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Rethinking Diplomacy and Politics of Power: Making Peace Last

There is no power
on Earth, that can
undo Pakistan

Muhammad Ali Jinnah

01

Ambassador (R) Shahid Masroor Gul Kiani

Former ambassador who has been teaching international relations, international law, diplomatic law, diplomacy & foreign policy at public universities in Pakistan and abroad. His latest publication is *Pakistan-India Relations-Composite Dialogue Process (CDP): Current State and Future Prospects in Bringing Peace to the Sub-continent* (2019).

Restraint, Caution & Negotiation are significant hallmarks of diplomacy that took many shapes during the many millennia of its journey, as it progressed to suit global needs and requirements. In the historical context, Cardinal Richelieu's fascination with

statecraft and diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century was indeed diplomacy's milestone, which bigger powers later emulated or made attempts to imitate, 'the charting genius of a new concept of centralised statecraft and foreign policy based on balance of power' (Kissinger, 2014, p.21). This century also witnessed the Peace of Westphalia, the fruition of a long series of nearly impossible diplomacy, in fact negotiations between warring states whose conflicts in the last eighty years had scarred Europe. 'The Peace of Westphalia became a turning point in the history of nations, because the elements it set in place were as uncomplicated as they were sweeping (Kissinger, 2014, p.21). Erudite Austrian Metternich and equally sagacious French Talleyrand, the leading European statesmen highlighted the importance of diplomacy at the Congress of Vienna, a momentous event, happening a little more than half a century after the turbulent French Revolution:

Rethinking Diplomacy in South Asia: Restraint, Caution & Negotiation

It produced a consensus that peaceful evolution within the existing order were preferable to alternatives; that the preservation of the system was more important than any single dispute that might arise within it; that differences should be settled by consultation rather than by war (Kissinger, 2014, p.61).

In spite of the diplomacy of *Restraint, Caution & Negotiation* now wearing the 'crown' of peace in the Seventeenth and most of the Eighteenth Century, the devastation wrought by the First World War in 1918, jolted the idealistic leaders envisioning a short war. While the diplomacy at work in post-First World War leading to the Treaty of Versailles was idealistic aiming to prevent future wars, the wounds it inflicted on Germany negated its spirit, as it threw to the wind, the much needed *Caution* which the leaders gathered at Versailles ignored at their peril:

Rarely had a diplomatic document so missed its objective as the Treaty of Versailles....Too punitive for conciliation, too lenient to keep Germany from recovering, the Treaty of Versailles condemned the exhausted democracies to constant vigilance (Kissinger, 2014, p. 84).

Post-Second World War witnessed the United Nations (UN) with all aplomb enter the global arena to take centre stage. Multilateral diplomacy then gathered full steam and the UN, its specialised agencies and scores of regional organisations, both political and military in nature sprouted in every continent. The UN gave all states, especially newly independent ones, the 'multilateral stage', which was a newer form of diplomacy, to share their dreams and air their grievances against their once colonisers who now seemed

far less confident, as their colonies faded away more quickly than they had anticipated.

The leaders attending UN sessions found meeting their counterparts on the sidelines of these sessions, an 'effortless' and convenient way to exchange views and negotiate with them on all subjects and issues, even contentious ones:

When the features of public and quiet diplomacy were combined, the diplomatic process in the United Nations has been characterised as preventive diplomacy or the diplomacy of reconciliation (Hovet, 1963, p. 29).

Thus, when Pakistan and India appeared on the globe in August 1947, they had a plethora of ways and means to thrash out their differences. The top leadership of both nation-states had negotiated with the British colonisers for decades and were steeped in the art of diplomacy, and had used *Caution* and *Restraint* as the requirement demanded - this kept the British negotiators guessing and on their toes and had no choice but to relent to the forces of reason:

On the 14th of August 1947, the British rule in India came to an end.....it spelled the termination of the Raj and the birth on 15 August 1947 of two independent dominions - India and Pakistan. For Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah it was his 'finest hour' (Zaidi, 1999, p. xii).

But, alas, right from the word go, Pakistan and India became antagonistic. Instead of peering into scores of examples of settling disputes by sitting across the table and putting energy into the required *Restraint, Caution & Negotiation*, the soul of diplomacy, the two neighbours at the outset chose war!

The first one was on Kashmir, the result of a combination of betrayal by the Indian leadership and acquiescence by the departing colonisers, 'Mountbatten could not disguise his partiality for the Congress nor act as honest broker in the matter of accession of the states' (Zaidi, 1999, p. xvii).

Thus, Pakistan and India have been at odds since their creation, and this unfortunate, but continuous enmity at times baffles friends of the two states, who are unable to understand as to how two neighboring states can go against the realities of the 'tyranny of geography', which demands at least normal rules of peaceful co-existence, because geopolitical considerations are quite often an important aspect of relations between states that have common borders, and the aim is to avoid conflict.

Their leaders were stalwarts of the challenging anti-colonial negotiations and understood the pitfalls of ignoring 'geo-political compulsions', 'The nexus between state and social borders is also clearly evident in many situations where borders, both in a territorial and a symbolic sense, are an object of conflicting claims' (Kolossoff & Scott 2019).

In the historical context, the relationship between Pakistan and India can also be termed dichotomous; engaging at times and also remaining incommunicado! Both have fought wars and also sought out each other. Diplomacy, in its various forms, has played a significant role in keeping their relationship on an even keel, and in the reduction of the deep mutual mistrust, especially within the political and military leadership. Their leaders found ways to meet and exchange views on the sidelines of international conferences, which include UN, Commonwealth or the occasional stop overs in each other's capital.

The military has its own priorities - the various wars that the two armies have fought should not spring any surprise over the hardening of their stance. But the behaviour of their armed forces during the various wars, by and large was highly professional, ranging from observing the cease fire to treatment and exchange of Prisoners of War. In both, for the political or the military realm, *Restraint, Caution* and constant communication led the way, a result of negotiations by professionals. General Bajwa, the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan has been consistent in calling for peaceful ties with India, even during the 2019 post-Pulwama tension:

It is our sincere belief that the route to peaceful resolution of Pak-India disputes – including the core issue of Kashmir – runs through comprehensive and meaningful dialogue (Farooq 2018).

Pakistan and India are not unique globally in their history of rivalry, nor of the brutal conflicts, but certainly exceptional in its 'longevity' in the modern era. It seems that in the very recent past, successive leadership of both states have somehow been 'compelled', for their own myopic domestic reasons, to put on the backburner, any thought or prospect to resolve their differences through peaceful means. The negativity, bolstered by media and political propaganda has also impacted on a segment of the public in both the countries. This has, in recent times, resulted in a complete breakdown in communicating the desire to improve relations.

There appears to be no incentive, especially for India, a bigger power, led by a leadership whose ascendancy to authority is imbedded in having convinced a major segment of its electorate that only Pakistan is to be blamed for the problems their country faces, but also that Pakistan was not getting away 'free'.

The seeds of the animosity between Pakistan and India can be traced to the very birth of these two states, and is reflected in terms of the size of their population and territory. Despite Pakistan-India watchers who have studied these two states for decades, and who are not very optimistic of any permanent resolution in the short-term, remain hopeful of a breakthrough in the current impasse - the optimism is based on the significant milestones in the bilateral relationship of these two neighbours.

While conflicts, skirmishes and wars of words have found ample space in the media, and on the streets of these two neighbours, regretfully, the range of diplomacy used in settling and attempts to settle equally contentious issues are indeed commendable, but the lament is that they have found lesser space in the media and among the people across the divide. Pakistan and India have agreed, even though at times, with some hesitancy, to third-party mediation or backchannel diplomacy. The prudent use of *Caution, Restraint & Negotiation* was evident when they accepted the offer by the World Bank (actively supported by the United States), who negotiated the historic Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960. Historian Feldman writes:

The best that can be said is that nothing was done that will either exacerbate ugly situations or prejudice the position and the claims in any future negotiation with India (Feldman, 1967, p.188).

Pakistan and India readily agreed to the Soviet Union's offer to host a summit of their leaders and also to mediate between them. The Tashkent Summit which took place in January 1966 in the wake of the 1965 Pakistan-India War was hosted by the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin and took place in a scenario of unanimity:

On the diplomatic front, the Super Powers were in full agreement on the need for a ceasefire and very anxious for it to hold for formal talks to take place between India and Pakistan to ensure that war did not out again (Bajwa, 2014, p. 313).

The Tashkent Summit was the best Pakistan and India, two war-fatigued states, could have desired or hoped for.

History has many versions of the Tashkent Declaration, but it was 'Caution and Restraint' in the discussions of the Pak-India leaders, prodded by the Soviet Premier's diplomacy, which pushed the astute leaders to agree to a peaceful resolution of issues between the two states.

The 1971 tragedy had challenged the vision of the founders of Pakistan and even more, confounded global onlookers as *Restraint, Caution & Negotiation* were put to the test as Bhutto and Indira Gandhi, used their wits and wisdom, as they sat down in July 1972 in Simla, a much cooler environment than the 'Winter heat of 1971'. The result was way forward for co-existence; and as declared by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs:

It was a comprehensive blueprint for good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. Under the Simla Agreement both countries undertook to abjure conflict and confrontation which had marred relations in the

past and to work towards the establishment of durable peace, friendship and cooperation.

While Pakistan had little elbow room to maneuver in Simla, it still managed to secure the maximum to its advantage by a combination of *Restraint*, *Caution* and skillful *Negotiation*. History had one or two lessons to share with India, as it too negotiated with Pakistan with *Caution and Restraint*, 'The main objective, in Haskar's eyes, was not to humiliate Pakistan but rather to create trust and confidence between it and India' (Frank, 2001, p. 345). Indira was quoted having assured Bhutto 'she wanted to bury the past' (Bhasin, 2018, p. 256), and Bhutto's response was equally reassuring 'it was in our interest that his efforts to turn the face of Pakistan from its hatred and bitterness to a new future of peace and friendship is very much worth supporting (Bhasin, 2018, p. 256).

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) between Pakistan and India continued when some trust was restored even during the most difficult phase of the relationship, albeit for shorter periods, laying the basis for leaders of the two countries to exercise *Caution and Restraint* and to sit down in Lahore in 1999 to negotiate peace; this happened in a most challenging period or an 'explosive' one due to the nuclear tests of 1988:

The visit ended with the signing of three important documents.....which laid down the road map for deeper relations between the two countries (Bhasin, 2018, p. 374).

The desire to move the bilateral relations forward prodded the two countries to continue exploring ideas and listen to suggestions, during very demanding periods.

The Kargil Conflict of 1999 coming on the heels of the Lahore Summit of the same year had all the ingredients to throw away

Caution and Restraint to the winds. However, pleasant surprise awaited the supporters of peace and dented the enthusiasm of the skeptics as it did not undermine the keenness of the leadership, even though it sprang a blow to the bonhomie created by the Lahore Process and scuttled a sincere desire to lay the basis for burying the embittered past. 'The threads of the Indo-Pakistan dialogue was picked up in 2003' (Malik, 2010, p. 378), and led to the historic handshake in Islamabad on the sidelines of SAARC Summit in Islamabad in 2004:

The SAARC Summit in 2004 provided the breakthrough which promised to usher in a new beginning (Bhasin, 2018, p. 388).

Prime Minister Imran Khan's assumption of office in August 2018 was a breath of fresh air in the domestic politics of Pakistan, as he carried no 'baggage' from the past and desired to bring peace within the country and mend fences with neighbours, especially with India. He received the desired message from Prime Minister Modi, 'We are ready to enter a new era of relations with Pakistan' (Daily Dawn, 2018) and to whom the country's PM responded in an equally warm tenor:

The solution to conflicts should be found through dialogue...Instead of answers to conflicts, wars and bloodbath give birth to tragedies.

The two leaders across the divide understood both the futility of rhetoric to only please the skeptics, and the significance in diplomacy of the use of *Caution, Restraint* which encourages *Negotiation*. Pakistan showed immense *Caution and Restraint* in the wake of the killing of the Indian security forces in Pulwama (Indian Occupied Kashmir-IOK) when it was accused; India had little or no proof to share. This was followed by the aerial attack on Balakot in Pakistan. Prime Minister Khan's restraint and his deft handling of

this serious crisis brought him plaudit at home and abroad. Later, Indian too understood the dangers of the two nuclear states remaining at 'tender hooks'. *Caution* was in the air, as both governments contained the crisis, leaving enough space for possible talks in the future. The quiet diplomacy, especially of the US was encouraged to scale down the heightened tension:

The US maintained a high level contact with the government of both countries. The Secretary of State Mike Pompeo led the diplomatic engagement directly, when he spoke with the Indian Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj, National Security Adviser Doval, and Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi...The Secretary's involvement played an essential role in de-escalating tension between the two sides (Ali, 2019).

Dust had not fully settled over the Pulwama and Balakot incidents, when the Indian Government recently announced (on 5 August 2019) the revocation of Article 370 of its Constitution which had given special status to the IOK, even though this Article was a 'fig leaf' to the otherwise demand of the Kashmiris to the end of Indian 'militarisation'. This, in fact, means a complete reversal of the UN stand on the 'disputed status' of Kashmir, which calls for a plebiscite to decide the destiny of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan has naturally been outraged, as the fear is that:

India's decision to revoke J&K's special status is likely to further complicate India-Pakistan bilateral relations (Sarral, 2019).

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision will have far reaching consequences for Pakistan-India relations and regional peace and security. There is likelihood of an increased repression and human rights violations by Indian forces in IOK, which shall breed violence and fuel indigenous uprising, and further generate tensions with Pakistan.

India's premise that all is well in IOK seems to be false: it has mobilised hundreds of thousands of troops, detained thousands of Kashmiris, imposed a curfew resulting in food and medicine shortages and a complete blackout of news emanating from IOK. Natwar Singh, a diplomat of some substance who also held senior cabinet positions in the Congress-led government in India, rightly understood the sensitivity of the Jammu & Kashmir dispute to the Pak-India relationship,

Indo-Pak relations have been, and are accident prone. The future lies in the past. Kashmir is the ultimate hurdle. We have to deal with Pakistan in a pragmatic manner if we are nit to make a mess of the relationship (Singh, 2014, p. 187).

Subsequently, Pakistan and India have been on a parallel diplomatic offensive, a 'war of narratives'. What followed was volley of words, devoid of *Caution, Restraint* and not a whiff of any willingness to *Negotiate*, which many Pakistan-India onlookers termed it as a continuation of the Post Pulwama crisis. This rhetoric received a boost during Prime Minister Imran Khan and Prime Minister Modi's annual 'yatra' to the United Nations General Session which took place in September, 2019; Imran Khan pulled all his plugs at his UNGA Speech on the dangers in IOK and Modi had his own 'indefensible' argument on the issue at the address to the Indian Diaspora in Texas, US.

In the current 'deafening' incommunicado between nuclear armed Pakistan and India, what is there for the 'murder of crows' to pick up from the litter of accusations and counter accusations; actually, very little, except continued misery of the people of the IOK, as the Indian Government would not talk to them. The only way to end the suffering of the people of IOK is for Pakistan and India to sit down and talk, even though they may still argue.

To set the scene for these two warring states to bring back the diplomacy with its components of *Caution, Restraint & Negotiation* to the table shall require deft handling at the hands of seasoned diplomats stationed in each other's capitals; there has never been a substitute for 'experience, wisdom and foresight' which these diplomats have accumulated over decades of working in mostly in the field in difficult places and circumstances. So state craft in Pakistan and India shall require the astuteness to send back the heads of mission to their capitals, so that they can share the message of the leadership at the highest level! There are no shortcuts:

India and Pakistan do not only share common border but common fate as well, and therefore, they must forget the past and cooperate (Jha & Singh, 2016, p. 294).

Regretfully, even the sharing of usual and mundane messages by the leadership over flying each others' territory has ceased, as requests to overfly has been denied. Even these messages could have been the harbinger of peace and reconciliation. Earlier, Prime Minister Modi's decision not to avail the shorter route to Bishkek over flying the territory of Pakistan to attend the SCO Summit did not win him any plaudits in India or Pakistan. In the dark clouds hovering over the Sub-Continent, a silver lining seems to show the light of reconciliation leading to 'forced' co-existence. That light is

the opening ceremony of the Kartarpur Corridor and its continued use;

The Kartarpur Corridor, whose foundation was laid in 2018, to be opened officially by Prime Minister Imran Khan on 9 November 2019 offers an excellent opportunity for Pakistan and India to utilise it as an 'out of the box solution' to restart the bilateral talks through former PM Manmohan Singh, who has been invited to attend. Even though, Manmohan Singh is a leader of the opposition Congress Party, he commands immense respect in India and Pakistan and has been a voice of reason, *Caution and Restraint*, the components of diplomacy, without which the two parties cannot negotiate. Remaining incommunicado is neither an option, nor the desire of the people of these two neighboring states. Possibly it was looking at the 'crystal ball', when it was envisaged:

A lot would depend on how India and Pakistan negotiate their way out of current challenges...the long term sustainability of their dialogue depends on achieving tangible progress towards narrowing down their differences on the core issue of Kashmir (Lodhi, 2012, p. 347).

Pakistan and India's mistrust have for decades added to the strife globally and also made the world more unpredictable; people long for global stability 'A stable world is a rare thing....maintaining it demands creative diplomacy' (Haas, 2019, p. 22), or in the words of a seasoned US South Asian onlooker 'Yet it is precisely the 'clutter' of India-Pakistan animosity that remains very much at issue, and that may prove in the future even more perilous' (Talbot, 2004, p. 224).

The fact that both the states are nuclear armed, may have weighed heavily on the minds of the leaders of Pakistan and India, pushing them to explore ways for normalising relations. In searching for

peace, the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) comprises a basket of issues and subjects of mutual interest. The process is a most innovative manner of diplomacy and has also been used most effectively by Pakistan and India, since its inception in 1985 in visibly improving the relations between these two states; over long hours, officials guided by the leaders negotiate, reflecting a sophisticated but cautious approach in dealing with thorny issues, tinged by utmost restraint before committing their states to any solution. The diplomacy has been 'rethought', and can put to use again by Pakistan and India.

President Nixon who had established a fairly good working relationship with the leaders of Pakistan and India was appalled at the priorities of these two states; instead of having peaceful bilateral relationship, which reflected tolerance, restraint and utmost caution in their dealing with each other, opined 'Two of the poorest nations in the world-India and Pakistan-spent more than \$11 billion a year for the purpose of waging a future war' (Nixon, 1993, p.161).

In the end, the road for the two neighbouring states leads them to the path of co-existence, a compulsion, of which Pakistan and India can neither duck their heads nor escape the reality, as fate and geography have brought them together; they have to row the boat together to reach the shore of peace and harmony, which in fact is their ultimate and desired destination. The two states should put their heads together and prove the soothsayers wrong, because in the current scenario, at times, a mix of pessimism and real - politick creeps into the best of the diplomacy practitioner, 'on the face of it, the outlook is not encouraging; the best hope seems to be for a grudging co-existence based on a nuclear stand-off and a peace that is no more than the absence of war' (Akhund, 1997, p. 455).

Restraint may be the essence of the Pakistan-India relationship, rather hinges on it, as accusations and counter accusations have been their hallmark even when they are looking to negotiate.

If the United States, the sole Super Power can be cautioned to stay on the course of restraint, than Pakistan and India also could also seriously ponder and attempt to emulate 'To get back on track, Washington should return to the realism and restraint that served it so well in the past' (Walt, 2019).

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02

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5 August 2019 will be remembered as the darkest day in Kashmir's history. It will also be remembered as the day when Pakistan's policy circles had a rude awakening from their slumber. India's annexation of Kashmir was an act in brazen violation of its international commitments.

India's Kashmir Lawfare: Pakistan & Change in Narrative

On that day, Pakistan's policy circles were reminded that they had been hedging their bets on the wrong crowd in India. As a result, there has been a forced rethink in Pakistan on the Kashmir policy. The build-up to the event and its immediate aftermath is telling of the political currents underpinning the present-day discourse in India.

All this was until Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his endless wisdom, made the unthinkable strategic blunder: abrogating Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Thereafter, gates of hell have been slowly but surely opening for India.

The entire country has been whipped up in a mass frenzy of ultra-nationalistic jingoism. The brutal suppression of Kashmiris is justified by the media that has been shamelessly conjuring fictional stories in support of the State narrative. The noise emanating in Indian circles is telling of what is being cooked: Pakistan is

planning a terrorist attack through proxies, the new India must be 'one nation, one flag' and the list goes on and on.

Amidst all this, the chorus of 'all is well' in Kashmir is ringing out loud. Horrid tales of torture, killings, and attacks on Kashmiri civilians are hidden behind the façade of stories of potential 'grand economic development' of Kashmir. In other words, the road to Kashmir's hell has been paved with good intentions.

To effectively respond to this new Indian assault, Pakistan had no choice but to discard its stale narrative and rethink its Kashmir policy. Luckily for Pakistan, its Prime Minister, by taking a leaf from the international playbook, took the initiative of battling out the war of narratives; using new vernacular instead of cliched terminology that was no longer creating any ripples in global corridors. How far Pakistan can develop on the Prime Minister's initiative will determine whether or not Pakistan can effectively redraw the Kashmir narrative lines.

Parallels between RSS/BJP and Nazism

So what has Prime Minister Imran Khan managed to do that has given a new pair of legs to Pakistan's Kashmir policy? It all began the day he coined the term 'fascism' to describe the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)/ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Prime Minister kept it simple: RSS and BJP share eerie similarities with Nazis. Both are totalitarian; both divide society in an attempt to incite hatred along ethnic and religious lines, and both tap into an 'engineered' version of the past to catapult the masses towards a preordained future course of action. The SOS call of the Prime Minister has been: forces of fascism have reared their ugly head, and the world must act fast.

The Prime Minister, thus, pulled out the word 'fascism' – a term relegated to history – and thrust it in the international limelight to showcase the threat faced from RSS/BJP. He used vocabulary that the world understood and which it could relate to. In doing so, the Prime Minister has been refreshing the global memory, which is prone to fatigue.

On 30 August, i.e., Kashmir Solidarity Day, a forceful and eloquent op-ed penned by the Prime Minister appeared in the world's leading *New York Times*. Amongst other things, this op-ed highlighted the threat faced by Kashmiris, Pakistan, and the world from this fascism. The world has been pre-programmed to think about India and Pakistan in a certain way.

Let's be clear: Pakistan's struggle for nomenclature was never easy. India has been harping on the 'Pakistan-is-a-state-sponsor-of-terror' narrative since time immemorial. This narrative is etched in global conscience. The world has been pre-programmed to think about India and Pakistan in a certain way.

Breaking away from the shackles of a negative stereotype is never easy. India was helped by 9/11 – a watershed event which enabled it to cement its anti-Pakistan narrative further. All this arguably left Pakistan with little to no global clout to argue its case.

Pakistan's narrative was also severely damaged by the apathy and negligence of previous governments. It wouldn't be wrong to say that over the years, Pakistan's Kashmir policy had been on 'autopilot.' There was no out-of-the-box thinking, no reinventing of narratives, no new storylines.

All Pakistan could rely on were 70 years old United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that had lost their teeth. The 'K' word had stopped echoing in global corridors, and the 'freedom fighter' had been re-labeled a 'terrorist.' India was

pinching Pakistan where it hurt most and, ironically, Pakistan was a 'sitting duck' talking about peace with India.

Leveraging on the Modi/RSS Mania

Kashmir finds itself at the cusp of unprecedented change. While this change may have shaken up the status quo in Pakistan, it contains seeds of new opportunities. Whether the country leverages those opportunities or squanders them will be entirely our choice.

Historically, two themes underpin Pakistan's Kashmir policy: 'territory' and 'people.' For Pakistan's new Kashmir narrative to be meaningful and effective, policymakers will need to dispassionately consider whether conferring preconceived meanings from the past on present-day policies has enabled the country to 'sell' its narrative to the world-at-large.

If the success of Pakistan's Kashmir policy is gauged purely, based on how far the world is willing to go to stand with Kashmiris, then the nation will have to move away from recycled metaphors and instead weaponise the narrative through new vocabulary, nuances, and themes. Language is a powerful tool. If used correctly, it can change hearts and minds.

The 'Territory'

Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) is a complicated dispute. The fact that it is differently categorised by the parties (India calling it, variously, 'internal' and 'bilateral'; and Pakistan calling it 'international') means that there is also a dispute over nomenclature.

Irrespective of these differences of categorisation, the *de facto* control enjoyed by India over Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) has, over the years, conferred a certain presumption of legitimacy (as opposed to legality) to Indian claims in the eyes of the world. This is not to suggest that Pakistan's claims with respect of territory are unfounded in law.

The 'people' (Kashmiris) debate has been gaining significant traction in international circles. The focus of Pakistan's narrative—at least for now – should, therefore, be on the 'people.' Rather, this is to emphasise that true to its nature, the global community jealously safeguards the concept of the sovereignty of states and favours the party with more considerable political and economic clout over the weaker one. In other words, the world prefers to preserve the *status quo* when there is a leverage disparity between two sovereign states.

Therefore, while abrogation of Article 370 severed India's legal relationship with IOK, it 'colored' the act of abrogation as a *de jure* 'internal matter.' It would be naïve of Pakistan to expect that a world that did not provide the necessary support to resolve the J&K dispute for 72 odd years will immediately side with Pakistan at a time of increased rhetoric emanating from India.

Importantly, Pakistan's 'territorial' claim over IOK has been misused by India to discredit and delegitimise Pakistan by linking it with terrorism. In other words, India has managed to poison the well. Unless the situation on the ground in IOK drastically changes, Pakistan's territorial claim over Kashmir is thought of as no more than 'noise', and the chances of a meaningful outcome favourable to Pakistan are bleak.

This is not to suggest that Pakistan's legal claim over IOK has been extinguished. Far from that. But at the moment, it will be an uphill battle for Pakistan to argue its case solely along territorial lines. It

would be more sensible for Pakistan to park this issue – at least for now.

Pakistan should instead look at other unprecedented opportunities that have recently surfaced in this imbroglio. The ‘people’ (Kashmiris) debate has been gaining significant traction in international circles. The focus of ‘Pakistan’s narrative– at least for now – should, therefore, be on the ‘people.’

The ‘People’

The world-at-large appears to be concerned about two issues at the moment: an all-out war between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and the fast deteriorating human rights situation in Kashmir.

The first concern is nuclear Armageddon.

Pakistan has been trying to convince the world to see the writing on the wall: the threat to international peace and security posed by a reckless Indian regime that has been throwing lit matches at a pool of high octane petrol.

While Pakistan must stress on the threat to peace and security (something that the country has done and continues to do), on its own, this is not sufficient.

If Pakistan focuses solely on the ‘security and escalation’ aspect, it can overshadow the more significant issue i.e., the people (Kashmiris). For the issue to stay relevant, Pakistan will need to leverage recent developments that have positioned the people debate at the centre of global discourse.

First is the UN Secretary General's recent remark that J&K is an 'international dispute' that ought to be resolved in accordance with UNSC resolutions. This confirms that Kashmir is still visible on the international radar.

Second is the UNSC taking up the Kashmir dispute after a hiatus of 50 odd years through 'informal consultations.' That this happened despite India's relentless diplomatic pushback is nothing short of a victory for Pakistan. UNSC consultations injected life in an otherwise dead issue and established that it is not India's internal matter.

At present, the Kashmir dispute is stuck somewhere between, 'bilateralism' and 'multilateralism.' However, slowly but surely, it is once again beginning to snowball into a multilateral issue. The required global impetus to firmly reposition Kashmir in the multilateral paradigm can be provided through a refocus on the 'people.'

UNSC Resolution 47, which requires the J&K dispute to be settled through a 'free and fair plebiscite' offers the people the choice between accession to India or Pakistan. Notably, no UNSC resolution on J&K contemplates its independence.

Pakistan should expend all its diplomatic and legal efforts on coalescing global support for the self-determination of Kashmiris. This should be pursued as a stand-alone policy that is separate and distinct from Pakistan's territorial claims over IOK. Right of self-determination has been recognised in international law as a principle of 'jus cogens,' i.e., a fundamental principle of international law from which no derogation is possible. No patent illegality (occupation, suppression, colonialism, etc.) can extinguish this right through lapse of time.

This right of self-determination exists today as much as it did at the time of partition. The International Commission of Jurists confirmed it in their 1995 report on J&K.

What does this mean for Pakistan's existing Kashmir policy?

Firstly, that the slogan 'Kashmir Banega Pakistan' won't sell anymore, and therefore, Pakistan should re-think the policy that is tethered to 'territory.' Second, that any future plebiscite on J&K will also include territory under Pakistan's control. This is the bitter pill that Pakistan will have to swallow if it wants a resolution of the Kashmir dispute within the international framework.

Building Blocks of Pakistan's New Narrative

Pakistan's new narrative should, therefore, build on the right of self-determination of Kashmiris. It should continue to highlight the grave atrocities being committed against Kashmiris at different forums by using various means and methods. This will ensure that Pakistan's narrative is both meaningful and en vogue – the real litmus test of its success. Pakistan has had a good start in re-writing the narrative lines. The word 'fascism' can change the world's 'belief system' about India by making the world 'de-link' with existing perceptions about the country. All Pakistan will need to do is to make sure that the line does not go slack and the discourse remains fresh and relevant in the global conscience.

In other words, it is a re-programming of global conscience. However, it is imperative that Pakistan develops its narrative into a compelling storyline and institutionalises it to avoid the vocabulary becoming cliché or redundant.

The ultimate challenge for Pakistan will be to make the world 're-think' and 're-imagine' India. This is a step further after making the world 'de-link' from India as the paragon of democracy and virtue.

This will require bringing out the 'alternative truth' about Kashmir – something that India been deliberately hiding from public view.

It is equally essential for Pakistan's narrative to remain de-linked from territory because it gives rise to the default presumption about the country's role in fomenting terrorism in IOK. This is the fictionalised truth created by India, which Pakistan will need to battle all along. To script a meaningful and compelling narrative, broadly speaking, Pakistan should focus on the following three areas.

Identification

First is identifying the target audience. The entire world is a playground for Pakistan's new message.

Amongst others, Pakistan's focus should include: UN Human Rights Council; UN Human Rights Committee; European Union; Amnesty International; International Commission of Jurists; International Committee of the Red Cross; international, regional and local NGOs; global and regional bodies with a focus on international human rights and international humanitarian law; world capitals (Washington D.C., London, Brussels, Moscow, Beijing etc.); renowned media houses and think-tanks; influential media personalities; public sector officials (US Congressmen, parliamentarians); Kashmiri diaspora; Pakistan's own diaspora residing abroad; and (importantly) Indian NGOs, intellectuals, media persons and dissenters.

India over IOK has, over the years, conferred a certain presumption of legitimacy (as opposed to legality) to Indian claims in the eyes of the world. Luckily for Pakistan, this identification exercise is already coming together on its own (without any effort on Pakistan's part). World-renowned media outlets such as NY Times,

Washington Post and BCC have given unprecedented coverage to Indian atrocities in IOK.

Not a day goes by without leading Western newspapers, providing a snapshot into 'on the ground' realities in Kashmir. This is beginning to hurt India really bad. All Pakistan will need to do is to make sure that the line does not go slack and the discourse remains fresh and relevant in global conscience.

Projection

Second is dissemination. Disseminating the message is an area where Pakistan has lagged in the past. Pakistan's message must move from being descriptive to being prescriptive. Projection is required for deeper integration and resonance of the message. Over time, Pakistan's narrative should have its own explanatory power. All this requires tools and capacity building.

Pakistan's diplomats (retired and serving) who have an established track record of serving abroad in world capitals, must be scrambled to world capitals to convey Pakistan's message in a 'lucid, temperate, rational way' (Javed Jabbar, Dawn, 28 August 2019).

It is merely a matter of reversal of roles. India has provided Pakistan with an unprecedented opportunity unlike any in the past. If ever there was a time for Pakistan to turn the tables, it is now. This will require robust state machinery that functions as the back office.

Pakistan should set up a lawfare directorate positioned at a ministerial-level that creatively, consistently and promptly harnesses international law to achieve strategic and policy objectives on Kashmir.

Projection of the narrative also requires a 'bold, vigorous communications strategy.' This can be achieved through a 'comprehensive, multi-dimensional, sustained multi-media campaign' that deploys a range of methods. This should include purchasing and utilising print and electronic media in major countries, opening up centres across the world to project the rich cultural history of Pakistan, etc. (Javed Jabbar, Dawn, 28 August 2019).

In the past, Pakistan has not invested in soft diplomacy. This is an area where India has achieved resounding success. It is high time that Pakistan actively promotes its own culture and that of Kashmiris across the world. Common threads between cultures that can gravitate the world towards Pakistan (tourism, cultural exchanges, festivals, etc.) can go a long way in undoing the country's hard image, an unfortunate consequence of apathy and circumstances. Social media is the most effective tool of communication in today's time and age.

Electronic media such as Twitter is being used consistently and effectively by the Government and the Armed Forces to send out messages on Kashmir. Pakistan will need to further weaponise that space to ensure that its narrative and storylines reach the four corners of the world.

Pakistan should invest in a credible media house similar to RT Russia that can give the 'alternative viewpoint' on events. Besides English, Pakistan should also get its message across in other global languages such as Spanish, French, Chinese, Arabic, and Russian.

Reception

Once Pakistan's message is out, it must double down on efforts to make sure that the message 'gets in.' This is very important because persuasion, alliance-building, and order shaping is a protracted process. It requires persistence, perseverance, and above all, smartness.

Chipping away at India's vulnerabilities and follies at the right time and in the proper manner will sharpen Pakistan's narrative lines. Pakistan will need to strategically marshal its tools and resources regularly to make sure that all boxes are ticked time and again.

A fascist regime, in its hubris and recklessness, managed to do what Pakistan couldn't achieve in 72 years: bring Kashmir at the forefront of international discourse.

Reception of the message will enable Pakistan to build an 'irrefutable belief system' about Kashmir. Pakistan needs a narrative that is self-sustaining and reinforcing. This is the hardest part. The idea is to repeatedly and consistently harp on India's aggression and breaches in Kashmir and present the 'alternative truth.'

Pakistan's end game should be to craft a self-executing belief system that reflects the desire of the global community to see the process of self-determination of Kashmiris through to its logical conclusion.

It is easy to become pessimistic by looking at the fate of recent self-determination movements. However, when the world gets programmed to think in a predetermined way, a cyclical process of 'reinforcement' sets in that makes certain conclusions and outcomes inevitable.

Pakistan can testify that this was done, rather effectively, by India deploying and repeatedly using the term 'terrorism' to condemn Pakistan. Through some luck and some tact, Pakistan too can beat India at this game. It is merely a matter of reversal of roles. India has provided Pakistan with an unprecedented opportunity unlike any in the past.

*If ever there was a time for Pakistan to turn the tables,
it is now.*

Pakistan will need to strategically marshal its tools and resources regularly to make sure that all boxes are ticked time and again.

Till the evening of the 4 August, Pakistan's Kashmir policy was in shambles. It had stopped creating a stir in global circles. However, everything changed on 5 August.

All this has built unprecedented global pressure on India and stoked anxieties in Indian circles. India has managed to keep things under wraps for now. However, it continues to be the focus of the global lens. Pakistan's struggle for nomenclature has been helped by these developments.

Pakistan must now move on and leverage further on this opportunity. It should develop a new narrative based on identification, projection, and reception. The new narrative, if tactfully crafted by Pakistan, will enable it to build consensus on Kashmir in the court of public opinion.

This can propel the Kashmir question forward in a meaningful manner. It can also rain down international opprobrium on India and force it to lose further face in the world and possibly reach out to Pakistan in a desperate bid to save face and avoid further harm to its international reputation.

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03

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The strategic concerns of a country emerge from its geostrategic environment that is formed by two elements; the first, its *geographical location and relations with neighbouring countries*; and second, the *international*

Foreign Policy of Major Powers in South Asia and Beyond: Strategic Concerns for Pakistan

structure or global political system and relations with major/global powers. However, in recent times, the importance of Regionalism has grown immensely. In this context, the chapter aims to discuss and assess contemporary strategic concerns of Pakistan with a focus on interplay of major powers in South Asia and regional politics of Asia-Pacific and Middle East. Pakistan lies at a pivotal location in South Asia which has both strategic and political benefits as well as challenges. The South Asian region has been marked by rivalry between Pakistan and India, the two nuclear states since 1947. However, in their bilateral equation a major role is played by extra-regional powers i.e. United States (US), Russia and China. In order to understand Pakistan's concerns and emerging political trends in South Asia, the study assesses current power politics and regional dynamics in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East as well. Pakistan's apprehensions stem from the growing US-India nexus in South Asia and particularly in Afghanistan, power alignments in the Asia-Pacific directed against China, and delicate balance in the Middle East. The current threats and challenges as well as the patterns of amity and enmity among

the regional states in South Asia and the global powers is a central focus of the study.

Prelude

The international order is once again drifting towards patterns of multi-polarity. Old alliances are being broken and new groupings are emerging (Terhalle, 2015). The world has moved from inter-state wars to intra-state conflicts while hybrid warfare has become a predominant reality. Previously, states used to rule-based on their military might. However, while the importance of military strength has not reduced, economic preponderance has assumed as much significance as a component of national security. States are, therefore, more bound by economic and diplomatic interdependence than ever before (Terhalle, 2015). The rise of China in Asia, a power house of economic activity, and growing US strategic interest in Asia-Pacific has impacted South Asia as well. While the White House came up with an 'Asia Pivot'/Rebalancing Strategy' in 2011 (Katzman, 2019), which is focused but not limited to increasing US military stronghold in Asia-Pacific by the end of this decade; China, meanwhile, pursues an independent foreign policy that is focused on the objective to ensure its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic development (Weissmann, 2015).

This global transitional phase has also trickled down to the regional level. The post-Cold War era has witnessed old regional alignments undergoing critical transition while Asian nations have risen (Khan, 2013). South Asia is bounded by Central Asia, West Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia, and by the Indian Ocean. South Asian politics are largely defined by orthodox rivalry between two nuclear armed states Pakistan and India. Two most important factors that shape South Asian's security situation are Afghanistan and terrorism in the region. With the China-Pakistan Economic

Corridor (CPEC) in the making, South Asia has gained even more attention of the global powers.

The geostrategic and security environment of South Asia has become extremely vulnerable since the Pulwama attack in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), and subsequent course of action taken by India that has heightened tensions between Pakistan and India (Ispahani, 2019). Relations between the two countries remain at the centre of South Asian security calculus, and mainly form its political atmosphere.

Pakistan and India both try to maintain a strategic balance of power in their favour by **first**, maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states in their immediate neighbourhood, and second, by maintaining cordial relations with the extra-regional players especially global powers such as the US, China and Russia (Khan, n.d.).

Interplay of Major Powers in South Asia

Power Imbalance in South Asia- Key Determinants of the Strategic Environment

There exists a natural imbalance in South Asia as India is a larger state than any other country in the region. India has an inherent advantage of size, market, population and colourful cultural outreach. It has the biggest territorial mass, military and economic resources, and higher population, larger political and diplomatic weightage which augments its coercive power in the region particularly towards its archenemy Pakistan (Cohen, 2001). India's belligerent attitude towards Pakistan and its hegemonic ambitions have been more pronounced as its economy has grown and its

military/industrial complex has expanded. India has embarked on an ambitious program for modernisation of its military hardware through comprehensive military diplomacy with global powers as well as with Israel (Khokhar, 2018).

Since the Pulwama attack in IoK on 14 February 2019, the situation in South Asia has become highly volatile. With an eye on elections, Prime Minister Modi cashed it to immediately accused Pakistan of complicity and received sympathetic response from the US and France as well as its own public. Encouraged, India claimed to have undertaken an airstrike against the perceived terrorist training camp in Balakot (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) blatantly violating the Line of Control.

Pakistan's calculated and measured response portrayed the country's resolve to protect its territorial sovereignty against any Indian aggression. The whole episode has once again brought the Kashmir dispute to the international stage as a flashpoint between two nuclear powers. The US and other major powers, including China and Russia, were quick to counsel restraint and offered to mediate. India haughtily refused.

The international community expected India to behave in a more responsible manner commensurate with its size and military power, but was not obliged. Pakistan, therefore, is extremely wary of India's proclivity to up the ante at the slightest pretext.

US-India Nexus as Against Pakistan-China Alignment and Russia, a Balancer

The main determinant of the shifting strategic environment in South Asia is the US-India nexus as against Pakistan-China

alignment. US' biased approach towards India through economic and strategic inducements has tilted the balance of power in South Asia immensely. It includes US undue support to India in its pursuit of NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) membership and permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Meanwhile, expansion of China-Pakistan relations from political to economic domain has enhanced their mutual ties to a strategic level. China's BRI and its flagship project CPEC with Pakistan is not well taken by India and the US. Russia, in this scenario, can take the role of an 'offshore balancer' in the South Asian strategic milieu. Russia's relations with India have come under stress due to India's increased inclination towards the US. However, Pakistan-Russia rapprochement after Russia lifted its arms sale embargo on Pakistan in 2014, has given a sense of balance to the region. The pertinence of Russia, therefore, has amplified many folds in the South Asian context (Khalid, n.d.).

United States

The US-India strategic partnership has solidified their consensus on the mutual drive to contain China and attain a favourable political regime in Afghanistan (Khokhar, 2018).

Unjustified support by US has encouraged India to adopt an extremely inflexible and militaristic foreign and security policy towards the region, specifically directed against Pakistan.

The US has shifted its focus from Pakistan to India motivated by its strategic objectives in the region. It is apprehensive of China's growing economic expansion specifically under its Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore, the US interest is to hamper China's economic rise and hence its 'Contain China policy' co-opts India as an important partner.

China

Meanwhile, Pakistan-China ties have reached new heights of mutual trust, comprehensive engagement and reciprocal cooperation. Their strategic cooperation witnessed progression from geopolitical to geoeconomic domain when several agreements were signed for the USD 62 billion Chinese investment for CPEC under President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI has brought China and Pakistan even more closer not only in political and diplomatic terms, but economic terms. For successful implementation of CPEC under BRI, the security situation of the South Asian region is also of crucial importance.

Meanwhile, China and India are trying to manage their bilateral relations despite longstanding border dispute to secure their shared economic interests while continuing military and political competition as strategic competitors (Jacob, 2019).

India considers the successful prospects of CPEC (as BRI flagship project) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route as a threat to its economic and strategic interests in South Asia as this has the potential to further strengthen Sino-Pakistan bilateral ties and boost their geo-economic and geostrategic outlook in the region and beyond (Jacob, 2019).

Russia

Russia's relations with Pakistan are gradually improving and are viewed as a positive development for both sides. Russia lifted its embargo on arms sales to Pakistan in 2014 and since then bilateral relations between the two states have improved (Younus, 2018). Russia carried out military exercises with Pakistan despite clear reservation from India. China has also encouraged improved ties between Russia and Pakistan. This suits all sides on the Asian chessboard where Sino-Russia partnership is focused on limiting

the US's pervasive influence in Asia. With regard to its relations with India, Russia enjoys historic fraternity since 1947. This relationship developed into a strategic one after the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1971 (Younus, 2018). However, due to growing convergences between US and India, particularly after the US-India Nuclear Cooperation agreement (Bajoria and Pan, 2010), bilateral ties between Russia and India have come under stress. The shift in Russia's approach towards India and Pakistan is driven by its convergence with China in a broader context to counter US hegemony. Moreover, Russia seeks markets for its arms sales and Pakistan seems a plausible option.

Both Russia and Pakistan are at a place where they can benefit from each other and use their relationship to leverage against growing US-India terms.

Stalemate and Contrasting Interests in Afghanistan

The present-day scenario in Afghanistan is one of an 'imbalanced stalemate'. In other words, whereas on the one hand neither the US nor Afghan Taliban have been able to secure an outright military victory, the balance of power has undoubtedly tilted in favour of the Taliban. Withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would only serve America's limited objective of securing an exit.

The US is looking for a face-saving reason to cut itself loose from its longest war abroad without appearing to have given in on demands of the Taliban, who wish to decide the future for Afghanistan on their own terms, in the absence of foreign actors.

In 2018, Moscow took the initiative to encourage talks between Afghan leadership and the Taliban, but the Afghan government refused to attend the first two meetings. The latest round of

negotiations took place in Moscow in February 2019, between the Taliban and prominent Afghans, including former president Hamid Karzai. However, again there was no participation from the Ghani government, evoking anger from the latter (Seligman and Gramer, 2018). The talks failed to agree on a suitable timeline for American withdrawal but produced a nine-point 'basic vision' for post-insurgency Afghanistan (Seligman and Gramer, 2018). The vision emphasised on a commitment to create a strong yet inclusive central government and respect for the fundamental rights of the Afghan citizens. The US and Russia are both in parallel strands making efforts for talks to reach a conclusive solution to the Afghanistan crisis (Biddle, 2013).

Regional dynamics and involvement of outside powers are fundamental to the conflict in Afghanistan. The Afghan leadership, along with US military commanders, characterise much of the insurgency's relentless strength and longevity either directly or indirectly to Pakistan (Biddle, 2013). The situation in Afghanistan has a direct impact on other states in South Asia specifically Pakistan and India. The growing US-India convergences in Afghanistan is divergent to Pakistan's efforts for lasting peace in the region. This scenario further adds to the security apprehensions of Pakistan.

Afghanistan is heavily influenced by India and is being used by it as leverage to destabilise and malign Pakistan (Biddle, 2013). The increasingly growing Indian interest in Afghanistan stems mainly from:

India's broader regional rivalry with Pakistan, which obstructs the former's efforts to form stronger and more direct political and commercial ties with the Central Asian Republics (Kathori, 2018). For Pakistan, a peaceful Afghanistan that is politically stable and internally confident is the key to regional peace. However, all efforts at cordial relations with Afghanistan have remained unsuccessful as Afghan leaders, under Indian influence, are reluctant and distrustful of Pakistan.

Afghanistan mostly maintains cordial ties with its other neighbours, including the Central Asian States, though there is a doubt that rising instability in Afghanistan may affect and complicate these relations (Kenderdine, 2018). Afghanistan also signifies a growing priority for China in the context of broader Chinese objectives in Asia as well as at the global level. For Russia, its interest in Afghanistan is directly linked with the fear of spill over effects in Russia's backyard, Central Asian Republics.

Pakistan as the Vanguard of Fight against Terrorism

The South Asia region has faced the menace of terrorism for decades. Despite huge potential for economic growth, rich natural resources, maritime links/routes, manpower, terrorism has been one of the main impediments to regional development and stability. Terrorism has negatively affected foreign investment in South Asian countries and caused immense economic instability and uncertainty (Thompson, 2018). These countries recognise that terrorism/ terrorist activities have not only hindered economic growth and development in the region, but also negatively impacted relations between them (Kenderine, 2018).

Although most South Asian countries have experienced the fallout of terrorism, Pakistan and Afghanistan have taken a direct hit with pervasive negative impact on their security, stability and strategic (Lakshman, 2019).

However, unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan is not a weak country. It has confronted the wave of terrorism as an upfront state. Unfortunately, time and again Pakistan's sacrifices in its fight against terrorism are not appreciated. India accuses Pakistan for 'playing a proxy war against India' for years by using terrorist groups as a trump card (Lakshman, 2019). In the recent Pulwama attack in IoK, India again blamed Pakistan as a kneejerk reaction without any evidence. Being a victim of terrorism, it is strongly felt in Pakistan, India, encouraged by US, is embarked on a campaign to malign and destabilise Pakistan as a matter of policy.

Pakistan has been internally struggling with the deadly eventualities of terrorism. The operational success against terrorism in various areas within Pakistan has been a result of concerted efforts from Zarb-e-Azb to Radd-ul-Fasaad over a period of at least a decade. Stabilisation in restive areas must now be followed by rehabilitation efforts which are in process (Rhaman, 2017).

The Asia-Pacific and the Middle East are increasingly becoming important for the geostrategic environment of South Asia. The shifting sands of world order has brought multiple actors on the international chessboard with competing interests in one region and cooperative mode of action in other. The inter-regional politics in this context and alignments between states affect the overall strategic environment of regions as well as countries of those regions. Therefore, for a comprehensive assessment of strategic concerns of Pakistan, analyses of the Asia-Pacific and Middle East along with South Asia are equally important. The Asia-Pacific has become a major hub of competition and cooperation for major powers.

Impact of Regional Politics of Asia-Pacific and Middle East on South Asia

The Asia-Pacific has undergone various shifts in its regional alignments and realignments, security order and power equations. In relevance to the relative decline of West, it has evolved into a powerhouse of geopolitical transformations and global economic hub as a part of Asian ascendance. (Kimura, 2015). The accumulation of military power followed by the region's economic development is shifting the balance of power within the region and between Asia and the West (Khan, n.d.). It is a popular belief in the Western academic world that the most important strategic issue today in the rise of China economically as well as its military outreach. China's economy has been increasing by 7 to 10 per cent annually for almost three decades (Ikenberry, 2015). Moreover, China's defence expenditure has amplified by an even higher percentage (Ikenberry, 2015).

Chinese leadership have time and again reiterated its peaceful rise, however, there are grave reservations about it. It is perceived in the West that China will exert its weight to pursue hegemony and influence in the Asia-Pacific and other regions which might lead to conflict with the US and other important players of respective regions like Japan (Ikenberry, 2015). To hedge against this perceived situation, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, Vietnam and others are enhancing their bilateral as well as intra-regional trade, defense and diplomatic ties, trading military technology with each other, and conducting joint military exercises sponsored by US. Moreover, US perceives China's rapid development with apprehension, hence, the formation of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) as an attempt to contain China (Pant and Bommakanti, 2018).

The US has built a network of alliances around China's periphery by developing and enhancing cooperation (economic, military and strategic) with India, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia and Indonesia.

Its proactive involvement in the region and unchecked support of its declared strategic partners in South Asia as a tactic to counter China interprets into what is generally known as its China Containment Policy (Pant and Bommakanti, 2018). Resultantly, this have raised concerns within South Asia too where countries are trying to find their niche and left with the choice to align with one major power or the other.

An economically strong China with its capabilities and stakes in the region will remain a main player in the region's realignments. Russia too is resurging and building allies, for example simultaneously balancing relations with both Pakistan and India. However, the US has still not lost its pre-eminence on regional as well as global level. This evolving situation might strain the present structure of regional relationships. The question is how the countries in South Asia would manage to balance between the competing interests of the US and China (Bukhari and Bukhari, 2016). For South Asia, the shift of strategic focus towards Asia Pacific has become an unrelenting concern in the wake of impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan (Kimura, 2015).

Geostrategically, sitting at the confluence of major regions, Pakistan is vital for trade and commerce links between South and Central Asia, East and West Asia.

Pakistan can also provide practicality to its proposal of providing connectivity to ASEAN via western China and CARs by both land and sea via Gwadar Port (Munir, 2018).

CPEC, presenting a new and positive direction to the emerging Asia-Pacific scenario, has the potential to kick-start a new paradigm of international order based on connectivity and cooperation as opposed to the US model of competition, coercion, conflict and chaos.

Politics of the Middle East and a Delicate Balance

The prevailing strategic churning in the Middle East is not only relevant to the global powers but also regional countries of South Asia. Due to regional congruity the situation in the Middle East has direct and indirect impact on South Asian states, especially Pakistan and India. The Middle East has been relevant in global politics for its rich resources, especially oil. It has always remained on central focus of global powers. The post-colonial order in the Middle East is deteriorating. Arab spring, situation in Syria, Iraq and Libya portray the picture of volatility of the region. Moreover, Islamic State (IS) played a major role in disintegrating peace and stability (Kuo, 2018).

Most of the regimes here are authoritarian in nature and influenced by one major power or the other. Other than the issue of Israel and Palestine, the region is also overshadowed by Saudi-Iran rivalry. The religious and sectarian dimension to the conflicts in Middle East makes the region and neighbouring countries more vulnerable. A very crucial country in Middle East is Israel, a strong ally of the US and India. Israel provides an anchor for American policies and objectives in the region.

Other than sectarian conflicts and regional power politics, for the Middle East, its resources have been a blessing as well as curse. The US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act

(CAATSA) imposed sanctions on Russia, Iran and North Korea. The bill was passed in 2017 and was later signed as a law under President Donald Trump (Katzman, 2019). It forbids other countries to purchase arms and oil from these countries, besides other restrictions. However, CAATSA waivers were provided to eight countries that are India, China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Italy and Greece so that they could purchase oil from Iran. The waiver was for six months and ended on 2 May 2019. The US has already told five countries - China, India, South Korea, Japan and Turkey that they would not be exempted from sanctions anymore after the waivers end. Soon after the US administration announcement, oil prices rose immediately ('US will not reissue waivers for Iran oil imports,' 2019). The scenario where the waiver is not extended, other oil producing countries like Russia and Saudi Arabia will have to produce more oil, thus, making the prices rise even more. This situation would not only disturb Iranian economy, but also irritate the countries trading oil with Iran. Turkey and China have already opposed this decision. Moreover, decisions like these would not serve regional stability ('US will not reissue waivers for Iran oil imports,' 2019).

In the context of volatile situation in Middle East, South Asia remains at the brunt of any spill over effect. South Asian states, especially Pakistan, share historic cultural and religious bond with the Middle East. Moreover, both regional powers of South Asia; Pakistan and India, have a great number of diasporas in the region. The religious and sectarian diversity in Pakistan is also linked with the Middle East. Conflicts and issues in the latter have both security and economic stakes for South Asian countries.

Indian policy planners have long conceded that it was impossible for India to replace Pakistan in the Middle East and maintained only an energy dependency relationship with the region. However, since 2018, perceptions about Pakistan and India have significantly changed in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran are investing

geopolitically and strategically in India. Pakistan has to walk a tight rope in an attempt to maintain the delicate balance in its relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan shares historic and religious bond with Saudi Arabia. However, Iran as a neighbour cannot be ignored.

It is also important to focus on dynamics injected by the global powers in the Middle East.

Conflict in Syria has lingered on partly due to power politics and confusion in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where initially major powers vetoed each other's decisions and resolution seemed impossible. The unchecked situation in Syria allowed IS to expand its tentacles into other regions, including South Asia.

The US decision to proclaim Jerusalem as Israel's capital in 2017 and then issuing a map depicting Golan Heights as Israeli territory in April 2019 was a clear provocation (Badie, 2019). Lastly, in context of Pakistan and India, the Indo-Israel nexus is noteworthy. For Pakistan, the Israeli entrenchment in South Asia vis a vis India is of crucial importance (Ayub, 2019). Israel not only provides defense aid to India but has also supported India's course of actions staunchly in the aftermath of Pulwama attack in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK) in February 2019 (Ispahani, 2019).

With India being backed by US and Israel in its attempts to malign and destabilise Pakistan, the South Asian region can never be peaceful. China and Russia however, are using balanced approach towards South Asia that is providing relative stability to the region for now.

Strategic Concerns of Pakistan and Way Forward

The geostrategic milieu in the South Asia is volatile and dynamic. A new course of relations among regional countries is dependent on global Super Power competition between the US and China. China has fully focused on the South Asian region to establish alliances that could augment her economic advancement. In addition to advancing its economic ties with Pakistan, China has developed credentials with India and Afghanistan as well. Like China, the US is also making efforts for regional cooperation and has invested billions of dollars to sustain its presence in the region, specifically in Afghanistan.

Strategic Concerns

1. Pakistan has finally reached a conclusion that US can never be an all-weather friend. Both countries share more of a transactional relationship. Therefore, dependence on the US has proven to be misplaced. However, Pakistan cannot afford to have 'bad' ties with Washington, therefore, while advancing its relationship with China, managing ties with the US is a major strategic concern right now.
2. Pakistan has regained its relevance in international politics through CPEC and contemporary efforts for peace talks on Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan is no more an independent country which could exert its will on its foreign relations with its immediate neighbours. Afghanistan's affairs are being driven under the influence of regional as well as extra-regional powers. (Nazar, 2018) Being a neighbour, Pakistan is wary of future situation in Afghanistan amidst the presence of external influencers, especially India.
3. Pakistan has fought terrorism for a long time and is now faced with challenges of rehabilitation in affected areas and dwindling economy. With recent blasts in Quetta (Khan,

2019), Gwadar (Safi, 2019) and Lahore (Jarh et al., 2019), once again security situation is vulnerable. In an environment like this, when Pakistan needs to focus on CPEC as return of terrorism or border infiltration remains a serious concern.

4. India, the biggest market in South Asian region, has the advantage of being an irresistible destination for both the US and China. India developed cordial ties with both competitors while consolidating its presence in Afghanistan on the US bandwagon. This trajectory of US, China, Russia and India has grave challenges for Pakistan in terms of security.
5. Trying to stay neutral and not choosing a side in the hindsight of power competition in the Asia-Pacific and maintenance of delicate balance in its relations with Saudi-Arabia and Iran in the Middle East is a challenging but much needed task for Pakistan in contemporary milieu.

Way Forward

The current geostrategic milieu of South Asia demands foreign policy adjustments from Pakistan that sustain strategic relations with China; enhance bilateral cooperation with Russia; continue efforts to de-escalate hostility and distrust with India; engage US' cooperation in economic sectors within Pakistan; and alleviate trust deficit to improve ties with Afghanistan and Iran.

For a policy like that to work, regional engagements i.e. 'Regionalism' will play a pivotal role. Regional organisations in this regard also hold great significance. While the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has become redundant, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with both Pakistan and India as members can play an imperative role.

Pakistan should continue to foster its relations with neighbouring countries to mitigate differences and encourage collective efforts against regional challenges like reconstruction in Afghanistan, rehabilitation of Afghan refugees, fight against terrorism, maintaining balance between rival/competing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, the US and China.

It is also imperative to highlight that Pakistan has not lost its relevance in the larger regional political context nor can it afford any rivalry with the US. Therefore, maintaining cordial ties with all countries and extracting benefits from bilateral and multilateral relationships can help Pakistan come out of its economic and diplomatic challenges.

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04

Shazia Nawaz

Humanitarian worker, having worked with UNICEF, ACTED, and IFRC, albeit, mostly with the ICRC (for 17 years to date) around the globe as well as in Pakistan. Currently based in Sudan.

Who am I?

As a Pakistani female, born and raised in Peshawar, I recognise the privilege that I had in pursuing my education. My father, who I have always had the loving support of, encouraged me to begin my career with an international organisation.

Pakistan/Pakistani in a Foreigner's Eyes: Changing Perceptions

My Career

Working with an international humanitarian organisation, one of the largest in the world, has been a unique honour. It has afforded me the opportunity to travel and serve humanity in a variety of regions and countries.

My First International Assignment

I would like to share my experience while on my first international assignment from my Peshawar office. First, I was the first female who was sent on this assignment from our organisation in Pakistan which was a courageous step in supporting gender equality.

My first reaction - surprise!

When I arrived at my duty station, my foreign colleagues were in awe to see that there was a woman coming to work with them, especially after having learnt I was from Peshawar - their eyes

widened with amazement, almost if though they were looking at a monster.

The questions that followed were mostly directed towards my lifestyle and life choices.

‘How come you aren’t wearing a veil or an *abaya*?’

‘How could your parents give you permission to travel and live alone in a country like Pakistan and from a place like Peshawar no less?’

They had a very different picture of a Pakistani female - one who stayed at home without any education or abilities to survive in the ‘outside’ world. Their amazement grew when they learned about my education (I have done MSc (Hons.) in Agriculture Chemistry and MBA in Accounting from Peshawar University). It was worth seeing the look on their faces as they started to ‘discovered’ things about me, my background, education and parents which completed different from what they had generally heard or read.

This was the time when Pakistan was battling terrorism - a time when female education in the country was considered impossible by the foreign world.

My Reaction/Contribution

I am very glad that I was able to change how a Pakistani girl is perceived. They were expecting a girl which the global media often portrays - instead, they came to know someone who is empowered, educated, and a strong, proud Pakistani. By virtue of this identity, I was able to change their mind-set about Pakistani society and its people.

I answered their questions without overreacting despite the realisation that the perceptions of my new colleagues were clearly coming from old books and media hype. Without any formal degree or training in diplomacy or international relations, I was acting as an 'Ambassador of Pakistan.'

The Challenge

I still remember that many of my fellow co-workers were fearful when any city in Pakistan was offered to them as an assignment. For some odd reason, they used to hide it from me, probably because they did not want to offend me. However, when they did share their fears with me and we engaged in a dialogue where they expressed their concerns, I heard them out. Their primary fear was security, to which I simply replied 'I go home to Peshawar for my holidays, would I do that if I feared for my safety and security'? and, 'had they not seen me coming back safe and sound without any issues?'

Good and bad things can happen anywhere and anytime. Pakistan is no exception, but this does not make it a 'bad' country.

My impression was that once they voiced their fear to someone who was from there, apprehensions did not feel as overwhelming and realistic.

Interestingly, one of my hesitating colleagues went to Pakistan and found his soul mate in Pakistan.

Yes, he married a 'Pakistani girl'!

Later, he told me that accepting the assignment in Pakistan was the best decision of his life.

The Lesson

Being a Pakistani, I feel that we have additional responsibilities on our shoulder when we meet a foreigner or travel abroad since we need to demonstrate from our attitude and behaviour what being a true Pakistani is - whether as a male or a female.

Creating awareness about Pakistan and presenting the real picture to change the negative image of our country is a responsibility all of us need to shoulder with grace, patience and dignity. Though it may not always be easy, it is not impossible either!

Nuclear and Hybrid Warfare: Important Lessons

My Message to you
all is of hope, courage
and confidence

Muhammad Ali Jinnah

05

Dr Adil Sultan

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Introduction

India's nuclear doctrine of 2003 contained several inconsistencies that have been further compounded by statements made by senior members of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), signaling a possible shift in India's 'No First Use' (NFU) posture. These statements could be intended to dissuade Pakistan from contemplating the early use of nuclear weapons and create space for a conventional conflict.

India's Shift from a 'No First Use' Nuclear Doctrine: Implications for Regional Stability

The ambiguity created by India's senior leadership on the country's NFU commitment is likely to compel Pakistan to take remedial measures and ensure the credibility of its deterrence posture, which could end up into a renewed arms competition between the two regional neighbours.

India professes that China, not Pakistan, is its principal adversary but the bulk of its military deployments and doctrinal postulations – both conventional as well as nuclear – remain Pakistan-specific. Statements by the Indian leadership threatening Pakistan with a nuclear ‘First Strike’, while maintaining its NFU commitment towards China could be aimed to achieve ‘escalation dominance’ over the former and maintain a posture of ‘assured retaliation’ towards the latter. India, nevertheless, does not have the potential to maintain two different postures against the two countries with asymmetric military potential, thus, further complicating the regional deterrence matrix.

India’s Nuclear Doctrine

India released its Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in 1999, within a year of becoming an overt nuclear weapon state. Subsequently, the draft was modified and released as an official nuclear policy on 4 January 2003. It contained several inconsistencies that became more evident with increase in its nuclear capabilities that are difficult to categorise as ‘minimum’.

Box-1

Key Features of India’s 2003 Nuclear Doctrine

Building and maintaining a *credible minimum deterrent*.

A NFU posture – nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.

Nuclear retaliation to a First Strike will be *massive* and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.

In the event of a major attack against India or on Indian forces anywhere, through biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.

Inherent Inconsistencies in India's 2003 Nuclear Doctrine

Credible Minimum Deterrence?

India maintains that it will continue to follow a policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) without specifying, who the intended *deterree* is - China or Pakistan? India professes that China remains its principal adversary, but the bulk of its military deployments and doctrinal developments remain Pakistan-specific. If India claims developing a 'credible' deterrence posture against China, it cannot remain 'minimum' against Pakistan; and likewise, a 'minimum' posture against Pakistan will not be 'credible' against China.

To deal with this 'minimum-credible' paradox, accentuated by two different dyadic deterrence relationships (India-China and India-Pakistan), India could possibly consider 'decoupling' its nuclear strategy. This could enable it to justify the ongoing nuclear build-up against the 'projected' threat (China), while providing options to pursue more aggressive strategies against its 'principal' challenger (Pakistan). This, in theory, may help address some of the grey areas that continue to undermine the credibility of India's nuclear posture, but is likely to further complicate operational challenges for managing nuclear deterrence against two different Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs).

India's military modernisation, which include amongst other things, the development and operationalising of its nuclear triad and 'Continuous At Sea Nuclear Deterrent' (CASD) potential, would increase its reach beyond the Indian Ocean. It is also building Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs), and Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABMs). All these developments combined together far exceed India's requirement of a 'minimum'

deterrence and cannot be justified under the rubric of CMD posture.

India's No-NFU Posture

India's 2003 nuclear doctrine states: 'NWs [Nuclear Weapons] will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere,' but this was made conditional and the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons, even if attacked by biological or chemical weapons, was also retained. This effectively nullified the NFU commitment that India continues to officially propagate actively as one of the central tenets of its nuclear use policy.

Some recent statements by senior decision-makers indicate that India could possibly contemplate the option of a First Strike against Pakistan, which would be in contrast to its NFU commitment. There is also a possibility that the use of these two strategic constructs - 'First Strike' and 'First Use' that have different connotations, could be due to lack of clarity as several senior members of the NCA have used these terms interchangeably.

'First Use' is commonly understood as an effort to warn the adversary about the consequences of the failure to retreat from aggressive posturing and is generally limited in scope. If used in self-defense, this could be considered as legitimate. 'First Strike', on the other hand, would aim to destroy an opponent's capacity to retaliate by launching a pre-emptive counterforce strike. The force required to achieve this objective may be massive, and would thus, fall under the purview of aggression, and is therefore, considered unambiguously illegal.

In the peculiar South Asian environment even a limited counterforce First Strike by one may be construed as massive by the other, thus adding pressures on the national leadership to skip intermediate rungs of the escalation ladder and resort to the exchange of strategic weapons.

Notwithstanding these inherent dangers, several high ranking Indian officials, including the former Strategic Forces Commander-in-Chief Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal, former Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, and former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, and more recently, the incumbent Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, have all indicated that India might be on its path to modify the NFU commitment. In his book, Shivshankar Menon also hinted that India could contemplate a pre-emptive nuclear strike even against the 'threat of use' by the adversary. This is not only in contrast to India's NFU pledge, but could also be destabilising, especially once New Delhi does not have the means to verifiably conclude when the opponent would be preparing to actually launch its nuclear weapons.

India's notion of a counterforce First Strike may be different from its classical definition i.e., a bolt-from-the-blue attack. Notwithstanding the nomenclature and rationale provided by the Indian officials, it seems India may be drifting away from its long held position of NFU, in favour of a counterforce pre-emptive First Strike.

For India, to build its potential to launch First Strike against Pakistan, it would need significant increase in its nuclear weapons, besides building requisite Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Without these capabilities, ambiguous statements on the NFU commitment would further erode the credibility of India's deterrence posture.

Implications for Regional Stability

Nuclear doctrines are not a *fixity* and could change depending upon the nature of the evolving threat and technological achievements. This, nevertheless, would be considered as rationale and credible, only if the strategic constructs developed provide clarity of the intent, and are compatible with the existing nuclear potential. In India's case - both seems to be lacking.

New Delhi is building overall military strength, including its nuclear capability, primarily to emerge as a potential global power with no 'existential' threat to its security. This is reflected in the ongoing developments that are not in consonance with its 'perceived' threat against China or against the 'actual' challenger Pakistan.

India formally maintains an NFU posture to project itself as a responsible NWS, while developing options for a 'First Strike' or 'First Use' against Pakistan.

Despite enjoying significant conventional military advantage, India finds it difficult to exploit the space for a conventional military conflict with Pakistan. Its limited war-fighting doctrine of Cold

Start, which was introduced in 2004, has been rendered obsolete after the introduction of Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) by Pakistan. To overcome this hurdle, India resorted to a land-based surgical strike in 2016, and emboldened by lack of response from the Pakistani side, India launched an aerial surgical strike in February 2019 against Pakistan and claimed killing more than 300 'terrorists'. These claims could not be later validated, but in the bargain, the Pakistan Air Force managed to launch a riposte and shot two Indian aircrafts.

India now again finds itself out of credible options to deal with the Pakistan challenge. Rajnath Singh's statement on the possibility of India giving up on its NFU posture could, therefore, be aimed at *dissuading* Pakistan from contemplating the early use of nuclear weapons in a future crisis, while opening a space for a limited conventional conflict. Notwithstanding the nuclear grandstanding, India does not have the potential to launch a decapitating First Strike against Pakistan. It also does not have the requisite ISR capabilities to identify Pakistan's storage sites. Even with the world's third largest nuclear inventory at its disposal, a counterforce First Strike would not be able to guarantee that India's major cities would be spared from the destruction caused by Pakistan's response.

India and Pakistan are now established nuclear powers with credible nuclear deterrence that makes the possibility of an all-out war unthinkable. Indian decision-makers' penchant to indulge in a behaviour of *nuclearism* would only erode the credibility of their country's deterrence posture, while adding compulsions for its principal challenger Pakistan to take corrective measures, and ensure the credibility of its deterrence posture, thus, keeping the region in a state of perpetual instability.

06

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The emergence of Information and Communication

Technologies (ICTs) has paved the way for changes in several spectrums of human society. Their use is not really a modern phenomenon. However, with issues crossing borders, societies becoming more vulnerable, and disputes turning into large-scale

conflicts, studying the role and use of ICTs has become vital. More so, nowadays, there is hardly any discussion about ICTs, especially in the context of conflict, without the words 'Hybrid Warfare' or '5th Generation Warfare' getting thrown in.

A New Era of Hybrid Warfare: Present and Future Trends

In the modern developed world, where states work assiduously to avoid being labeled as extroverts of hard power; sociopolitical groups and religious parties strive hard to seek legitimacy for their causes(s), use of hard power and opting for direct violence, is not an option. Modern warfare has become indirect. Instead of using traditional Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and confronting an adversary face-to-face in a conflict zone, Hybrid Warfare

requires involvement of 'insurgents' and 'protestors' instead of conventionally armed soldiers.

There is no erudite universal definition of Hybrid Warfare available. According to Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2017: 6), understanding about this concept is still underdeveloped. Resultantly, this slows down the ability to address it (Korybko 2017). However, despite several perspectives, it is generally agreed that Hybrid Warfare is a systematic use of state and non-state actors in military, political, economic, civilian, informational (MPECI)-related conflicts (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017). It is a strategic coordinated approach to exploit a nation's vulnerabilities in the aforementioned areas.

This is an area where the use of secret agents engaged in covert operations is replaced by non-state actors who are overtly engaged in public activities as civilians. However, such indirect warfare requires increased use of communication technologies and public platforms. Social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and applications like WhatsApp may function as new hideouts of such insurgents.

The intangible fault lines or a nation's vulnerabilities are multifaceted in nature. The Colour Revolution of the 2000s that occurred separately in Balkan States, Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and Far East Asia, has been widely discussed as precursor of modern Hybrid Warfare. This series of protests and the wave of revolutions were strengthened due to the impact and role of various anti-state actors. In case of Afghanistan, ethnic conflicts and the power struggle between various groups like Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks etc. has resulted prolonged bloody and

violent conflict. In case of Iran, ethnics groups including Azeris, Turks, Kurds, Balochs and Arabs have also been at loggerheads.

Pakistan, too, has been facing multifaceted challenges related to its national security for quite some time. Furthermore, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being actualised and challenging relations with India, the threat to national security has become even graver. According to Korybko (2017), Pakistan's rich diversity, which is its biggest asset, can also be easily manipulated to wangle violent conflicts in the country. In his opinion, unfriendly groups, organisations and countries will utilise and encash every opportunity to destabilise Pakistan.

The first such threat is the Baloch-Pakhtun narrative which has gained immense momentum in Balochistan province. The claim of being ethnically discriminated, unequal distribution of resources between the provinces, alleged ethnic cleansing of certain groups and other sociopolitical are fault-lines that need to be examined in the provincial context of Fifth Generation Warfare. In the context of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a similar narrative was persistent in the context of the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Other narratives which can be potential threats are military and police operations. The narrative being exploited around CPEC are mostly Punjab-centric. Wherein, it is argued that Punjab province is the sole beneficiary of the project. Along with this narrative, the other potential threats could be protests on issues related to farmers, trade unions and other civil society associations. In the context of Sindh, political discrimination of Urdu speaking population, military and police operations have captured significant social media attention. Another factor to be wary of is the hijacking of 'protest movements' – even if they begin on peaceful, legitimate, and legal grounds.

Projecting Power through Cyber Space

According to Mann (1992), ICTs have surgical effects on military warfare; information theory, artificial intelligence, and military technologies. His Chaos Theory outlines how social media has been weaponised. Nissen (2015) argues that the Internet and social media now functions as 'Command and Control' for operations with Cyber Space becoming a modern battlefield where countries engage against other to spread desirable narratives and anti-narratives. Both state and non-state actors delve into social networks in the cyber space to maximise their influence and achieve their goals.

As in the case of Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) used Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other social media platforms to disseminate their information and message. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has also been exploiting the Internet for their nefarious purposes. This Weaponisation of Social Media has enhanced Hybrid War through cyberspace.

Power Projection and Techniques

According to Hughes and Wacker (2003), at present, countries combine their military and economic power with advancements in IT waging psychological warfare through electronic means. Modern Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) is fought through various means which also includes conducting Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).

There is a thin line between whether PSYOPS conducted to inform or influence. In either case, they do not remain limited to traditional practices of radio broadcasts or dropping leaflets. Videos, comments, statuses, trolls, memes and messages are used

in tandem to create content aiming at informing or disinforming public. Analysing the use of social media in the Palestinian-Israel War of 2012, Mouton, Pillay and Wout (2015) found an unprecedented use of social media for PSYOPS. They found that the Israel Defence Force targeted the Palestinian population through Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr by posting graphic details of operations conducted posted online.

Cyber Space is now used more strategically than half a decade ago. Information operations in Hybrid War include several steps. First, a piece of 'information' regarding an issue or a conflict (depending upon a country's vulnerabilities) is created. The initial purpose is merely to *inform* the public. The second step is to *influence*. At this level, a more persuasive approach is adopted by the manipulation of existing facts, misleading arguments (and content). This can result in *coercing* opinions held by a target population. Creating persuasive messages sometimes also includes exposing unreported facts of a relevant group or party. After this, a COPE (Create Once, Publish Everywhere) strategy is used. This may include information flooding (through real and fake accounts in case of social media), promoting a certain types of content to deter and diminish undesirable opinions and propagating it through trolls. These information operations are planned subsequent to Human Factor Analysis (HFA) and Target Audience Analysis (TAA). It has already been widely found that social media is an effective tool to gather information about the public. The HFA is conducted through various means. For example, the case of Cambridge Analytica revealed how mining, fishing, collection and interpretation of data was strategically done to acquire empirical factors to target specific audiences. The HFA includes analysis of existing opinions of the public, their grievances, media literacy level, experiences (individual, group and media) and social hierarchy. The TAA includes conducting psychographics of a target audience. Such analyses do not require high-end equipment or scientific skills. A simple discourse analysis of public

discussions, a semiotic approach on statuses and digital media content can help in this regard. CYOPS (Cyber Operations) are also an integral part of Hybrid War wherein, critical infrastructure of a country is targeted. *Operation Stuxnet* was targeted at Iran through an Israeli malware which infiltrated the Natanz Nuclear Facility through a USB stick. Likewise, India carried out a three-year long *Operation Hangover* to attack Pakistan through cyber space.

Threshold

Hybrid War has three-way impacts - cognitive, virtual, and physical. The cognitive influence has much more lasting effects than the latter two. When citizens of a country are made to believe in narratives created by an adversary, the overall social fabric of a state gets disintegrated. In order to maximise penetration, adversaries plan their operations which target the most vulnerable population. This way warfare does not remain limited to borders and occur inside and outside a country. Many a times, a conflict may be 'created' in the peripheral areas first, gaining momentum and strength by moving inwards to core areas of a country or region. Due to the localised and regionalised nature of these conflicts, they are more cost-efficient and less politically sensitive in the context of a country's foreign relations (Korybko 2015). Another effect is physical, where critical cyber infrastructure of a country or a group is targeted (through cyber attacks). This can result in impacting public service delivery, and even military operations.

Mann (1992) argues that the geopolitical nature of war will define the modern warfare. In modern society, the interconnectedness of socio-political phenomena play a very crucial role. No adversary would have to militarily attack its opponent if it can be horn-locked in internal conflicts. Trade unions, political parties, religious groups, professional associations, social and civil society groups, if mobilised through cyberspace, can paralyse the whole economic and political system of a country. The negative effect of such socio-

political deadlock is much more long lasting than a short-timed war.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Hybrid Warfare is a systematic use of soft and hard power by manipulating cyberspace against a country or a group. Its consequences can be immensely detrimental for a state's security, stability, economic growth and socio-religious solidarity. A country, like Pakistan, with nascent IT infrastructure and data protection laws, needs to be extra vigilant and adopt a proactive approach with regard to Hybrid Warfare. A proactive approach includes self-introspection about the issues the state faces internally, and which can be and are being, manipulated by adversaries. More research and development is needed in the areas of Human Factors Analysis and Target Audience Analysis. Anti-state narratives on social media must also be tackled diligently. However, counter narratives should not be arbitrarily spread over cyberspace. They must be well-planned. One such approach is the 4D Approach (Deter, Diminish, Delve, Detonate). During such campaigns, PSYOPS could also be used to strengthen desirable narratives and encounter adversarial propaganda.

The draft for Cyber Security Policy resides with the Ministry of Information Technology, its finalisation and promulgation needs to be taken up urgently. There is also a need for joint civil and military coordination for Cyber Security Assessment and Response (e.g. through Computer Emergency Response Teams [CERTs]) since Pakistan's readiness needs to be multi-sectoral and multi-layered. It is important to have more awareness at the national level about the challenges arising from Hybrid Warfare.

For example, while the need for action and a policy on cyber security is essential, there must be a balance between security and the fundamental legal rights of citizens as well. In this regard, the role of academia and education becomes vital. The latter will also impact the state's human capital and capacity, which remains, weak in the area of cyber security. As a nation-state, Pakistan's change leaders must be cognizant that:

....societal fault-lines can [not] be tackled through state-sponsored meta-narratives and by suppressing dissent....taking the iron fist route only opens ourselves further to the very vulnerabilities that can be targeted. The thing to do is to make people feel that they are better off and better protected by being part of the state rather than opting out. That feeling of belonging is a function of participation, not alienation and isolation (Haider 2019).

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Getting Governace and Economics Right

No nation can rise
to the height of glory
unless your women are
side by side with you.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah

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Newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan had sworn repeatedly he would never walk up to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ask for loans as previous governments had repeatedly done (Zaidi, 2019, p. 157).

Pakistan in a Neoliberal World: Reflections on Ideology and Political Economy

Pakistan had become a regular visitor of the Washington-based institution: since 1980, thirteen times such loans were requested and then extended to Islamabad. This rate makes roughly for a loan every three years, ranging from USD 300 million USD in 1993 to USD 7.2 billion in 2008. If we go all the way back to 1958, the total amount of loans in 2019 would be around USD 27 billion.

IMF sponsored loans are supposed to help a country unable it to confront by itself a serious deficit in its balance of payments, usually the result of trade imbalances (more imports than exports). These issues often times are accompanied by currency devaluation and inflation. They are likely to harm or forestall altogether economic growth, employment and ultimately, for countries like Pakistan, sustained development. Social unrest and political radicalisation are the most dangerous consequences of letting an economy slip further into a serious and prolonged crisis. Born together with its sister institutions (the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades, now the World Trade Organization) in Bretton Woods, US in 1944, the IMF was supposed

precisely to help countries in financial strains to stabilise their economy and avoid all that. The idea was that a healthy, thriving economy is the best antidote against social havoc and political jingoism – the 1929 crisis and eventual Hitler’s ascent to power were memories all too vivid for the 43 countries gathered in New Hampshire.

But when looking at Pakistan, one is bound to ask, ‘why so many loans?’ As discussed, the declared mission of the IMF is to stabilise a country economy in specific dire moments. It is not to become a form of life support, a constant provider of financial resources to face a seemingly chronic sickness.

What happened? Who is responsible for this state of affairs?

It is obvious that Pakistani elites in charge must to a great extent be held accountable for what appears to be, at the very least, gross incompetence. Pundits and scholars more qualified than the present author have already provided extensive and valuable research to account for the domestic responsibilities when considering Pakistan’s permanent ills – singling out in particular elites’ mismanagement, corruption, poor governance and faulty budget allocation (Zaidi, 2005; Zaidi, 2019; Bengali, 2019; Ahmed, 2009 & Khan, 2009). We cannot, of course, ignore or overlook any of those factors if we wish to provide a comprehensive explanation for the repeated IMF loans over the course of the years. However, in this essay, I want to focus on the wider international environment that made Pakistan no different from dozens of other countries across the globe. Whatever the Pakistani elites did or didn’t do, it was not enough, on its own, to make the country unique in its repeated and unholy pilgrimages to DC.

Whenever economic and financial issues arise, Pakistan has to deal with them in the context of an international environment that features opportunities (not many) and constraints (a lot). Pakistan did not have a voice in shaping this context. Consequently, it seems to have little choice whether to accept certain rules and policies or not.

And here lies the crux of my argument: if we frame the international context in which Pakistan must operate as an issue of choice or lack thereof, then Pakistani economic predicaments do not lie solely, or even primarily, in the economic domain. They become a political issue.

The Problem of Ideology

This political issue stems from an ideology that has come to set the standards for how economics and the finances are to be dealt with. This ideology, variously known as 'Neoliberalism' (the term I will use herein), 'free market capitalism' or 'market fundamentalism' (particularly used by Stiglitz, 2016), has become such a staple element of contemporary global governance that we do not even recognise it as such. I did not choose the word 'ideology' lightly. Amongst the most disputed terms in social sciences, ideology has been defined in a variety of ways.

Neoliberalism is an ideology in two distinct and quite different fashions. It is an ideology because it entails a certain assessment of reality; a desire to shape such reality; and a master plan to do so. Neoliberalism believes in capitalism and markets as sites conducive to human freedom. Limitations to markets operation in the form of state intervention in the economy limit or hamper such freedom. Hence, such undue interference ought to be removed by enhancing privatisation and liberalisation. In the global era, we are

living, the corollary of an open national economy, with free trade and capital (but not people) mobility, ought to follow suit as well. But Neoliberalism is an ideology also in another way. In the Marxist tradition, ideology refers to a systematic misapprehension or mystification of reality, a clouded view that covers as a veneer the true state of affairs beneath it.

It is by trying to reconcile these two definitions of ideology that the import of Neoliberalism can be laid bare. On the one hand, there is what Neoliberalism claims to fight for – a freer, more emancipatory version of capitalism, properly in tune with human nature rational inclination to seek for more prosperity and wealth. In this sense, Neoliberalism strives to remove via scientific, technical procedures rooted in an objective understanding of the economy the various impediments that stand in the way of the proper fulfillment of this project: more freedom, more economic growth, the two barely distinguishable in its rhetoric. In the neoliberal vision, the market is the space where prosperity and liberty are created. Crucially, the market self-regulates itself, and thus, any interference with this law-like proposition is undue and detrimental.

On the other hand, Neoliberalism has been able to masquerade a politico-economic project precisely under the guise of such purely technical administration of economic processes. It has purported these processes as consonant with an allegedly specific logic dominating the economy, a logic that mimics the laws of nature in its inescapability and therefore, renders mute – or even absurd - any attempt at confronting it or advancing alternatives. This project aims to foster free markets, ultimately, to secure the social, political and economic dominance of a certain class – transnational capitalist elites – at the expenses of all the others.

Far from being concerned with rekindling economic growth, Neoliberalism configures instead as a massive process of dispossession of publicly held assets at the expenses of the vast majority of people (Harvey, 2007a; Harvey, 2007b). The cures it proposes for healing faltering economies answer to this purpose, not to any alleged desire to make mismanaged economic systems conform to the 'proper' logic of the market.

Neoliberalism, in its unabashed adoption of a radical notion of free markets, has brought to bear Karl Polanyi's (1944) fateful warning about the consequences of this embrace. A market-driven conceptualisation of the economy would submit people to the needs of the market: not the market to the needs of the people. Polanyi famously labelled this condition 'disembeddedness': uprooting the economy off of its social and political soil, where its ultimate *raison d'être* (fostering and sustaining human wellbeing) lies. Polanyi saw nothing but misery in doing so. When humans are made subservient to a logic fundamentally other than their own survival, welfare and sense of meaning, they will resist such imposition. Only coercion will make, then, the logic of the market dominant, with the attendant obvious, terrible costs:

The idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark Utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness (p. 3).

Neoliberalism is nothing but the project of extending the logic of free markets across the political-economic domain in its fullest. Where Neoliberalism sees, avers and postulates a separation between the two, with the political (read the state and the public) as inherently inimical to the economic (read the individual and the private), it seeks to make consonant with this vision countries, societies and people, wherever they might be. But such distinction

and the implications that Neoliberalism draws from it are fallacious. The political and the economic are not separated; and limiting their interaction is not a golden path to freedom and emancipation. The opposite, according to Polanyi and others after him (such as Dependency Theory economist Gunder Frank), is true: the fictitious separation must be enforced; that specific articulation of freedom properly marketed and sold - if that is freedom at all, that is.

Law Enforcement

Therefore, if Neoliberalism at its core conjures up an attempt to shape politics and economy along the supposed needs and imperatives of the market, Pakistan has become only one of the stages where this project has unfolded. The narrative provided is quite straightforward: the country's chronic economic imbalances have been due to a failure to structure the economy in ways consonant to the inner logic of the market. Pakistan has to abide by economic laws, objective and scientific, laws that reflect and speak of self-adjusting markets. If in Pakistan we don't witness self-adjusting markets, something is wrong with Pakistan - not with the way Neoliberalism has posited markets to function. State intervention into the economy, in the form of public ownership or monopoly of key sectors of the industry, manufacturing, commerce, communication, transportation and natural resources were the main culprits. Privatisation via selling of these public assets ought to fix this state of affairs. Furthermore, consider social policies tackling inequality and poverty, price controls and subsidies to staple consumption items, social security and public welfare measures: in Neoliberal orthodoxy, none of these cannot be provided by the market in ways inherently more efficient and thus just a fortiori.

The bloated public sector, home to too many civil servants, ought to be trimmed down in the name, again, of efficiency.

Looking to the outer world, restrictions to international trade and capital mobility, foreign direct investments and joint ventures, transnational acquisitions and merging had either to be relaxed or wholeheartedly abandoned. It was a matter to conform to economic laws: in the same way Pakistan conforms to the law of gravity, as it would be foolish, pointless and counterproductive to resist it. However, given that economic laws proved less compelling than natural ones, adherence to such positively inescapable diktats became a matter of compliance, which had to be enforced, if necessary, over the stubborn and reluctant country.

I must warn the reader here. There is nothing inherently wrong with the provisions that Neoliberalism suggests if they were taken and implemented for what they are: tools that can, but need not to, be used, in a careful, deliberate and selective fashion.

Some are appropriate in certain circumstances (dismantling state monopolies if they turn out to be inefficient and rent-seeking industries); others are not (indiscriminate opening to foreign imported goods may flood the market and drive small local business to failure, with destructive social costs). Some are good only in combination with other, others only on their own. Some require time, and change can be slow, even painstaking. But crucially, they should always be considered tools to serve people. The basic un-human aspect of Neoliberalism is that it purports those and similar measures as good in and of themselves because consonant with the logic of the market: their adoption alone would

be necessary and sufficient in and of itself to guarantee the welfare of the people. Eventually.

For the time being, Neoliberal measures comport such drastic and cumbersome restructuring of a country's economy (and consequently life) that they would meet the sternest opposition of those vast sectors of the population immediately affected by them. Again Polanyi described this resistance as a 'second movement', opposing the 'first' one introducing free markets: people would seek state intervention in the form of economic regulation and social protection. Trade unionism is in this sense a clear and paramount example of the 'second movement', and thus, it is no surprise that Neoliberalism looks at them as dangerous enemies towards their cherished free market reforms.

Such societal resistance can be quite sturdy indeed. It is then best to impose Neoliberal re-adjustment only when possible to do so: the opportunity to achieve compliance with Neoliberal guidelines manifested any time Pakistan found itself in the dire economic predicaments mentioned above. The request of financial relief configured an opportunity to steer and push Pakistani economy towards more privatisation, liberalisation and free trade. Each loan has featured conditionalities, tighter and tighter strings attached to it, a form of tied aid that intended to twist the arm of the country towards a market-driven economy. This is not, of course, a linear process, nor one where Pakistan (and other countries in similar position, such as Egypt – see Mitchell, 1995) has no bargaining power. The state wishes to keep for itself strategic sectors such as heavy industry, mining, and energy; some budgetary decisions, such as defense, are often off the table when negotiating with the IMF; moreover, politicians, who love either to be re-elected in a democratic system or simply to enjoy a degree of popularity even in authoritarian systems, may choose to coax the public with higher expenditures, or to sooth local private industries concerns about foreign competition with subsidies and tariffs on import goods.

However, the country which asks for help is never in the stronger bargaining position. The IMF has the chance to simply refuse the loan if Pakistan is not deemed a worthy recipient – in other words, if there are no sufficient guarantees of its compliance to a Neoliberal agenda. In times of financial crisis, precisely the times where help is needed, receiving (or not) help from the IMF is no small matter. Reportedly, Pakistan had some USD 6 billion left in its coffers when the deal was finally reached in May 2019, a sum which could cover only two months of imports, including oil. If societal resistance needs be crushed in order to obtain the loan, so be it: in these critical junctures, with a worried public, an enfeebled work force and faltering social protections, the crushing is all the easier as the IMF can present the government a scenario where there is no real alternative: it is either loan and Neoliberal adjustments; or it is bankruptcy and further economic havoc. Once this Manichean play comes to pass, the opportunity to implement Neoliberal policies is there for the take.

‘The Treatment was Fine, but We Lost the Patient’

At this point, however, we are bound to ask once again: why does Pakistan keep needing loans? IMF help is conditional to the adoption of Neoliberal measures, which are said to fix the economy, in the long run making such requests unnecessary. Yet, if 39 years of ‘wait and see’ since 1980 is not enough to enjoy the auspicious positive developments promised by the Neoliberal treatment, what ought we to think? This rhetorical question does not want – it benefits repeating – to exonerate Pakistani politicians, officials and elites for their undeniable responsibilities in handling the national economy.

Too many countries, regardless of the elites governing them, plunged into crisis all too similar to the recurrent predicaments that Pakistan faces: even the virtuous 'Asian Tigers', held as the epitome of Third World countries economic growth, knew a devastating financial crisis in 1997.

As the evidence suggests (Stiglitz, 2002), the IMF came to rescue – as it should be given its mission and mandate – only to enforce Neoliberal measures that worsened the crisis and plunged Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea (the world's 11th largest economy) into even more misery, social unrest and economic depression. Only Malaysia, not blinking under the IMF pressure, managed to withstand the storm further suffering.

What shall we make of all this? There are, in my view, two considerations we can ponder over. First, if Neoliberal measures do not seem to work in rescuing countries from crisis and stabilise their economies, this does not mean they do not work in what they are really, surreptitiously, trying to achieve: privatisation of public assets to favour those classes that can purchase those assets. David Harvey, probably the most articulate critic of contemporary Neoliberalism, labelled this process as 'accumulation by dispossession' (2007). Whenever transnational capital has faced hurdles in maintaining high returns, be it because of state intervention (such as high taxation on incomes and profits) or organised labour, or generous social policies, or any combination of these, it has launched an assault to re-affirm class power in light of such developments. This move, I contended with Harvey, is the defining trait of Neoliberalism and free market ideology.

The treatment, in Pakistan and elsewhere, was never meant to save the patient, but to make the surgeon rich(er). The staggering rise of income inequality within countries as well as across the globe (famously illustrated by Piketty, 2013) only testifies to the startling success of Neoliberalism in achieving this goal.

A No-Brainer

The other consideration I would like to propose here involves a simple thought experiment of sorts. Imagine walking down the streets of Moscow in 1980. If you were to ask a random Muscovite, 'What is the dominant ideology here?' anyone would respond without blinking, 'Socialism,' or else 'Communism.' One need not to be trained in Marxism, political economy or international relations to consider in fact the answer almost commonsensical. There was a sense that the ideological position of the incumbent regime, whether you liked it or not (now we know many didn't), was fairly identifiable - if anything because it was trumpeted always rather vociferously even as the cracks in the system became more and more evident. The unholy wedding between economy, politics and society that underpinned the Soviet experiment for some 75 years had many issues: but disguising what it stood for and what ideology it intended to uphold was not one of them. In other words, identifying what ideology dominated the Soviet Union (or any other country experiencing 'Real Socialism') was a no-brainer - no matter your inclinations towards it.

Now imagine you were to walk down the streets of New York City in 2019, and ask a random New Yorker, 'What is the dominant ideology here?' My hunch is that the answer would be much less straightforward, if proffered at all.

We live, it seems, in a post-ideology world, where the demise of Socialism and the end of the Cold War left us with a system that features liberal democratic polities and a capitalist market economy. There is no 'ideology' anymore insofar as the non-democratic states are, sooner or later, turning into democracies, and any rate they offer in the meantime no better alternative; furthermore, free market capitalism keeps making inroads in previously state regulated or dominated economies. Allegedly, these twin processes, which Fukuyama famously heralded as the 'End of History' precisely thirty years ago, are not the result of any 'ideological' project – the way, for example, that Socialism was. They are held as expression of the natural propensity of humankind to seek freedom (hence liberal democracy) and prosperity (hence free market capitalism). In a cosmic-like confrontation with alternative ways of arranging our collective lives – not only Socialism, but also right-wing authoritarianism, post-colonial nationalism, and even, lately, various forms of Islamism – they won, fair and square. Not the result of an ideological – political, economic, social – project; only the most congruent outcome given our human nature.

In the streets of New York – or Paris, London, Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro, Beijing or Karachi – there is no ideology at play. Only nature. Our question, indeed, calls ultimately for another purportedly commonsensical retort: 'There is no *dominant ideology* here.' Another no-brainer, it seems.

Only, unlike the hapless Muscovite, our friend in New York would be wrong. There is a dominant, worldwide ideology. It is not marketed and trumpeted as such, but it has all the features of a discursive construct that alters, shapes and moulds political, economic and social relations. It is dominant as it has been sweeping the globe at least since Fukuyama's triumphalist hurray, possibly even before. And, be sure, there is nothing natural or pre-determined about it.

A bit like the Devil, whose trickiest move is to persuade humanity he does not exist, so Neoliberalism's most prodigious sleight of hand is to present itself as the outcome of natural dispositions and not of a political project. Indeed, this feat amounts to its most prodigious gimmick, though certainly not the only one, in that it also presents us with a stark reality where it does not even make sense to think about 'what else'?

In this Manichean world, where the cosmic struggle between good and evil has ended, Maggie Thatcher finally said it best: "TINA – There is no alternative." As a neoliberal enthusiast, I am confident she said it giggly.

Neoliberalism as an ideology has, thus, hampered our possibilities to recognise it as such and, therefore, fight it as such – the same way Communism or Fascism were thought as clearly identifiable evil ideologies. Neoliberalism's greatest trick, its continuous disguise as a purely scientific economic doctrine when it is instead a radical political project, is robbing us of alternative ways to think about how to arrange our collective lives, in Pakistan and elsewhere, to build more equitable, just, prosperous and humane societies.

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Let's first put into perspective the connection and correlation of governance and sustainable development on an economy and the people connected with it. Sustainable development argues that the current use of resources should minimise the level of harm to the future use of resources. Governance is capable of common sense and of undertaking the versatile planning that is required for sustainable development. In the classical context, the relationship between governance and sustainability has been empirically examined in terms of the rule of law, bureaucratic quality and corruption. However, governance is versatile and consists of variables such as pluralism, accountability, political stability and the absence of violence and government effectiveness. According to most studies, sound governance carries a significantly positive effect on sustainable development. Meaning, there exists a definitive correlation between good governance and sustainable growth and development.

Economic Governance and Pakistan

Understanding Principles of Effective Governance in Pakistan's context

Evolutionary theories in biology often emphasise that variation as well as selection are blind so that there is no guarantee of the quality of the outcomes other than that they will fit the contingencies of the selection environment. For science and technology, and for social life generally, the selection environment is not blind, and when variations, that is, novelties, are produced,

there is anticipation on eventual selection of attempts to change the selection environment so as to increase the chances for the variation to survive. Van den Belt and Rip (1987) showed (using the label of quasi-evolutionary theory) that nexuses between variation and selection emerge (with test laboratories for new products as an example) and positioned the existence of paradigms in science and technology as a temporary, but forceful stabilisation of selection, thus, continuity in variation leading to a trajectory or path of further development. In the co-evolution of science, technology and society, patterns at the institutional and societal level also emerge and stabilise (and open up again). For example, there is a diffuse social contract between science and society visible in expectations about science, its mandate and division of responsibilities, and the institutional arrangements. The phrase 'Science, The Endless Frontier' (after V. Bush's report to the US President in 1945) is often used to characterise the post-Second World War social contract.

However, evolutionary perspective does not offer immediate entrance points for normative evaluation, specifically on stabilisation of patterns on emerging eventualities or outcomes that would be difficult to escape. Also, in wake of recent changes in and around Science, one can argue that Strategic Science itself could be closing in upon itself too quickly, because of strong economic and decision-making pressures to deliver in a stipulated time frame.

So, let's try and apply all the above on the governance being dispensed at home in order to determine whether or not it is indeed providing us the much needed road map to sustainable development. As we know, Pakistan has entered its 13th International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme since 1988. Go through the basic conditional ties of all the IMF programmes till now, including this latest one, and one finds out that not only are

nearly all of them almost similar, but also that these programmes are never easy to implement, since they cause a lot of pain to the common man.

The skepticism, however, is not just limited to this, because when one takes a cursory look at IMF lending in general over the last 5 decades, we do not find a single Asian or South Asian example where a country emerged as an economic tiger post-programme.

Anyway, the point is moot now as we have already entered the IMF programme and the real challenge to manage the economy is beginning to manifest itself, ironically, not so much in the policymaking of the government itself, but through the pain being inflicted as it proceeds to take control over key economic decisions. And such a challenge relates to the very ability of the present managers to craft policies - amidst an on-going economic slowdown - that not only mitigate the fall outs from the Fund's dictates (on high discount rates, devaluing currency, removal of across the board subsidies, raising tariff, stoking inflation through the supply side and oft undertaking arbitrarily revenue drives), but also inspire confidence of the people and to keep them calm by keeping their hope alive (an area where the government has miserably failed thus far).

The Way Forward

So what exactly is required to be done?

First and foremost, it is necessary to talk to the stakeholders in order to accommodate their genuine concerns. It is adversely affecting the investors, businesses and industry, traders and services providers, and with it the economic activity itself - markets are stagnating, which can never be good for business.

The fact remains that PKR 1.4 trillion are being proposed in new taxes and no matter the efforts of finding new tax payers or restraining the tax collection machinery from harassing the existing taxpayers, the reality is that this new burden (at least for now) of taxes will once again fall on both, the existing tax payers and the average consumer through a spike in indirect taxation.

Given the existing draconian tax laws and the arbitrary powers that still remain vested in the tax collector, undertaking such ambitious revenue drives without first bringing in the long awaited reforms in the current tax collection-mechanism, will not only be foolhardy but also counterproductive, since it would further erode the trust of the taxpayer in the government, as new stories of harassment, extortion and corruption unfold.

The greater public fear though is not just limited to this imminent intrusion, but goes far beyond to all sorts of other additional proposals that seem to be doing the rounds on the government's behest. Like, for example, abolishing of the present zero-rating facility on the five principal export sectors of the country; subjecting the expenses' entries to scrutiny, currently exempt under section 115(4) that allows the exporters full settlement of their tax liabilities by deduction at source and once the zero-rating is finished, going on to impose, as high as 17 per cent GST on the exports' sectors. Needless to say that these concerns should be quickly and properly addressed, because such levies will not

achieve much for the national exchequer, but result in tying up scarce liquidity of the exporters and increase their costs, thereby, making our exports uncompetitive - e.g., 70-75 per cent of the production in textiles is meant for export, and only around 25 per cent gets consumed locally.

The trouble is that for anyone who has little or no practical understanding or the sensitivities of the Pakistani economy, it is difficult to understand that it has a peculiar way of working.

Over the last 40 or 50 odd years in many ways the informal and formal sectors have become intertwined where they complement each other by cutting corners cum costs at different stages of the manufacturing chain, and today, a large portion of our export competitiveness is driven by the low cost structures of the undocumented sector.

For example, the readymade garment sector, which by the government's own admission is our fastest growing (by nearly 29 per cent) export sector, would suffer immensely if suddenly its entire supply chain was to put under a sales tax regime.

No one is not against documenting the economy, but key supply chain structures cannot and should not be changed overnight. Any brash cum knee-jerk actions like suddenly abolishing the zero-rating of the five main exporting sectors of economy or burdening the home manufacturing disproportionate to regional realities, runs the risk of dismantling the entire economic system of the country, of whatever little manufacturing based exports that we have at the moment.

Any change to bring the informal sector into the documented domain needs to be gradual and through incentives and not coercion.

In recent history, Bangladesh, Vietnam and now Myanmar have shown how targeted facilitation in sync with the larger vision (in their case promotion of exports) can work miracles! The trouble is that the new economic managers do not have a domestic track record businesses can relate to, and hence, there is this unsaid trust deficit between them and stakeholders.

The main problem one feels is in the approach or the mindset that everyone is a thief - a thinking that naturally manifests itself in policymaking by reflecting in an operational approach based on negative energies of coercion, giving an impression that this government is after everything that one has earned or possesses. This, in itself, is very dangerous, because it gives a message that instead expanding, one would be better off contracting one's activities.

What is needed today is for the government to restrain itself from sucking liquidity out of the markets and instead focus on seeking revenues through growth and by bringing inclusive reforms that incentivise a tax culture based on reciprocity.

It is time for the economic managers to move beyond the mere IMF agreement and look for real answers of why the economy is not responding and what exactly needs to be done.

Learning Economic Lessons from the Past

'Change' Management requires a clear vision, strategy and effective implementation. The current situation warrants that we quickly re-think the policy choices taken thus far and important changes needed:

Investment

The government will be better off facilitating the domestic investor in a way that locks directly into industrialisation which in-turn can go on to boost our exports and generate employment. One only has to look as far as Bangladesh to realise how they have cleverly encouraged smaller FDI inflows and have allowed only those investments that bear synergies with its larger vision of making the country a supply-chain powerhouse of the world. Manufacturing helps Bangladesh bolster its ever rising exports – the thumb rule being that every USD 1 investment be allowed only if it results in a minimum increase of USD 3 in annual exports.

Footprint of the Government

This stems from an inherent mindset of distrust on the private sector displayed by successive Pakistani governments that keeps on pushing capital in the public sector domain. No marks for guessing that the public sector essentially is a less efficient user of capital than the private sector. Meaning, the more one expands the public sector at the expense of the private sector, the more one loses. To move towards market principles and transparency a host of legislative changes will need to be adopted, starting with some initial steps, for example, in the energy sector, like:

Doing away with the unnecessary legal protection extended to WAPDA's functionaries; immediately allowing direct-distribution to the private sector producers by giving them access to distribution networks against a paid-sharing formula; revisiting all IPP agreements; allowing the provinces a direct stake via tariff to help control line losses and theft; and by simply taking over some of the heavy loss making operations and putting them instead under private-public management controls.

Again, going by Bangladesh's example, it today only subsidises power to its exporting industries, and that too, partially. If some part of exports needs additional support, then it is compensated through other ways like outright export subsidies, ranging from 5-20 per cent, depending upon the specific product category. The idea is to not allow losses to pile up in their power companies even if it means increasing the general tariff in accordance with market realities. Power rates in Bangladesh have risen by as much as nearly 50 per cent over the last three years, i.e. from USD 6 cents in 2015 to USD 9 cents/kWh as of today.

Exports

No arguments that focusing on increasing exports is the right thing to do, but the trouble is that in today's competitive world, increasing exports is a science. A simplistic route by way of devaluing the currency will just not do and this is becoming quite obvious. Post-devaluation, Pakistan's exports have posted a mere 1.64 per cent increase over nine months from July '18 to March '19; in fact exports decreased 1.78 per cent in January '19 over December '18 and April '19 over March '19.

When we closely study the global export miracles over the last five decades, we learn that sustainable increase in exports primarily comes through a stable currency and not the other way round. Without going into the details of its reasoning, it was always a kind of writing on the wall that we, too, will get no real or meaningful increase in our exports by devaluing the Pak Rupee. However, to seek substantial export growth a more precise strategy is needed that not only explicitly identifies the growth areas and then backs it with direct support for capacity building, and shoring up of competitiveness to beat the competition. Similarly, in today's data rich world via IT, we can easily determine which categories to support, where to focus on skill development, how and where to tweak existing FTAs, precisely which new products to launch,

what specific subsidies to provide and to whom, what global price points to adopt for our products, and which markets to target.

Ease of Doing Business

For meaningful investment to happen and for businesses to flourish, ease of doing business is an index, which nearly all-aspiring countries take very seriously these days. The key elements in our CPI Basket that measures inflation hardly have any correlation to the central bank's discount rate (34 per cent food items, 24 per cent house rent & 15 per cent fuel & transport). Further, to ease operations, we still have no announcements on the one-window compliance facility, implying businesses still have to grapple with multiple governmental agencies, which some count at being in excess of 50 (including federal, provincial and municipal), and for that matter none either on any operational reforms.

Further, a massively devalued Rupee has compromised on the connectivity of the Pakistanis per say with the outside world – a natural side effect of any devaluation drive – with added capital pressures on any new plant investments for capacity addition, up-gradation for value addition or for balancing and modernisation. Any further devaluation will simply isolate Pakistan further. If the government is serious about arresting the present economic decline, it needs to defend its currency and not allow the Rupee to sink further, because regardless of all the jargon about market forces/supply & demand, the reality is that in non-tradable currencies, such as the PKR, respective governments do have a distinct role to play in determining their global parity.

To create a business friendly environment, calm and confidence will need to be restored and the constant outbursts on accountability and clampdowns will have to come to an end.

Losing out on Winners in the Economy

From what one understands, the government is looking to shift investment away from the real estate sector in order to stop avenues for parking un-taxed money and to see to it that this money instead gets diverted to more productive sectors. The trouble is that given a recessionary trend both at home and in the international markets, this is not a time to experiment.

Just retain your winners whether they are in the shape of real estate or the stock exchange or beauty parlours or food retail outlets – the mantra for now should be to keep the economy ticking.

The revenue collection for the time being can mostly come through indirect measures, at least till the markets improve: Meaning, by taxing perceived consumption (especially high end) through a fixed mechanism (like a pre-determined turnover tax regardless of profitability) rather than monitoring daily sales; and additionally by continuing to milk petroleum sales – petrol prices in Pakistan are still the cheapest in South Asia.

The key to economic management is not only a holistic approach but also requires ensuring that policies from all ministries work in tandem to deliver the desired outcome. What the policymakers need to be mindful of is that the Pakistani economy does not work in the credit entrenched way as the western economies do and excessive raising of the discount rate will only further distort the supply side dynamics with little success in taming core inflation. Also, there is no real weightage of wages in the inflation at home, since the local wages in absolute terms are already very low or perhaps not sustainable to feed an average sized household. As explained above, the inflation here has completely different dynamics and is being largely driven by government's own policy measures and not due to any external factors. With a substantially devalued currency over the last 34 months and an already

compromised average individual disposable income (due to an increased burden of new taxes), any further unnecessary cum unrealistic hikes in the interest rates will only further hurt the domestic manufacturing's competitiveness, thereby, further compromising employment generation and poverty level in the economy.

So, the question is, what then are the solutions to overcome the prevalent stagflation?

First, to start with interest rates will need to be brought back down to a maximum of 10 per cent. India is at 6 per cent and the Modi government has already indicated in its recent budget that it prefers to lower it further; Bangladesh is at 5 per cent; and Sri Lanka is at 6.50 per cent.

Second, it will do the government good to formally partner with the central bank in order to facilitate increasing of aggregate supply (in the economy) through supply-side policies, such as privatisation or otherwise quickly resurrecting SOEs, deregulation reforms to increase efficiencies; and last but not least, announcing policy measures that directly aim at reducing costs of production for the domestic industry.

Third, and perhaps the most important factor that needs to be ensured is that any further devaluation should be avoided. By now it has become quite clear that the currency's devaluation beyond a certain level has in fact proved to be counterproductive: In the process causing more pain, both to the government and the private sector, while in turn achieving scant little to boost the economy.

Martin Luther King Jr. once said that 'We must create full employment or we must create [basic, guaranteed] incomes.' The irony is that more than 40 years later, we just talk a lot about the last half of that statement, whereas, there is virtually no real talk

about the philosophical underpinnings of King's other idea—'full employment.'

Ostensibly, economic mismanagement carries long-term repercussions, because economic cycles can invariably take a long time to correct themselves: On growth and job creation, the present managers will be well served by also studying some very respected work in this regard by the eminent Russian economist, Nikolai Kondratiev, who advises on how disturbed economic cycles in a non-conductive environment can sometimes take as long as 50 years to re-correct themselves. Incidentally, he also emphasises why nations cannot sustainably develop unless they ensure cheap capital to the investor. In fact, the underlying argument to his work is how a government is responsible for arranging cheap capital in its economy and what it must do to see to it that cost of capital to its investors is always globally competitive. A cursory look at the successful economies shows that they have ensured this for their investors, in fact today are operating at negative interest rates. Closer to home, Turkey recently reduced its discount rate by nearly 400 basis points in one go; and China just announced another cut of 100 basis points, with expectations for more in the coming months. For Pakistan to support 13.25 per cent in an economic structure where discount rates have little correlation to real inflation is just not healthy for business.

Conclusion

The average man on the streets neither understands nor really cares about the economic mumbo jumbo on deficits and debt. This is precisely where the government is unable to deliver. The heart (or perhaps) the rhetoric may be in the right place, but operationally it finds itself to be out of its depth in being able to solve the issues confronting an average Pakistani.

So, the question here arises that where exactly is this government going wrong? Answer: Mainly, in its mindset and in its

understanding of Pakistan's economic culture. Very few governments understand that changing culture can often be impossible.

Economic management is a science, which relies on elements such as economic history, structure, environment and culture, as much as it relies on pure economic theories. Policies need to be devised in the context of an economy's history, environment, culture and its existing structure. Any government that does not understand these elements, when devising economic policies, will end up facing a brick wall instead of making any progress.

The only way to change a culture is to totally deconstruct and then rebuild an organisation or an economy and still this may not be foolproof. With economies, this option may simply just not be there. Their solution lies in first understanding the very culture and environment of an economy and then building the desired 'change' around the very underlying realities that otherwise are largely unalterable. A tunnel vision has ended up unleashing dynamics that have resulted in scaring people away from operating or in putting up the cost of doing business so high that it has just become unviable for most to operate. One must realise that there are some basic fundamentals of the way things happen here in Pakistan:

- a) There is big culture of philanthropy that helps the government in shoring up public and social safety nets that otherwise it simply could not have managed on its own (by many accounts private sector philanthropy in Pakistan is perhaps one of the largest in the world in terms of per capita spend and connectivity).

- b) Pakistan is amongst the lowest ranked in terms of state support deliveries, meaning if the government collects less, it delivers less as well.
- c) There is a large undocumented sector in the economy, which may not be directly contributing to the national exchequer, but indirectly its contribution tends to be immense, since it provides unemployment to the poorest of poor, in areas and sectors where government's reach may not be possible or limited, pays its due share of indirect taxes and sometimes even more due to higher tax rates for this sector, and last but not least, keeps the markets flooded with capital crucial to ensuring domestic consumption. Come too hard on it and most of these operations will either close down or go out of business; and,
- d) Pakistan's bureaucracy is in general inefficient and corrupt and unless it is first overhauled, the more capital that gets diverted its way the more capital will, in effect, be moving away from efficient to inefficient hands.

So, in essence what this implies is that any reforms that are brought about should not only be sensitive to these realities, but also be aimed at a gradual change without eroding the very benefits being reaped in the present way of working. Pakistan needs to go back to the drawing board and properly comprehend the real nuisances of managing her economy. It is time we discarded the failed initiatives of the past, and instead brought about some real fresh thinking on the table aimed at increasing both productivity and output.

09

Javed Jabbar

Pakistani writer, advertising executive, politician, intellectual, scholar, artist, mass communications expert and Former Minister of Information, Government of Pakistan.

Casting one's vote is the first step towards strengthening a democratic existence.

— *Dawn*

The Lahore Resolution portrays a vision formulated through a consultative and democratic process. The creation of the original State of Pakistan in 1947 and its post-1971 renewal represent a continuation - with periodic suspensions - of participative methods to achieve state stability and national cohesion.

Democracy in Pakistan: A Dynamic Work-in-Progress

Whether through non-official mechanisms such as political parties (most of which are internally non-democratic!) or through official elective institutions such as Parliament, the democratic principle, often elusive, remains a fundamental ideal.

This dimension was distorted by four military interventions. Yet ironically, even in the military-led phases, the democratic facet was strengthened by the promotion of elected, truly empowered Local Governments (2001-08) and the introduction, irreversibly, of private electronic media (2002 onwards). But just as the uniquely

created national concept and the equally uniquely created State of Pakistan continue to evolve from the 'baby' age of 70 years, so too should democratic systems be always improved and enhanced.

Like the on-going evolution of Pakistani national identity which can be termed 'Pakistaniat', democracy in Pakistan is a dynamic work-in-progress. During the past 72 years, procedures, categories and compositions of our electoral system and elected institutions were sometimes advanced. For instance, seats in legislatures were increased to reflect growth of population. There were also substantive improvements: reserved seats for technocrats in the Senate (1985); power to the indirectly elected Senate to initiate Bills to amend the Constitution (1985); 17 per cent reserved seats for women in the Senate, National Assembly and the four Provincial Assemblies, along with 33 per cent reserved seats for women in Local Bodies (2002) - all the above four changes occurring during military-led governments.

The 18th Constitutional Amendment of 2010 is an excellent example of how civil, political, elected governments can forge a progressive consensus to decentralise power. Yet the same 18th Amendment regrettably added exclusion of non-Muslims from being eligible for election by the National Assembly as Prime Minister. This came on top of the prior exclusion of non-Muslims from eligibility for the Presidency.

Why are some of us in the 97 per cent so afraid of the only three per cent?

To address new challenges and complexities that arise in times of rapid change, and to deal effectively with issues specific to Pakistan's needs, we should debate and eventually adopt entirely new features, such as the ten listed below. These features could strengthen, deepen and reinforce democratic values and practices.

The ten proposed reforms will seem like a wish list. So be it. Like long journeys that begin with small steps, practical changes can begin with impractical-looking dreams. Substantive changes in electoral and democratic systems and structures require overwhelming consensus between members who are already part of existing systems.

Any reform that potentially disrupts familiar privileges and predictable continuity is likely to be strongly resisted. Yet as in some other countries and, on occasions, in Pakistan too, our legislators have transcended personal interests. We can begin by debating certain proposals so as to benefit from open, sustained public discourse, and eventually, shape constitutional and legal instruments for reform.

The Quorum Quandary

The first step should be to decisively reduce, if not eliminate altogether, the quorum problem. This is a virus which infects virtually all legislatures. Even when there is substantive business to consider, majority ruling parties or coalitions are frequently unable to ensure the minimum required attendance. All legislators, especially directly-elected representatives, face enormous pressures on their time to address voters' and constituencies' problems, myriad issues which require personal involvement. However, there is absolutely no justification for the recurring tendency of the vast majority of legislators to remain absent from forums in most sittings. Being elected to a legislature is one of the highest honours that can be bestowed.

Persistent absenteeism of parliamentarian insults those very citizens who have granted this distinction to their representatives. To deal with extreme apathy, extreme disincentives would be fully justified. These can be heavy fines, loss of voting privileges, and expulsion for an x number of future sittings.

Different options can be candidly debated before adoption.

Make Voting Compulsory

A second critical need is to make representation in legislatures authentically participative, and representative of the electorate. The country's entire electoral system is an unthinking imitation of the first-past-the-post system used by Westminster and widely practised, as in the United States, India and elsewhere. But merely because the system is practised elsewhere does not oblige us to follow suit.

Our conditions require innovation or adaptation. To illustrate the virtual absurdity of this system, let us assume there are five candidates in a given constituency. Four candidates get more votes on a combined basis than the fifth candidate who leads the rest simply because of obtaining say, just one vote more than the second highest competitor. Yet the fifth candidate goes on to represent all those who voted against him and who are larger in number than those who voted for her or him. To cap it all, only about 50 per cent of the registered voters bother to vote. Which means the winner also represents those who did not vote at all, making the first-past-the-post system both non-participative and un-representative of public opinion. Two reforms can redress this anomaly:

One - make voting compulsory for all citizens aged 18 and above, as is done in over 20 countries of the world, including Australia, Argentina, Bolivia, Belgium, Egypt, Greece, Singapore. In such a system, there are penalties in case of failure to fulfill an essential duty in a democratic state i.e., to vote, to elect representatives, and thus, take individual self-responsibility for the composition and performance of legislators.

Two - it is equally necessary to allow for a second round of voting in situations when the candidate with the highest number of votes has secured less than 50 per cent of the total registered votes. In a second round, of, say, the top two vote-getters, only the candidate securing a minimum of 51 per cent of the total registered votes should be eligible to represent a constituency.

A Directly-Elected Senate

The third reform is required to address the fact that Pakistan is possibly the world's most asymmetrical federation. Punjab consists of more people than all the other three provinces combined. Another province – Balochistan – comprises an area almost as large as the other three provinces. But it has the smallest population.

A directly-elected Senate with financial powers would alone be able to ensure equity and equanimity between all constituent units of the Federation.

In the existing directly-elected National Assembly with sole final financial powers, the large numbers from Punjab give an unfair advantage to one province alone over the other three less populated provinces. With a directly- elected Senate comprising equal numbers from each province, the two principles of

population, and of Federalism, would be evenly balanced with both Federal Legislatures representing direct-voting choices.

A Directly-Elected President

A fourth reform worth consideration is to enable the President to be directly elected. At one stroke, this would promote inter-provincial convergence and national cohesion. When a Presidential candidate would need to secure significant numbers of votes in, say, Gwadar, Balochistan as well as, say, in Gawalmandi, Lahore, we would move faster and closer towards national integration. Currently, as per the Parliamentary system, a Prime Minister, theoretically, need not win a single vote from any of the smaller provinces such as Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As long as she or he wins from a single constituency from Punjab and as long as his party wins a majority of seats, the individual has a good chance to become Prime Minister of a State comprising four provinces, without voters in three provinces placing their confidence in him.

To date, the country has had only indirectly-elected Presidents e.g. President Ayub Khan via the basic democrats process or Presidents Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf through referendums. When residents of all provinces become directly connected to the election of the Head of State who would also be the Chief Executive, the federated state would be enormously strengthened.

To allow for the virtues of a Parliamentary system to co-exist with a directly- elected President, adaptation could be attempted from the French model.

A Shared Presidency

The fifth suggestion arises as an alternative to a directly-elected Presidency and is associated with twin considerations. Firstly, to give each constituent unit of the Federation a continuous involvement at the highest level of the State. Secondly, to reduce the role of superficial charisma. This could be achieved by adapting the Swiss model whereby members of a Council of Ministers that represents the constituent units of the Swiss State share the term of office with each member becoming Head of State for a given period e.g., 12 months.

Directly-Elected Women Legislators

While the reserved seats for women in all three tiers of the legislative sectors have made a distinct difference in giving women a new political profile, there is a need to consider options by which, on a rotational basis, a certain percentage of seats could be contested only by women candidates. This would endow far greater legitimacy, authority and credibility to women's participation in political affairs than does their participation through reserved seats.

The seats earmarked for women-only candidates could be shifted across provinces over several elections spread over a 15 to 20-year period so that all constituencies are able to provide opportunities to capable women leaders.

Local is Focal

Instead of describing Local Government bodies as the 'lowest tier', the seventh reform should reverse the whole sequence by placing the grassroots level, community-based tier at the apex of democratic structures; and, by holding their polls before the Federal and Provincial polls. It is only when these institutions in which citizens and their representatives are able to frequently

interact with each other at a neighbourhood level, become truly empowered and entrenched will we be able to build purposeful structures at the Provincial and Federal levels.

Health and Education - National, Not Provincial Alone

Although the 18th Constitutional Amendment substantively devolved power from the Federal level to the Provincial, there appears to have been a dangerous abdication by the Federal Government of responsibility for the social sector, including the vital subjects of education, health and population growth.

The Centre needs to retain a holistic, harmonious, unifying national vision for the qualitative nurturing and well-being of citizens, without interfering in, or curbing the authority of the Provincial Governments.

Political Parties Reforms

The ninth and tenth reforms should deal with political parties. One possible measure is a formula by which political parties that fulfill the criteria of genuine representation, and enjoy a given number of certified members, receive funding from the public exchequer.

As practised in several countries, state funding of political parties, in whole or in part, could eliminate the scope for corruption and under-hand practices by which illicit money and political parties are synonymous.

Candidates routinely grossly under-report actual expenditures on election campaigns.

Creation of a Political Parties Commission

The tenth measure should be the creation of a Political Parties Commission. While the Election Commission does presently register and validate political parties, it already has a vast, multi-layered responsibility to conduct elections and deal with the numerous pre-poll, poll and post-poll issues. Whereas, a Commission exclusively tasked with the monitoring of parties would make a notable contribution to the evolution of stable democratic organisations.

This body would exclusively regulate the functioning of political parties, conduct internal party elections to prevent manipulation, discourage perpetuation of family dynasties and cliques, demand complete transparency and accountability, and encourage equity and fairness in the award of party tickets and in the formulation of party policies.

To guarantee that such a Commission acts impartially, political parties could be represented in the membership of the Commission which could also include independent eminent citizens, serving or former judges, and administrators. Doubts probably already exist for each of the above ten proposals. Just as the likelihood that for every possible solution, there is a new problem. The critical task is to dispassionately examine each option to refine and enhance democracy, to move from 1940 to 2040 - and beyond - with processes and systems that cope with new emerging realities and challenges.

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10

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Healthcare has served as a popular reference point in both Pakistani politics and activism. Yet, successive leaderships have struggled to achieve any significant impact in terms of nationwide equity. Mass disparities in healthcare distribution and accessibility, inadequate budgets, and a soaring population growth rate have jointly compounded Pakistan's pursuits for health-intensive development, while regional powers continue to make headway.

Universal Healthcare and Financial Equity: Inside Pakistan's *Sehat Sahulat* Program

However, early signs of Universal Healthcare are beginning to show in Pakistan's Northern most province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is home to the *Sehat Sahulat Program*, a government-run health protection initiative that provides below poverty line segments significant financial coverage, and province-wide accessibility to secondary and tertiary treatment facilities.

Ever since the launch of Sehat Sahulat's services in 2016, thousands of citizens below the poverty line have undergone treatment, with majority of them opting for tertiary care – the most specialised and costly bracket of health procedures.

Some of these include angioplasty, cardiovascular treatments, and organ transplants. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government has operationalised services across 75 per cent of the province's 35 districts, and is now preparing to launch the scheme on a nationwide scale.

As efforts get underway, five elements become central to our understanding of the *Sehat Sahulat* Program's functioning, characteristics, and early success.

Indian Origins

Sehat Sahulat's origins stem from India's 2008 Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) Insurance Programme. Under this model, the Indian government aimed to increase below poverty line (BPL) access to in-patient medical care (patients who require admission to hospitals), across both public and private health facilities. In 2011, the *Sehat Sahulat* team conducted a feasibility study which found RSBY to be the most compatible health insurance model for Pakistan, based on the understanding that Indian states face similar socioeconomic and urban-rural dynamics.

The provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa went on to embrace RSBY's central emphasis on out-of-pocket payment reduction (reduction of personal costs on healthcare) among India's poor – while augmenting it with new features: a provincially-approved *funds retention formula*, and cross-sector public-private health partnerships.

Resonance at the Grassroots

Interviews with 80 families – comprising 400 *Sehat Sahulat* enrollees across 15 cities – revealed a high level of patient satisfaction with public hospital treatment. ‘I am suffering from severe chest burns’, shared a 55-year old enrollee undergoing treatment at Lady Reading Hospital, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s largest public hospital. ‘If something was to go wrong with my kidneys, I could not afford the costs without the *Sehat Sahulat* card.’

Another patient, a father of three from the rural district of Swabi, underlined the utility of the insurance scheme for his family. ‘For my children and wife, when they get sick or need urgent treatment, it is usually beyond my reach to ensure healthcare for them. I am even able to save some remaining funds in the *Sehat Sahulat* card for our future treatments.’

Patient feedback makes it abundantly clear that in the three years since the commencement of *Sehat Sahulat*’s services, the program has offered a much-needed financial cover for the poverty-stricken segments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and facilitated their immediate healthcare urgencies. However, to make this process more consistent, challenges of excessive administrative autonomy among public hospitals and growing patient referrals from rural-to-urban hospitals, must be given due attention.

Revenue through ‘Fund Retention’

Amid a struggling economy, how does the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa sustain healthcare revenue for the scheme? To address this dilemma, the *Sehat Sahulat* team had a *Fund Retention Formula* approved by the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2016. The formula empowers provincial public hospitals to retain a certain percentage of income generated from their treatments. The retained amount is divided into two portions: 25 per cent

transferred to the provincial government, and the remaining 75 per cent held by the hospital for service quality improvement and doctors' share.

Dr Muhammad Riaz Tanoli, Director of program, considers the formula to be an important intervention for retaining competent doctors in the province's public sector. 'Since many of our doctors pursue private practice as well, they encourage patients to go to private hospitals for a quick, overnight treatment. To deter this practice, the *Fund Retention Formula* incentivises hospitals in such a way that if a private practice yields PKR 10,000 a day for the doctor, he receives PKR 4,000 extra from public hospitals. This way, we strike a financial compromise.'

Equitable Access: Public-Private Partnerships

The 'Health Foundation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa', a legal body created through the 2016 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly Act, is used by *Sehat Sahulat* to bolster partnerships in underdeveloped districts. Its mandate is to involve the private sector in the dispensation of health services to the masses.

The end goal is to have sufficient amounts of health services so that these health facilities are accessible to the population. For that we have to make certain policy decisions. Currently, there are three districts where the public and private health sector remains underdeveloped - Kohistan, Tora Bora and Tang. It is here that the role of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Foundation becomes critical in looping in the private sector, and aligning it with the public sector for maximum service accessibility.

- Dr Shahid Younas, Chief Health Sector Reform Unit, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Meeting Health Security Targets: Sustainable Development Goal 3.8

The *Sehat Sahulat* model is built in alignment with Pakistan's commitment to Universal Health Coverage (UHC) by 2030. The commitment, listed as part of Sustainable Development Goal target 3.8, calls for achieving UHC that includes 'financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.'

The *Sehat Sahulat Program* currently offers a 540,000 PKR per-head lump sum to below poverty line segments, applicable across both secondary care (specialist care) and tertiary care (post-hospitalisation) brackets.

Eradicating financial barriers is one of the objectives of the Sehat Sahulat Program. We are taking care of catastrophic health expenditure in the province, in a bid to extend financial protection to 69 per cent of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's population. Neglected transgender segments are also being included. Efforts, towards achieving Universal Health Coverage, are clearly under way

- Dr Shahid Younas, Chief Health Sector Reform Unit, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Ultimately, the Program's execution in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province offers a blueprint for developing public-private healthcare collaborations effectively in larger provinces, such as Punjab. However, if the end goal is to make healthcare truly universal in Pakistan, the government must encourage bottom-up legislation across all provinces, so that interventions such as the *Funds Retention Formula* can lead the way to fruition.

Climate Change and Water Security: Potential Solutions

I do not believe in
taking the right decision
I take a decision and
make it right

Muhammad Ali Jinnah

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The role of water in economic output, job creation, household sustenance, and industrial growth depend on the kind of water systems and policies a country develops and implements. Due to its value and importance in all aspects of life, water is a highly political issue. Water policies worldwide have become one

of the first, and the most profusely regulated areas. The purpose of this study is to explore the water policies of Pakistan (2017) and India (2012) through quantitative analysis of textual data. The results show that Pakistan's National Water Policy, 2017 is more comprehensive as compared to India's National Water Policy, 2012.

India's water policy distinctively prioritises industrial growth at the cost of its agriculture sector; and while it mentions inter-regional and inter-state disputes in sharing of water as detrimental, the issue is not tackled at length in the document. The policy calls attention to flood forecasting by using real-time data acquisition systems and models but again offers little in terms of on-ground implementation and or the importance of transboundary data sharing. Pakistan's policy, on the other hand, is more multi-sectoral in terms of focus on irrigation, agriculture, climate change, research and development, inland navigation and the importance of the

A Potential Contribution of Text Mining: Comparative Analysis of Water Policies of Pakistan and India

Indus River. The document offers specific targets for energy, agriculture and development of water reservoirs which will provide water during the non-monsoon period as well as help balance national emissions by encouraging hydropower and lowering the price of energy. Unlike India's policy, it recognises the need for initiating regional mechanisms to address issues linked to transboundary waters such as hydro disasters owing to water release and stoppage at critical times. Pakistan's water policy does, however, fall short in terms of lack of attention given to water sensitive urban designs, adaptation measures to manage natural hazards and mapping of water-sector development goals in line with the Sustainable Development Goals; and trade in water-intensive crops. Both governments can learn from each other and update their respective water policies in the light of these quantitative findings. Text-as-data approaches for comparative policy analysis are becoming more common worldwide. It is vital for Pakistan to catch up since text mining processes have a very high potential to uncover new aspects of policy making that were previously hidden, and add more nuance to administrative data or policy documents.

Introduction

Three little atoms. The simple bond, of two Hydrogen atoms with one Oxygen, is all it took to create life on Earth. A growing population, urbanisation, industrialisation and changes in consumption and production patterns, are resulting in a rapidly increasing demand for this simple combination of atoms.

While nearly 70 per cent of the world is covered with water, less than one per cent is readily available for human consumption. According to the European Environment Agency (2012), sustainable water management requires knowledge, robust data, and indicators that can show the linkage between water management, social and economic benefits, and ecosystem services.

Despite technological advancements providing clean water, more than one billion people worldwide are still suffering from inadequate, unreliable and difficult access to clean water (Swyngedouw 2007). Water plays a vital role in health, agriculture, food production, economic growth, energy, natural environment and politics. Due to its importance in all aspects of life, it is a highly political issue. The governance of how water is used, who uses it and how much is used, is consequently very complex.

Even with the world's largest glaciers, Pakistan (and India) is among the world's 36 most water-stressed countries. One of the consequences of rapid population growth has been significant decline in per capita water availability - from 5,260 cubic meter in 1951 to 908 cubic meter in 2017.¹ According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Pakistan's water pressure on total renewable water resources has reached an alarming 74 per cent. An increasing population means that the situation will continue to deteriorate. The country's water storage capacity is only 10 per cent of its annual water flows, enough for approximately 30-36 days only.

Despite these worrying facts, the development and implementation of a national water policy faced delays for more than a decade due to provincial reservations. The first-ever National Water Policy of Pakistan, after a decade of wrangling and consultations, was finally approved on 24 April 2018. It has been hailed as a 'milestone', 'groundbreaking' and 'historic' document.

As compared to Pakistan, India has three different versions of a water policy. The National Water Policy (NWP) of India was first enunciated in 1987 (Ministry of Water Resources 1987). Thereafter,

¹ As per international standards, a country having annual per-capita water availability of <1700m³ is categorised as 'water stressed'. With per capita available water of 1545 m³ India is also a water stressed country.

the NWP was revised in 2002 (Ministry of Water Resources 2002) and 2012 (Ministry of Water Resources 2012). The revisions were linked to issues such as rapid urbanisation, population growth, growing water insecurity, problems in water governance, wide temporal and spatial variations in water availability and access to safe drinking water.

The water resource allocation problem is interdisciplinary nature. It requires modeling techniques that can study water allocation as integrated with hydrology, agronomic, economic, and institutional components (Mukherjee 1996). Exhaustive literature is available on water issues from different perspectives and fields. For instance, the impact of variability and changes in water availability on the environment and irrigation, as well as on the value of irrigated agricultural production (Kirby et al. 2015).

Almost every aspect of the policy-making process involves some form of verbal or written communication. This communication is increasingly made available in electronic format, which requires new tools and methods to analyse large amounts of textual data. Text mining is an emerging field that encompasses new research methodologies and software tools (e.g. R, Python, Orange) that are being used by companies, governments and academia. In last few years, text mining has also entered the fields of economics and finance (Bollen et al. 2011; Levenberg et al. 2014; and, Sun et al. 2016). Likewise, there are examples of applications of text mining in the field of anthropology, communication, political science, psychology, education, and sociology (Acerbi et al. 2013; Sun et al. 2016; Lazard et al. 2015; Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Kallus 2014; Colley and Neal 2012; Evison 2012; and Mische 2014).

There are several subjective analysis and reviews about water policies. For instance, according to Pandit and Biswas (2019), India's water policy is no more than a 'feel good' document. However, no quantitative analysis of water policies is available in

literature. To fill this gap, this study is an attempt to use an emerging field of text analytics to estimate policy preferences from officially documented policies of Pakistan and India. Section 2 of this paper provides the data and methodology. Section 3 discusses the empirical results followed by a conclusion and recommendations.

Data and Methodology

Data

For this study, water policies of India and Pakistan have been reviewed. The National Water Policy (2018) of Pakistan is available with the Ministry of Water Resources.² The most updated, National Water Policy (2012) of India is available with the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation.³

Methodology

Text analytics applies analytic tools to learn from collections of text data, like government documents, annual reports, social media, books, newspapers, emails, etc. The goal can be similar to humans learning by reading such material. However, using automated algorithms we can learn far from massive amounts of text, than through human reading. By using text analytics, one can summarise the main themes and compare them.

² Ministry of Water Resources, 2018, 'National Water Policy,' <https://mowr.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/National-Water-policy-2018-2.pdf>.

³ Ministry of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation 2012, 'National Water Policy,' http://mowr.gov.in/sites/default/files/NWP2012Eng6495132651_1.pdf.

Box-1

Data Pre-processing and Data Cleaning

The following data processing and data cleaning tasks were performed:

- Conversion of the scanned documents into text files (only in case of Pakistan).
- Corpus building: The primary task was to build a corpus of both policy documents on which analysis was performed.¹
- Conversion of the entire document to lower case.
- Removing punctuation marks (punctuations like periods, commas, hyphens etc. can provide grammatical context which supports understanding). For analysis, we ignore punctuation.
- Removing stopwords (stopwords are common words found in a language. However, for estimation, they are not very helpful as we would expect them to be evenly distributed across the different texts. To increase computational performance, 174 words like and, or, in, is, for, were removed).¹
- Removing numbers (Numbers are not relevant to analyses).
- Removing extra whitespace.
- Stemming (Stemming uses an algorithm that removes common word endings for English words, such as 'es', 'ed' and 's'. In other words, this analysis reduces the terms in documents to their stem, thus, combining words that have the same root.
- Creating a Document Term Matrix: This is a matrix with documents as the rows, and terms as the columns and a count of the frequency of words as the cells of the matrix.¹

Empirical Findings

Pakistan's National Water Policy, 2018

In raw form, Pakistan's water policy consists of 52 pages, 1,445 paragraphs, 1, 1949 words and 79,153 characters. After text processing, which includes removal of punctuations, numbers, white spaces and English stopwords, we are left with 1,609 unique terms and 64,740 characters. In Table 1, distribution of term frequencies is reported.


There are 719 unique words in the policy document, 288 words appear twice, and 142 words appear thrice. Collectively, 1300 terms have a frequency of five or less. There are 309 words with frequency greater than five; and 144 words with a frequency greater than 10. Likewise, 49 terms appear more than 20 times; and 24 words have a minimum frequency of 30. In most frequent terms, there are only 2 having frequency greater than 100; 15 terms have frequency greater than 40; and 10 terms have frequency greater than 50. The most common terms in Pakistan's water policy are presented in Figure 1. The most common terms include water (N=418), shall (N=168), manage (N=88), resources (N=85).

Table-1
Distribution of Term Frequencies - Frequency of Frequencies of
Pakistan's Water Policy

Frequency	Frequency of Frequency	Frequency	Frequency of Frequency	Frequency	Frequency of Frequency
1	719	18	8	39	1
2	288	19	6	40	1
3	142	20	6	42	1
4	94	21	4	43	1
5	57	22	2	47	1
6	46	23	2	49	2
7	39	24	5	53	1
8	35	25	1	54	1
9	24	26	3	57	1
10	21	27	1	63	1
11	15	28	1	64	1
12	14	29	2	73	1
13	9	30	4	85	1
14	14	31	3	88	1
15	6	32	1	168	1
16	13	34	2	418	1
17	4	37	1		

Source: Compiled by author.

Figure-1
Frequency Plot – Pakistan’s Water Policy




Source: Compiled by author.

Key: development (N=73), nation (N=64), plan (N=63), pakistan (N=57), sector (N=54) and flood (N=53).

Figure 2 shows the lexical dispersion of the most frequent terms in Pakistan’s National Water Policy, 2018. Each strip represents an instance of a word, and each row represents the entire text. The graph shows the occurrence and location of these common words in the policy document. It is depicted that the word ‘water’ is dispersed smoothly from the beginning till the end of the document. Contrarily, the term ‘flood’ mostly appears in the middle of the document, and is not discussed at the end of the policy document. The terms ‘manage’, ‘resource’ and ‘develop’ are located with gaps in almost all sections. The word ‘pakistan’ and ‘nation’ collectively appear 121 times in the document, and appear mostly at start and end of the policy.

Figure-2
Lexical Dispersion Plot - Pakistan's Water Policy



India's National Water Policy, 2012


The Indian water policy is precise as compared to Pakistan. In raw form, it consists of 17 pages and 30,917 characters only. After text transformation, there are 25,012 characters only. The details are reported in Table 2 which shows the distribution of term frequencies.

Table-2
Distribution of Term Frequencies - Frequency of Frequencies of India's Water Policy

Frequency	Frequency of Frequency	Frequency	Frequency of Frequency
1	402	15	1
2	175	16	2
3	79	17	1
4	45	18	3
5	34	19	1
6	31	21	3
7	20	22	2
8	13	24	2
9	16	28	1
10	8	32	1
11	6	40	1
12	1	43	1
13	3	49	1
14	2	211	1

Source: Compiled by author.

Figure-3
Frequency Plot – India’s Water Policy



As compared to Pakistan (N=1609) unique terms, India’s water policy consists of 856 unique terms. There is only one word ‘water’ with frequency greater than 100 (N=211), no word falls between the frequency of 50 and 100; and only six words having minimum frequency of 25. 21 words appear have minimum frequency of 15; and 41 words appear ten times or more. Comparatively, there are 403 terms which appear only once in the document and 175 words repeat only once. Figure 3 shows the most frequent terms in India’s water policy: ‘water’ (N=211), ‘need’ (N=1609), ‘resource’ (N=43), ‘use’ (N=40), ‘manage’ (N=32), ‘plan’ (N=28), ‘project’ (N=24), ‘flood’ (N=22), ‘river’ (N=22), ‘develop’ (N=21), ‘increase’ (N=21) and ‘state’ (N=21).

Figure-4
Lexical Dispersion Plot - India's Water Policy





Figure 4 shows the lexicon dispersion of India's water policy. The plot shows the dispersion of the top ten common words. Although the term 'water' appears almost half as less than Pakistan's policy, the dispersion is almost similar which means the term is dispersed in all sections. A similar pattern can be observed for 'resources' in the document. The terms 'planning', 'development', 'use', and 'management' are also dispersed in all sections of the water policy. Contrarily, India's water policy discusses 'rivers' which are absent in Pakistan's policy.

Comparison between the Two Policies

To compare the water policies of both countries, the study uses 'similarity', 'comparison', 'word in common' and 'word cloud' graphics. The distinct results can be seen with comparative word clouds of both policies in Figure 5. The colours and fonts show the more frequent agendas of the document. The larger the font size is the higher its the frequency. This comparison of both policies is depicted in Figure 6. The similarity plot shows the most common words in their water policies.

Figure-5
Word Cloud of India and Pakistan's Water Policies




Source: Collated by author.

In addition to a comparison plot, Figure 7 shows the frequency of words in common between the two water policies. The results show that both policies focus on water, planning, development, irrigation systems, agriculture sector, nation and policy design. The figure shows that that the most common word in both policies is understandably 'water'. However, the bar length shows that Pakistan's Water Policy has more focused on water as compared to India. The second most frequent common focus is management of water resources followed by development. Both policies focus on the agricultural sector and irrigation system, but Pakistan is more interested in floods and agriculture as compared to India.

One salient feature in India's water policy is focus on real-time data collection and database management. The second important difference is the focus on economic value of water by treating water as economic good and evaluating its wastage and inefficient usage. The third feature is India's stress on new water resources projects, project funding, and maintenance of old projects, timely completion and execution in *pari-passu* manner. Last but not the least, India's water policy especially provides institutional level importance to the river basin to resolve inter-State, inter-regional disputes to improve water use efficiencies.

Figure-7
Words in Common between Water Policies of Pakistan and India



Source: Collated by author.

As compared to India, Pakistan’s water policy is unique in terms of its focus on policies, irrigation, agriculture, and the importance of the Indus River. Having one of the largest irrigation networks in the world, the policy especially focuses on irrigation. The term appears 47 times in the policy document with importance given to maintenance of the irrigation system, low irrigation efficiency, drainage as part of irrigation planning, its indispensable importance for Pakistan’s agriculture and the provincial government’s role.

The tricky bit here is the 18th Constitutional Amendment. Under this Amendment, water distribution for agriculture, domestic and industrial purposes became a provincial subject. Despite the economic importance of water and calls for increased infrastructure investment on projects like the Bhasha Dam, the Centre has

delegated a lot of responsibilities and powers to provincial governments. The second most unique priority of Pakistan's water policy is the agriculture sector. With respect to agriculture, the policy focuses mainly on the drainage improvement, threats to coastal lands, food security, agriculture productivity, hydropower facilities and role of universities and departments.

Third, Pakistan's policy contains the word 'Indus' 29 times. This is because of the importance of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and international water laws, monsoon waters flow into the Indus River, its dependence on climate change and faster melting of the glaciers, Indus Basin Replacement works (especially dams) and diversion of canal water.

Another salient feature of Pakistan's water policy is the provincial autonomy. The policy focuses on provincial master plans, Provincial Irrigation & Drainage Authority (PIDA), Provincial Water Authority (PWA), formulation of policies related to water pricing, drinking water, water quality, provincial agriculture, repair and maintenance and development expenditures.

Although both countries mention climate, however, Pakistan's water policy is significant (N=30) given its review of issues like intensification of floods; erratic, monsoon rains; and frequent droughts outlined as major concerns for the country. The policy emphasises on the serious consequences of climate change on water resources, food security, water flow in the Indus system, and increasing/frequent intensity of floods. Extreme weather and monsoon rains and mitigation against the impact of climate change through storage are also topics that are tackled.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study compares the water policies of Pakistan and India using text analytics. As compared to India, Pakistan's water policy is

more comprehensive and addresses important multi-sectoral issues and concerns. Both policies focus on water resources management, development, irrigation systems and their national interest. In comparison, Pakistan's policy highlights areas linked to the agriculture sector, provincial autonomy, Indus Waters Treaty and the country's irrigation system. While the Indian policy focuses more on water and its impact on the economy, database management, basin management, ground water level, and importance and funding of water-related projects. India's water policy is contradictory in terms of water management and allocation. On the one hand, it explicitly mentions that water needs to be managed as a community resource under public trust doctrine, on the other hand, the policy underlines the need to treat water as an 'economic good'. Likewise, the policy distinctively prioritises industrial growth at the cost of its agriculture sector; and while it mentions inter-regional and inter-state disputes in sharing of water as detrimental, the issue is not tackled at length in the document. The policy calls attention to flood forecasting by using real-time data acquisition systems and models, but again offers little in terms of on-ground implementation and or the importance of transboundary data sharing. According to two of India's senior water experts:

Reasons for the NWP basically being a paper exercise are many, including lofty drafting and policy prescriptions that are divorced from reality; lack of courage at the Water Ministry to take a firm stand on any of the provisions at either the drafting or the implementation stages; the practice of keeping specialists away from policies; and the dominance of generalists who have neither a demonstrable understanding of the complexities of the water sector nor a long-term commitment to it (Pandit and Biswas 2019).

Pakistan's policy, on the other hand, is more multi-sectoral in terms of focus on irrigation, agriculture, climate change, research and development, inland navigation and the importance of the Indus River. The document offers specific targets for energy, agriculture and development of water reservoirs which will provide water during the non-monsoon period as well as help balance national emissions by encouraging hydropower and lowering the price of energy. Unlike India's policy, it recognises the need for initiating regional mechanisms to address issues linked to transboundary waters such as hydro disasters owing to water release and stoppage at critical times. Pakistan's water policy does, however, fall short in terms of lack of attention given to water-sensitive urban designs, adaptation measures to manage natural hazards and mapping of water-sector development goals in line with the Sustainable Development Goals; and trade in water-intensive crops. From Pakistan's perspective, the country needs to build at least 13 dams equivalent to the Kalabagh Dam (UNDP 2017). It is facing a serious issue of decline in surface water flows and groundwater depletion rate, which is not a focus of the policy. Finally, the National Water Policy of Pakistan does not address the role and importance of trade (N=0) in terms of the growth and export of water-intensive crops such as rice, cotton and sugarcane. This basic textual analysis indicates that governments of both these countries can learn from each other and update their respective water policies in the light of these quantitative findings.

From a public policy perspective, it is becoming increasingly important for policy analysts to have the skills to be able to compile and analyse unstructured data fast. An analyst should be able to 'mine' available online databases to collate a set of synopses, data, information, or policy recommendations so that s/he can have a concise policy review document done in hours rather than weeks. The government, academia and think-tanks need to start building the capacity of public officials in 'natural language text processing'

and application of that programming to real datasets that reflect public policies.

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Introduction

Agriculture is the largest sector of Pakistan's economy with a large impact on socioeconomic conditions of its rural population. Pakistan has a vast rural sector which accounts for almost 65.1 per cent of the total population (UN, 2019). Being a dominant sector, agriculture contributes 18.5 per cent to GDP, employs 38.5 per cent of the country's labour force, and contributes to the growth of other sectors of the economy (Government of Pakistan, 2019). Sustained agricultural development is required for economic growth, raising living standards of the people, and reducing poverty in the rural areas of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan, 2011).

However, despite being the largest sector of the economy, along with government's keen interest to improve performance of the agriculture sector, crop output per unit area is still low. The reasons for which, inter alia, are water scarcity and poor governance. The water scarcity problem is more severe in mountain regions where agriculture mostly depends on rainwater for irrigation. However, this problem can be minimised if abundant water in the peak rainy season (monsoon), which is mostly lost as runoff, is properly stored and utilised for irrigation purposes in the dry season.

Rainwater Harvesting: Viable Solution for Water Security in Rural & Mountainous Areas of Pakistan

Pakistan's population is growing at a fast rate. The present population of the country is 216.57 million, with a growth rate of 2.04 per cent (Government of Pakistan, 2019). By the year 2030, the population will reach to 262.59 million (UN, 2019). Food security for this burgeoning population is a central challenge facing Pakistan. The essence of sustainable agriculture development, however, is not only to provide food for the rising population, but also to save water for future use (UNEP, 1992).

The challenge is to develop and apply environmentally sound water-saving techniques and management methods in the water scarce areas. One of the potential water scarce areas in Pakistan is mountain ranges where agriculture is mostly rain-fed and a large number of farmers grow just for subsistence.

Mountain Ranges in Pakistan

Pakistan has two mountain ranges in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas namely the western mountains and the northern mountains. Western mountains include major part of Kohat and Bannu Districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and tribal areas of Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bannu and Kohat. Northern mountains include Malakand Division, Hazara Division, Northern Areas and Murree-Kahuta Tehsil of Rawalpindi District (Shahid and Hasnain, 2000).

Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world where per capita availability of water is declining at a fast rate (Briscoe and Usman, 2008). The present per capita availability of 1100 cubic meters (Abbasi, 2009) will drop to 855 cubic meters by the year 2020 (Semi, 2008). The country depends heavily on annual glacier melts and monsoon rains. During monsoon, 70 per cent of

precipitation falls in just 90 days (Abbasi, 2009). In Pakistan, mountain agriculture is largely rain-fed (Shahid and Hasnain, 2000). Water deficiency is one of the major problems that affect rain-fed agriculture. A number of relevant techniques such as collection of water during high intensity rains and efficient use of harvested water can be adopted to promote sustainable agriculture development in the rain-fed conditions (Ujjayant, 1998).

Overdependence on agriculture in the mountain ranges in Pakistan, coupled with extremely unreliable rainfall justify the adoption of rainwater harvesting systems for resolving water shortage problems in the mountain agriculture. Several indigenous water harvesting methods in mountain areas, such as Rod-kohi system in southern KP; Sailaba and Khushkaba systems in Baluchistan, have been evolved over time (Shahid and Hasnain, 2000).

The Departments of Soil Conservation and On-farm Water Management have taken water harvesting initiatives in different areas of the mountain ranges. These departments, however, have implemented schemes in few selected areas on a large scale. Many potential areas, such as earthquake hit areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa including Hazara Division, Chitral valley in the northern mountains, southern Sindh, and Balochistan have been neglected. These areas are drought-prone during periods of low intensity rains.

Study Purpose

Like other mountain ranges of the Himalayan region, Mansehra - situated in the northern mountains - has an unpredictable climate with poorly distributed rainfall. The geomorphologic and climatic

processes are the major constraints for agricultural development in the area. Most of the arable land is rain-fed and scarcity of rains after monsoons results in drought like situation. In such circumstances, small-scale water harvesting schemes are best suited for sustainable agriculture development. The main purpose of this study is to identify water-related problems in the area and the potential for harvesting rainwater to combat water scarcity problems in the region. The efficient use of harvested water can be useful in resolving water shortage problem in the area. It will also help in agriculture diversification and sustainability of food production in the rain-fed areas.

Research Area and Data

This chapter is based on a case study of two mountainous villages namely Reerh and Ghoutar which are located in district Mansehra of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Mansehra is situated at 157 km from Islamabad and has a hilly terrain where agriculture is mostly rain-fed.

Village Reerh is located in the Union Council Sandisar which is situated at about 3 km from Mansehra on the main Mansehra-Naran Road. The total population of Reerh is 2800 with a total of 350 households. Majority of population depends on agriculture as their mainstay of living followed by services and business. Major crops of the area are wheat, maize, rice, vegetables, and fruits (apricot, fig, apple, and olive). However, fruits and vegetables are not grown for commercial purposes due to water shortage. There is a large natural pond in the middle of the village. Water of the pond is used for livestock, construction, and other domestic purposes. There is no irrigation system in the village. The only source of water for irrigation is natural precipitation. However, some people use indigenous rainwater harvesting systems to store rainwater for irrigation purposes.

Ghoutar is the village of Union Council Attar Shesha which is situated at about 5 km from Mansehra on the main Mansehra-Naran Road. The estimated population of the village is 2200 with a total of 300 households. Like Reerh, majority of households are either farming or business dependent. The major crops in the village are wheat, maize, and vegetable. Information was collected from 200 households by using a semi-structured questionnaire.

Water-related Problems

As this research presents case study of an area with water scarcity and high dependence on precipitation for irrigation, collecting information on water-related problems are of vital importance for policy decisions. It was found that irregular rainfalls and insufficiency of water to meet crop-water requirements were major issues in the area. In village Reerh, 52 per cent respondents noted that irregularity in rainfall pattern was the main problem and no or inadequate precipitation in the growing season drastically affected crop production. In Ghoutar, 42 per cent reported the same problem. Similarly, 30 per cent respondents in Reerh and 46 per cent in Ghoutar reported that even after precipitation, the water available for irrigation was not sufficient to meet the crop-water requirements, particularly in the dry season. Weak capacity of the already existing reservoirs, wear and tear in the water channels, and high cost of improving the existing or establishing new water reservoirs were major problems identified by the farmers in both villages.


Adoption of Different Rainwater Harvesting Schemes

As both villages are located in the area where rain-fed agriculture is in practice, the existence of rainwater harvesting was common. The schemes were, however, mostly constructed indigenously with minimal efficiency. They were built with small storage capacity and the outlet network from the system was not as efficient as

required. Nonetheless, poor farmers had made efforts to store rainwater and use it when needed. Figure 1 provides information about the existence of different indigenously built water harvesting schemes and the proportion of sample population that had adopted it.

The figure explains that 50 per cent respondents in both villages were using no water harvesting scheme at all. The remaining 50 per cent in each village had adopted them. The figure shows that 16 per cent in Reerh and 18 per cent in Ghoutar were using water harvesting channels to store water for irrigation purposes. Another 10 per cent in Reerh and 12 per cent in Ghoutar had constructed bunds as water storage reservoirs. These two types of techniques require a minimal technical know-how and finances. However, the water storage capacity and longevity is too small. It was also observed that 10 per cent respondents in Reerh had constructed water tanks for storing water. Another 12 per cent were collecting rainwater in ponds which either they had constructed by their own or naturally existed. Similarly, 8 per cent and 10 per cent in Ghoutar were also harvesting rainwater through tanks and ponds, respectively. A very common rainwater harvesting technique, rooftop collection was, however, adopted by only 2 per cent respondents in both villages, respectively.

Figure-1
Adoption of Different Rainwater Harvesting Techniques



From the above discussion, it is concluded that both potential and indigenous knowledge about rainwater harvesting existed in both villages.

The need is, however, to develop rainwater harvesting techniques in a scientific way which overcomes limitations of the indigenous water harvesting systems. This is also encouraging from the point of view of adopting new interventions in the future.

Cropping System and Crop Productivity

The role of rainwater harvesting in improving productivity in rain-fed agriculture has been appraised by many researchers (Ali et al., 2007). In Pakistan, few selected crops such as wheat, rice, cotton, sugarcane, and maize dominate overall crop production (Government of Pakistan, 2019). However, it has been noted that

productivity of cereals, particularly summer crops, is low in Pakistan (Ahmad et al., 2016). In the research area, the major crops grown were wheat and maize. Besides, rice and vegetables were also grown on a small piece of land. The area under the major crops (wheat, maize, and rice) and per unit yield is discussed below.

Area under Wheat and Yield per Unit Area

Wheat (*Triticum aestivum* L.) is one of the most valuable crops and a staple food. It is cultivated under a wide range of moisture conditions where precipitation ranges from 250 to 1750 mm (Tiryakioğlu et al., 2015). Like many other countries, wheat is the major crop in Pakistan and is sown on both irrigated and rain-fed lands. The share of wheat in national GDP is 2.2 per cent and the crop contributes 10.1 per cent to value added agriculture (Hussain et al., 2014). In brief, the crop has a dominant position in the formulation of agriculture sector policies in the country. Yet, yield levels in the rain-fed areas of Pakistan are exceptionally low, which can be increased if special attention is given to agricultural development in these areas (Abbas, 2013). Because of unavailability of water, farmers in the research villages grow wheat on a small portion of land just for their own consumption.

The results show that the average irrigated area under wheat crop in village Reerh was 5.48 *kanals*¹ and rain-fed area was 19.79 *kanals*. The production in case of irrigated and rain-fed lands was 291 kg/*kanal* and 205 kg/*kanal*, respectively. The results of a paired-samples t-test indicate that the average per unit yield in irrigated conditions is significantly higher than in rain-fed conditions.

¹ Local unit of land measurement and used here because the farmers had very small landholdings. 1 Kanal is equal to 0.05 hectares.

Wheat plays as an important role in Pakistan's food security and hence low area under cultivation and low yield per unit area raises serious concerns at the government level. Nevertheless, this yield gap can be minimised if, among others, proper water management practices are adopted.

Similarly, in village Ghoutar, wheat was sown on an average 5.52 *kanals* on irrigated land and 17.73 *kanals* on rain-fed land. The production in this village was 314 kg/*kanal* on irrigated land and 235 kg/*kanal* on rain-fed land. These results suggest that the average per unit output in irrigated conditions is significantly higher compared to the rain-fed conditions.

Although significantly higher differences in yield, the above results exhibit poor yield in both irrigated and rain-fed circumstances. Studies show that farmers obtain an average 30 to 60 per cent less yield of major crops than their demonstrated potential in the research stations (Hussain et al., 2014). Thus per unit yield, and the resultant overall production, in both villages can be substantially increased by adopting improved farming practices. This includes bringing more area under cultivation, improved cultural practices, greater attention to tillage and harvesting, more balanced and timely use of fertilizers, and higher water-use-efficiency (Abbas, 2013).

Area under Maize and Yield per Unit Area

Maize (*Zea mays L.*) is another staple food crop in Pakistan and is sown on both irrigated and rain-fed lands. Rain-fed agriculture contributes 27 per cent of the maize produced in Pakistan (Baig et al., 2013). The situation of areas under maize crop and the effects of availability of water on its yield are almost similar to that of wheat

crop. On average, 5.31 *kanals* of irrigated land and 14.63 *kanals* on rain-fed land in Reerh was under maize crop. There was also a distinct difference in yield per unit area in the village as shown by 261 kg/*kanal* in case of irrigated land and 180 kg/*kanal* in case of rain-fed land. Similarly, the situation in village Ghoutar was not much different than village Reerh. On average, 9.10 *kanals* of irrigated land and 17.43 *kanals* of rain-fed land were under maize crop. The total per unit output in Ghoutar was 345 kg/*kanal* in case of irrigated land and 184 kg/*kanal* in case of rain-fed land. This corresponds to low yield, as the gap between maize yield at farm and research station is more than 41 per cent (Hussain et al, 2014).

Furthermore, a paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare yield in irrigated and rain-fed conditions. There was a significant difference in yields in irrigated and rain-fed conditions in both villages. This implies that the yield in case of irrigated conditions is significantly higher as compared to the rain-fed conditions. Hence, it implies that the net increase in more area under irrigation will have significant contribution in the overall production in the area.

Area under Rice and Yield per Unit Area

Rice (*Oryza sativa L.*) is a staple food for three billion people worldwide (Maclean et al, 2002). It is the major food for most of the world's poorest people, particularly in Asia. Statistics show that the annual consumption of rice exceeds 100 kg per capita in many Asian countries (Zeigler and Barclay, 2008). In Pakistan, rice is the second most important economic food crop.

Pakistan has a comparative advantage in producing the highly-valued, aromatic basmati rice. Basmati has been a major export, and generates substantial revenues for the government from export duties. The government has adopted a number of policy measures to promote larger production of basmati rice (Abbas, 2013).

Unfortunately, rice is not grown on the large portion of rain-fed land. Because of water shortage, it is grown only on a very small piece of irrigated land; even then water remains inadequate for the crop which drastically affects per unit yield.

The low rice yield in the research villages is attributed to lack of water because it requires as much as 2000 liters of water to grow 1 kg of rice (Sivanappan, 2006). Even in subsistence agriculture, this is the lower yield per unit area and, hence, overall production does not fulfill the consumption needs of the households. The household demand for rice can be substantially fulfilled if water is available for irrigation and rice is sown on a larger portion, which otherwise remains barren for a complete cropping season. Therefore, if promoted, rainwater harvesting technologies can assist more people to achieve food security (Awulachew et al., 2005).

Although the research area was water scarce, there existed the potential, indigenous knowledge and techniques for rainwater harvesting. The need is, however, to develop rainwater harvesting techniques on scientific grounds which overcome deficiencies of the indigenous rainwater harvesting systems. This will help in meeting crop-water requirements of the farmers and will promote sustainable agriculture in the area.

Policy Implications

Based on the findings, the following policy implications are recorded:

1. There is a need for establishment of large-scale water harvesting schemes which meet agricultural crop-water requirements in both growing seasons.
2. Crop production can be increased if the farmers are provided with drought-resistant seed varieties for different crops. The Department of Agricultural Extension can play this role very effectively.
3. No intervention in any area is possible without help and proactive participation of the local communities. The local communities were organised in community based organisations (CBOs). However, the structure and functionality of these CBOs can further be improved by proper follow up and trainings.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this study was to identify the potential for rainwater harvesting techniques in Mansehra, Pakistan. In Pakistan, mountainous agriculture is mostly rain-fed and is characterised by low production due to shortage of water in the peak growing seasons. Irregular rainfall patterns make the issue more severe. Nonetheless, there are some indigenously developed techniques to store rainwater for further application in future.

Rainwater harvesting techniques are important for overcoming water shortage problems in rain-fed agriculture. On the one hand, people had water shortage for agriculture purposes, but on the other, they are using different techniques to store water, such as small-scale local harvesting techniques such as canals, ponds, tanks, bunds, and rooftop schemes.

The capacities and technical structures of these systems is, however, not enough to meet the crop-water requirements for both the growing seasons. The land is fertile and production of wheat, maize, rice, vegetables and even fruits was recorded in the area. The area under cultivation and per unit production was, however, too low. This was mainly because of the unavailability of water for irrigation. Based on the overall findings, it is concluded that there exist a greater potential for large scale rainwater harvesting systems in the area. Once built on a larger scale, the stored water could be used for irrigation purposes in the dry season. This will enable farmers to bring more area under cultivation for both cropping seasons, and thus, the overall production will be increased.

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Introduction

Climate financing in Pakistan has not received significant attention from the international community. Pakistan received approximately USD 5 million from the Global

Climate Fund (GCF) which is a very insignificant amount against the climate vulnerability that this country is prone to. However, after years of struggle by climate change experts from within the climate ministry as well as non-government organisations, this fund was increased to USD 38 million dollars in 2015. It has been argued that the implications of climate variation or change remain contingent to the change itself and on the characteristics of the society exposed to it. Lack of a consistent dataset has restricted Pakistan's readiness to face climate change, which has, according to the government, increased financial losses in terms of adaptation cost to 3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually. Mitigation¹ cost could be approximately 5.5 per cent of GDP (GoP 2017).

Pakistan is among the most climate vulnerable countries of the world; and was ranked the seventh most climate-risk country by

Climate Financing Potential in Energy Sector: Towards a Carbon Neutral Pakistan

¹ Mitigation measures to prevent the damages or to reduce the chances of occurring these changes, where abatement is also well technique among climate change economists and associated experts.

Germanwatch in 2017. However, despite being in this list, our contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has been rising. Since 1990, Pakistan's GHG emissions in different sectors were studied under four different projects conducted in 1990, 2004, 2008 and 2012. The projects showed an increasing trend in the emissions of CO₂ where energy, industrial processes and agriculture sectors remain the major contributors. Emissions from the energy sector are the highest, followed by agriculture and industrial processes:

Emissions from the energy sector have increased to 171,440 (thousand tonnes of CO₂ equivalents) from 156,821; from the agriculture sector have increased to 162,860, which was 120,284 in 2008; from industrial processes have elevated from 17,866 to 19,595. Other sectors, which include Land-Use Change and Forestry (LUCF) and wastes, also show a rising trend. LUCF emissions have slightly increased to 9,671 from 8,920; while those from waste have doubled - from 5,505 in 2008 to 10,554. These trends suggest that there is a consistent increase of CO₂ emissions which provide a breeding ground for GHGs and rising temperatures.

Experts around the world have estimated that the most vulnerable developing countries will need to bring in new investments of up to USD 3000 million by the end of each year, which will need to increase to USD 500 billion each year by the end of 2030 to reduce their growing GHG emissions in line with a global equilibrium target of 450 parts per millions of CO₂ equivalent (Venugopal and Srivastava, 2012).

The significant impact of climate change on communities living along coastal lines is becoming more visible with more and more internal migration in Pakistan. In case of adaptation measures, local rules, regulations, norms, values, other informal institutions have significantly contributed to controlling deforestation and forest degradation across different provinces of the country. Decline in

proportional access to alternative energy sources ultimately compel households to use forest products to fulfill their daily energy needs.

The rural economy of Pakistan is agro-based which is important for the food security of the country. Agriculture contributes significantly to global warming. This sector has potential for attracting mitigation and adaptation financing. On the one hand, Pakistan plans to reduce 20 per cent of its GHG emissions till 2025 which are estimated at 1,603 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO₂). On the other hand, very limited international funds or grants are available to support the abatement cost of USD 40 billion, according to a 2017 Asian Development Bank report. Pakistan's economy will face a significant extenuation cost of climate change because the clean energy to produce electricity for an increasing population is very expensive. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development:

Policies and financing tools designed to address climate change can also have significant distributional impacts, disproportionately affecting low-income populations. One example is financing tools that effectively put a price on carbon, such as carbon taxes or congestion charges, which tend to be regressive. To address these concerns, authorities can channel revenue from such instruments towards climate investments that benefit low-income populations, such as improvements to sustainable public transport.

Potential of Climate Financing in Gas and Electricity Sector

It is very critical to set an optimum equilibrium point between the opportunity cost of a sector and reduction in CO₂ emissions to a target level. However, it should be estimated carefully how many

units of electricity should be given up for the reduction of emissions of specific targets. Energy transition from highly polluted to environment friendly options in the electricity sector can contribute to substantial economic gains for Pakistan. Projected emissions of 2,685 MtCO_{2e} till 2050 are expected from the country's energy sector, which is the highest, followed by the agriculture sector projection of 1395 MtCO_{2e} by 2050. Mitigation techniques can work for reduction of CO₂ emissions in the electricity sector when production from diesel is shifted to solar or wind energy plants. The total CO₂ emissions from the energy sector in Pakistan is estimated at 0.566 tCO₂/MWh (tonnes of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour) for wind and solar power projects; and 0.478 tCO₂/MWh for hydro power projects excluding Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC) grid and 0.606 tCO₂/MWh for wind and solar power projects and 0.505 tCO₂/MWh for hydro by including the KESC grid. This emissions factor is also an element of the amount of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) that can be accumulated by employing clean Alternative and Renewable Energy (ARE) projects. The amount of CERs generated by an ARE project also have the potential to earn carbon revenue streams (Yousuf et al., 2014).

Potential of Climate Financing in Coal Power Plants Offsetting

Major climate funds can be generated by shifting from coal base production activities to oil, nuclear, gas and hydro-based electricity generation in Pakistan. Apart from shifting to more renewable sources, if Pakistan can agree with trading partners to limit or reduce the subsidies for the export and import of inefficient coal-fired power plant technologies; if we can shift our coal power plants to solar under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) approved agreement re-alterations, the government can reduce emissions with minor incremental costs. It is important to

calculate the associated costs of coal-based production and cost of alternative energy sources.

On 30 June 2015, the government initiated a project, 'Carbon Neutral Pakistan,' with technical assistance from the People's Republic of China to set up a local carbon market to cut GHG emissions and attract foreign investments. The total estimated cost of the project is USD 3.85 million which is reflected in the 2016 public sector development program (PSDP). This project will help industrial and other sectors to sell and buy carbon credits locally, and make internal adjustment of carbon emissions and credits. The carbon markets are also expected to initiate a competition for greener technology in the country

- Asian Development Bank, 2017, p. 6

According to the Resource Specific Energy Production Potential and GHG emissions, small hydro power plants have the potential to produce approximately 4500 mega watts of electricity which is a cleaner production process in terms of emissions through electric motors and transmission line losses. However, electric energy consumption has higher GHG emissions as compared to production through small hydro power plants.

According to a USAID-NREL-AEDB-PMD study conducted in 2006, Pakistan has estimated wind power potential of 346,000 MW out of which around 60,000 - 70,000 MW is technically utilisable. The data on wind as an energy source shows that southern parts of Sindh, North Western areas of Balochistan, central parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, western Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan could be potential wind corridors to produce sustainable energy for an ever increasing population.

Bagasse, rice husk, straw, dung, municipal solid waste has estimated potential of generating 4,000 MW of power in Pakistan. Around 34 million hectares of marginal land is available in different parts of the country that is best suited for this purpose. This has estimated potential to produce 50 million tonnes of biofuels per annum according to the Ministry of Water and Power.

Conclusion and Recommendations

As a nation, Pakistan understands its responsibility for protecting and preserving the planet's atmosphere. Therefore, despite being one of the most climate-vulnerable regions, in 2017, Pakistan became the first country in the world to endorse the Climate Change Financing Framework (CCFF) adopted at the state-level. The Framework serves as a 'road map for integrating climate change in public financial and economic management.' This was followed by the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (in partnership with the United Nations Development Program), announcing the country's first provincial strategy for financing climate action in July 2018. According to the UNDP, this initiative 'lays out new guidelines for linking climate action priorities and strategies to budgeting systems and processes, outlining clear roles and responsibilities for provincial key departments.'

In order to generate climate financing, the federal government can also impose taxes on fuel, emissions trading, electricity production and carbon emissions. Some other schemes may be introduced in the shape of subsidies for reducing emissions like removing fossil fuel subsidies and royalties from fuel mining.

Box-1

Policy Points to Ponder

- *Apply an inclusion lens to climate-related spending and financing, given that climate change impacts are poised to disproportionately affect low-income and vulnerable people and places. Invest revenues from environmental taxes and fees in measures that also boost inclusive growth.*
- *Make greater use of land value capture tools to support climate and inclusive growth objectives. Take advantage of skills development and job-creation opportunities in urban infrastructure financing and investment, particularly relating to energy efficiency investments.*
- *Explore the potential for green bonds to achieve both climate and inclusion goals.*

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Pakistan is on the right track to build its climate resilience in all sectors but we still have a long way to go. The government should provide the provinces with sufficient revenue for climate change adaptation and mitigation. Provinces, on their end, should try to mobilise their own climate funds as well by accessing capital markets, issuing green and climate bonds; and establishing public-private partnerships, amongst others. If strong regulatory frameworks and creditworthiness exist, the private sector will be more than willing to enter into partnerships for more renewable energy projects.

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- IPRI Paper 2, *Bharat Mein Intehapasand Hindu Nazriyat ka Farogh* – Asghar Ali Shad (2001)
- IPRI Paper 1, *Terrorism* – Rafiuddin Ahmed with Fasahat H. Syed, Zafar N. Jaspal, Ahmed Ijaz Malik, Faisal S. Cheema and Huma A. Shah (2001).

Research and Policy Insight Series

In 2019, the Institute initiated a new series called the *Research and Policy Insight Series*. The purpose of this Series is to provide concise overview of an important security, international affairs or political economy issue, persuasive policy directions and recommendations on the best course forward. The Series, therefore, hopes to act as a decision-making tool and a call to action for non-specialist audiences such as policy leaders and change agents who are interested in studying, formulating or influencing policy. Drawing on rich evidence and practical experiences, the Series will harness diverse perspectives, both from within and outside the Institute. While all geographic regions are vital, the main focus of the papers will be on Pakistan and South Asia so that new policy ideas and proposals are generated by opinion leaders and ‘evidence accurate beliefs’ created among those who may not have yet decided where their opinions lie on an issue.

- Fayyaz Ali Khan, *FATA Mainstreaming: Way Forward* (2019)

