakistan and Iran.⁵¹ The present Russian leadership, however, foresees some new directions in their policy towards India. A strategic partnership between Russia, India and China could be one of the determinants of Russian foreign policy. Russia seeks to have a qualitatively new level of relations with India, “signifying at the same time that this alliance is not anti-West.”⁵² It is a reality that the US has kept a low profile in South Asia as far as forming a strategic alliance is concerned. The Russian-Indian alliance is bound to have some effects on the domestic and foreign affairs of the South Asian countries themselves, and in the countries where US has some interest.

China

In view of a thaw in Sino-Russian relations after a strategic partnership and the belligerent tendencies between India and China, the Russian-Indian defence deals are going to have multiple implications for China. While studying the implications for China, the Russian alliance with China needs to be considered, as it had a significant effect on China’s pattern of alliances and foreign policy decisions. In April 1996, after over half a century of border disputes and deep-seated hostility, Russia and China entered into a strategic partnership.⁵³ Russia and China signed a ‘Treaty for Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation’ in Moscow the same year. The treaty should signal to the Western world that a major geopolitical shift might be taking place in the Eurasian balance of power, with serious implications for the US and its alliances. The 2001 Russia-China treaty covers important areas of cooperation like joint actions to offset a perceived US hegemonism, demarcation of the two countries long-disputed 4,300 km border and arms sales and technology transfers. Russia has also supplied China with Su-30MKI aircraft.⁵⁴ On June 14, 2001, Russia, China, and four Central Asian states announced the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Together, the agreements portend an important evolving geopolitical transformation for Russia and China, two regional giants who are positioning themselves to define the rules under which the US, the European Union (EU), Iran, and Turkey will

⁵¹ Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *Soviet Moves in Asia* (Lahore: Ferozsons Publishers), p.11.

⁵² Vladimir Radyuhin, “Moscow-Delhi Ties not anti-West: Russian Official,”

<<http://www.hindu.com/2001/04/29/stories/0329000c.htm>>

⁵³ “Limited Partnership Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia,”

<http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/press/books/clientpr/CARNEGIE/russ-chi.HTM>

⁵⁴ “China Unveils Secret Warplane,” *The News*, November 6, 2002.

be allowed to participate in the strategically important Central Asian region.⁵⁵

In South Asia, the next step after this strategic partnership was to be the 'strategic triangle,'⁵⁶ an Indo-Russia-China nexus. The growing US presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan could motivate these countries to consider this possibility of a triangular nexus.⁵⁷ Indian insecurity towards China in a strategic triangle is a dividing point in the probable Indo-Russia-China nexus. It is clear that India would demand more concessions with regards to armaments and its missile defence programme, and would also want China to reduce its support for Pakistan. These terms could not be acceptable to China and the possibility of a consistent military strategic triangle between these countries might not be easy, despite Russia's efforts.

China has economic, military and strategic interests in Pakistan. These have their individual and collective importance for both the countries. Economically, China has helped Pakistan develop Gawadar port and plans to establish trade relations between the western province of Xinjiang and Pakistan. Strategically, Pakistan might be the only country with which China does not have a border dispute. In the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan and the formation of a new government, it is in China's interests to ally with Pakistan in the formation of a China-friendly government in Afghanistan in order to address the issue of disturbance in Xinjiang.

The troubles between India and China are not all over, so in the case of a crisis, China could benefit more from a secure and allied Pakistan. Militarily, Pakistan has been a recipient of Chinese technology and support not to mention that Pakistan and China face a collective military threat from India and it is not rational for them to give up their defence cooperation especially in the circumstances of recent tension between India and Pakistan, and the declarations made by the Indian defence minister after their nuclear test in May 1998, about China being India's primary adversary. Moreover, India justifies its enormous defence spending as a way to achieve parity with China. The recent missile test of Brahmos also has implications for China, as Brahmos has 'secondary proliferation potential'⁵⁸ due to the possibility of increase in its range.

⁵⁵ M. B. Naqvi, "The Chinese Challenge," *Defence Journal*, July 2001, < <http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/august/chinese.htm>>

⁵⁶ K. M. Pari Velan, "Indo - Russian Relations: Post Pokhran-II," op. cit.

⁵⁷ Kalyani Shankar, "Will there be a Russia-China-India Axis?," http://www.satiribune.com/archives/dec16_22_02/opinion_axis.htm

⁵⁸ Naeem Salik, op. cit., pp. 49-51.

India would demand China to show its sincerity by ending its support to Pakistan in defence technology. The claim of any illegality of foreign support to Pakistan cannot be justified in view of Britain receiving Polaris and Trident missiles from the US and Israel receiving Lance and Arrow missiles from the US and Jericho-1 missile technology from France.⁵⁹ Indian objections to China-Pakistan cooperation are not justified when it is receiving military support from Russia, the US, the UK and Israel. India might have some concerns, based on its own priorities and objectives, in being a partner in a probable alliance with China. India does not want to give any kind of signal to the West that it is a party to any anti-West alliance. It would be difficult for India to ally with China strategically and thus China will still have security concerns vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan

In the recent missile technology transfer, there is a significant balance shift in the military affairs and capability. The greatest of these shifts is due to the introduction of Brahmos missile. Russia and India have made sure that this missile does not come under the MTCR domain. This has serious implications for Pakistan, as it will give the Indian Navy a comparative superiority and leave Pakistan's coastal cities vulnerable. The Russian nuclear submarines did not provide the required edge to the Indian Navy, so they have decided to halt the development of SLBMs like Sagarika and are concentrating more on the development of Brahmos. Although it is still being experimented to launch cruise missiles from diesel-operated submarines, yet it can be tried with certain modifications.⁶⁰ The greatest negative impact that this development had was the renewal of the missile testing competition between India and Pakistan, where Pakistan was obliged to conduct two missile tests to address its security concerns.⁶¹ Moreover, New Delhi has boasted of this missile, which is an improved version of Russia's Yakhont missile as a manifestation of Indo-Russian relationship. Brahmos gives India a standoff capability and strategic reach, which can be extended beyond the present range of 280 km. Major General (Retired) Ashok Mehta claimed that "Brahmos exposes Pakistan's coastline and soft

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 50.

⁶⁰ Ahmed Ijaz Malik, "Early Warning Systems: Relevance for India and Pakistan," *Defence Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 10 (May 2002), p.74.

<http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/may/warning.htm>

⁶¹ "Pakistan Tests Missile Hatf IV", *Dawn*, October 5, 2002; "Pakistan Tests Second Missile," *Dawn*, October 9, 2002.

underbelly,” he also pointed out that “India is gradually moving away from a mere buyer-seller relationship to one of joint production, technology transfer, and exchange with the Russian defence industry.”⁶²

India has tested its GLSV Geo-Synchronous Launch Vehicle in April 2001. It is widely accepted that a GSLV is readily convertible to an ICBM with requisite modifications,⁶³ thus extending its sphere far beyond Pakistan.

The nuclear submarine deal between India and Russia has not been a success in qualitative terms. The Russian submarines have not been serving the defence purpose of India and had to be returned. Pakistan should not, and need not, try to match India ship for ship or submarine for submarine. Instead, it should go for acquiring the latest technologies. In future, there is an added responsibility of defending Gwadar and Ormara, along with the Karachi Complex. Moreover, the upgraded Agosta submarines must be made capable of preventing a naval blockade of Karachi by the Indian Navy. This spate of Indian arms purchases, which Pakistan criticized as destabilizing, follows another deal with France to buy 10 Mirage 2000H fighter aircraft and 40 MI-17 combat transport helicopters from Russia. In addition the fifth generation fighter Su-30MKI that has been added to the Indian Air Force⁶⁴ will compel Pakistan to upgrade its fighter aircrafts.

Due to the proximity of the Indian Air Force airfields and the availability of an aircraft carrier, which India plans to acquire from Russia, the Pakistani surface units, especially destroyers/frigates, would remain vulnerable to anti-ship missile attacks from Indian aircraft. Therefore, to ensure their defence, adequate air protection would have to be provided to them by the Pakistan Air Force during critical phases of transition/battle. This would require very close coordination between the Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy.⁶⁵ This could be the counter measure the Pakistan Navy can take in response to the probability of the Indian Navy acquiring the carrier-borne MIG-29K fighter planes. Pakistan has been working on the K8 aircraft, which will help in improving its air power. India has felt the need to acquire a new naval destroyer as the naval destroyers given by Russia have become obsolete. The main problem India faces is of the time required to equip the latest naval destroyers with air power.

⁶² Naeem Salik, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Rahul Bedi, *op. cit.*

⁶⁵ Malik Ayaz Hussain Tiwana, “Pakistan’s Security Concerns and the Navy,” <http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/april/navy.htm>

The acquisition of MIG-29K is an effort to keep the required standard of the Navy although this could probably cost India more than acquiring a new naval vessel.

The T-90S tanks are an advanced form of T-72 and they have 'Reflecks' and laser guided missiles. To counter them, Pakistan has Anti Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Green Arrow technology, TA-80UD, T-852AD, and Al-Khalid (MBT-2000). T-90S is still under trial, even in Russia. Pakistan Armoured Corps will have 125 mm calibre guns on the tanks by 2012. Moreover, the ATGM technology comprises a wire-guided remote controlled system. India plans to deploy the T90S tanks in the southern region where the military tactics of Pakistan army match the Indian arsenal and magnitude of deployment. These tanks do not have great manoeuvrability in the cultivable land, due to inherent restrictions. It might not be very favourable for the Indian army to deploy them in the upper Punjab sectors of Pakistan. The balance between the Pakistan and Indian army would thus remain reasonably maintained.

The Russian-Indian influence in Afghanistan is another factor that came to light after the transport of the Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners of war from Panjsher to Tashkent, and then to Delhi.⁶⁶ It is quite obvious that this development or similar developments could have negative implications for Pakistan. Considering India's extreme propaganda against Pakistan, these prisoners could be used to defame Pakistan. India's refusal to provide the identity of the perpetrators of the December 13, 2001, attack, on the Indian parliament shows that India does not provide proof while making accusations. India is quite liable to use these prisoners to frame them in any future terrorist event. In the internal political situation of India, there is a relative negative development where the Indian extremist political parties have formed a government and have committed genocide of Muslims.

In a reversal of Cold War roles, Washington was making up with New Delhi. US arms supply to Pakistan was stopped in 1990 in view of the latter's nuclear programme. On the other hand, Moscow appeared to be improving ties with Pakistan. In November 1991, just before the Soviet collapse, Moscow, for the first time, voted in the UNO for a Pakistan-sponsored proposal for creating a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, much to the consternation of New Delhi. Taken positively, this can be a ground for converting Pakistan's foreign

⁶⁶ "Transfer of Taliban from Kabul to India Continues....,"

<http://www.ummah.com/uzbekistan/eng/ennews/2002/07/ennews31072002_9.html>

policy failures to its advantages. This can be a point to engage with Russia and offer support on the areas where the Pakistani and Russian interests converge. Moreover, Russia and the US called on India and Pakistan to join in the negotiations and become original signatories to the treaty banning nuclear weapons test explosions and the proposed convention to ban production of fissile material for nuclear explosives, and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's territories. The Clinton-Yeltsin joint statement evoked strong media comment in India. It was pointed out that while calling on India and Pakistan to sign the NPT, the two had made no mention of Israel, which was also a nuclear-weapon threshold country.⁶⁷ It is thus imperative for Pakistan to support a balanced policy on nuclear disarmament and control, as it is a security requirement of Pakistan to have strategic weapons as long as the irritant issues are not resolved.

Undoubtedly, Russia has been wary of the Iranian and Pakistani propensity to mix economic and political diplomacy with religion. Russia fears that the spread of Islamic militancy in Central Asia could threaten the Russia's southern flank, which has a substantial Muslim population. The Muslim-majority Caucasian republic of Chechnya is already striving to break away from Russia. The terrorist acts in Tajikistan and the opposition by the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) have motivated Russia to ally with Tajikistan in curbing the threat of fanaticism and militancy over there. At the same time, Moscow would not like to antagonise the Muslim countries in the south, viz., Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, if only to preclude the possibility of a Muslim bloc emerging in the region on an anti-Russian platform. Russian policy towards these countries is both flexible and realistic. Russia would like to maintain normal cooperative relations with these Muslim countries.⁶⁸ As an ally in the war against terrorism — and having itself been a victim of the violence perpetrated by some misled organizations promoting bigotry and extremism — Pakistan can actually cooperate with Russia in countering terrorism, rather than becoming an antagonistic party in the conflict that effects all the countries in the region.

⁶⁷ Jasjit Singh, "The Moscow Message," *Hindustan Times*, January 24, 1994. Also see Inder Malhotra, "US-Russia Nuclear Effrontery," *Times of India*, January 20, 1994. Also see <<http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan-6.html>>

⁶⁸ Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking," op. cit.

Afghanistan

The primary area of convergence of interests between India and Russia in Afghanistan is the access to the Caspian oil and gas resources by exploiting the Indian and Russian sympathetic factions in the present government of Afghanistan.⁶⁹ The Russian influence has always been there in Afghanistan and, after the fall of the Taliban, Russia is engaging with its allies again. 'Near Abroad' is the recent idea of making the Caspian region a zone of influence for Russia. This has been promulgated in the "North Russian Plan."⁷⁰ In its final stages, an oil pipeline will run from the Tengiz oilfields to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk in southern Russia where oil tankers will be loaded for the world market. For Kazakhstan, this is the most efficient and convenient route for oil export. "Besides the Tengiz oilfield, the Karachaganak and Aktyubinsk oilfields in the North can also use this pipeline to export oil. According to a Russian analysis, Turkmenistan has 6.5 million tonnes of oil and 5.5 trillion cubic metres of gas fourth in number of the world's reserves. In terms of explored gas reserves, Kazakhstan has 6 billion tonnes of oil and 2 trillion cubic metres of gas and Azerbaijan has 3.5-5.0 billion tonnes of oil and 600 billion cubic metres of gas."⁷¹

Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan have already signed a trilateral gas accord at Ashkabad on the December 26, 2002.⁷² Moreover, the prospects of an oil pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan have created economic and security concerns in India. Iran resents one of the pipeline's intended objectives, its marginalisation in Caspian Sea energy transportation. However, Russia and India are particularly concerned about its impact on Pakistan. If constructed, revenues from the pipeline will be a significant boost to the Pakistani economy. In the Indian perception, as an emerging power with regional ambitions, a stronger Pakistan could be a threat to India. Pakistan would likely become more assertive in pursuing its regional goals, in particular towards India and the Kashmir issue.⁷³ In such a situation Pakistan's interests have to be safeguarded and there is a need for Pakistan to collaborate with

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Dr. Maqsdul Hasan Nuri, "Russia and the Caspian Sea: Perceptions and Interests," <http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/dec/russia.htm>

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "Jamali signs trilateral gas accord today," *Dawn*, December 27, 2002.

⁷³ Hooman Peimani, "The Afghan and Central Asian Factor in Indian-Pakistani rivalry,"

http://www.cacianalyst.org/2002-04-10/20020410_INDIA_PAKISTAN.htm

Afghanistan in the achievement of the objective of this pipeline for the mutual benefit of the two countries. The gas pipeline accord signed on December 26, 2002, between Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, would definitely improve Pakistan's economy condition and enhance Pakistan's strategic standing in the Caspian region.

A military base recently set up in Farkhor, Tajikistan, close to the Afghan border, is also in competition for access to the oil and gas rich Caspian region. India, Tajikistan, Russia and Iran had backed the Tajik dominated Northern Alliance and still have their influence in the government in Afghanistan.⁷⁴ India can favour the Afghan Tajiks through its influence in Tajikistan and can use them for the achievements of its own motives. With a following among the Tajiks, Russia and India would not consider it favourable that the Pashtuns have a majority in government. This might have a serious backlash leading to violence as a result of intervention by either of the two countries in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. As a result of favouring the non-Pakhtuns in the government, there can be a possibility of the revival of a Pakhtun movement in Afghanistan. This could increase Pakistan's security concerns and allow India to exploit the situation by reigniting the Pakhtunistan issue. As long as Pakistan has an adversarial relationship with India, the possibility of India using the anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan for its own motives cannot be ruled out.

Iran

In the recent past, efforts were made to engage New Delhi in the emerging strategic triangle, Moscow-Teheran-Beijing, with the major objective of weakening American influence in this region. Fighting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and criticism of the Western military intervention in Kosovo provided Russia, China, India and Iran with motives to create a common axis. Until recently, despite the traditional and historical ties, India and Iran remained strategic adversaries. India viewed Iran through the Pakistan prism. Iran, claiming a special role as leader of Islamic states, was one of the strongest critics of Hindu-dominated India. In view of the possibility of a strategic triangle and the passage of oil pipelines through Iran, India would be willing to improve relations with Iran.

By developing close ties with Iran, India hopes to neutralize Pakistan's quest for influence in Iran. Iran hopes to break its international isolation by befriending India. Iran, one of the world's biggest producers of natural gas, can find a ready market in India.

⁷⁴ "India sets up military base in Tajikistan," *The Times of India*, October 18, 2002.

Iran seeks close cooperation in the sphere of defence with India in order to meet the requirements of its armed forces and with the intention of forming a bloc against Western interests in the region. Teheran is considering a 5-year military modernization plan and, therefore, wants to build up its defence capabilities by using the potential of regional states, including India.

However, there still exists a lot of mistrust between the leaders of the two countries, as the majority of the Iranian leadership is still wary of a strong Hindu-dominated India, while New Delhi views an influential Islamic Iran as a potential adversary in the long run. This is the main reason why many of the agreements previously signed have not been implemented.⁷⁵ Pakistan does not need an adversarial Iran as its neighbour, when the major irritant like the extremist Taliban regime has been removed. Recent visit by President Khatami in December 2002 to Pakistan has opened up many avenues for mutual cooperation and would certainly go a long way in improving bilateral relations. Pakistan and Iran have signed three agreements on trade, plant quarantine and science and technology. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has also been signed. The MoU puts emphasis on improvement in trade and economic relations, joint ventures in areas of oil and gas, education, trade, software technology, agriculture, building up of free trade zones, railway systems, fibre links and improvement communication and transportation between the two countries.⁷⁶

President Bush identifies Iran as one of the biggest sponsors of terrorism in the world and one of the three states which, according to him, jointly constitute an 'axis of evil.' Putin, on the other hand, regards neighbouring Iran as an important strategic as well as trading partner. Bush was extremely critical of Russian support to Iran in development of a nuclear power plant, which, according to him, might be used in future to develop nuclear weapons. Nearly 1,000 Russians are assisting the Iranians in the project, which would fetch 500 million pounds sterling for the ailing Russian economy.⁷⁷ Economically, Iran is one of the countries that can serve as a market for Russian industry, including the machine-building industry. This is a country rich in oil resources. The prospect of the creation of transportation routes across Iran and the economic role of co-

⁷⁵ Dr. Dinesh Kumar, "The Limits Of The India-Iran Rapprochement," < <http://www.westerndefense.org/bulletins/June1-01.htm> >

⁷⁶ "Four accords signed with Iran," *Dawn*, December 25, 2002.

⁷⁷ Dr. Ehtasham Anwar Mahar, "Russo-US Rapprochement," *The Nation*, June 7, 2002.

operation within the Caspian Sea is of immense importance. Some experts in Russia believe that there exists a certain attraction within the triangle: Russia-India-Iran. Russian public opinion as a whole is positive to a more profound development of Russian-Iranian relations.⁷⁸

Pakistan has to improve its relations with Iran using its geographic proximity to its advantage; extending trade ties and offering support in the building of the oil pipelines. This has to be a first step to counter any possibility of isolation due to Russian-Indian cooperation in Iran without Pakistan. This is the time for Iran to engage with the countries of South Asia to end its isolation due to the antagonism by US.

Conclusion

In view of Pakistan's adversarial relations with India, the Russian-Indian military cooperation is likely to increase the security concerns of Pakistan and shift the military balance in India's favour. Rationality demands that Pakistan must keep a balanced approach in developing ties with Russia. The greatest factor that has hindered Pakistan's alignment with Russia has been the diplomatic irresponsibility and indifference shown by the political leaders in the past. This has been due to some hindrances like the internal political instability, Pakistan's syndrome of dependency on the US and the lack of intellectuals and analytical studies on Soviet Union.⁷⁹ The social structure of Pakistan also played a negative role where the religious clergy did not favour any alliance with an atheistic state like the Soviet Union. In the present situation, it is only prudent that Pakistan makes its foreign policy more proactive and dynamic, and makes itself a progressive Islamic state where religion does not prevent the people and the state to look for better options in achieving their objectives.

There can be prospects of Pak-Russian cooperation. The comments by Russian Presidential spokesman Sergei Yasterzhembskiya, who came to Pakistan in 2000, can be a starting point for the initiation of defence and strategic cooperation. The probable fields of cooperation in this proposal were the economic projects, MI-17 helicopters and curtailment of terrorist activities.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Vitaly Naumkin, "The Russian-Iranian Relations: Present Status and Prospective for the Future Perceptions," *International Affairs*, Vol. 3 No.1 (March-May 1998), <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/III-1/naumkin.htm>

⁷⁹ Hafeez Malik, op. cit., p.344.

⁸⁰ Nasim Zehra, "A Bid to Turn Around," *Defence Journal* (October 2002)

Pakistan and Russia are already working on a Consultative Group on Strategic Stability.⁸¹ Pakistan must engage with Russia first in the fields of economic development and trade, which can then have a spill-over effect to strategic cooperation. "Russia needs a market for its goods and Pakistan can provide a lucrative market. Geographically, Pakistan might not be a neighbor but through proximity of CIS and ECO, Pakistan can engage with Russia, as Pakistan is a member of ECO. Russia has probably for the first time felt the brunt of the IMF and is in a better position to understand Pakistan's position in fighting debt problems to address the economic and security concerns."⁸² Pakistan and Russia are linked in trade and economic accords under which, so far, the trade between them is estimated at around \$ 26 million.⁸³ Russia has helped Pakistan develop the Karachi Steel Mills through a grant of \$ 5230 million.⁸⁴

Pakistan can try to overcome the stagnation and dissonance in its relations with Russia. On the count of terrorism, it was alleged by the Russians that Pakistan has been supportive of the Chechen movement and the Talibanisation of Central Asia. In the current situation, it is clear that Pakistan and Russia face similar threats from the extremists. It is, thus, in the mutual interests of both countries to make a new start in the common fight against all kinds of terrorism, not to mention the war against drugs, where again both countries have similar stands.⁸⁵ This can be possible as the mind set of the Russian Federation is different from the Soviet Republic and the new federation desires cordial relations with the rest of the world and favours resolving all the irritant issues between the nations.⁸⁶

<<http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/pak-russian.html>>

⁸¹ "Pakistan-Russia ties improve," *Dawn*, September 17, 2002.

⁸² Discussion with Ms. Amara Saeed, Research Fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, November 5, 2002.

⁸³ Statement by Yuri M. Kozlov, Chief Specialist, Ministry of Economic Department, Moscow at the Seminar on "Identifying the Irritants in Pak-Russian Relations and Possible Remedial Measures," Area Study Centre Peshawar University, October 24, 2002. Also see "Pak- Russia ties vital to peace and prosperity in region," *The Nation*, October 24, 2002.

⁸⁴ Hafeez Malik, op. cit., p. 329.

⁸⁵ Statement by Natalia V. Melekhina, Representative, Moscow Institute of International Relations at the Seminar on "Identifying the Irritants in Pak-Russian Relations and Possible Remedial Measures," at the Area Study Centre Peshawar University. October 24, 2002.

⁸⁶ Statement by Dr. Artem Rudnitsky, Representative of Russian Embassy, at the Seminar on "Identifying the Irritants in Pak-Russian Relations and Possible Remedial Measures," at the Area Study Centre Peshawar University.

Russia can play a positive role in South Asia by acting as a mediator between India and Pakistan. The Tashkent conference and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) can be the starting points. It seems friendship with large Asian countries like India and China fits well with the new policy in Moscow. In this way, Russia can project itself as a true Eurasian power.⁸⁷ President Putin's initiative at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) at Almaty Kazakhstan on June 4, 2002, attracted special attention for several reasons. A notable aspect was that it appeared to reflect a readiness on the part of Russia to play the role of an honest broker.

The newly formed NATO-Russia Council has initiated efforts to cool standoff between India and Pakistan. The Presidents and Prime Ministers strongly urged both sides to de-escalate and to resume talking together so that their problems could be resolved peacefully.⁸⁸ This in turn implied that Moscow would show sensitivity to the concerns of both parties, and thus modify the traditional pro-India stance it had maintained since the 1950s when Pakistan had joined the Western pacts. President Putin's initiative to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and India has been launched with the support and motivation of President Bush. A possibility of gain from the present situation of engagement could be, that both Pakistan and India join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that was set up last year⁸⁹ and the ASEAN forum.

Pakistan must consolidate a military alliance and strategic relations with China. China can help in improving relations between Pakistan and Russia by using its strategic alliance with Russia. Security is one of the great motivations in the formation of alliances. Pakistan has gained enough from the Chinese and Russian assistance than from its most allied ally of the past years. The obvious impediments in improving relations with Russia are India and terrorism. Terrorism has effects on Russian and Pakistani policies. Whereas Russian leadership still has some reservations about the religious fanatics in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistani religious political parties and their leaders still have the memories of the Russian war in Afghanistan. The recent hostage taking by Chechens in a theatre at Moscow in October 2002 has brought this concern in the open. Pakistan has to take strong foreign policy

⁸⁷ "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking-Jyotsna Bakshi," op.cit.

⁸⁸ "NATO-Russia to weigh Indo-Pak issue at defence ministers meet," <<http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/050602/dlfor31.asp>>

⁸⁹ Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, op.cit.

decisions keeping in view its national interests with due consideration to new objectives that include gaining diplomatic support from regional countries and ridding itself of the label of terrorists' supporters. Pakistan can adopt a foreign policy that is different from a value-free realism and still achieve the objectives of its national policy. Objectivity is essential in the seemingly unchangeable game of international power politics. Power politics require states to be inherently strong to gain a reasonable status and bargaining power. For Pakistan, mending diplomatic fences with Russia and forging a defence and strategic cooperation is going to be a tall order, as it will invoke Indian displeasure. In view of the fact that Russia understands the need for following a balanced policy of alliances in South Asia, it would be in its own interest to follow an indiscriminatory⁹⁰ approach towards India and Pakistan. It would be advantageous for Pakistan, if Pakistan and China were in a strategic partnership, thus making it compelling for Russia to consider them resilient actors in the region. It is time Pakistan puts its national interest above all and seeks alliance with the nations that are capable of delivering. ■

⁹⁰ V.Iakunin, "India and Pakistan Nuclear Option," *International Affairs*, 1996, Vol. 42, No. 4, p. 49.